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
Members only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

The Council wish to thank Mr. Bourke-Borrowes, Mr. Dinely, and Mr. Dibben for their valuable gifts of books and slides.

Members are asked to send any change of address to the office and to notify the office immediately if they do not receive the lecture cards while home on leave.

The following members' *Journals* have been returned: Dr. Neligan, Captain William Booker. The Secretary would be glad of their present addresses.

Owing to the necessity for economy, the Council have found it advisable to alter the setting and paper of the *Journal* so as to reduce expenses of printing and postage. Members are asked to make the Society more widely known and to get fresh support for it.



THE PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ORDER UNDER A RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE*

By SIR WILLIAM BARTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

HE absorption of the North-West Frontier Province into a federated India is one of the most difficult and complicated of the problems arising out of the pledge that Great Britain has undertaken to endow India with democracy. The essence of the problem is to assimilate the border Pathan to the Indian; in any policy that may ultimately be devised the question of law and order will be a predominating factor.

To understand the Frontier problem it is necessary to give full value to one outstanding fact: that the Frontier is not India, whether you look at it from the geographical, ethnographic, or historical standpoint. Take the geographical position. It is true that the ribbon of alluvial soil between the Indus and the foothills which make up the Dera Ismail Khan district is part of the Indus river plain. North of Dera Ismail Khan the country beyond the Indus is the extreme verge of the Central Asian highlands. Bannu is an oasis surrounded by a ring of barren frontier hills. Kohat is a series of hills and valleys. The vale of Peshawar is another oasis similar to Bannu; Northern Hazara belongs to the Frontier massif. The area of the regularly administered territory is 13,000 square miles; of the tribal hinterland 25,000 square miles.


So much for the geography. The people of the settled areas number two and a half millions, the great majority Pathans. Across the border in the tribal area the population is estimated to be three millions, practically all Pathans. The Pathan belongs to the Turco-Iranian stock.

* Lecture held at the Royal Society's Hall on October 14, 1931. In the absence of Lord Lloyd, the chair was taken by General Sir George Barrow, G.C.B.

The CHAIRMAN, in introducing the lecturer, said few people had such a thorough knowledge of the North-West Frontier Province and its needs. Sir William had seen the problem from every practical point of view, both as a Political Officer and from Simla, and the Society was specially fortunate in having his paper. (Applause.)

His language, Pushtu, has no affinity to any of the languages of India; it is more akin to Persian. The code of tribal law, or *Pukhtunwali* of the Pathan, differs widely from the customs of the Punjab. The religion of the Frontier people, excepting a small sprinkling of Hindus, is a perfervid Islam. The Hindu on the Frontier, except under the British, has always been in the position of a vassal. That is still his position across the border. Nowhere in India is Islam so strong as on the Frontier.

And now let us consider for a moment the history of the Frontier. For several hundred years from the second century B.C. Buddhism, which knew no caste, prevailed over Brahminical Hinduism in the Western Punjab and in the Afghan borderland. The Brahmin never recovered his old dominance in these regions, especially beyond the Indus. By the eighth century the Arabs had carried the banner of the Prophet into Sind; beyond the passes Islam was gathering strength for a hurricane of attack on the Hindu. By the eleventh century Islam had absorbed the Afghan Frontier, which was then definitely lost to Hinduism. From this time onwards with brief intervals the political gravitation of the border was towards Kabul and Persia rather than towards Delhi. Some of you may have vivid recollections of seeing a caravan of Ghilzais or Powindahs coming down the Khyber Pass or the Gumal. Every year in the winter a quarter of a million or more of Afghans from the central highlands swoop down the Frontier passes, bringing with them their womenfolk, their cattle, horses, sheep, and camels. Most of them stay in the province to graze their flocks and herds; others cross the Indus to trade; some who have no cattle work as labourers. Their presence, by the way, introduces a new complication into the policing of the Frontier. These migrations remind one of Exodus: they furnish the key to the history of the tribes who now hold the settled districts of the Frontier and the tribal hinterland. All these tribes were bred in the bleak uplands of Khorasan, a term which includes the Afghan plateau and Northern Persia. Year by year they left their frozen highlands with their flocks and herds to find pasturage in the milder climate of Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Bannu, Kurrum, and Swat. By degrees they pushed the original denizens across the Indus or exterminated them. Most of the Frontier had been appropriated by the Pathan tribes by the end of the fifteenth century: Bangash, Mohmands, Yusafzais, Afridis, Mahsuds, Wazirs, the congeries of tribes in Dera Ismail Khan—all had found a permanent home on the borderland. Considering their origin it is not



surprising that at this time Pathan nationalism looked rather to Persia than India for political inspiration. The Mughals appear on the scene in the sixteenth century, and for two hundred years held the Frontier and Afghanistan as uneasy satellites. Persia reasserted her influence in the beginning of the eighteenth century; Herat and Kandahar were captured by Persian armies; Nadir Shah, the Persian emperor, sacked Delhi in 1739; a few years later one of his generals, the Afghan Durani, Ahmed Shah, formed the Afghan kingdom, extending its boundaries to Lahore. For a hundred years the Frontier was divorced from Delhi. The Sikhs pushed out the Afghans sixty or seventy years later; in 1849 the British took their place after crumpling up the Sikh kingdom. The Frontier again acknowledged an unwilling allegiance to an Indian Empire.

This brief sketch of Frontier history and of the origin of its peoples shows how weak and transient has been the association of the borderland with India for over a thousand years. The British had for the first time in its history brought the whole of India under one flag. How were they to handle this new problem of assimilating the Pathan into the empire? They might have constituted his country a separate province, leaving the people to manage their affairs by tribal methods with the advice and guidance of British officers, as is done in Baluchistan today under the Sandeman system; such a policy, if successful, would have simplified Frontier problems. The British preferred their own system, and amalgamated the Frontier with the Punjab. They may have hoped to assimilate the Pathan; if so, the hope has proved vain. The Hindu politician must at least applaud their policy of attempting to unify the Frontier with India. And so the border districts were endowed with the complicated administrative machinery of a British Indian provincial government: police, law courts, English law, an elaborate revenue system, and so forth. The Pathan hated it all, though he revelled in fighting in the law courts. To ruin your enemy by forcing him through the whole gamut of the law courts up to the Chief Court of Lahore was almost better than shooting him in the back. The Pathan across the border was repelled by the system. It is little wonder that he gave daily praise to Allah for the independence secured to him by his bleak and inaccessible mountains. It is true that the rigidity of British law and police was to some extent modified by the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which gave discretion to the Deputy Commissioner as Head of the District to try cases in which feeling was running high, under the Jirgah or jury system, approximating to some extent to tribal law; he could also withdraw cases actually before the court where a blood feud was involved. With all this we have failed to bring peace and contentment to the border; crime is as rampant as ever, the province is still the most litigious in India; we have to admit failure to turn the Pathan even of the settled areas into a law-abiding citizen of the Indian Empire.

All through the British period trans-border life has re-acted on life in the settled area and vice versa. These influences have undoubtedly been emphasized by the absence of a clearly defined and closely followed policy with regard to the tribes of the hinterland. When the Sikhs crossed the Indus the Pathans of the border had been in close political association with Kabul and Persia for over a hundred years. Their spiritual home was Kabul. The savage feud between Pathan and Sikh only emphasized the Pathan national feeling. The Sikhs never attempted to penetrate the border hills. The British followed their example, adopting a policy picturesquely described as the policy of "burn and scuttle" as reprisals for the raids, murders, and kidnappings in the settled districts indulged in by the border tribes. At the outset of British administration the Afghans held advanced posts almost on our border. Afghan troops held the Khyber; the Kurrum Valley was an Afghan province; there was an Afghan outpost at Jandola. The Afghans had some kind of influence; they did not exercise it in our favour and they had no real control. In such conditions it is not surprising that the British had little or no influence beyond the foothills. After forty years of Frontier administration we began to realize that if we wanted a quiet border we must exercise some form of control and influence beyond the boundary. This was impossible so long as there was a clash between the interests of Kabul and India. The remedy was to delimit the sphere of influence of the respective Governments. The then Amir, H.H. Amir Abdurrahman Khan, was induced to accept this policy; the result was the Durand line, which since 1893 has been the political boundary between Afghanistan and India. It has been demarcated for most of its length from Chitral in the north to Chaman in Baluchistan in the south. It is not an entirely satisfactory boundary in some respects. Thus in some cases it divides the allegiance of a tribe: almost everywhere the door is left open to political penetration from Kabul; and Kabul has not neglected the opportunity. This has throughout been a serious obstacle to Indianizing the Frontier. This form of activity could only be prevented by interposing a military screen between the tribes and the

Afghan; anything of the kind is in most cases impossible. We missed

our opportunity in 1919.

The Durand line marks an epoch in Frontier history. We had occupied the Khyber with levies after the Afghan War. A new school of military strategy now advocated a forward policy on the Afghan border as a corollary of the Durand line. This policy was adopted to a considerable extent; we occupied Chitral and the Malakand; the Kurrum Valley was taken over; we occupied the Gumal Pass, Jandola and Wana, also the Tochi. These movements improved the strategical position, but they were not accompanied by any definite policy of inducing the little tribal republics of the Pathan to merge their nationalism in a new loyalty to India. The difficulties of such a policy were, and still are, formidable. The Pathan hates Afghan methods of rule as much as ours, but with all this he has a feeling of sympathy for Afghan hegemony. His daydream still is a great jehad, or Holy War, starting from Kabul and sweeping like a wave over the Frontier to Lahore and Delhi. The main obstacle to British influence is the inaccessible nature of his country, and without military dominance any real influence over tribal politics is almost impossible. In most tribes there is no real centre of authority; tribal affairs are settled in tumultuous assemblies, often ending in an exchange of rifle shots. It is not easy for tribes in such circumstances to control the action of individuals, and in this respect tribal responsibility, the sheet-anchor of border law, often breaks down. The cost of effective military occupation would have been prohibitive; the Indian Government preferred to take the line of least resistance in the hope that time and contact with India would soften the psychology of the Pathan.

Lord Curzon in 1901 introduced a change of policy. The Punjab had failed to assimilate the Pathan, and he accordingly decided to give the Frontier an individuality of its own. The Frontier was separated from the Punjab, and the present North-West Frontier Province came into existence. Lord Curzon realized that the Frontier problem was mainly economic, and he decided to give the tribesmen remunerative employment by substituting irregular corps of local Pathans for the military garrison in the salients. No other striking changes were introduced beyond the constitution of a local High Court at Peshawar (the Judicial Commissioner's Court) instead of the Chief Court at Lahore. It was too late to put back the clock and introduce a system more in harmony with Pathan tribal life. The Curzon régime held through the Great War, but broke down at the end.

We may pause here for a moment to consider the alternative before the British in 1849, when they first took over the Frontier. There can be no doubt that a rough-and-ready scheme of administration, with a system of law and order based on and adapted to the idiosyncrasies of the Pathan, would have been more appropriate than the complicated system of administration in vogue in British Indian provinces. It might have been possible to leave the maintenance of law and order mainly in the hands of the Khans and the local jirgahs or tribal assemblies, much as Sandeman did later on in Baluchistan. As already observed, it was too late to put the system in the melting-pot in 1901.

It is clear from what has been said that the nexus between the Frontier and India since we took over from the Sikhs has been British rule. For this nexus it is now proposed to substitute the inclusion of the Frontier in an Indian federation. Let it be observed here that it is only recently that the Pathan, true to his nationalism, has shown any interest in Indian politics. The Morley-Minto reforms evoked no response; he was not greatly interested in the political changes in 1919, possibly because he felt that the movement was largely Hindu. He was more concerned in the fate of the Khilafat and Islam. The growing numbers of the intelligentsia, mainly the output of the new Islamia College, made a demand for political reforms almost inevitable. The Bray Committee toured the province in 1922 and produced the Bray report. The majority recommended reforms on the Morley-Minto model, the minority (two distinguished Hindu politicians) recommended reabsorption in the Punjab, forgetting for the moment that the result would have been to give the Muslims an overwhelming majority in that province. Agitation increased. What brought the North-West Frontier into the vortex of Indian politics was not so much the sense of political solidarity with India, not the feeling of injured self-respect that the Pathan was not thought the political equal of the Indian; the strongest motive was the feeling that Islam was in danger and that Muslims in India must stand four square to the encroachments of a possible Hindu raj. I am not concerned with the question whether the feeling has any justification. That it existed cannot be denied. Another factor in the situation was that the younger members of the intelligentsia felt, rightly or wrongly, that the Khans or landed gentry, and tribal chiefs who have throughout exercised great political and social influence in the province, and especially in Peshawar, were setting reactionary forces to work against a democratic advance. Several of these Khans wield magisterial powers which would

astonish the British J.P.; they can impose sentences of seven years' imprisonment; they practically control police jurisdiction in large areas. The pressure they can bring on people they dislike is enormous. Their powers are perhaps not always used wisely or impartially. To counteract the influence of the Khans the young intellectuals fought for a democratic government to give them control of the Khans. It suited the Muslim politician in India to demand a full-blown democratic constitution on the Frontier. The demand was conceded at last year's session of the R.T.C. The Frontier was to advance to the point reached by the other provinces. A Committee, presided over by Mr. Haig, was appointed to advise as to the subjects to be handed over to a responsible Cabinet and to make recommendations in the matter of finance. The Committee reported last June. It recommends that Law and Order should be handed over to a responsible Minister. Watch and ward of the Frontier would be a Central subject, in charge of the Chief Commissioner.

The main issue officially before the British Government with regard to the Frontier is whether in the best interests of India and of the Pathans themselves law and order should be placed in the hands of a Minister responsible to a popular assembly. Unofficially a greater issue is involved: whether it is possible to assimilate the Pathan into an Indian federation, to wean him from his ultramontane tendencies. Until this is done the military problem will present almost insuperable difficulties.

The problem of law and order is predominant on the Frontier. It is a political as well as an administrative problem: it affects conditions on both sides of the border. With a view to make this clear, to give the problem its proper setting, I have felt it necessary to go at some length into the history of our Frontier relations. You have five millions of Pathans in the political boundary of India with their traditions, inclinations, and national feeling drawing them away from India. Can you afford to make dangerous experiments in that explosive country? Administrative inefficiency would have its reactions across the border involving expensive military operations and possibly the increase of the permanent garrison of the Frontier. As the Simon Commission remark, the question of law and order on the Frontier is closely related to foreign and diplomatic policy and imperial defence; it is really an all-Indian problem. Only time and experience could indicate the path throughout the thicket of difficulty.

Let us glance for a moment at the machinery of law and order in

operation. There are the District Police, about 6,000 strong: they are responsible for the ordinary criminal administration; the Frontier Constabulary, 4,600 strong, are responsible for watch and ward. Both forces work in close co-operation under the Deputy Commissioner as Head of the District. Crime is dealt with chiefly by the magistracy; the Sessions Courts are concerned with appeals and murder cases. I have already referred to the Frontier Crimes Regulation. This is used to a considerable extent where the police are unable to obtain judicial proof in accordance with the law of evidence based on British standards. Village life is riddled with the blood feud; disputes about women, land, water rights, grazing rights, are a constant menace to the peace. Outlaws in blood feud murders swarm across the border. In co-operation with their friends in British territory they frequently bring off raids, dacoities, and kidnappings in British villages. The Frontier Crimes Regulation makes it possible to proceed against family groups and villages whose record in harbouring transborder people grows too insistent. You will sometimes find villages divided in factions; each faction has its club or hujrah. Faction feeling is a constant irritant in village life, and often leads to riots involving heavy casualties. Fights in the law courts and about women so often lead to murder that the authorities find it desirable to have such quarrels decided outside the Court under the Frontier Regulation. In dealing with border crime police and constabulary act frequently together. Despite the elaborate machinery the statistics of crime are amazing. Serious offences in the Peshawar district have increased from 709 in 1902 to 2,045 in 1929; 307 murders were committed in the same district in 1928—nearly half of the whole total of the Punjab, with its twentyone million people against one million in the Peshawar district. The Punjab is the most criminal province in India. You may say that the whole system needs changing and that a Minister may perhaps show the way to a better scheme of things. This is a doubtful proposition. The main advantage of the present system is that it secures impartiality. The Chief Commissioner or a British officer specially nominated by him has the last word in cases under the Frontier Regulation. If the Minister is to have charge of law and order this rôle must be transferred to him. I doubt if there is any Pathan in the province equal to the strain involved.

There are other points of importance. Take, for example, the case of the immigrant nomads from Afghanistan. Some of these are truculent and difficult to handle. The ordinary police are often unable

to deal with them. The Frontier constabulary has to be called in. Suppose the Minister harried them. This might have repercussions beyond the border. Powerful Mullas or religious leaders frequently exert their influence against the Government on both sides of the boundary. Here, again, the ordinary police are often powerless. The Minister, influenced by the Mulla's partisans, might in any case decline to take action. The Minister might be reluctant and unable to deal with such agitation as the Red Shirt movement of 1930, which set the Peshawar border in flames. All this shows how closely the political and police administrations are interwoven and how difficult it is to put them in water-tight compartments.

Let us consider the situation that may possibly arise. Suppose a leading Khan has a sufficient following in the new Parliamentary Council and takes the portfolio of Law and Order. Now there are few, if any, of the Khans who are not involved in some feud or other or who are not at least an object of envy and dislike to their neighbours. There would be endless intrigues to get the Minister into trouble with a view to proving his incapacity; unless he were a saint-Pathans usually aren't—he would utilize his control of the police in the courts to hit back; administrative disorder would follow, transborder elements would soon be involved, and the consequences might be serious. That is one aspect of the case. The Legislative Council will probably number about forty, which would give Peshawar, the nerve-centre of the province, with its population of a million, something like fifteen members in a tract 3,000 square miles in area. Human nature being what it is, it is almost incredible that these members should not endeavour to exert some moral influence over the magistracy and local officials. This would lead to creeping paralysis unless firmly repressed. The Minister, dependent on most of the members for his majority, would in all probability not feel disposed to interfere. Take another point. There is in India a god of universal appeal' not officially included in the Pantheon, the god Sifarish. Its influence runs through the whole hierarchy, from the Viceroy down to the chuprassi, or messenger, who sits in a red coat outside the verandah of the official. Sifarish is faith in the efficacy of pulling strings. If a person of low degree wants a menial job in the office of the Collector, he approaches the chuprassi, or head servant, and asks for a recommendation and pays for it. If he can he will try to influence some more important person. If it is a question of a clerkship desired by a person of higher social standing, dozens of people

will be approached to influence the Collector and important office personages. Lawyers, honorary magistrates, municipal commissioners, landowners—anyone with the entrée will be approached with a view to turning the mind of the Collector in the right direction. The same thing happens with promotion. You will never convince the Indian, especially if uneducated, that promotion goes otherwise than by favour or affection. If you want an appointment or promotion you must pull the strings. Imagine a Minister exposed to influences of the kind on the Frontier. He would be besieged with requests to take this case away from the regular courts and have it tried under the Frontier Regulation; to reopen under the Regulation in a different form cases tried and decided by the regular courts; to cancel security; to upset orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner in the interests of the public peace. His strongest and most influential supporters would beset him with sifarish; he could not resist and maintain his influence. A British officer-e.g., the Chief Commissioner-would not be faced with the same difficulty. Then consider the question of Watch and Ward. If the portfolio of Law and Order goes to a Minister, the Deputy Commissioner of a district who is in political charge of the tribes adjacent to his border will be a double-headed Janus, looking to the Minister and the Chief Commissioner; the Political Agent in charge of the remoter tribal areas also comes into the picture. Friction might easily occur between the political authorities and the Minister. For example, the latter might feel that the Political Agent was not exerting sufficient pressure on the tribes under his control to prevent their depredations in the settled districts; the Political Agent, on the other hand, might think that the Minister was putting difficulties in the way of a Political Agent by declining to arrest tribesmen in the districts, to bring pressure to bear on intriguers, etc. The chief instrument of the Deputy Commissioner in dealing with Frontier defence is the Frontier Regulation. The Minister, through his control of the police and the magistracy, might, if he chose, seriously embarrass the Deputy Commissioner in the use of the Regulation. The tribes would not be slow to observe the lack of co-operation between the Minister and the political authorities, and the result might be an outbreak of border crime.

The position might be still worse if, as is possible, the younger school of Pathan politicians dominated the Council and the Minister had to be chosen from one of their number. A Minister of this type might adopt the principle that Frontier Regulation methods savoured

too much of autocracy, and set himself to oppose them. A Minister of the young intelligentsia might, in fact, especially if under the influence of the Bar, place undue emphasis on the regular law as opposed to popular methods. This would certainly not make for order. He might very easily cause friction by a policy of destroying the power and influence of the Khans. A policy of this kind would speedily result in deadlock. It is true, of course, that the Chief Commissioner or Governor would be expected to interfere to prevent a breakdown. Interference might have to be so frequent that it would defeat its own ends.

There are other matters affecting the merits of the question. Take the question of finance. The Province is a deficit province. By reason of its exposure to an unsettled frontier and the number of cantonments located in it the police force is much larger proportionately to the police of other provinces. The proportion is 1 to 375, as compared to 1 to 1,000 in the Punjab. The Frontier police have to be better armed; in most cases it is necessary to locate them in fortified buildings. The result is that more than half the cost of the police and of the courts is provided by the Central Government. This is certainly a reason for reserving at least a measure of Imperial influence over the department of Law and Order on the Frontier. The revenue of the Frontier is roughly half a million sterling; the expenses of ordinary administration involve a subsidy from the Government of India of over a million. This is apart from the expenditure on watch and ward and political administration, which runs to nearly a million and a half.

The moral basis of the claim to complete popular control, despite the fact that the Province does not pay its way, is not free from criticism. It has frequently happened that the people of the Marches in other countries have to submit to restrictions which are unnecessary in the case of people in a less exposed position. It is urged that the Province was separated without its consent from the Punjab, and that its standard of administration has deteriorated in consequence. As against this the Pathan was not particularly happy in the Punjab; he certainly does not want to be reabsorbed into it. At least as much money proportionately has been spent on education, medical relief, sanitation, etc., as in the Punjab. If in some cases the standard achieved is lower, this may possibly be due to local circumstances. Other points urged in favour of the Pathan are the homogeneity of the Frontier population; the capacity of the Pathan for self-government, as disclosed by his history and traditions; his ability to defend himself;

the service he has rendered to the Empire as Warden of the Marches. There is some force in these arguments. It may, however, be noted that as a general rule it is only where some form of autocracy has been possible that any semblance of settled government has emerged in the tribal life of the Pathan.

The Indian politician may be prepared to take the risks involved. Would this be fair on the British officer, on whom the burden of keeping up the structure must rest for many years to come?

I trust I have succeeded in demonstrating that it is at the moment almost impossible to separate the political administration of the Frontier from the sphere of law and order. Both are inextricably interwoven. Now the political administration of the Frontier is obviously an Imperial affair; is it just to India to risk dangerous political complications by placing the responsibility for law and order in the settled districts in the hands of a Minister? The result might be widespread disturbances, involving military operations on an extensive scale. Could the Viceroy and his advisers hope to escape the criticism of the representatives of the Indian taxpayer in the Federal Assembly? Could the British Government take the risk? The burden of responsibility will ultimately rest on their shoulders.

Let me emphasize once again the main issue: the assimilation of the five million Pathans of the Frontier into the Indian Empire. You will never be able to reduce the military budget substantially till that is achieved. With assimilation the danger from the north would almost disappear. Is there any hope of a policy that might lead the Pathan to sink his nationalism in the wider nationalism of the Indian Empire? A policy with such an aim in view would postulate peace, contentment, and prosperity in the administered area. You could hardly hope for this with law and order under a Minister. Given a settled border, what should be the future policy with the independent tribes? Opinions differ greatly on the matter. If anything is to be accomplished great expense will be involved, the bugbear which deterred a bold policy fifty years ago. If, however, the Indian politician wishes to solve the problem he must face the cost. In the end it should mean economy. Take the case of Waziristan. In 1920 it was decided, despite protests from the Finance Department, to occupy in force a strategic position dominating Wazirs and Mahsuds and to open up the country by a network of roads. The result has been to pacify the country, and there cannot be the least doubt that but for the Razmak cantonment the Red Shirt activities of last year would

have spread all down the border, followed by extensive tribal risings, with military operations involving an expenditure of fifteen to twenty million pounds. The forward policy in Waziristan is paying for itself. There is no doubt that if you want a peaceful and progressive Frontier the same policy must be adopted further north. Open up the country with roads, dominate it with a strong military garrison in a strategic position, and there can be little doubt that the Pathan will begin to realize that he belongs to India and not to Kabul. India must, however, be prepared for further sacrifices to complete the moral conquest of her ancient enemy: a scheme must be devised to give the Pathan a reasonable degree of economic stability. The dominant factor in his troubled life is poverty. It should not be impossible to shape a project of remunerative employment, at least in the winter months, especially if vocational training were made available. Definite progress would be difficult unless the Pathan could be induced to establish some form of central authority in his little tribal republics capable of enforcing compliance with tribal obligations to the Indian Government. Military occupation would make it possible to bring to bear the moral pressure necessary. You can't expect the Pathan to renounce his independence completely; ultimately the tribes might join in a confederation pledged to maintain the peace of the border, with the privilege of sending their own representatives to Delhi like the Indian States.

This is, of course, the roughest sketch of the possibilities of a new Frontier policy. If success could be achieved, then law and order could safely be placed in the hands of a Minister; there would no longer be any impediments to complete provincial autonomy.

You may ask whether there is any alternative to a Minister apart from putting a British official in charge of law and order. It might be possible to put the portfolio of Law and Order in commission on the Ceylon model, with, say, a committee of two Pathans and one Hindu member and a British officer as president, an appeal to lie to the Chief Commissioner in case of disagreement. With able men of balanced judgment in such a position there might be harmony between the political and administrative spheres. And it must be remembered that a successful National Government in Peshawar would exercise a strong moral influence beyond the border.

Let me say in conclusion that in what I have said I hold no brief for the Indian politician. Some of my best friends in India are Pathans. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to see them running their own show. It is unquestionable that they are more suited to democratic institutions than the majority of the people of India. I would say to them, Festina lente, proceed with caution; build up experience before you assume the full burden of responsibility. And let me say, further, that in venturing to criticize the policy of Frontier administration I imply no reflection on the British officers, military and political, who for eighty years have helped to keep the border safe for India. Without them the system would collapse. Briton and Pathan must still work together for the common good. British officers have been, and still are, the mainstay of the Frontier administration. Britain has given, and will still give, her best to this land of glamour and sudden death.

"A scrimmage in a border station, A canter down some dark defile; Two thousand pounds of education Drops to a ten rupee jezail."

Sir Michael O'Dwyer:

Although it is twenty years since I left the Frontier, conditions as regards law and order do not seem to have changed for the better from what they were in my time.

In considering that all-important question of law and order, it must be remembered that there are two sides to it—the political and the administrative. In the past the tribes were often stirred up by Kabul or its local agents, and in order to maintain law and order we must have a very good understanding with the ruler of Kabul. Today we have that understanding. The present ruler, King Nadir Shah, has honourably lived up to his engagements and shown himself most fair and loyal. Indeed, he has kept his firebrands on his side of the border much better than we have ours. It is greatly due to his influence that the Red Shirt movement has not spread into independent territory to a greater extent than it has. Turning to the administrative side, the Frontier was always lawless, and lawlessness is increasing, as may be seen from the fact that in one district alone, with a million people, 307 murders were committed in a year, whereas in England, amongst forty million people, there were under 100 murders in the same period.

I can understand that if the departments responsible for law and order were reserved in the Frontier Province and not in other provinces it must give rise to friction and heart-burnings, but I would suggest a solution which should apply to all provinces. In my opinion the transfer in any province would be a most hazardous and indeed a

criminal measure. It would be practically impossible for any Indian, while racial and religious antagonisms are so tense, and they are growing worse, to hold the scales between the different communities. There would be continual appeals to the Governor, and the Governor is already overworked and will be far more overworked under the new scheme. Moreover, some of the Governors are appointed from home and have no local knowledge. I should therefore suggest a Deputy Governor be appointed in all provinces, not necessarily drawn from the Civil Service, but from the police or any other Service, a man with a practical knowledge of administration who would see justice administered impartially, and who should be entirely responsible for these departments. This would, I think, make it possible for the Governor to cope with his work, which is steadily becoming more difficult and delicate, and would safeguard internal security, the assurance of which is essential to any Government. A precedent already exists in the North-West Frontier, where the Chief Commissioner has a deputy to aid him in the internal administration. The greatest blessing we have conferred on India is the "Pax Britannica." Under the conditions created by the Reforms it is increasingly difficult to maintain, but its maintenance will be impossible if the Government were so rash as to make it a pawn in the political game.

The Chairman then rose to say a few words thanking the Lecturer for his enlightening lecture. As to the question of the number of murders committed in a year, it must be remembered that a very different opinion is held of crime by some Eastern races from what it is here in England. If he might be allowed he would relate an incident to express his meaning.

When he was adjutant of his regiment an Indian officer, who was an Afridi and whose home was a little way across the Frontier, asked for a month's leave. As it happened to be the drill season and no one was granted leave at that time, except for a very special reason, the Commanding Officer asked him for what purpose he wanted the leave. He replied: "I want to go and shoot my uncle." The C.O. seemed to think this was a sufficiently good reason and gave him the leave. After he had been absent about three weeks the Chairman received a letter from him in which he said: "Honoured Sir, thanks to your honour's instruction in musketry and reconnaissance I have successfully shot my uncle." Had he been our side of the Frontier he would have been tried for murder and possibly hanged. As it was, he came to England to attend Queen Victoria's Jubilee, and received the Jubilee

Medal from the Queen's own hands. He recounted the occasion to the Chairman with great pride, and was particularly pleased because the Queen spoke to him and the other Indian officers in Hindustani. When asked what she said, he replied: "Oh, none of us could understand a word she said."

The Chairman continued that when he was commanding a certain district in India he had obtained permission from the principal civil authority to march two or three companies with fixed bayonets through the streets of a somewhat turbulent city once a fortnight. After a time, however, he was told that this must cease, as it might unduly excite the populace. Later on one of the Indian chiefs came to him and said: "Nothing ever helped to keep the people so quiet as your marching through the streets with fixed bayonets; why did you stop it?" The problem of the Frontier brings home to everyone the fact that the Indians are not one nation. As a highly placed Indian said to him: "You talk of federating the Indians—you might as well try to federate the whole of Europe into one nation." The Chairman continued:

"Sir Michael O'Dwyer has made a remarkably interesting suggestion, one which I should very much like to see carried out, for it would, it seems to me, solve many of our difficulties. The Society is fortunate in having the whole position put before it so clearly and with such wide and scholarly knowledge by Sir William Barton, and it only remains with me to thank him in your name for his valuable paper." (Applause.)

AIR OPERATIONS ON THE N.W.F., 1930

By AIR COMMODORE H. LE M. BROCK, C.B., D.S.O.

On Wednesday evening, September 30, a meeting of the Society was held in the Royal Society's Hall, Burlington House, Piccadilly, W. I. A lecture given by Air Commodore H. Le M. Brock, C.B., D.S.O., the Right Hon. Lord Lloyd in the chair.

The Chairman: My lords, ladies, and gentlemen, we are very fortunate to-night in having here Air Commodore Brock, who had command of the Air Force on the whole of the Frontier from Chitral to Waziristan in 1930. You will realize the importance of having so competent and experienced a person in responsible command over so large and important an area. I do not think we could have anybody more worthy of our attention, and we shall listen to him on this very important question with particular interest. (Applause.)


IR COMMODORE BROCK: My object to-night is to tell you a little of what happened on the North-West Frontier last year, and especially something about the part taken by the Air Force in suppressing tribal insurrections in all that territory that lies across the border between Bajaur and Waziristan inclusive.

In my opinion, the tribal unrest last year was more serious and more widespread than it has ever been before, even not excepting 1897 and 1919. In the course of four months there were twelve distinct outbreaks distributed along the Frontier. All the tribes were affected. And this was practically entirely due to the new element of propaganda originating in India fiself. The tribesmen were being led to believe that the British were going, and that there would be no opposition to their risings and raids.

I shall describe how we dealt with the risings, and I think you will realize, as I go along, that it was largely by the use of air power that we were able to keep the situation in hand.

Without that air power I believe that there would have been a general blaze-up all along the Frontier, which, in the circumstances might have been very difficult to cope with.

There were, no doubt, other new factors affecting tribal control, such as the improved means of communication and transport (particularly in Waziristan), and I don't wish to minimize these factors, but it was, I think, the new weapon—aircraft—that really altered the nature of the problem that we were faced with.



As there has been a good deal of misconception on the use of aircraft in tribal control, I think it would be as well, before I go any further, to refer to one or two points connected with it.

There are two distinct and main ways in which aircraft can be used:

1. In co-operation with other arms—i.e., for reconnaissance, artillery observation, direct action against tribesmen with bomb and machine-gun, dropping of supplies to columns and beleaguered posts, delivery and picking-up of messages, and so on—and

2. As a new weapon, using the new method for which it is ideally suited and for which the other arms cannot be so well used—i.e., interfering with the normal life of the tribesmen by damaging their villages and denying them the use of them, and of their fields, for an indefinite time.

It is this second method that is the principal one by which aircraft can get their effect—one not so well understood, and which I will just

explain.

In the past the tribesman has relied upon his inaccessibility. His village, all his material resources, his base of operations, his crops, his cattle, have either been out of our reach altogether or only to be reached by fighting our way a long distance through the hills to them. To punish him, we have tried to bring him to battle, but the many new resources of our troops have made him more reluctant than ever definitely to oppose them. We have, in the past, in order to punish him, had to penetrate with difficulty, and with great cost in money and lives, to his villages, and shell them or otherwise destroy them. Roads, of course, make this easier—but there cannot be roads everywhere, and they are expensive.

This much-prized inaccessibility is taken away by the new weapon—in fact, it is now we ourselves who are inaccessible to the tribesmen. The air weapon affords no chances of loot, and few of casualties, for it can operate out of range overhead.

It should be emphasized that, except against hostile lashkars themselves, the procedure is invariably first to warn the tribesmen by a definite notice, when it is decided that action must be taken, that they must evacuate their villages by a definite time and not again return to them until they have submitted, and that their villages are going to be bombed to enforce this order. Tribesmen very soon learn to respect this order, and, if they do not at once submit, feverishly proceed to get all their families and as much of their moveables and valuables away as they can. Last year on the N.W.F. they were always given twenty-four hours from the time of receipt of the notice before bombing commenced.

There is no reason why, from our point of view, the village should not be empty when attacked. We are not aiming at infliction of casualties, but to cause intolerable inconvenience for an indefinite time by excluding the tribesmen from their villages, and, of course, to punish them by causing material damage.

I can say here that there is no occasion on which this method has been correctly used when it has not successfully secured the full submission of the tribesmen, and if we examine the operations of this kind that have taken place in the past, we shall invariably find that where full success has not been obtained one or more of the conditions we have laid down as essential has not been, for one reason or another, granted us. I will try to bring this out in my narrative.

The first essential is good tribal intelligence; to know exactly which villages to deal with and where they are. The second is rapidity in initiating and controlling the action taken. This depends on the smooth and speedy working of the administrative machinery to obtain political and Government decisions.

We are thus able to deal with each outbreak before it can spread. It is as with a fire brigade—one engine can deal with a small outbreak, but if there is much delay in attending to it the fire becomes a big conflagration. This rapidity of action is most important, because very often a mere threat at the start will cause a tribe to submit.

Direct touch by the air commander with the political authorities handling the tribes and with all intelligence resources is essential, and also central control of the air forces, so that the maximum strength and economy of force can be utilized. Of course, we must also have a secure base from which to operate the aircraft.

I will now give you my account of what happened in the various outbreaks in unadministered tribal territory last year. But please note again that I am dealing with the air operations and, in doing so, if I omit what was occurring on the ground, it is not because I do not fully appreciate the part which the regular troops and the irregulars were also taking, when the outbreaks were accessible to them, but because I am confining myself to the operations carried out by my own Service.

I must assume that you all have a fair knowledge of the geography of the North-West Frontier.

I shall, in any case, refer to the map as I go along, but I might remind you now of the sorts of distances that we had to deal with.

Peshawar-	Chitral	•••		130	miles
,,	-Kila Drosh	•••	•••	110	,,
"		•••	• • •	48	99
,,	-Parachinar	•••		85	
,,	-Razmak			135	,,,
,,	Wana	***		165	22
Chitral-Wana		•••	• • •	280	22
Kanigvram-	•••	• • •	190	,,	

The period over which I shall take you is from the end of April to the end of September, 1930. I shall not deal with the subsequent occupation of the Kajuri Plain.

During the period under review we had available six squadrons of twelve aeroplanes each. The aeroplanes were of the ordinary light two-seater type. One of the squadrons came from Quetta in the middle of May.

NARRATIVE

Our troubles started at the end of April, as the immediate result of some arrests that were made in Peshawar City on April 23. I have no time to describe the internal disturbances in the N.W.F. Province, or the measures taken to settle them, but it is important that you should remember that they and other subversive activities in India were the real causes of the unrest amongst the tribes across the administrative border.

During the previous winter there had been a good deal of political agitation going on in the neighbourhood of Peshawar, under cover of an "uplifting" Youth Movement, which blossomed out later into what came to be known as the "Red Shirts," under the leadership of Abdul Ghaffar. He was one of those who were arrested.

The Mohmands

It was from his father-in-law, the Haji of Turangzai, that the first indication of trouble across the border came. The Haji is an aged outlaw from British territory who has been the cause of a good deal of trouble amongst the Mohmands in the past. He lives at Lakarai in Safi Mohmand territory, although not himself a Mohmand. There

are many Mohmands settled in that corner of Peshawar district in which the Red Shirts were being organized by his son-in-law, and which adjoins Mohmand territory proper. The Haji left his home with his son, Badshah Gul, and a few followers, on April 26 and proceeded to Ghalanai, ten miles from the border, where they began to collect a lashkar. Ten days later Badshah Gul had arrived in a nullah, just on their side of the border, with a force estimated at several hundreds, consisting of representatives of several Mohmand sections and of Bajauris. Here they began to make common cause with the insurgents in the district, who undertook to provide them with food.

We commenced reconnoitring over Mohmand territory on May 1. Our aircraft were occasionally fired upon, but there was nothing particularly significant in that. The presence of small bodies of tribesmen near the border was constantly reported.

On May 7 a demonstration flight of forty-one aeroplanes was made over the area. The effect of this was to deter the more friendly sections of the Mohmands from joining the Haji, particularly the Halimzais and Tarakzais, who are assured clans inhabiting those portions of Mohmand territory adjoining the district. Ghalanai, by the way, is a Halimzai village.

On the same day (May 7) the Chief Commissioner asked Government for permission to attack the lashkar if they did not remove themselves from the border within twenty-four hours of being warned, as they were having an unsettling effect on the district. The next morning I received orders from Simla that offensive action was to be taken. Not very much was seen of the lashkar, but its presence was continually confirmed by reports of small parties with red flags. On the 10th larger parties were seen, and by midday that day the warning letters reached the Haji and Badshah Gul. At one o'clock that night a message was received from Badshah Gul that "the Government can do what they like."

The following morning offensive action commenced, but only against the lashkar collected in that particular nullah mentioned before.

I think it probable that if the situation had permitted of our warning the Haji, immediately we knew that he had left his home and was raising a lashkar, that his own home and those of his adherents would be bombed, unless he desisted from his hostile activities, there would have been little further trouble.

The chance was missed.

For various reasons, ten days were allowed to lapse before any effective air action was authorized. In the meantime the Haji had been joined by many Mohmands from the Afghan side of the Frontier, which, by the way, it is important to remember, has never been demarcated for a greater part of its length in this quarter. The situation had therefore become more complicated.

It should be noted here that one of our conditions for successful air action—i.e., rapidity in initiating action—was absent in this case.

So there we were, fourteen days after the Haji had left his home, restricted to action against the lashkar only.

However, we were determined to make the best of it and to make the lives of these tribesmen in their hiding-places as uncomfortable as we could, and I think we succeeded. Bombing started on May 11 and continued, with several breaks for negotiations, until June 24. The bombing consisted of a harassing type, both day and night, with an occasional heavy bombardment when we heard that new parties had arrived on the border. We were well informed of their whereabouts and their approximate strengths. In spite of their resorting to caves and thereby presenting a very difficult objective for air attack, their casualties gradually mounted up, and were known to have reached three figures. From time to time sections of the lashkar became disgruntled and cleared out, their places sometimes being taken by fresh drafts.

During all this time my own view was that we should be compelled to bomb the villages from which the lashkar was being recruited, and it was eventually decided to do so.

To start with, permission was given to warn the Haji that his own village, Lakarai, would be bombed. The warning was given and the village bombed with good results on June 5 (incidentally the day of the first Afridi incursion into the district). I will show you some slides of the village being bombed at the end of the lecture. The effect was immediate. Large numbers of the lashkar retired to their homes and there appeared a desire to negotiate. But the Haji himself and his son remained intractable. Eventually an ultimatum was sent on June 19 that all the Safi villages would be liable to be bombed unless the lashkar dispersed. Two days later the Haji was asking for a settlement, and on the 24th the Mohmand war was over.

One of the causes of the Haji's departure was the failure of the Utman Khel to effect anything on their side, due to very successful, although belated, air action against their villages.

The Mohmands had effected nothing beyond a bad influence on the district, due to their presence on the border. They suffered a lot themselves, and I don't think they will ever be foolish enough to come down again. In October, when the Afridis were trying to rouse them, an ultimatum was sufficient to keep them quiet.

The Utman Khel

While we were dealing with the Mohmands, and before the Afridis had made their first incursion, reports began to arrive of an Utman Khel lashkar, consisting of the Shamozai and Asil sections, collecting on the Swat River. The first reports came in on May 20. On the 31st we were bombing a bridge over the Swat River. On June 1 some tribesmen were seen in the Jindai Khwar on the border. On June 2 and 3, after due warning, some Utman Khel villages, just over the border, that were harbouring the lashkar, were bombed. The effect of this was to drive the lashkar into hiding in caves in the Jindai Khwar, where we proceeded to attack them whenever seen. We also bombed a village on the Jindai Khwar at night, after due notice.

Eventually, on June 14 and 15, ultimatums were issued that the villages from which the lashkar had come would be bombed if it did not disperse. The ultimatum having no effect, air action was taken against the villages on the 16th and 17th, particularly those in the Barang Valley, some of which were unmarked on the maps, but photographs of which had been taken and identified by the political agent himself flying over the area. The result was immediate. The lashkar dispersed on the 18th, and were not heard of again. A small ground force visited the Jindai Khwar on the 19th and rounded up some stragglers.

Here was a clear example of the good effect of air action on turbulent tribesmen. Not only were the fighting men themselves harassed from the air, but as soon as their villages were bombed they cleared off home. The villages received due warning and were evacuated before bombing commenced. They were mostly very small hamlets, but they were severely damaged by some very accurate bombing.

The Shamozai sections concerned immediately sent a deputation to the P.A. Malakand begging for the bombing to cease and to make a settlement, promising not to help the enemies of the Government any more. However, six days later, a Jirgah of several other sections of Utman Khel was held at Chingai, with the intention of raising a lashkar. It seemed that they could not profit by each other's experiences! But to show the effect of bombing on the Asils, this tribe refused to allow any lashkar even to pass through the Barang Valley for fear of further bombing.

The attitude of the hostile Utman Khels was rather obscure, but they were no doubt influenced by the intensive propaganda of the Fakir of Alingar in support of a *jehad* and expectation of combined action with Bajauris and Mohmands. They had an excuse to come down, to demand the release of the prisoners captured in the Jindai Khwar on the 19th.

Thus, at the beginning of July, reports began to be received that the Fakir of Alingar had induced a lashkar of some fresh sections of Shamozais, some Alizais and some Mandals to come down to the south side of the Swat River. Nothing was seen of them until July 11, when our reconnoitring aeroplanes were fired at. Ultimatums were that day issued to the sections involved that their villages would be bombed unless they recalled their contingents. This having no effect, villages in the Arang Valley and others were bombed on the 13th. The weather was bad on the 14th and 15th. On the 16th the situation was not quite clear. The Alizai contingent was reported to have recrossed the Swat, but the Shamozai and Mandals were still south of that river. So their villages were again bombed on the 17th. The next day they had all crossed back to the north and operations were suspended. They never crossed the border, and they effected nothing, and they were severely punished for their efforts.

Later, on July 25, reports came in that 500 Mohmands had crossed the Swat and occupied Utman Khel villages just over the border. We took photographs of Mohmand villages that day.

On July 26 ultimatums were issued to the Mohmands that their villages would be bombed unless they retired.

The next day three maliks came in with letters from Mohmand and Ambahar maliks to say that they had come to secure the release of Abdul Ghaffar and the relief of the oppressed people in British territory. They were told by the P.A. that unless they were back across the Swat by two o'clock on the 29th they would be bombed. They had gone that evening, and thereafter no more was heard of them or of the Utman Khel.

It should be noted here that while we were dealing with the second

lot of Utman Khel we were also working hard in Waziristan. For example, one of the Risalpur squadrons was bombing Mahsud villages in Waziristan on July 12, Utman Khel villages on the 13th, the Utman Khel lashkar on the 14th, it had a rest on the 15th, bombed Mahsud villages again on the 16th, and Utman Khel villages again on the 17th. This is a good example of our mobility and also of the necessity of centralized control.

Waziristan

We must now turn to Waziristan, and we have to go back to May again. We shall find here our two conditions of success—intelligence and rapidity of action—well illustrated.

By the first week of May propaganda had begun to have its effect amongst both the Wazirs and Mahsuds. There was restlessness at Kaniguram and Makin. The situation deteriorated until on May 11, the day we started bombing the Mohmands, a lashkar of about 4,000 Madda Khel and Khiddar Khel sections of the Tochi Wazirs invested Datta Khel militia post, while a party of Daurs sniped Boya post. The Tochi Scouts holding these posts offered a most vigorous and successful resistance. Warnings of air action against villages were not issued at once, but for three days aeroplanes bombed and machine-gunned the lashkars around the posts with good results. On the 12th a demonstration of twelve aeroplanes was made over Kaniguram and central Waziristan to calm the Mahsuds. On the 13th another lashkar was attacked by aeroplanes, four miles from Datta Khel, resulting in its dispersal. That day a twenty-four hours' ultimatum was issued to the Madda and Khiddar Khel that their villages would be bombed unless their lashkar dispersed and they surrendered twenty maliks as hostages. The ultimatum expired at two o'clock the next afternoon. To save time, the squadrons were already in the air at that hour, and their orders to bomb were communicated to them by wireless. The villages were bombed. The lashkar heard of the bombing that evening and by nine o'clock they had gone. The maliks submitted the next morning—i.e., four days after the attack on Datta Khel.

The Mahsud Jirgahs were then in progress, so a demonstration of forty aeroplanes flew over Kaniguram. This is believed to have helped to restrain the hotheads. The Jirgahs broke up, and nothing further happened until the 27th. On that day a lashkar of about 500

was raised by the Shabi Khel and Kikarai sections of Mahsuds with the object of attacking a loyal Garrerai village for betraying some Hindu agitators to the authorities. With the help of a warning that their villages would be attacked, they were induced to disperse, but their lashkar had incited some Shaman Khel of Maidan, near Ladha, led by two notorious hostiles, Ramzan of Sultana and Sadde Khan of Kot Langar Khel, to attack the Garrerai village, which they proceeded to do on the 30th, in spite of a warning of air action. Consequently Kot Langar Khel and Sultana were bombed on the 31st. This had the desired effect in causing the dispersal of the lashkar, and the Shaman Khel seemed afterwards to appear friendly.

But we had not finished with these two gentlemen. The friendly Shaman Khel were unable to restrain them from further hostile activities. There was a good deal of agitation going on amongst the Mahsuds as the result of the visits of agents and other subversive influences, which I need not describe. Fresh hostile gatherings were reported, particularly near Kaniguram and in the Upper Shaktu east of Razmak; consequently Sultana was again bombed on June 19 and 21. Again the lashkars dispersed temporarily, and there was peace.

But at the beginning of July the situation deteriorated rapidly. On July 3 a report was received that a lashkar was assembling near Kaniguram, again under Ramzan and Sadde Khan and also a Nazar Khel mullah, Kundalai. The Nazar Khel were immediately warned. On the 4th reports were received of another lashkar, numbering about 2,000, of Shabi Khel, Jalal Khel, Kikarai and Galeshai, in the hills eight miles east of Razmak, under the leadership of Galin, a Kikarai. The Shabi Khel were immediately warned of air action failing dispersion of the lashkar.

These two lashkars attempted to co-operate. I cannot relate their movements, but on the 6th, Sorarogha Post was loosely invested, and on the 7th a bridge on the Jandola—Razmak road at Marobi was damaged. We started bombing on July 6, commencing with the Shabi Khel villages. One village was reported to have suffered a good deal of damage that day, and Galin's own Kot at Waladin was wrecked. We continued bombing the Shabi Khel villages on the 7th and 8th, and caused considerable material damage.

In the meantime, on the night of 7th/8th, Ahnai Post, five miles south of Sorarogha, was attacked by a lashkar 1,500 strong under Khaisor, a Langar Khel. They burnt a neighbouring khassadar post. Sorarogha also became more closely invested. We attacked the

lashkar investing Sorarogha on the 7th and 8th, which was then believed to number about 3,000. We also dropped some wireless equipment, including valves, into the post. The garrison maintained a spirited defence. Further ultimatums were issued on the 7th to the Nazar Khel, and on the 8th to the Badinzai. The Nazar Khel came in on the 8th, and begged that their villages should not be bombed. Their assurances were not considered genuine and they were dismissed.

On the 9th practically our whole available strength was employed in attacking the lashkars around Sorarogha and in the Tank Zam. One bomb alone was reported to have killed twenty and wounded nineteen.

On the evening of the 9th the Shabi Khel retired from the fray, going straight back to their villages to inspect the damage. They gave no more trouble.

Kundalai's contingent also withdrew from Sorarogha, some going back to their homes in Maidan to obtain fresh supplies and recruits and another party going south to attack the Jandola—Wana roads. Further khassadar posts were captured and burned on the 10th.

On that day we commenced bombing the Badinzai villages in the Maidan Algad, and continued bombing the lashkars wherever seen. Some heavy casualties were reported to the latter. One bomb alone killed six and wounded forty of them sheltering under a bridge.

The Razmak column moved out that day (the 10th) to Tauda China and started shelling villages within reach of their guns. The weather was unfit for bombing on the 11th, but we continued again on the 12th, and went on, with one or two breaks due to bad weather, until the 24th. During that period, in addition to the Badinzai villages, we bombed villages belonging to the Jalal Khel, Nazar Khel, Langar Khel, Shaman Khel, and Kikarai. The Shabi Khel villages in the Shaktu were bombed again on the 12th to hasten the despatch of the Jirgah. They came in that evening.

I have not time to give you the details of the bombing, although they are very interesting, and the results showed in each case the immediate effect of bombing villages. The Resident, having an adequate air force at his disposal, took a severe line with all the hostile sections and refused to accept anything but complete submission from each of them. For example, the Badinzais came in on the 12th and asked for bombing to be stopped. They were told that they must bring in a full Jirgah. Until then bombing would continue. They came in again on the 14th, but refused to accept our terms. They

finally submitted on the 23rd, after some heavy damage had been caused to their villages both by bombing and shelling.

On the 15th the Jalal Khel and the Nazar Khel submitted, but as the latter failed to produce their leader Kundalai they were dismissed and told that bombing would continue.

The Kikarai submitted fully on the 17th.

Shinatizha, a Nazar Khel village, was very seriously damaged by bombing on the 17th and 18th. The Nazar Khel came in again and were given three days' grace to collect a Jirgah. They failed. Bombing continued, until finally on the 25th all bombing was stopped as all sections had submitted, except the Nazar Khel, whose Jirgah was coming in; but their villages had meantime been badly knocked about and several were in flames.

They submitted unconditionally on the 27th, bringing in their leader Kundalai. Thus, in three weeks we had squashed what might have been a really serious Mahsud rising.

The Razmak column had moved to Ladha on the 22nd. Their presence there, combined with the bombing of the villages, completed the discomfiture of the hostile Mahsud sections. The column remained at Ladha till August 5, when all the principal hostile leaders had been accounted for, except Ramzan and Galin, and Government terms had been accepted.

There were some subsequent attempts to form lashkars in the Shawal during August, but as the result of air reconnaissances and some offensive action, they failed to come to anything.

Afridis

Now for the Afridis. More was heard of them by the public last year than of the rest of the Frontier tribes put together. This, I am afraid, was largely because they were not so vigorously dealt with, as I think now they might have been. There seems to have been always a rather curious respect for the Afridis, because, I suppose, they flank the Khyber Pass, and have given a certain amount of trouble to our armies using that pass. Otherwise, except for 1897, they don't seem to have caused us anything like as much trouble as the Mahsuds or even the Mohmands. They seem to be rather a miserable lot as fighting men. In 1897 they played tip and run for a week in the Khyber, which necessitated an expedition into their country costing a great deal in money and lives.

However, as the result again of considerable anti-British propaganda, following on the disturbances in the province, and of some discontent arising from a settlement of the Orakzai Sunni-Shiah dispute, in which the pecuniary compensation did not reach all the Afridis that expected it, there was unrest amongst the Afridis during May, which eventually developed into the raising of lashkars at the end of that month. By June 1 these lashkars, numbering some thousands, had begun to move down the Bara Valley. We watched them coming down in large parties. They came without any attempt at concealment. They were carrying banners, and had every appearance of hostile intent, or, in any case, of an unwarranted incursion into their own low country bordering the district, at a time of year when they should have been carrying on their peaceful pursuits in the hills. But it was reported that they were accompanied by their elders and maliks, who were trying to restrain them from any hostile act. So it was decided that we could not take action against them until they had committed themselves. What I think could have been done at the time was at least to warn them that if they came beyond a certain point, or debouched into the plain, they would be considered as hostile and would be subjected to air action.

But this was not done, and they were allowed to come right to the borders of the district before action was taken.

Eventually, on the evening of June 4, reports were received that they intended to attack Peshawar and the cantonment that night. The Chief Commissioner then decided that they should be bombed, but it was too late to do so in daylight, and we missed a good opportunity of teaching them a lesson that would have been remembered for many years. We had been watching them assemble in many hundreds in the open on the west side of the plain all that afternoon and evening. When we did receive instructions to go for them we had unfortunately only two flights available. Neither were they actually standing by, for at 12 that day the Chief Commissioner had finally decided that nothing was to be done until they had committed some hostile act. Realizing that that could not happen until nightfall, we took the opportunity of giving the Mohmands a good dose that evening before having to switch over to the Afridis the next day. So the two bomber squadrons from Kohat were already out on that job. In addition, the two at Risalpur were all prepared for bombing the Mohmand village of Lakarai at dawn the next morning, and were not standing by. We didn't wish to upset that arrangement at all. So we only had No. 5 Squadron (the Quetta squadron) at Kohat and No. 20 Squadron at Peshawar, one flight of which was also out on a job. No. 5 Squadron did not know the particular area well, and, as the area was close to Peshawar district, it would not have been wise to employ them for night attacks. So only two flights of No. 20 Squadron could be used. They made five excursions between 8.30 and 12, bombing around camp-fires that they saw and at flashes of rifle shots which were aimed at them. We closed down at midnight, as by then the Afridis could have reached the outskirts of the aerodrome and might have caused unnecessary casualties to aircraft and personnel. Actually they did come right up to the aerodrome during the night.

Nothing happened during the night, except for an encounter between some Afridis and a cavalry patrol along the Bara road, which was heard from the cantonment in the early hours of the morning.

The situation at daybreak on the 5th was very vague, and it was some time before reports began to come in of the Afridi incursions into the district. I have not time to describe the operations around Peshawar that day, but I think the numbers of Afridis in the district were very much exaggerated at the time.

During the night they had certainly been disabused of their beliefs. They had been told that the British rule had ended and that the district would rise with them and take possession of the city and cantonment. Their first shock came from the bombing that night. This is known to have been sufficient to stop all but a handful of desperadoes from crossing the border. Many of the tribesmen never even crossed the plain. The few that came into the district found the cantonment defended as usual and the villagers disinclined to help them, beyond providing food, cutting some telegraph wires, and blocking some roads.

After some delay in the morning we were given permission to continue bombing tribesmen seen in the Kajuri Plain during the day. Some good targets were found, and many casualties are known to have been caused. We also co-operated with the troops, who were sweeping the district south-west of Peshawar; and towards evening we caught a bunch of Afridis in a nullah about three miles from the aerodrome. One flight made two attacks on this party and caused them heavy casualties, believed to have been sixteen killed and twenty-four wounded.

By the next morning (the 6th) all the Afridis had left the district.

We bombed a number of tribesmen retiring across the plain again that day. In the meantime the Chief Commissioner had authorized a formal warning to the Afridis that their villages would be bombed if the lashkars did not disperse. This ultimatum was delivered on the morning of the 6th.

We continued bombing the dispersing lashkars around the plain on the 7th, but were not allowed to follow them up the Bara. We made night attacks too on the nights of the 5th and 6th on the caves around the Kajuri Plain.

Thus ended the first Afridi incursion. They went home discomfited and disgruntled by the way in which they had been led astray. Their casualties were reliably reported to have been over eighty and possibly were many more. But the tribe as a whole had not been punished, nor had they been made to realize that they could not affect British policy in the province by any action of theirs.

During the rest of June and all July disputes continued amongst the Afridis, chiefly between the maliks and the Khilafatists, who were drawn largely from the mullahs and the younger men of the tribe, and also between different sections of the tribe. These disputes kept them sufficiently divided to prevent lashkars forming, but they still seemed to believe that combined action could bring about a rising in the district and the end of British rule.

A deputation met the P.A. Khyber at Jamrud on July 13 and dictated terms. Of course they could not be accepted.

Eventually, on August 1, a large Jirgah was held at Bagh and agreed that a lashkar should be raised. I cannot relate now the movements of this lashkar, nor can I describe in any detail their doings in the district. They had learnt, as the result of their first visit, to move in small parties and chiefly by night, so we did not see a great deal of them in their progress down to the Kajuri Plain, where they had arrived by August 7 in a strength estimated at 5,000.

It is also difficult for me to give you shortly the arguments used in deciding what air action was to be taken in the circumstances. I myself hesitated to recommend the bombing of the Afridi villages. The targets were poor, and I had my doubts whether we could, with a reasonable expenditure of bombs, disturb the Afridis sufficiently to make them submit unconditionally to any terms that we might dictate. I now think we could have done so. Our experiences with the Massozais and Chamkannis subsequently, against very much smaller and more scattered targets, were very satisfactory.

But the political argument was mainly that the object at the moment was to drive back the lashkar, and leave the real settlement of the tribe to a later date, when the whole tribe could be made to realize their responsibility for the disturbances. We were, therefore, committed to bombing only the lashkar itself and villages in the Bara belonging to those sections who allowed the lashkar to pass through their territory.

After due warning we started bombing the villages in the Bara valley on August 6. These villages are practically empty in the hot weather, in any case, but the ground all round them is much cultivated both winter and summer. Although the bombing of those villages probably did not affect the lashkar itself very much, beyond interrupting their supplies, it is believed to have effectually restrained the tribe as a whole from entering the fray, and more so the Orakzais, who were sitting on the fence at the beginning of the month. Considerable damage was done to houses and crops, and, at any rate, we showed the Afridis what we could do in that way. In the meantime we attacked scattered parties of the lashkar whenever we saw them. We bombed them in the caves and around the Kajuri Plain on the night of the 6th. By our action that night and on the following day it is known that we effectually prevented them from concerting a combined attack on Peshawar. Their movements thereafter in the district were very disunited and ineffective. Small parties hung about for several days, chiefly in the villages, woods, and nullahs on the southeast side of Peshawar. They were not very satisfactorily dealt with, largely due to the enclosed nature of the country and to the assistance they received from the local inhabitants. They were, however, powerless to do anything beyond cutting telephone wires and other trivial damage at night. This was largely due to continuous air patrols over the district. On the afternoon of the 9th a party of Afridis broke into a supply depôt on the Nowshera road and did some damage. Otherwise no large parties were encountered at all.

By the 12th, six days after their arrival, they had all cleared out of the district again, and by the 16th the lashkar had dispersed from the Kajuri Plain. We had continued to bomb parties of Afridis whenever seen either in the district or on the Kajuri Plain up to the 15th, and had made many night attacks on camp-fires around the plain. The total casualties inflicted on the Afridis, both on the ground and from the air, was estimated at about 100 killed and 250 wounded.

A whole lecture could be devoted to the Afridi situation alone.

There were many interesting points connected with the incursions which I cannot discuss here. I have scarcely mentioned the ground operations against the raiding gangs. But I think I have given you a fair account of the air view of the incursions. They were certainly not entirely satisfactorily dealt with, but I fully appreciate the political side of the question, and I do not for a minute suggest that any other action would have been wiser in the circumstances. But we did miss a chance, which did not occur again, as I had hoped, to give the Afridis a really hard knock. At the time the general idea was that an opportunity would occur later. It was accepted that they would have to be punished for their misdeeds, but not then. As you know, the punishment evolved into a military occupation of the Kajuri and Aka Khel plains. It was thought that the Afridis would resent this to such an extent as to bring the whole tribe in against us in some really big operations, which would give us our opportunity to punish them properly. As it turned out, in spite of their keen resentment at the occupation of a large strip of their own country, they have been too frightened to hit back. My personal belief is that it is the threat of air action that has kept them quiet. If so, perhaps it was cheaper in the long run not to have struck them hard at the time. The bombs have not been used, and perhaps they never will be. The threat may be enough.

Orakzais and Chamkannis

It only remains now to deal with the Massozais, an important subsection of the large Orakzai tribe, and the Chamkannis, both of whom inhabit the country between the Kurram and the Afridi Tirah, and also to mention the operations against the Afghan tribes who were threatening the Peiwar, Kharlachi Post, and Lakka Tiga Post on the west side of the Kurram, during August.

During July the Afridis had tried to stir up the Orakzais, but without much success, chiefly because their head mullah, Akunzada, who is now subsidized, refused to help. I believe a luckily timed air reconnaissance over a Jirgah also had a salutary effect. In August therefore, only the Massozais and the independent Chamkannis gave real trouble. The former raised a lashkar and attacked the militia post at Badama, north-east of Sadda, on the night of 9th/10th. Fighting was severe, and our casualties were four killed and seven wounded. Fighting continued through the 10th and the following night, during which the lashkar began to withdraw. Unfortunately the weather on

the 10th prevented our aircraft from giving any assistance to the militia that day, but the next day our patrols caught sight of some of the retiring lashkar and attacked them. One flight is believed to have killed twenty-three out of a group of twenty-four with one salvo of bombs.

In the meantime, on the 10th, the Chief Commissioner had authorized the issue of a twenty-four hours' notice to the Massozais that their villages would be bombed failing complete submission. We started bombing their villages on the afternoon of the 11th. It was necessary to deal with both the Massozais and Chamkannis severely and quickly in order to steady the position generally on the Kurram—Afghan border.

We continued bombing the next two days. The results were rapid. On the 14th the Samil Massozais were suggesting submission, having been the hardest hit on the 12th and 13th. They were consequently not bombed any more, and we concentrated on the Gar Massozais. On the 15th the whole tribe asked for a five days' armistice. This was refused. We continued bombing them on the 16th and 17th. On the 18th all were ready to submit, so bombing was stopped. They came in on the 22nd, and on the 24th accepted Government terms, agreeing to surrender 40 leading maliks as hostages and 100 rifles. They professed future loyalty and ascribed their misconduct entirely to agitators from Tirah. The whole affair was over in a fortnight.

Meanwhile, the Chamkannis further north had raised a large lashkar. On August 11 they were informed in writing that, unless complete submission was made before midday on the 12th, their villages would be bombed. The letter was returned without acknowledgment, and during the day they attacked militia picquets at Manosam and neighbourhood.

Consequently we bombed the Haji Khel section of the Para-Chamkannis on the 12th and 13th. On the 13th the Toi section of the Haji Khel requested an interval, which was granted up to dawn on the 15th, when, having remained inoffensive, while the other section, the Awi Haji Khel had continued to fire on our picquets, we continued to bomb the latter on the 15th and 16th. The lashkar had then withdrawn. Bombing was suspended, and the Haji Khel came in on the 24th and agreed to terms on the 25th, including the surrender of twenty hostages and thirty-two rifles.

However, two other sections of the Chamkannis, the Khwajaks and Khani Khel, remained hostile. They were again warned, and

their villages were bombed intermittently from August 27 to September 19. The Khani Khel came in on the 18th, surrendering sixteen hostages and thirty-two rifles. The Khwajaks deposited their hostages and rifles on the 22nd.

It will be noticed that it took some time (three weeks) to force these last two sections of Chamkannis to submit. This was partly due to the encouragement that they were receiving from the operations of the Afghan tribes on the Kurram border and partly due to delays on account of the difficulty of picking out the hamlets of the offenders. Photographs had to be carefully compared with the maps, and special reconnaissances were made, with the political agent and a local jemadar as passengers, in order to ensure that the right targets were selected. Then there was a break of three days for negotiations, which came to nothing. Also the targets were so small that it was often not economical to attack them with more than one or two aeroplanes at a time. Actually only two flights were employed against the Chamkannis. The bombing was purely an "interruption of life" type. It was interesting for that reason, as it proved that it has the desired effect, even when the targets are very small and scattered, and it needs only a very light expenditure of bombs. Incidentally, I believe that this method of bombing could have been employed with good effect against the Afridis. It is interesting to record that soon after we started bombing the Chamkannis 200 families were reported to have moved across into Ningrahar to escape injury. That seems a very satisfactory and humane way of enforcing submission, as it entails no loss of life, but only discomfort and annoyance.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that two other sections of the Orakzais, the Ali Khel and Malla Khel, raised a lashkar on August 12 and moved towards the Khanki valley. Warnings were at once issued that collections of armed men on or near the border would be considered hostile and bombed. On the 13th an ultimatum involving general air action was issued to them. By the evening of the 14th the lashkar had withdrawn and dispersed.

I have no time to deal with the operations on the Afghan—Kurram border. They lasted from August 17 to September 12. They were mainly defensive. We carried out a number of reconnaissances along the border and ranged guns. Our aeroplanes were heavily fired upon, but for obvious political reasons we could not retaliate against tribesmen in Afghan territory.

That concludes my narrative of the air operations. Our average

strength during the summer was 110 officers and 700 men, which corresponds to that of one infantry battalion.

Our total casualties due to enemy action were two killed and one slightly wounded.

Conclusion

I have not time to give you anything like an adequate summing up of the year's operations.

I have told you how we were at times restricted in our actions, for perfectly sound political reasons, and how delays occurred in initiating action.

I think, however, that as a result of last year's experiences, many of us, including the tribesmen themselves, have a better understanding of the effect of the air weapon, if it is correctly applied.

I gave you at the beginning of my lecture the conditions necessary for its successful application. They are, in two words, Intelligence and Speed. With these two conditions properly fulfilled, I think there is no doubt that air power can take an even more effective share in the control of unadministered tribal territory than it did last year and at much less cost.

Most of the tribesmen who were bombed last year had never had experience of air power before. Those that had, except for one or two exceptions, remained quiet. I believe those who suffered last year have learned their lesson, and that the probability is that in future the mere threat of air action will be sufficient. It is the fear of becoming subjected to air operations that now affects the tribesman in his behaviour. When once started the effects of air action are much the same as operations on the ground. In each case the tribesmen are being punished for their misdeeds. But where air action brings about its great moral effect is in the accessibility of every portion of a tribe to the air and in providing no opportunity to the tribesmen to hit back. Air action is far less costly in money and lives, both tribal and our own. The material damage can be considerable, but there is no wholesale destruction as in punitive expeditions of the past. We act mainly as a nuisance—that is, in the interruption of life and in the labour necessary to repair the damage. It is, therefore, probably the most humane form of warfare that the world has ever seen.

Before sitting down I should just like to pay a small tribute to the late Chief Commissioner, Sir Steuart Pears, who was so tragically killed three weeks ago at Nathia Galli.

Some of you will remember that he was appointed to the province at very short notice at the beginning of May last year; that is, at a very critical moment. It is not for me to speak of his work in the province, but in my work with him I was quickly impressed with his tremendous energy and his marvellous knowledge of the trans-border tribes. He had been away from the province for some years, but within twenty-four hours of his return he seemed to have a complete grasp of the situation and was handling details as if he had been continually at it without a break. I saw him two or three times a day throughout the summer and had innumerable telephone conversations with him, and I was amazed at his power of accumulating in his head information on every detail of our work. In fact, I have never met a man with so active a brain. He found time for everything and was always ready to talk and help. He had, amongst other things, a passion for maps, so that when he discovered our mosaics there was no satisfying him. His billiard table at Government House became covered with them, two or three deep, by the end of the summer.

We provided him with a mosaic of the tribal territory on the northern side of the Kurram valley, which was at least eight feet square. He soon knew every inch of it as if he had been flying over it daily for weeks. He was not very keen on flying himself, but on one occasion we had to rush him down to Delhi for an interview with the Viceroy. He left Peshawar by the night train, was picked up by us at Rawal Pindi at 7.30 a.m., and deposited in Delhi by 12. He left Delhi again late that night; we picked him up at Lahore the following morning, and he was back at Peshawar at midday. He was enchanted with the journey. In spite of the fact that he worked all day and every day and most of the night, too, throughout the hot weather, he remained fit and full of energy to the end. I must say that not only had I a great admiration for him, but I also came to love him dearly. I feel that he must be a great loss to India just at this moment. (Applause.)

Air Marshal Sir Robert Brooke Popham said that he entirely agreed with the lecturer that the two essentials to effective action were Intelligence and Speed. From his own experience in Iraq, he thought that a demonstration was sufficient to stop any trouble once the tribes knew the power of the air arm.

The CHAIRMAN: We must all be grateful to the lecturer for his interesting description of the work of the Air Force on the Frontier, and still more shall we admire the wonderful gallantry of the Force,

of which our lecturer has said nothing, in flying over such extremely dangerous and difficult country. It is a very real tribute to the efficiency of the Service that the casualties were so small.

I may say frankly that I myself would not go as far as to lecture in advocating the universal use of the Air Force. That it has made an enormous difference strategically from the military point of view in certain areas is unquestionable. It has revolutionized reconnaissance work; for punitive purposes we have heard to-night what it can do, what it has done, and how much more it is likely to develop in the future, although there is not always such good visibility as on the N.W.F. But I think for the time we have to halt at this. Many of us who are administrators, more especially in the East, do not believe the time has come when the air arm can be used administratively, because almost the whole value of our rule in the East has come from the personal contact of our officers with the tribesmen and the people they govern. The aeroplane which flies up from a base a hundred miles away, punishes good and bad alike, and flies back again, has no value from this point of view; you cannot select from the air.

But there can be only one view of the enterprise and increasing power of the Air Force as constituted to-day, and there can be only gratitude and admiration for the splendid feats they have done on the Frontier, feats of which our lecturer is so able an exponent. (Applause.)

THE SANDEMAN POLICY AS APPLIED TO TRIBAL PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY

BY COLONEL C. E. BRUCE, C.S.I., C.I.E., C.B.E., O.B.E., (LATE A.G.G. BALUCHISTAN)



HERE stretches along the North-West Frontier of India from the Arabian Sea to the Himalayas, some 1,200 milesa great belt of tribal territory. This great borderland consists for the most part of lofty mountain ranges lying to the west of the Indus, but contains within its area varying types of country and extremes of climate, such as the arid deserts and barren hills of Mekran and Las Beyla, on the Arabian Sea coast; the fertile valleys and plains around Sibi, where the summer heat is so intense that 45

there is a local saying, "When God made Dadar, why make hell?" Dadar is a village, at the mouth of the Bolan Pass, which, unfortunately, was practically wiped out during the recent earthquakes.

Baluchistan, including the Khanate of Kalat, with its stern and majestic hills, its rugged and serrated peaks, impressive in their wild and savage grandeur, occasionally giving place to smiling oases, renowned for their wonderful fruits. One of these oases is Quetta, where the temperature sometimes falls below zero and the cold of the bitter winds, which sweep down in winter from the Khojak or Khwaja Amran range—very often accompanied by driving tempests of sleet and snow—have to be felt to be believed; winds that seem to "pierce through one's chest and come out at one's back." Baluchistan, very sparsely populated—a country which has been described as a "land of villages without inhabitants, of mountains without trees, and of rivers without water."

Waziristan, with its equally forbidding but no less fascinating hills of the Sulaiman group, said to be the birthplace of the Pathan race; with its lower hills like those of Baluchistan, but in the higher ranges forest clad, with green "mergs" and mountain glens, where grow the blue gentian and edelweiss in profusion. A country which in many places compares with Kashmir.

Passing the fertile valley of the Kurram, and the hills stretching up to the Sufed Koh, or white mountains, which lead eventually to the Hindu Kush, we come to the barren and rocky hills of Orakzai and Afridi Tirah, the Mohmand, and Swat hills.

Leaving the Swat Valley behind us, we reach the tree-clad hills of Mahaban and Aornos, the scene of one of Alexander the Great's victories, so graphically described by Sir Aurel Stein.

These and the hills of Boner descend again steeply to where the mighty Indus breaks its way through this great mountain barrier, to eventually find the sea somewhere not very far south of Karachi.

From the eastern banks of the Indus, in this region, rises the Black Mountain, the home of the Isazai or Black Mountain tribes, one of the last of the Pathan tribes along the border. No man who has served a lifetime on this border can ever forget either the stern and cruel majesty of its peaks, their great beauty when caught by the rays of the rising or setting sun, or the superb gorges and defiles, such as the Dilkhuna in Baluchistan, and others in the Sherani country, like the Ghat, with its stupendous and precipitous cliffs, where the sun is said never to reach some of the innermost recesses of the defile.

Nor can he forget the great passes through these ranges—the Bolan, connecting the plains of Sind with the plateaus of Kelat, Baluchistan, and Kandahar; the Gomal and the Tochi, leading from the plains of India to Ghazni and Southern Afghanistan; the Kurram and the Khyber, links between the Kohat and Peshawar valleys with Kabul; and the Malakand, running up to Chitral and the Pamirs, to mention a few of the more important ones.

These great gateways, carved by Nature through this mighty barrier, where storms, crashing on the hills, convert the once dry, stony, and silent river-beds into raging torrents, feet high, which, passing between rocky walls, through tremendous chasms, bring down the life-giving waters and silt to irrigate and fertilize the valleys and plains lying at the foot of these hills, such as Dera Ismail Khan, Bannu, Kohat, and Peshawar.

These great passes, down most of which for centuries have wound in endless succession not only invading armies but adventurous traders, such as the great Powindah nomad clans, who, until the Pax Britannica came along, had yearly to fight their way down to India.

These merchants with their strings of camels, laden with the goods of Afghanistan to be exchanged for the produce of Hindustan. Their caravans coming down at the beginning of the cold weather, and returning as the summer approaches to the highlands of Khorassan.

A hard land, which has naturally bred a wild and virile race of lawless mountaineers—very Ishmaelites. And, let it never be forgotten, armed to the teeth, and with their eyes ever glued on the rich harvests, waving in dangerous proximity to their mountain fastness. Lands, in most cases, dependent for irrigation on torrents which flow down from these very hills, and from the looting of which they are only stopped by the strong hand of the law and those who administer it.

A land whose God with the Baluch is his horse and his sword, and with the Pathan his jezail and his rifle. The spirit of the Baluch mountains and the Baluch's love for his horse and his sword have, I think, been picturesquely given by a Drishak bard:

"The mountains are the Baluch's forts; these hills are better than an army.

The lofty heights are our comrades; the pathless gorges our friends.

Our drink is from the flowing springs; our cups the leaf of the phish (dwarf palm).

Our beds the thorny bush; the ground our pillow.

My horse is my white sandals; for my sons you may take arrows;

For my brethren the broad shield; and for my father the wide wounding sword."

A land of the vendetta and the blood feud, where life is considered of little value and might has ever been deemed the right. Generally speaking, the tribes which inhabit this area from the Arabian Sea to Quetta are Baluchis and Brahuis; and from Quetta to the Himalayas, Pathans, or speakers of the Pushtu language.

In 1866 there were, and in many places still are, two distinct frontiers—namely, the administrative border between the settled districts and tribal territory, and that between tribal territory and Afghanistan, subsequently called the "Durand Line." This tribal territory was, and is, within the British and not the Afghan sphere of influence. In that year the North-West Frontier from the Black Mountain to Karachi was administered under the "Close Border" system—a system under which the hills which interposed between us and Afghanistan were a "No Man's Land"; and to such an extent was this the case that the country within a day's march of Peshawar was, and, with the exception of the actual Khyber road and its vicinity, still is, even up to the present day, practically a terra incognita, and there is no security for British lives within a few yards of this frontier. It was also a system whereby punishment was meted out to the tribes by either fines, blockades, or expeditions, or a combination of these.

Fines, which, if paid at all, were generally paid by the most respectable and law-abiding section of the tribe.

Blockades, which kept the laborious, hard-working portion of the tribesmen from going about their lawful occasions.

Expeditions, where the villages of the wretched people were burnt to the ground, their women, children, and flocks turned out on to the hillside. Eventually the troops retired, leaving behind them a legacy of hatred and contempt. A policy which made a desert and called it peace. A policy "neither dignified, becoming to a Great Power, humane, nor even economical."

This was the state of affairs which Sandeman, who was joined at this time by my father, found when he took over the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and it was here that he was to inaugurate the policy which has ever since borne his name, and which he was to carry to success in spite of official opposition and obstruction.

It is, however, only fair on other great frontier officers before him to remember that Sandeman never claimed to be the originator of the system. What he did claim was to be the only true disciple of Edwardes, Nicholson, Abbott, James, and others. Anyone who has read the lives of Sir Robert Sandeman and General John Jacob of Jacobabad must, I think, have been struck not only with the similarity of their lives, and of most of their views, but also with the similarity of their deaths. Both equally disapproved of the wars of retaliation on the Punjab frontiers; both, while making themselves feared and respected, were animated with love for the people amongst whom their lot was cast and were ever seeking for their welfare. Both recognized that to be successful on the frontier "a man has to deal with the hearts and minds of the people and not only with their fears." Both were filled with that untiring energy and indomitable spirit whereby alone success can be achieved on the frontier, and both lie buried amongst the people whom they loved and for whom they lived and died-martyrs to their devotion to duty. little cemetery at Jacobabad, his grave still a place of pilgrimage to Muslim and Hindu alike. Jacob, at whose death-bed mingled the tears of his old Sind Horse troopers and the leaders of the neighbouring robber tribes whose strength he had broken, the tribesmen, however, "comforted with the fond imagination that, as his body had been committed to their soil, his spirit would remain to watch over Sandeman, who lies at rest in the little garden at Las them." Beyla, far from kith and kin, but among the people whom he loved and for whom he gave his life. Sandeman, for the privilege of burying whose earthly remains two great tribal chiefs nearly went to war.

Hot winds may sweep over their graves but cannot disturb their sleep, for the great end for which they strove, the peace of this wild frontier, is assured, unless we prove unworthy of their trust. Sandeman believed with Edwardes that on the frontier "a benevolent despotism is the best of all governments," and, like him, "gave his whole soul to the establishment of that vast and priceless blessing, peace." Sandeman found that not only was this belt of practically uncontrolled tribal territory responsible for a great deal of raiding and trouble generally, but that many of the headmen were making a good thing out of it by harbouring outlaws across the border and assisting them, and raiding gangs brought down by them, in their

crimes. Wherever the "Close Border" system has been, or still is, in force, this unsatisfactory state of affairs has continued to exist up to the present day. This Sandeman was determined to put down with a strong hand; but, like the good physician, he was not content merely to give the medicine but sought for and found the root cause of the disease, which he proceeded to do his best to eradicate. This he found to be to a great extent economic-namely, that many of the tribesmen were dependent on raiding for their livelihood. While therefore admitting that his tax-paying subjects in the settled districts were entitled to demand protection from the depredations of the tribesmen, he did not lose sight of the fact that, once law and order had been established and peace secured, the tribesmen also had the right to live. He recognized that these tribes, whether Baluch or Pathan, had no real Government and were in need of one, and that if they were stopped from raiding justice and humanity alike required that they should be given something better to replace it. moral obligation was rather pithily put to me by one of the most renowned Mahsud raiders, Khonia Khel. This name Khonia Khel practically means "Bloody Bill," and well did the name fit him, as he was reputed to have shot more Wazirs-their deadly enemies-than any other Mahsud. "Sahib," said he, "I have three wives, and five strapping sons like myself, and several sisters with large families. You have stopped me raiding in Dera Ismail Khan, in Bannu, and in the Tochi; and now I hear you are going to stop me raiding in the Khaisora Valley." (This valley was in tribal territory, and as a matter of fact he was shot a fortnight later when trying to raid there, though I am glad to say he was not killed.) "You will not even allow me to raid in Birmal and Khost, though they are in Afghanistan. There has been no rain, so no grazing for my flocks. How, then, am I to live?" I pointed out that I had been fighting their battles daily. To this he answered: "Yes, sahib, I know you have been, but for Heaven's sake go on." Had he no justice in his claim? Page, the well-known American Ambassador, once said of the Englishman that he was the best policeman in creation but had a policeman's ethics. "Talk to him about character as a basis of government in an outlying country, and he will think you daft. He fails to realize that successful nations stand something in the position of trustees to such unfortunate lands, and to realize that it is their duty to lead them along the slow path of progress." No such charge could, however, be made against Sandeman. From first to last he looked upon

the problem from the tribal point of view and recognized the moral obligation this entailed. He never forgot that no administrator, be he Government officer or tribal chief, can possibly be successful unless he works through the people for the people. He never allowed "I dare not" wait upon "I would." Where, however, Sandeman showed real statesmanship was that he did not make the error—an error we seem in some danger of falling into to-day—of trying to graft on to semi-barbaric tribes a purely Western administration, but built up one which, while conforming in the main to Western standards, was based on the tribal organization and admitted of the participation of the tribesmen therein. The keystone of his administration was the "Jirgah," or council of elders. To this he implemented tribal service (or tribal allowances) and tribal levies, whereby the tribe was not only made responsible for law and order but also given the means by which it could be enforced.

Finding the tribal organization in a state of rapid decay and the power and influence of the tribal leaders much diminished, he proceeded to rebuild it under competent chiefs and headmen, advised, controlled, and supervised by experienced British Political Officers, for he recognized that "dealing with lawless tribes it is the personal influence, born of intimate knowledge and sympathy, which is the chief factor of success."

His attitude towards the tribal chiefs was well described by Sir Denys Bray—his was not a policy of merely "bolstering up the chiefs." "First and last his aim was to preserve the ancient tribal system. The chief who carried his tribe with him because he never lost sight of the fact that his authority was derived from the tribe and was to be exercised for the welfare of the tribe was Sandeman's ideal. A chief who flouted his tribal officers, encroached on the ancient liberties of the tribe, and sought to change his status from a constitutional chief into that of an irresponsible despot, looked for his support in vain."

It must never be lost sight of that his support was always conditional on the chief or tribesman being worthy of that support.

One of the main causes of the late Afridi defection and the disturbances in Peshawar was, in my opinion, due to the defects of the "Close Border" system, which was still in full force in that area; and indeed since the departure of Sir Robert Warburton had gone still further back in its want of knowledge of the tribes. That personal influence and knowledge was lacking, as British Political Officers,

once again, were practically confined to the Khyber road and its immediate vicinity. Not being allowed to cross into tribal territory, they had perforce to depend on middlemen, who in many cases were not Nearly all the books written by experienced frontier officers, from Edwardes up to to-day, have given countless warnings against the use of these men. Even at the time of his departure, or just afterwards, Warburton had written that "the evils of the system are even now being continued, in spite of every assertion to the contrary," but warnings went unheeded. The inevitable consequences were that lack of supervision and want of knowledge had allowed certain of the tribal leaders to have things far too much their own way, and to keep too large a share of the allowances and other benefits in their own hands. They had thereby alienated their own tribesmen against them, and had decreased their power and influence over them. This had therefore brought about the very state of affairs which Sandeman had found at Dera Ghazi Khan and had so sternly eradicated.

On the other hand, one of the main causes why Waziristan—in former times the greatest firebrand on the frontier—gave so little trouble—and what trouble it did give was immediately stamped out with practically no loss of life and little expenditure to Government—was due to the fact that the "Close Border" system had been done away with and the Sandemanization of the country commenced. That personal factor of intimate knowledge and sympathy was no longer wanting.

Sandeman recognized that if the headmen were expected to support him he must be in a position to be able to support them. "You cannot expect support if you cannot, or will not, give it," said my father; and you cannot give it if you have not got control. To carry out his policy properly and to be able to give adequate support control from within was necessary.

His policy then became one of peaceful penetration, at the request of the tribes themselves. The necessity for interior control was, I think, forcibly put by one of the old Wana Wazir headmen when these headmen were being called on for assistance, before we had reoccupied Wana. "Either act in Wana," said he, "in a manner worthy of the rulers of India (namely, come up and support us), otherwise you cannot expect us to assist you by doing your work for you and thereby incurring the enmity of the tribe."

Peaceful penetration necessitated the opening up of the country by roads, for, like the Highlands of Scotland, the road was the way.

"Had you seen this road before it was made
You would lift both your hands and bless General Wade."

Just as the Highlands of Scotland were to bless General Wade, so was Baluchistan to bless Sandeman in the years to come. Not only is the protection of the Indian frontier from a military point of view predominantly a matter of roads, but these are even more essential for promoting trade and developing the country and its resources, as the tribal problem is really much less military than economic in its character.

Some forty years ago my father advocated the same policy for Waziristan-namely, control from within. He recommended a brigade at Razmak, with strong outposts at Wana, and Sherinna, joined up by roads, and all other concomitants of the Sandeman policy, as well as tribal allowances and tribal levies. Though the latter two were sanctioned, it was not till about forty years later that the keystone and very essence of the system-namely, control from withinwas really commenced. The loss of lives and money which this delay entailed are matters of history and can easily be ascertained. It may therefore be said that with the exception of Baluchistan the "Close Border" system was in force all along the frontier up to nearly 1923, when a start was made at Sandemanizing Waziristan. spent the years 1923 to 1928 either in or on the borders of Waziristan, and had therefore a good deal to do with the carrying out-if not the inauguration-of the policy so strongly advocated by my father, perhaps it is not for me to say too much about it. Possibly I may be forgiven, however, for quoting : wo short extracts, one from The Times and the other from a speech Sir Denys Bray. The former wrote: "The hopes that inspired the policy have been fulfilled. It seems that the Pathan can after all be Sandemanized." The latter said: "The policy has made good . . . indeed, our success blinds us to its magnitude."

These comments were made before the late disturbances in Peshawar and on its borders. I have already briefly shown what the results of these disturbances were on Waziristan, in spite of the new policy being then in its infancy and being put to the very severest test imaginable. I will merely add that information from the spot was that had we not been in a position immediately to reoccupy Wana, and had we not done so, the Wazirs would almost certainly have risen against us. I would go further and say that if the present troubles spread to Waziristan it will in no way be due to the system,

but to our failure to recognize with Lord Roberts and Sandeman that, after all, "these tribes are not our own flesh and blood, and their loyalty is the outcome of their belief in our invincibility and their reliance in our power to defend them." Is it indeed to be wondered at, if their beliefs are rapidly being shattered, when they see the Red Shirt Army not only allowed to exist but increasing daily, and becoming a more or less organized body, its recruits now being sworn in on the Qoran? When they see this, and, in addition, see the Red Shirts even allowed to spread across the frontier, is it any wonder that the tribesmen are frankly amazed, or that a leading man in one of the districts writes that unless steps are taken this want of action is almost certain to lead to disastrous results?

"In politics experiments lead to revolution," said Disraeli. Experiments may be tried in India proper, though even there I should have thought that they were exceedingly dangerous. To try such experiments on the frontier, which, as the Royal Central Asian Society was told only the other day, is "one of the few spots on the earth's surface where we, the British, can take a knockout blow," may be

nothing short of disastrous.

One of the most difficult problems with which the local administration is faced on the frontier, more especially under the "Close Border" system, is in the matter of outlaws. An "outlaw" is a man who has committed a heinous offence in British territory and has fled across the border, where, with the assistance of his friends inside, he very often becomes a leader of tribal raiding gangs and a thorn in the flesh of the authorities. Having had to do with the death, arrest, or surrender of over five hundred outlaws on the frontier, perhaps the story of the arrest of one of the most desperate of these may not only interest you but give an example of some of these difficulties.

At the time I am speaking of one of the most famous of the outlaws harbouring with the Mahsuds was one from the Mianwali district of the Punjab, by the name of Kalu. One day information was received from Mianwali that there had been a raid, and Kohat was asked to do its best to intercept the gang. The District Police, Frontier Constabulary, and Levies were at once turned out and the tribes and villages warned that if the gang broke through their limits, without their having taken adequate action to intercept them, tribal responsibility would be enforced. The very essence of the Sandeman system was tribal responsibility. How well the tribesmen carried out their responsibilities the following story will, I hope, illustrate.

gang on this occasion, consisting of only seven men, was first seen by two shepherd boys. Leaving his companion to watch the gang unostentatiously, the other boy made quickly to his village, where he was lucky enough to find some of the levies who had been turning out the villagers in accordance with the orders received. These levies, accompanied by a hue and cry party from the hamlet-for this is all it really was-engaged the gang, who, fighting stubbornly, retreated in the direction of the Karghar, a spur of the Salt Range. country is practically untraversed by paths, and such pools of water as are occasionally found are undrinkable by reason of the all-prevailing salt. At that time of the year mountain-side and torrent-bed are alike red-hot. This country was reached about midday, the raiders disputing every foot of the ground and the villagers and levies hanging on tenaciously. By dusk one wounded raider had been picked up, and from him the pursuers first heard of the redoubtable Kalu's presence with the gang. Nothing daunted, the villagers, many of them armed only with swords or nothing at all, hung on, in spite of the death of two of their number and the wounding of three others. Other villagers beaten up by the police had meanwhile been closing in and taking up the chase. Though the intervention of darkness caused a temporary loss of touch, the police inspector, who had meanwhile turned up, did his best to draw a cordon round the hills, where the gang had last been seen. It is doubtful whether he would have been successful, in spite of the weariness of the gang and the awful thirst from which they must have been suffering, had it not been that the three local Kohat outlaws who had been with the gang, finding the pursuit too hot for their liking, and knowing the country well, had managed to sneak away, leaving Kalu and the others in the lurch. The remainder of the gang were now really and metaphorically in the dark. Touch with the gang was re-established at dawn, and shots were exchanged till 8 a.m., when Kalu, having fired his last cartridge, hurled a torrent of abuse at his adversaries, walked out, and was taken prisoner. Before doing so he smashed his rifle to pieces on a rock, saying it should never be said that the great Kalu had been taken with a rifle in his hand. All the four leading members of the gang were captured, every one of them wounded. Before he was hanged Kalu boasted, saying: "I shall leave three widows, but I have made many more than I shall leave." He also bragged that "apart from the normal business of raiding military convoys with the Mahsud, with whom he had been harbouring, he had killed 126 men,

and expressed special satisfaction that amongst these there had been four Indian police officers and one Indian military officer." Thus died Kalu, who had for years been a thorn in the flesh of the district officers and a name of terror to the villages—a beast possibly, but certainly a man of courage.

It is important to remember that critics of the efficacy of the Sandeman system to deal with Pathan tribes generally had always held up the Wazirs, and more especially the Mahsuds, as quite the most incorrigible, and as tribes over whom the system could not possibly succeed. This, however, was yet another case of history repeating itself, as when Jacob made such a complete success of pacifying the tribes on the borders of Sind, "it was frequently described to some difference in the character of the tribes" (I am here quoting from the "Life of Jacob"). Was it any wonder, then, if these critics argued in the case of Sandeman that though his system was applicable to Baluchis it was not so to the Pathans; and that when he proceeded to use it, equally successfully, over an even greater number of Pathan tribes in Baluchistan, they should have said that this was because these tribes had lived for generations next to the Baluchis, and therefore must have assimilated some of their customs and characteristics? Is it any wonder, therefore, that now, when the results of the policy in Waziristan have begun to show that the system can be successfully used even there, still small voices are sometimes heard to say that anyhow it cannot succeed with the Afridis!

After a lifelong experience on the Indian frontier, and having had something to do with almost every tribe along this border, I can confidently say that, with the exception of minor matters, there is not the slightest difference between the Pathan and the Baluch in so far as the working of the Sandeman system is concerned. That system is indeed applicable not only to these tribes but indeed to all other suchlike tribesmen all over the world, as I hope to be able to show later.

To develop the country and its resources control from within is almost as essential as it is for the establishment of law and order; otherwise it is naturally most difficult to send officers to explore and prospect the country, make out the necessary plans and schemes, whether for road, irrigation, aftorestation, or any other developments. The new policy in Waziristan was, and I hope is, the policy of Sandemanization, with all that this implies. Sandeman admitted that by stopping tribal raiding the independence of the tribes was really being taken away, and that "having refused to let them look for government

to any other Power but ourselves we could not honestly refuse to give them that protection" and support which this implied. His policy, in fact, inculcated the same moral as the following story of Mahmud of Ghaznavi. "In one of the outlying parts of the dominion he had conquered a caravan was looted by robbers. The mother of one of the merchants who had been murdered complained to Mahmud. Mahmud urged the impossibility of keeping order in such an out-ofthe-way part of the country. 'Why, then, do you take countries that you cannot govern, and for the protection of which you will have to answer in the day of judgment?' answered the widow. Mahmud recognized the strength of her argument, sent a force, and saw that justice was done." Has this story no lessons for us to-day? really essential difference between the "Close Border" and the Sandeman systems might almost be summed up in the one word "control." Sandeman might have said with Chatham: "I will be responsible for nothing I do not control." Having obtained control, he was able to bring many of the blessings of civilization within the reach of the tribesmen. The "Close Border," on the other hand, by refusing to take over control, was not only destructive, but in many ways eminently selfish. With the exception of paying certain allowances and enlisting some of the tribesmen in the various types of frontier corps and in the army, it did, and could do, little for the permanent advancement of the tribes.

The tribal problem is, as already pointed out, mostly an economic one. Service in the army had certainly been of benefit to the tribes, but even this after the Great War, doubtless for very good reasons, had either been done away with or much curtailed, and this fact was probably one of the contributory causes of the late Afridi defection. That I am right in laying stress on the all-importance of "control" is, I think, borne out by a very distinguished military officer saying that once we could control Waziristan their tribesmen should be re-en-We certainly did in the end take over most of the passes and established a certain amount of control over these, but even this was done more in our own interests than in that of the tribes. In Waziristan at least we induced the headmen to cede to us all the best strategical positions in their country, in the fond hope, at least on their part, that by doing so they were insuring a strong Government, ready and willing to support them. They hoped that anarchy would thereby be suppressed and that the blessings of civilization would be brought within their reach. Without control from within these results

were impossible of achievement. By shirking taking over control we more or less left the headmen in the lurch and the intervening tracts to remain in a state of anarchy. Even if some slight progress could be made in times of peace, such a policy could not stand the test of war or trouble on the frontier, and no policy that will not stand such a test is worthy of the name. It is at best merely a makeshift one.

"What are my views," once said Sandeman, "but simply those which every Christian man or woman ought to feel towards their less fortunate neighbours." It was, I am certain, because of his intense human sympathy with the tribes themselves that his policy succeeded-namely, because it deserved success. No policy which does not aim at civilizing the tribes can, I believe, be successful. The only justification for taking away anyone's independence is to give him something better in its place. It is our justification for being in India, and it can be our only justification for having taken away the independence of the tribes-and a very full and complete justification, too! It was because of his great sympathy and understanding that he eventually came to be regarded as "the best friend of both chiefs and people and as justice incarnate." Bertram Thomas's delightful story in his "Alarms and Excursions" of the two Arabs arguing as to who was going to win the Great War, and one of them saying that the English would undoubtedly do so, as God would not allow justice to depart from the world, probably gives the reason for Sandeman's success better than any words of mine, for "where justice reigns 'tis freedom to obey." On the other hand, the "Close Border" system left the tribes half savage and embittered them.

Of the hatred and bitterness engendered in Waziristan by the 1919 expedition, anyone who was there in the years immediately afterwards could testify. I am glad, however, to be able to bear witness how by degrees the whole attitude of the tribe changed, and how even the women, who had hated us even more than the men, became our best propagandists. This, I am certain, was because the tribe came to recognize that we were now trying to help them to help themselves and were trying to establish peace and happiness, if not religion and piety, anyhow for future generations.

A few short stories might illustrate this:

Some Mahsud women sat on one of the bridges and refused to allow a "lashkar," or army of hostiles, to destroy it. The Mahsud headmen asked that the civil hospital should be put outside the perimeter wall at Razmak so that their women might also be able to attend it. They also promised to give heavy security that no damage

would be done to God's house, as they called it, thereby showing as complete a trust in us as formerly there had been distrust.

Some headmen offered a house in Kaniguram as a hospital to a well-known missionary lady doctor, and naïvely said that they could supply her even with instruments and drugs, as they had stolen these from us in 1919. Musakhan, the commander of the Mahsud armies in 1919 and still a hostile, wrote to me saying that as his father and my father had been friends he swore that he would give no further trouble, anyhow during the time I was Resident. I am glad to say that he kept his word, and in addition sent me a Kaniguram dagger—not perhaps a very appropriate present—which adorns my walls to this day.

Of the civilizing effects of the Wana hunt I was told by an officer who had only just come from there. He described how far afield they were able to ride; how the Wazir headmen were even joining the hunt, and indeed becoming regular thrusters, and with what genuine hospitality they were always received.

It has been said that "a prudent man may direct a state" but that "it requires an enthusiast to regenerate it." I know of no great frontier officers whose names will live in the hearts of the tribes who have not been enthusiasts, and certainly one of the most enthusiastic was Sandeman. For long he was undoubtedly regarded as "dangerous," and in the sense of having ideas a good deal in advance of his times, both he and all the other great frontier officers were possibly dangerous. But if the danger that was anticipated was that he would commit the Government, the results showed that the British Government never had a less dangerous political adviser, or one who made so few mistakes and who never committed the Government to anything that was not to their very great advantage. If Carlyle's conception of a great man as one who performed a mission "to establish order where chaos reigned supreme" be a correct one, then indeed was Sandeman "great." Surely these facts are there to teach us a lesson, and one very necessary to-day. If ever a policy-more or less in the words of the Prayer Book-was one built on the best and surest foundations of peace and happiness, truth and justice, it was the policy of this great man. It has been argued that "Scanderberg's sword requires Scanderberg's arm," but the master is dead, and his policy still lives and is indeed steadily spreading. Though the carrying on of his policy does not require a Sandeman, it does require officers who know the language and are in sympathy with the tribal customs. "It is on such men," said Lord Curzon, "that our security rests and not upon the

number of battalions we put there." Or, as Lord Lytton before him put it, "it is to the effect of the straightforward, upright, and disinterested action of English gentlemen, and to the influence which higher mental powers and culture never fail to exert over those who are brought into contact with them, rather than to the superiority in fighting power and appliances that I attribute the British supremacy in India, as well as the exceptional success of British rule all over the world. If personal character and influence be the powerful engine I believe them to be, it is desirable that their force should be exercised as constantly and directly as possible."

That Sandeman's policy is equally applicable to every tribesman, whether Baluch, Pathan, Arab, Kurd, or African; whether he lives in Indo-China, Burma, Morocco, Tripoli, Aden, the Sudan, or East, West, and South Africa, is, I think, absolutely proved from the fact that every great colonial administrator has, wittingly or unwittingly, taken him as their example or followed in his footsteps. instance, talking of the Sudan, Lord Kitchener said: "Its conquest imposed on us the task of civilization. The position which circumstances have forced upon us imperatively requires us that we should at once undertake the task of civilizing and developing the races under our control. . . . While helping them we must also teach them to help themselves." That great French colonial administrator's (Marshal Lyautey) policy in Morocco was based on Sandeman's and was described by Lord Buxton as "a policy of obvious and genuine sympathy and understanding carried out by a magnetic personality." The Marshal, in answer, described such work as that of "builders who brought peace and progress to lands where anarchy and disorder, stagnation and barbarity, had reigned." I should like here to quote a few very significant extracts from a speech made by the Marshal in England only two or three days ago, in which he stressed-

(a) The necessity of "leaving to the people the framework of its traditions, its beliefs, its habits of government, controlling only those of its actions likely to hinder its well-being and prosperity." ...

(b) How indispensable it was that there should be "cordiality between the protector and the protected."

(c) The absolute necessity for "understanding and sympathy."

(d) And that "the right of colonization was only justified by the sum of moral and material benefit wrought by the colonizing nation."

Could there well be a clearer advocacy of the Sandeman system or indictment of the "Close Border"?

Not many months ago General Smuts, speaking on the native

policy in South Africa, said "we are called on to retrace our steps, to take all proper measures which are still possible to restore or preserve the authority of the chiefs, and to maintain the bonds of solidarity and discipline which have in the past supported the tribal organization."

One of the instructors at the Quetta Staff College told me how years ago, before he had ever been to India, he was travelling along the French Indo-China border with some French officers, who told him that their tribal policy was based on that of a Colonel Sandeman and Mr. Bruce.

Anyone who has read Sir Arnold Wilson's and Bertram Thomas's books on Iraq and Arabia, Lugard's on Africa, to mention a few, can see how successfully the system has been carried out in those countries.

Yet it is at this time, when Sandeman's policy has been proving itself not only in India but all over the world, that one hears of almost full reforms having been recommended for the North-West Frontier Province and also for the repeal of certain sections of the Frontier Crimes Regulations.

Sandeman's policy was built on the tribal organization and tribal customs. The Frontier Crimes Regulations and Baluchistan Codes were built on the same foundations. The sections recommended for repeal are some of the most important ones on which the carrying out of that policy depends. To say the least of it, is this wise? May we not indeed be doing exactly what Sir Arnold Wilson said was being, or had been, done in Iraq—namely, "voluntarily abandoning the means and destroying the machinery" by which alone success can be, or has been, achieved?

Sandeman was, in short, "a member of that band of resolute, vigorous men which has existed, for a century and a half, for the founding, the construction, the extending, the consolidating of the British Empire in the East—a band of which the full number has been maintained, some coming forward when others fall and make a gap, some arising as others pass away." It has, however, unfortunately become rather the fashion nowadays to scoff at the ideals and principles of such men, or anyhow to say that their day was past, and not long ago I was told myself that the days when the spirit of service was the code of honour, when men administered the Empire without selfish motives, striving only to bring justice and mercy to primitive races, had probably gone for ever. If this were really true, it would, I think, be a very serious matter, as never were such qualities more necessary than they are at the present day, and it will indeed be a bad day for India and the Empire if it is found that in the day of need they are

not forthcoming, for "great realms are only maintained with the same means whereby they were created, and when strength of soul ceases empires pass away."

Let me, in conclusion, very briefly sum up the tribal problem: the tribal problem is the tribal area. Past experience has proved again and again that wedges of uncontrolled tribal territory are not only a source of trouble and danger but form also a convenient asylum for outlaws, raiders, and every form of intrigue. Even at the present moment this is again proving to be the case.

The State may refuse to extend its responsibilities, but for the fate of the Pathan clans within the Durand Line the British Government is responsible. For the Government to pretend that there is any question of maintaining the independence of these tribes is a fiction which cannot pass current with honest men. Their so-called independence has long since gone. Both economically and in every other way they If their headmen at our solicitation are dependent on us. consign to us valuable strategic positions in their country, surrender outlaws, and maintain law and order, thereby very often fixing a halter round their own necks and inheriting relentless blood feuds, are we entitled to shirk our responsibilities, throw them over, and There is not a shadow of doubt leave them in the lurch? that the tribesmen have ever regarded our failure to control these tribal tracts—the only possible way we could adequately support the headmen-as weakness.

There is, indeed, only one true remedy, and that is to do away with all feeble makeshifts such as protected areas and by the exercise of a just and civilizing control secure the safety of life and property and the development of the country and its resources. Thus only can we hope to secure the respect of the tribes on both sides of the border and bring them in definitely on our side, a source of strength instead of an ever-present danger.

The only policy that has done this, and has really worked for the permanent welfare of the tribes, is Sandeman's. From the Government's point of view it has proved itself both logically and economically sound.

From the tribal point of view it has not only had a very civilizing effect but has added considerably to the material welfare of the tribes. And by associating the tribesmen actively in the administration it established a form of self-government in many ways in advance of that which existed for a long time in India.

This policy does not mean that the villages are to be provided

with magistrates and tax gatherers. But it implies that the Government shall appoint qualified agents to represent to these tribes the authority of the King-Emperor. Men whose word the Jirgah can trust; who can go among them, get to know them, and be umpires and arbiters when required between clan and clan, and who can protect their villages from usurers and suchlike. The duties of such agents may or may not be called administration. Nothing is gained in the discussion by mere words. The clans need very little of what is called administration, but what little they do need must be of the best. In one word, Sandemanization!

Sir Denys Bray: We have been fortunate to-night in our lecture, perhaps because the lecturer himself was fortunate in that his life's work lay in an environment so congenial. This, indeed, is a good fortune he shared with most whose lot took them to that magnetic frontier. Colonel Bruce, however, came to the frontier the son of his father, Sandeman's right-hand man. And in tribal eyes it is only right that a son should stand in his father's place, and to him is there accorded as of right much of the respect and influence his father won.

His lecture was packed with fact and thought and stimulus. His subject once rent the frontier. But though he dealt trenchantly with it, the note of controversy has damped down. I shall follow his admirable example. Indeed, I shall not canvass present-day possibilities of extending the Sandeman system to regions yet unblessed, for I must not outstay my welcome, and I want to say a word about the system as I saw it in being years ago in Baluchistan.

In the light of after events, it now looks to me like an embodiment of a sane Swadeshi Swaraj long before these terms were current in political India. Sandeman's mission was to bring peace where there was chaos, and thus to uphold the King's peace throughout the land and to foster its development through indigenous agency on indigenous lines. Colonel Bruce has depicted the organic part played by the tribal levies, and the Chairman, like myself, has spoken of that Empire builder, Sandeman's first lieutenant, Bruce. But what of that little band of fellow-workers of whom Sandeman was so proud? There sticks in my memory the picture of the greatest of these: a puny figure of a man, a Hindu bunnia of no particular birth, face and hands leucodermic, and yet a tiger of a man with flashing eye and a voice that could command, another Empire builder, thanks to Sandeman, who threw him and his like while still young into the work, the zest and the responsibilities of Empire building.

But even Sandeman's genius could hardly have shaped such material into Empire builders had the Empire of his vision been a collection of code-ridden, law-ridden provinces, each with its political institutions, Westernizing more and more into English moulds. What Sandeman sought and wrought Colonel Bruce has described; home rule, with the country run as far as may be by the people themselves along the lines of their own immemorial customs, with their social and political institutions, evolving gradually into something better, modernized, instinct with something British yet still Baluch, Brahui, Pathan.

What would have happened had India had not one but half a dozen Sandemans? Not on the frontier—Colonel Bruce has answered that—but rather in India's political nerve centres? Perhaps instead of her politicians looking westward alone for inspiration, and trying to fashion a new India after the image of Westminster, we might have seen India growing into a true Swadeshi Swaraj within the Commonwealth—Oriental yet Westernized; modern, indeed, yet racy of India's ancient soil.

NAWAB SAHIBZADA Sir ABDUL QAIYUM: I have listened with great interest to the lecture of my old friend Colonel Bruce, and I agree with him that something should be done to improve the social and economic conditions of these tribesmen on the border. It does not look dignified for a highly civilized and worldwide Power to claim and possess a certain amount of influence and control over these people, leading a rather primitive life and practically cutting the throats of one another, and to be doing nothing to ameliorate their condition as good and sympathetic neighbours; yes, it does not become this Paramount Power to ignore their backwardness, and not to do anything to improve their condition. But the question is whether the tribes should be controlled by the "close border" or "open border" system. I am not a great believer in words, "close," "open," or anything else, but I do really wish that some real improvement be made in the condition of these people, whether by one system or other-i.e., any system short of occupation of the country and the disarming of the people. I suppose my views in this respect are not very different from those so eloquently expressed by the gallant speaker. I think that my ideas could be brought into line with that of his system, with respect to, at least, some of the tribes. Sir, as far back as 1875 it was felt by the then Viceroy that it was time that the British Government should do something for the improvement of the condition of these people. Perhaps in those days the difficulty was that the boundary between Afghanistan and British India had not been definitely settled, and neither Government could interfere in the affairs of the tribesmen; but in 1893 this question was decided and the Durand Line was demarcated. The Afghan Government availed itself of the opportunity and helped the tribes that fell to their lot by extending their civilizing influences to them, but the Government of India has not yet done anything to improve the condition of the tribes that have come under their sphere of influence. They have not yet decided what should be their permanent policy towards these tribes, and the fact that there was this year a committee sitting at Peshawar dealing with this question shows that they have not yet made up their minds what to do. It is hard on these people that, while they are claimed to be under the influence of the British Empire, they are not deriving the same amount of benefit from the position that they are entitled to and naturally expect.

There is, however, one point which I should like to make quite clear, and it is this: that the idea of self-determination is now deeply rooted in the minds of all Asiatics, and it is on this account that the British Government has fixed that as a goal for India, and has chalked out a road for them to follow and reach the same. If these tribes are within the present-day Indian Empire, and are part and parcel of it, I do not know if the present Government is going to fix another goal and chalk out another road for them to follow and reach that goal. All the Asiatic countries-Japan, Turkey, Persia, and even Afghanistan-are now following the same line, and I wonder if this little tract of land, lying between Afghanistan and India, however free and independent it may look or may be, will like to be out of this general advance! There are tribal organizations and customs among these people for the management of their affairs, and these old institutions or old tribal governments, based on democratic lines, can be easily developed on modern lines. The light in this direction now comes from the West instead of from the East, and everybody should be benefited by that light. I think that even if the British Government were to go up to the Durand Line by the "close" or "open border" system or by peaceful penetration or regular expeditions and annexations, and were to civilize these people by the present-day system of giving them education, etc., they will eventually claim their rights of self-determination and of managing their own affairs. This will be a long process and may fail, so they may as well be encouraged in developing their old institutions of self-government under the light of the new Western system. Their old machinery of self-government cannot suit them for ever, and may be modernized in the light of their new surroundings.

I am sorry I have prolonged the discussion. I must be back to the point, which is that I am in agreement with the gallant speaker inasmuch as that something should be done for these tribes, and a better organization and a better system of settling their own affairs should be devised for them and forthwith introduced, not necessarily by sending expeditions against them or occupying the country, but by sending really honest and sympathetic advisers to them, in the persons of Political Agents, who hold charges of these areas, to give them help and advice as to how to develop their resources and organizations. (Applause.)

Sir Henry Dobbs: I am in entire sympathy with what the lecturer has said and with what Sir Denys Bray has also said, but I detected in the remarks made by Sir Abdul Qaiyum certain hints that there are other points of view, and I thought it might be interesting for a few minutes to tell you of my experience of the difficulty facing us not only on the frontier but also in Iraq, in which I introduced the same system for the management of the tribes, and that is the very great dislike and suspicion of the tribes, tribal organization, and tribal chiefs felt by all educated Orientals who have been brought up in the neighbourhood of towns. This is the case not only in India but in Iraq and also in Turkey and Afghanistan. It is very remarkable, and it is the greatest difficulty which people who are in sympathy with the Sandeman system have to contend against, for they are obliged to use as their instruments to a large extent educated officials of the country, who, more often than not, are in a great hurry to destroy it and to introduce what they think is the better system of centralized and individual control. That is the feeling which does actuate a very large number of Orientals, because they do not realize that the ideals of such men as Colonel Bruce and of Sir Robert Sandeman are not to crystallize and render absolutely permanent the present system of tribal organization, but to keep it from disintegrating too rapidly until a better system is ready to take its place. The educated East, instead of being patient, is the most impatient thing in the world, and cannot find time for gradual development. You find this impatience everywhere. When I was in Kabul, the chief reproach made by King Amanullah against the British was that they were trying to perpetuate the tribal organization and not give the tribes the blessings of civilization. He adopted the opposite policy of destroying the tribal organizations, and we know what the results were for him. That is the explanation of why the Sandeman system is so very difficult to carry out. Unless you have all your instruments in perfect sympathy with Sandeman's ideals, you find constant friction between town-educated people and the ideals and ideas of the tribesmen, and a constant hurry to get rid of the old tribal system. That is what all administrators have to contend with, and that is why some of them think that this system is not likely to be a very permanent one. I think Sir Abdul Qaiyum was really trying to represent to us here the feelings of large numbers of educated Indians who wish to get rid of this system as quickly as possible, and I feel great apprehension as to what will happen when such officials gain a greater control over the administration of the country. Although, therefore, I am a fervent admirer of the Sandeman policy, I am afraid that the future does not look very promising for it.

In closing the meeting the CHAIRMAN said: As a practical administrator with some years of experience behind me it seems to me that if the facts are faced fairly they will speak for themselves. Compare the happenings of the last two years in the Peshawar district, which has been under our direct rule for eighty years under the "close border" system, and the last three years in Waziristan, for so long the Alsatia of the North-West Frontier, a constant source of trouble and disturbance. Since Waziristan has been Sandemanized, all serious raiding has ceased, motor roads have been made through the country connecting the cantonments at Razmak and Wana with the base at Bannu, the making of which incidentally has helped to solve the economic difficulty of the tribesmen to some extent, and outlawry has given place to law and order. But, on the other hand, we can none of us contemplate without shame and humiliation the events of the last two years in the Peshawar district, where a combination of Red Shirts and Congress seditionists was allowed to paralyze the administration and to terrorize Peshawar City for a fortnight. This practical test of the system is the most convincing argument in favour of Colonel Bruce's thesis. I myself cannot question it. The Society is deeply indebted to him for his clear, courageous, but temperate representation of the problem which has baffled us for eighty years. (Applause.)

FROM BALUCHISTAN TO THE MEDITERRANEAN BY CAR*

By C. P. SKRINE, I.C.S.

N March and April, 1931, my wife and I carried out a long-cherished plan in motoring from the Indian railhead at Duzdab (now officially known as Zahedan) to Haifa in Palestine on our way to England. We knew too much about motoring conditions in Turkey and the Balkans to have any great desire to continue the drive through these countries; considerations of time, moreover, decided us to leave the western half of our journey to another occasion.

Our party included besides ourselves Muhammad Azim, our trusty Brahui driver from Kalat State in Baluchistan, and two black-and-white Persian cats in baskets. The project was perhaps a less adventurous one to us than to most of the travellers who had preceded us, in that, having served at Kerman from 1916 to 1919 and in Sistan from 1927 to 1929, I knew the first and least civilized 600 miles of the road (Duzdab—Meshed) thoroughly, and had Persian, Indian, and English friends at various places in Persia and Iraq. Further, I knew well how straight the paths of British travellers are made in Persia by such institutions—I had almost said charitable institutions—as the Legation and Consulates, the Imperial Bank of Persia, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Lastly, we both spoke Persian and French fluently, and had no fear of getting into difficulties with local officials or others.

An unfortunate contretemps at the very outset delayed us a whole week. Torrential rains in February had already, we knew, destroyed the "fair-weather" road between Quetta and Duzdab, hence the necessity of railing ourselves and our car to the latter place; what we had not reckoned on was the railway itself being cut, as it was the very morning we left, by a fall of rock on the line near Galangur,

^{*} On October 21, 1931, Mr. C. P. Skrine gave a lecture to a joint meeting of the Royal Central Asian and Royal Asiatic Societies, "Through Northern and Eastern Persia with a Cine-Camera," illustrated by cinema films and slides, General Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair.

three hours out of Quetta. We ourselves with our baggage transhipped on to a waiting train and proceeded to Duzdab, where we arrived on March 4, only a day late; but the car in its truck had to wait till the following week, for the former service of two trains a week had some time before been reduced to one. We put in the time partly at Mirjawa on the actual Indo-Persian frontier, 56 miles east of Duzdab, where, with the help of a hired car, we put the finishing touches to our exploration of the Kuh-i-Taftan region,* and partly at Duzdab, where we were hospitably entertained by the Vice-Consul, Captain Gastrell, and his wife. As it turned out, we would have been delayed at Duzdab for the same week even if we had arrived there complete with car on the date originally planned; for by the latest of the Persian Government's anti-dumping edicts the import of all foreign goods whatsoever had been temporarily prohibited except on a special permit from Tehran, and it took me just a week to obtain such a permit through the good offices of our Legation. Apart from this new complication, which has probably been resolved long ere now, we had no trouble whatever over the transit of the car through Persia. No deposit against Customs duty was required, only a transit permit, on production of which at the Iraq frontier the Persian Customs authorities released the car after I had paid the usual taxe de séjour at the rate of 8 krans (about 1s. 8d.) per day for the trip.

On Wednesday, March 11, 1931, at 9.10 a.m., we started up the well-remembered Meshed road. Our car, a 16-h.p. 6-cylinder tourer of a well-known British make, was piled high with baggage on the back carrier, on both running-boards, and on each side of the bonnet; for we had with us not only clothes and kit for two months' travel in half a dozen different climates, but light camp furniture and bedding and a box of stores and kitchen utensils. Muhammad Azim also had a good deal of luggage, as he was to spend the summer in Europe with us; and there were also, of course, the cats and their luggage. However, the car had already done nearly 20,000 miles of Persian and Baluch roads in two and a half years and had given no trouble, though systematically overloaded and over-driven, and with a man like Azim to look after it we had no fear as to the capabilities of the car. As it turned out, our confidence was completely justified, for with the exception of a worn universal fibre packing, which only slightly delayed us

^{*} See Geographical Journal for October, 1931.

on the Baghdad—Damascus run and was replaced in a few hours at the latter town, we had throughout the trip no trouble whatever.*

March 11.—Duzdab to Shusp, 184 miles. We found that this section, like most of the rest of the Duzdab-Meshed road, had been thoroughly repaired and remodelled by the Persian Government since we had last travelled over it in October, 1929. The difference compared with the summer of 1927, when we had first motored along it (in a British two-seater), was even more striking. On the 72 miles between Hormukh and Safidawa, for instance, we had in 1927 found the road cut by water in at least 2,000 places, and had accordingly averaged some 8 m.p.h. This time we did from Hormukh to Mukhi Surkh (51 miles) in one and a half hours. Recent rains had again damaged the 21 miles from Mukhi Surkh to Safidawa, and we took an hour to do 11 miles on this stretch; but our average speed for the run to Shusp worked out, even so, at 22 m.p.h. The first petrol depôt (A.P.O.C.) since Duzdab was passed 4 miles north of Khunik (165 miles); petrol and oil were also obtainable at Shusp, where we were pleased to find that the little rest-house, repaired and reorganized by me when Consul in Sistan, had been further improved by my successor. Two simply furnished rooms with bathrooms are reserved for officials travelling in the European style, and an excellent Hazara custodian, recruited by me in 1928, still looks after visitors with great empressement.

March 12.—Shusp to Birjand, 105 miles. Road again in very good order, except for the last 12 miles into Salmabad (40-52 miles), where the spring rains had damaged it. Running time five hours. No water for the first 21 miles but plenty after that. Petrol usually obtainable at Sarbisheh (55 miles) and Mūd (80 miles). At Birjand we were most hospitably entertained by our old friend, Sarkar Amir Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Alem, better known to his many friends of war-time days and after by his old title Shaukat-ul-Mulk. European and Indian travellers can always rely on the doctor-Vice-Consul at Birjand to arrange food and accommodation for them either at the Vice-Consulate or over one of the garages. As a town Birjand should not be judged by the east end of it alone, which is all one sees when entering or leaving it by car; the visitor with an hour or two to spare would do well to drive or walk with a guide through the town and out on to the broad talus of the Bāqarān Hills to the south, whence

^{*} For my views on the subject of British versus American cars in the East, see the Note at the end of this paper.

a very pretty panoramic view can be obtained of Birjand with its

a very pretty panoramic view can be obtained of Birjand with its fine old fort and myriad domed roofs closely packed on little hills, all in a setting of orchards and green fields. A visit may also be paid, if time permits, to one of the carpet-weaving karkhanas (factories), preferably that of Shahzada Muhammad Taqi Khan Mu'tazidi, which is quite a model of its kind. The best carpet-weaving centre in the Qaināt, however, is not Birjand, but the beautiful hill-village of Durukhsh, 25 miles to the east and quite close to the Afghan frontier; the poor-looking hamlet of Mūd, 26 miles down the Duzdab road, is also noted for its rugs and has many small karkhanas.

For any tourist who has a few days to spare at Birjand there are plenty of interesting expeditions to make—e.g., up one or other of the charming glens of the steep-sided Kuh-i-Bāqarān, with their Alpine villages and terraced orchards; to the curious natural subterranean passages of Chinisht, in one of which are to be found human remains of unknown antiquity; to the little hill station of Ab-i-Tursh, with its remarkable medicinal springs; or, best of all, to the beautiful valley of Darmiān, at the mouth of which on a 200-foot crag stand the ruins of Furg, the finest mediæval castle I have seen in Persia. Most of the way to these and other places of interest one can go by car, of the way to these and other places of interest one can go by car, and ponies can easily be arranged for the rest.

March 13.—Birjand to Kidri, 107 miles. We got away from Akbariya (the Shaukat-ul-Mulk's country house just outside Birjand)

at 8.20, but friends at the Vice-Consulate kept us talking, and it was past nine before we were off northwards over the hills. A glorious morning turned very soon to heavy rain and sleet, and the road became a quagmire. There are gradients of I in 6 and even steeper among the hills of Sehdeh and Rūm, and great care had to be taken to avoid skidding on them in the mud. It was an unlucky day. We had our first puncture on the trip (we only had three the whole way to Haifa), and had to mend it in a terrific hailstorm at the very top of a steep pass. Later, while ploughing up a track which the rain had turned into a mountain-torrent, in bitter cold, a big hornet which had somehow got into the car stung D. F. S. on the leg. A third rain-storm hit us just beyond Shahr-i-Qain (the old capital of the Qaināt), and we decided to give up the idea of trying to make Turbat-i-Haidari that day, and to stop at a Persian house we know of at Kidri, a small village in the middle of a wide valley among the fantastically shaped hills of Nīmbulūk. In the balakhana* of this house, which * Upper storey, hence balcony.

belonged as a matter of fact to our late host, Shaukat-ul-Mulk, we made ourselves and the cats quite comfortable with the help of the camp kit and "kitchen" we had fortunately brought with us; the caretaker and his family, pleasant, honest Persian country folk of the best type, supplied us with as much milk, eggs, and firewood as we liked.

March 14.-Kidri to Turbat-i-Huidari, 98 miles. The road from Kidri past the big oasis of Gunabad to Amrani Fort (45 miles) is good and does not seem to be affected much by rain. But the next 11 miles across the dreaded Amrani Plain took us over an hour. The plain is very low-lying and sandy, and the efforts of the Persian Board of Works to carry the road along a narrow causeway across it are not very successful. The causeway consists of mud, loose rocks, and sand, and one staggers and lurches along in ruts of varying depths, into and out of deep pot-holes, and through alternate sand and mud. Such tracks as there are have been made by lorries and cars with a high clearance, and if the under-part of our car had been much less than a foot clear of the ground we should certainly have stuck. As it was, we were continually scraping the top of the roadway. Thanks chiefly to the rains, the whole of the 53 miles from Amrani Fort to Turbat was slow going, but there was only one other really bad bit from 12 to 14 miles north of Maina. It was 5 p.m. before we found ourselves nosing our way through the crowded bazaars of picturesque Turbat-i-Haidari towards the comfortable private house which a hospitable Sikh merchant, Sardar Attar Singh Giani, insists on placing at the disposal of travellers from India.

Objects of interest between Birjand and Turbat included a very old mosque at Shahr-i-Qain with curious flying buttresses; the famous kanat (subterranean aqueduct) of Gunabad, the shafts at the source of which, 27 miles from the oasis, are said to be 1,000 feet deep;* and the beautiful old tomb of Haidari among its plane trees at Turbat.

March 15.—Turbat-i-Haidari to Meshed, 92 miles. Four passes are crossed on this run, the first and third of them having gradients of 1 in 5 on one side or the other. Coming from the south, the third

^{*} I was told this by the local officials when I first visited Gunabad in 1927. They said that the cleaning of these vertical shafts is done by means of a leather rope and bucket, which themselves weigh nearly half a ton. Two men live for days at a time at the bottom, filling and sending up the buckets with earth and stones, and another man lives halfway up in a cell dug out of the side of the shaft, to help in case the bucket sticks. Only seven or eight bucketfuls are brought up in a day, though eight men work at the windlass.

pass is the steepest, but the first is also difficult after snow. The roadway was very slippery, and we ought to have put on the tyre chains we had with us, but we were lazy and did not. As a result, we had to lighten the car and carry several hundredweight of assorted luggage uphill by hand. It was on one of these passes that we saw a novel sight; a broken-down Chevrolet touring car being pushed instead of towed by a lorry—a most dangerous-looking proceeding on a road like that. Though he every now and again slewed round at right angles to the track and had to start again, the driver of the Chevrolet seemed quite happy. We arrived at the comfortable Consulate-General at Meshed in time for tea, having done the 92 miles in six hours running time against the normal four and a half. We had the satisfaction of hearing, however, that ours was the first car which had got through to or from Turbat since the rains, and that two American cars, including a Buick, had stuck and been obliged to return!

March 16.—Halt at Meshed. We knew the Mecca of North Persia well, having twice spent a week there in 1927 and 1928. On this occasion we were the guests of the Consul-General, Colonel Barrett of my Department, and his wife, and spent the day very pleasantly choosing Turkoman rugs for friends at home and taking colour films of the exterior of the famous shrine of Imam Riza. The weather was perfect, and the beauty of the gold and lapis lazuli-coloured domes and minarets of the historic fane against the blue of the sky and the distant snows was unforgettable. It was sad to find that the local authorities, in their zeal for the modernization of their city, had destroyed what had been, after the shrine, the chief beauty of Meshed—the façades of the Bala and Pain Khiabans. One could only be thankful that one had seen these two beautiful old boulevards before they were town-planned out of all recognition.

March 17.—Meshed to Sabzawar, 141 miles. For the first 45 miles the road is bad, especially the 10 miles beyond Sharifabad, where the Turbat road is left. We took three hours over this section, making Qadamgah for lunch. Here there is a very fine seventeenth-century tomb, tiled in all the colours of the rainbow and set like a jewel among spreading planes and ancient firs of great size. It is a qadamgāh or "place of the foot-print" of the Seventh Imam, Riza, hence its name. From 45 miles into Sabzawar the road is quite good, especially through the Jagatai hills, where it is new and well engineered. At Sabzawar we made our first acquaintance with the "garage hotel" of modern Persia. Two-storeyed brick buildings surround one or

more courtyards; below, roomy garages for cars and lorries, a diningroom with a long table and roughly made chairs, the proprietor's office and a few rooms for travellers; above, rows of small bedrooms with doors which can be bolted from the inside (a necessary precaution), none too clean, but not as a rule actually verminous. Furniture, a wooden platform on which to spread one's bedding, a locally carpentered chair and perhaps a small square table. Sanitary arrangements of the most primitive (this is the least pleasant feature of travel in Persia nowadays). We usually paid 5 krans (1s.) each for our rooms and 2 krans for the garaging of the car; supper and breakfast for the three of us, consisting of mutton pilau, fried eggs, tea, and excellent Persian bread, cost at Sabzawar 13\frac{1}{6} krans (2s. 10d.). Petrol in North and East Persia cost us from 26 to 30 krans per four-gallon tin, or, say, 1s. 6d. a gallon on an average.

March 18.—Sabzawar to Damphan, 203 miles. The road is broad and well metalled for 5 or 6 miles, then unmetalled for the most part with short stretches of chaussée. We did 22 miles in the first hour, 20 in the second, and 17 in the third. For the rest we averaged 20 m.p.h. without difficulty, and on the 40 miles between Shahrud and Damghan 27 m.p.h. The trip is a dull one on the whole, mostly dasht or gravel desert, only the plane- and poplar-shaded villages of Mazinan and Maiamai and the huge seventeenth-century castle at Abbasabad breaking the monotony until Shahrud is reached. This is a well-watered picturesque township nestling at the foot of the extreme eastern end of the Elburz chain, the peaks of which were still snowy even on their southern sides.

Arriving at Damghan in pitch darkness we chose the wrong garage, the Massis, instead of the two-storeyed Rezaia, which is the best. The food was not bad-chicken habab, pilau, eggs fried in roghan (a quite inoffensive form of clarified butter used throughout Persia), mast (curds), potatoes, and good Persian flat loaves. No other vegetables but onions at this time of year. But the noise that night was indescribable. A raucous gramophone went on in the "restaurant" till midnight, and started again at dawn. A touring car arrived at about 3 a.m. and decanted an entire Persian family. There was no room, so father parked the squalling baby just outside D. F. S.'s door and proceeded to doss down there himself, until ejected with much vituperation by both of us together.

March 19.—Damghan to Barfurush, 208 miles. One of our objects in motoring through Persia was to cross the Elburz and see the Caspian coast and the forests of Mazanderan. In fact, we had hoped to be able to drive from Meshed via Kuchan and Bujnurd to the Caspian at Asterabad, and on to Tehran via Barfurush and the Firuzkuh; but the Bujnurd section, which had been put in order for the Shah's Meshed trip the autumn before, had been washed away by the early spring rains and we had to give up the idea and cross the Elburz from Semnan to Barfurush instead. This run turned out to be less difficult and strenuous than we had been led to expect, the road being on the whole well laid and smooth; but no one who is not accustomed to narrow and twisty mountain roads should attempt to drive a car over it. The car, too, should be a good hill-climber, otherwise it will not get back over the Elburz passes, which are much steeper on the north than on the south side. As the route is a new one for cars, I will describe it in some detail.

From Damgham to Semnan (72 miles) the going is good, except for a hilly tract between 45 and 57 miles. The last 15 miles into Semnan are one long toboggan-run; we did seven miles in ten minutes with the engine shut off. At Semnan the old caravan route to Tehran (still used by cars but liable to be blocked by mud) goes straight on, while the new Firuzkuh road takes off north-westwards and ascends by a series of easy gradients (maximum 1 in 10) to the foot of the Gur Safid pass. This is quite easy, the maximum gradient being 1 in 7. Next come 15 miles mostly downhill to Amirieh, where there is a garage hotel (accommodation poor) in the middle of a wide grassy plateau at an elevation of about 6,000 feet. Here the roads to Tehran and Barfurush bifurcate, the former passing through Firuzkuh village 21 miles to the west and the latter crossing the main watershed of the Elburz to the north by a pass which is quite easy on the north side, though liable to be blocked by newly fallen snow. We arrived at Amirieh at 2 p.m. (six hours from Damghan, 117 miles) but did not get away till 3.45, as I had to go into Firuzkuh to telephone to Barfurush about our arrival.

Splashing through deep snow slush we reached the bleak police post near the top of the Gaduk Pass (about 7,200 feet) in half an hour and thence crossed the divide without difficulty. The descent on the north side is really steep, the glen being very narrow with no room for elaborate grading. The suddenness of the change from the wide, bare Central Persian landscape to the Alpine scenery and dense beechwood of the Mazanderan gorges is amazing; one can hardly believe one is in the same continent. Eleven miles down the north side we

encountered a curious and unpleasant meteorological phenomenon. Rounding a corner we saw below us a sea of cloud; a few minutes later we dived into it; sun and blue sky were gone and a cold, raw drizzle enveloped us throughout the rest of the drive. We were told at Barfurush that this is quite a common experience, the moisture-laden north winds of the Caspian reaching up to a certain height on the steep sides of the Elburz and no further. Further down, we found ourselves running in the dusk past picturesque wooden farms, through rich pastures and orchards ablaze with blossom alternating with woods of oak, maple, ash, and walnut. Then come dense forests of beech and elm filling deep gorges, the trunks of the great trees clothed in thick moss and the ground beneath them carpeted with yellow and pink primroses. Some of the gradients in this section are very steep, 1 in 5 or 6, but none of them are more than 200 or 300 hundred yards long.

Then the country opens out again, and at 190 miles Aliabad is reached. Here the road bifurcates, one branch going north to Barfurush and the other east to the provincial capital, Sari, and on to the terminus of the new trans-Persian railway at the port of Bandar-i-Gaz. Construction of the line has reached Aliabad, and trains run weekly between this place and the terminus. The thought of what it is going to cost to carry the railway over or under the Elburz from Aliabad to Tehran is staggering. From here to Barfurush (18 miles) the country is flat and marshy and the road fairly good, though liable to inundation. We got in by 8 p.m. (ten hours' running time for the 208 miles from Damghan) and found our way without difficulty to the Imperial Bank of Persia, the hospitable manager of which, Mr. Sheehan, and his wife made us welcome. They were the only English people in Barfurush at the time.

March 20-22.—Halt at Barfurush. The rain continued for two days after our arrival at Barfurush, and then, just as we were preparing to recross the Elburz without having seen anything properly, it cleared up and the sun shone, bringing out marvellously the rich colours of the Manzanderan countryside, of the quaint brick-and-wood houses and mosques, and of the picturesque kilted costumes of the peasant women. Among other expeditions we motored down the 12 miles of indifferent road to Meshed-i-Sar on the Caspian, the port of Barfurush, ferried the car across a small river and drove for several miles on a narrow unmetalled road along the back of the sand dunes which line the Caspian shore. It is possible to motor the whole 200

miles to Resht, and we were advised at Barfurush to try it; the previous autumn a car had come through in twelve hours' running time. But nobody could tell us for certain whether the rickety wooden bridges over the numerous rivers were all in repair, nor how much damage had been done to the entirely unmetalled road by the winter rains, nor about petrol and accommodation for the night *en route*. So we decided not to risk it, though we longed to see the magnificent coastal scenery further west where the Elburz comes steeply down to the Caspian shore, and contented ourselves with picnicking among the dunes and wandering round a charming little fishing village of thatched cottages standing on emerald meadows, Ferikanār.

March 23.—Barfurush to Tehran, 176 miles. On the morning of our departure the snowy chain of the Elburz shone out clear as crystal against the blue of the southern sky, 50 to 70 miles away, the magnificent cone of Demavend (18,600 feet) towering grandly above his flat-topped neighbours. Out came cine- and still cameras, and I joyfully added one more telepanorama to my collection of the great ranges of Asia, which already included the Himalaya, the Karakoram, the Chinese Pamirs, the Trans-Alai, the Kunlun, and the Tien Shan.

Leaving at 9.30 and driving unhurriedly, with several halts to pick violets and primroses and take photographs and eat our lunch, we arrived at Amirieh once more at 4.15. The last few miles to the top of the pass are very stiff indeed, especially when the road is heavy with snow and slush. The lowest of our four gears—and it is very low—was needed for the last mile of the ascent, where the gradients are from 1 in 8 to 1 in 5, with hardly a break. Yet in spite of a following wind we only boiled just at the top, where the snow was piled higher than our heads on either side of the road.

After a short halt for petrol at Amirieh we drove on through the curiously Swiss-looking village of Firuzkuh towards Tehran, 90 odd miles away, thinking our troubles were over. But 6 miles beyond Firuzkuh we came to a series of boggy patches, at each of which one or more lorries were stuck, canted over in the mud at alarming angles. One of these effectively blocked the road, and in trying to "rush" a passage past it we ourselves subsided gracefully into mud well over our axles. It was lucky that we had brought a spade with us all the way from India, for without half an hour's hard work with it on the part of Azim and myself we would not have got out of the mud that night. The prospect of leaving the car unguarded and walking 6 miles back in a bitter wind, without our luggage, to the

shelter of a Firuzkuh garage was not inviting. Finally, with the help of three or four passers-by, we pushed the car out of the bog, after which we just managed to steer it through mud nearly as deep past two more derelict lorries. It was now dark, and the four hours from there to Tehran were among the coldest and dreariest I have ever spent motoring. The road, though quite good, is not easy driving in the dark, as it is very hilly and has many hairpin bends. With what joy did we at last, at 10.30 p.m., find ourselves passing under the Shemran Gate of Tehran-only to be stopped by the police and kept waiting a solid hour while our papers were examined and long telephone conversations went on with the local Scotland Yard! Escaping finally, we asked our way to an hotel which we had been recommended and went to bed, after a supper of Bovril and biscuits, well past midnight. At that hour and after such a day we were not too inquisitive as to the cleanliness and sanitary arrangements of the hotel, which was just as well.

March 24-27.—Halt at Tehran. The morning after our arrival we were rescued from our hotel, not a moment too soon, by a kindly Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Raymond Parr, and taken off to the Legation, where we were given a royal time and shown the sights of Tehran and its neighbourhood. Space forbids a description of these, and I will only say that the imperial gardens of Sultanetabad with the snows of the Elburz mirrored in their quiet waters, the peaceful precincts of ancient Rey, and the view of far-off Demavend rising above the pine-fringed castle of the Qājārs are alone worth motoring across Persia to see.

March 28.—Tehran to Dilijan, 150 miles. The road between Tehran and Isfahan is well up to European standards, and the 270 miles can be done without difficulty in one day; but we thought we would do it comfortably and spend the night at Dilijan, where we were told there was a tolerable garage hotel. The latter report proved to be incorrect, and we wished we had done the journey in one. There is, I believe, an A.P.O.C. depôt 13 miles on the Tehran side of Dilijan which is quite clean and a much better place to spend the night, provided one has obtained permission from the company's office at the capital. Our actual running time between Tehran and Isfahan was only ten and a half hours. The only place worth stopping at on the way is Qūm, second to Meshed alone among the holy places of Persia and famous for the beautiful shrine of the Prophet's daughter-in-law Fatima.

March 29.—Dilijan to Isfahan, 120 miles. The road is better than ever, but very dull, though the approach to the great oasis of Isfahan is impressive on a clear day. We put up at the first decently clean and well-run hotel we had come across in Persia, the Amérique in the Khiaban-i-Charbagh.

March 30.—Halt at Isfahan. I had often been told that Isfahan, the mediæval capital of Persia and the seat of government of the great Shah Abbas, was by far the finest town in the country from the point of view of the tourist, and I now found that the statement was no exaggeration. The Masjid-i-Shah, the Maidan, the domed bazaars, the sacred colleges, the Palace of the Forty Columns (there are really only twenty, but you see twenty more mirrored in the lake), and Shah Abbas' wonderful bridge-dam known as the Pul-i-Qaju, are among the finest existing specimens of mediæval Persian architecture. There is an old-world, academic, dignified atmosphere about Isfahan which is notably lacking in certain other Persian towns I could name. True, its glory has departed; but there is plenty of life in Isfahan yet, as you will see if you walk down the Khiaban-i-Charbagh of an evening and mingle with the crowds that promenade beneath the plane trees.

March 31.—Isfahan to Sultanabad, 207 miles. Returning on our tracks to Dilijan, we turned off westwards along a narrow but quite good unmetalled road which brought us, after many twists and turns, to Sultanabad. From the map I thought the distance from Dilijan to Sultanabad would be no more than 60 miles, but so circuitous is the route, especially between Mahallat and Mian-i-Rudan, that we found we had covered 87 by the time we got in. This was well after dark, and we were disappointed to find Sultanabad's one hotel, the Amérique, full up. The manager found some absolutely bare and rather chilly rooms for us on the upper floor of an empty house opposite, and we camped as best we could in these. Afterwards we found that we had been lucky; some English people we met at Kermanshah told us that they had spent a night in the hotel itself, and had been eaten alive!

Sultanabad is an important centre of the carpet trade and has broad, well-kept streets and a general air of prosperity and progressiveness.

April 1.—Sultanabad to Kermanshah via Malayer and Kangāver, 186 miles. This route saves a day compared with that via Hamadan, but the short-cut from Jokhar to Kangāver (45 miles) is little more than

a cart-track and very rough and hilly. We wasted three-quarters of an hour before the start finding the telegraph office at Sultanabad and wiring to a non-existent hotel at Kermanshah for rooms, so that we did not get away till 9.20, arriving at Kermanshah exactly twelve hours later.

Leaving Sultanabad the road is wide and good, with one steep hill (1 in 7) at 4-5 miles, till Daulatabad (28 miles, 11 hours). The country in spring closely resembles the Pamirs, with lofty snowcapped ranges separated by broad flat valleys dotted with villages and clumps of willows and poplars on the banks of swift, clear streams. At Daulatabad the road becomes narrower and turns up a valley to the left on to a still higher plateau. Crossing an almost imperceptible divide it descends a long valley to the big village of Malayer (63 miles, 23 hours). Taking the left-hand road when nearly through the town—the one which goes straight on, past a big mediæval castle, leads to Pur among the mountains and is a cul-de-sac-we came to Jokhar village (75 miles). Here we left the main Hamadan road and struck across fields to the west, lurching and bumping for several miles along a very soft carttrack. Then came a difficult ascent of 1 in 5 with a bad surface, just about as much as the overloaded car could do. We took an hour to do 13 miles; then the track improved somewhat and we averaged 16 for the remaining 32 miles through the pleasant green uplands of Nihāvand to Kangāver.

Here we found ourselves in the main Tehran—Baghdad road and our troubles—at least those connected with natural obstacles—over. After tea and a fill-up of petrol we bowled down the broad *chaussée* in the dark at 35-40 m.p.h. until we were below the great rock of Bisitūn, famous for its trilingual inscription, which, alas! we were unable to see. Here, thanks to a burnt-out dynamo-brush, our lights gave out; but so good was the road and so bright the moon that we covered the last 24 miles into Kermanshah in an hour all the same. At Kermanshah we found a quite fair hotel, the Bristol, to make up for the non-existence of the Hotel Bain-ul-Nahrain, which the inn-keeper at Sultanabad had recommended to us.

April 2.—Halt Kermanshah. After the bright sunshine and clear air of the day before it was disappointing to wake up to a leaden sky and high, dust-laden winds which blotted out the rugged mountains of Kurdistan and made photography impossible. None the less we explored the bazaars thoroughly in the morning, and after lunch drove out to the marvellous Sassanian rock carvings at Tāq-i-Bostān, 4 miles

north-east of the town. These should on no account be missed by travellers passing through Kermanshah for the first time, however hurried. Apart from the carvings themselves, which are said to be finer than those of Bisitun, the sight of a complete river gushing out from under a perpendicular cliff hundreds of feet high is most impressive.

Friends in the Imperial Bank of Persia and in the Customs office made our short stay at Kermanshah very pleasant. We were particularly fortunate in finding an old Duzdab friend in the (Belgian) Rais-i-Gumrukh (Director of Customs), who, with much signing of documents and telephoning to the frontier, enabled us to clear our car and baggage next day with a minimum of trouble and delay.

April 3.—Kermanshah to Khaniqin, 160 miles. The road to the

April 3.—Kermanshah to Khaniqin, 160 miles. The road to the frontier was not in such good repair as east of Kermanshah, and we averaged only 20 m.p.h. most of the way. Having decided to take the night train from Khaniqin to Bagdad, rather than try to motor through in one day (235 miles), we were in no hurry, and enjoyed our last day's run in Persia to the full. The weather was perfect once more, and the country looked its best. I shall never forget the view over the foothills towards Iraq from the edge of the plateau of Kurdistan, nor the descent by a well-engineered but alarmingly steep corniche road to the flowery plains of Qasr-i-Shirin. Every now and again we passed parties of Kurdish tribesmen, encamped in their black tents or on the march to their summer grazings; at one of their camps we spent an hour chatting with the men and filming the women milking the sheep.

At Qasr-i-Shirin we were close to the frontier, and officious gendarmes wasted twenty minutes of our time because my passport did not give my father's name (there being no place for it on the form). Shaking them off, we ran on to Khusravi on the actual frontier; here half an hour was taken up with the discharge of formalities connected with the car, including the payment of taxe de séjour on it at Krs. 8 a day while in Persian territory—some £2 in all. A mile or so on we came to the Iraq frontier post, manned by burly gendarmes in Glengarry caps, which looked odd to us after a month of the képi-like "Pahlavi hats" of Persia. We were kept another half-hour here, and at Khaniqin, which is now connected with the frontier by an excellent metalled road, nearly an hour was taken up with quarantine, Customs, and passport formalities. Reaching the railway station at last at 8 p.m. we treated ourselves and Azim to dinner at the excellent

canteen restaurant, loaded the car on to a truck, and made ourselves comfortable for the night in our sleeping compartment. We could not in any case have continued by car to Baghdad that night, as motoring is not allowed along the Baghdad road in the dark; and as we had to spend the night somewhere, we thought we might as well spend it in the train, which conveniently takes seven hours to do the 80 miles. But it is not cheap; Rs. 32 (£2 6s. 2d.) for a first-class ticket and Rs. 41 (£3 1s. 6d.) for the car. It certainly pays to leave Kermanshah in time to reach Qasr-i-Shirin not less than five hours before sunset and thus get through to Baghdad the same night.

We were now on beaten, though by no means always smooth, tracks, and it is unnecessary to give a daily itinerary of our onward journey to Haifa. On April 6-7 we crossed the 520 miles of desert between Baghdad and Damascus in twenty-four and a half hours (20) hours running time) with one of the twice-weekly convoys. Driving one's own car, the trip is definitely one to do once-for the experience—and no more. There is no made road beyond Ramadi (70 miles) until you get to the Damascus oasis, and you charge along hour after hour, now dodging bushes and sand dunes and outcrops of rock at 12-20 m.p.h., now scudding smoothly over clay plain at 45, till the sun sets and you come to the amazing fortress-hotel at Rutba Wells, literally 200 miles from anywhere. Here you are allowed an hour and a half or so for a wash and dinner, and off you go again at 8 p.m. with the roughest section of the whole route ahead of you. Never shall I forget those first four hours of the night, bumping and crashing along in clouds of dust from the car in front (to make matters worse, the Buick which was guiding us had no tail-light and I had only the reflection of its headlights to follow), expecting each moment to butt into a sandhill or nose-dive over a bluff. By midnight we had done 102 miles, and treated ourselves to twenty-five minutes' halt; then on again, thankful to find the surface steadily improving. In the small hours a curious thing happened. The car was humming across an immense smooth plain at some 40 m.p.h., D. F. S., Azim, and the cats all asleep. Suddenly I noticed that the North Star, which had been on my right ever since Rutba, had swung round to the near side of the car. Puzzled, I put on a spurt and managed with difficulty to catch up the Buick, tooting my horn. No reply. I drew quite close and tooted again, several times. Then it stopped, and the (English)

driver poked his head out and asked what was the matter. "Are you sure we are on the right track?" I enquired. "Look at the stars." "Good Lord, we're going back to Baghdad!" he cried, and without further ado he "stepped on the gas," turned right round and shot off westwards into the night! He had obviously dozed off at the wheel and, as always happens on these occasions, had steered the car in a wide circle. There we had been, for five or ten minutes perhaps, six of us in two cars dashing over the desert at 40 miles per hour, and only one of us awake! The Buick had the legs of us and, having lost time, made use of them; we did not see it again till 30 miles from Damascus, when, having missed the Customs post at Shammar, we halted for a cup of tea while the rays of the rising sun lit up exquisitely the snows of the Anti-Lebanon ahead of us. In due course the convoy, which had spent the usual hour or so over coffee and Customs formalities at Shammar, came up with us, to the relief of the Buick's driver. Eight a.m. saw us entering Damascus rather slowly and gingerly, for the tremendous vibration of the last 500 miles had accentuated the "juddering" caused by a worn fibre-packing in our universal joint, noticed first at Kermanshah but not properly diagnosed. The worn part was replaced in a few hours at Damascus and the trouble cured, but we were lucky perhaps that it did not begin seriously to affect our speed till near the end of the desert run.

The rest of the trip calls for no comment. The excellent roads of French Syria were a treat after the desert, and the glories of Damascus and Baalbek the fulfilment of a dream long cherished. Nor shall we soon forget the feast of colour at a village fête on which we stumbled in the Lebanon, nor the wild flowers on the beautiful coast road between Beyrouth and Acre. From Haifa, for the modest sum of £12, we shipped the car by cargo-boat to Manchester and proceeded ourselves by train to Port Said en route for Marseilles. Since leaving Duzdab exactly a month before we had covered 3,135 miles in eighteen running days, at a cost of 145 gallons of petrol and about 11 of oil. Thanks to the admirable way in which Azim had looked after the car, we had had no breakdowns and not more than three or four pounds to pay for running repairs. Depreciation on the car was negligible, for I got very much the same price for the car when I sold it six months later in England as I would have obtained for it in any case. From Baluchistan to the Mediterranean, therefore, if not perhaps beyond, we travelled very much more cheaply than we would have by rail and steamer—and how much more interestingly!

NOTE ON BRITISH CARS IN THE EAST

For years past I have been chaffed by my English friends in India for my adherence to British cars in the East. Ninety-five per cent. of English car-users in Northern India will tell you that British cars are far inferior to American for use on rough roads and tracks under Asiatic conditions. They are under-engined, they overheat, they have insufficient clearance, they don't "stand up" to the roads, etc. In nearly every case you will find that the maker of this sort of sweeping statement has little or no personal experience of driving a British car over long distances in the East, and that he is speaking from hearsay. If you could trace the source of the hearsay, you would find in most cases that it was the local agent of one of the big American car manufacturers. The truth is, that ever since the Americans in President Coolidge's time made their great and successful bid for the cheap car market in four continents, the British car trade with its nineteenthcentury ideas of salesmanship has had to struggle against American organization and distribution methods. As an example of these latter I may mention that in three different towns in North India I have walked into a motor shop and have asked about some British car of which the proprietor advertised himself as the agent. In each case I was advised not to try the British car, as it had all or most of the faults mentioned above, but to buy an American car sold by the firm as its main line. In each case I found that one specimen only of the British car was kept as a kind of object-lesson, no attempt being made to sell it; whereas the same shopkeeper was obliged by contract to sell a minimum number of the American firm's cars. On the one British car, if sold, he would make 10 or at most 15 per cent. profit; on the American cars, provided he fulfils his contract, he might make 40 or 50 per cent., at any rate on some of them. If, in order to fulfil his contract, he sells the last few cars of the batch at far below retail price, no questions are asked. Is it surprising that he and his like should decry British cars and advise their customers to buy American? As for the customer, you cannot blame an impecunious British officer or civilian, much less an Indian, for not buying British if a cheap and remarkably solid-looking American car is shoved under his nose and he is told by his garage and all his friends that a British car at the same price will go less well and that when it breaks down (as it soon will) no spare parts will be obtainable within six months. All's fair in commercial war no less than in the other kind, and the

British trade has only its own lack of enterprise and organization to thank if the Asiatic market, which might easily have provided work for half our present unemployed in an enormously expanded motor industry, has been lost. There is nothing wrong with the cars we do make, at any rate with those made by the few firms which pay some attention to the overseas market. I have driven four different kinds of British car for many thousands of miles in Persia and Baluchistan, as well as several different American makes, and my experience is that if you choose your model with care and insist on certain features, such as high clearance, a big radiator and extra spring-leaves, you will in the long run get as good if not better value for your money if you buy a British rather than a foreign make. After all, we make the best petrol engines in the world, and in coachbuilding also we are acknowledged supreme. Is it surprising that even in the cheaper grades our cars should be at least as good as American, French, or Italian?

In 1927-1928 I introduced British cars and lorries into East Persia, importing three different makes of touring car and a six-wheeler lorry myself and inducing several people, Persian, Indian, and British, to "buy British." In every case, except that of one car which was badly treated from the first by an opium-smoking driver, the results have been most satisfactory. But no interest has been taken in these sales by the makers or distributors concerned, nor has any attempt been made to follow up the advantage gained. The Persian market, it is true, is small compared with India. But not even in India, apart from a few big towns, is any serious attempt being made by British manufacturers to challenge American competition, or even to get at those who ought to be their best allies—British military and civilian owner-drivers.

A word on the interesting subject of spare parts. It is a commonplace in the East that, whereas "spares" for the cheaper American makes of car can be bought in every town, you have to write to England and wait months to replace a broken or defective part of an English car. There is something in this complaint; the failure of British firms to supply their overseas agents with sufficient stocks of spare parts on favourable terms is a real obstacle to progress. But there are two sides to the question. It is America which has taught the world to demand a plentiful and ubiquitous supply of "spares" for its cars. The idea is a good one; you induce a man to buy a car by offering it to him at little more than cost price, and he goes on buying spare parts for it and its successors for the rest of his life. Few people in this country realize the volume and importance of the spare-part trade overseas. I remember talking in 1929 to a well-known Muhammadan merchant at Duzdab who a year previously had been the biggest importer of American cars in East Persia. I asked him whether he was still selling as many cars as ever. "Oh no," he said, "I have given up selling cars. I deal solely in spare parts nowadays. I had a turnover of more than Rs. 10,000 in all makes last month alone." Comment is needless.

My experience is that, owing to the superior quality of the steel and other alloys used, British cars as a rule do not require nearly so many replacements as their foreign rivals of the same grade. Moreover, it is seldom really necessary to send home for a "spare"; Indian and Persian workshop mechanics are amazingly clever, and you can get almost anything copied if you know where to go. I once got an important part of a magneto copied perfectly at Meshed in a few days. But it is too late now to start educating the world up to British cars. The demand for spare-part "service" must be reckoned with and supplied if we are to make up any appreciable portion of the ground lost.

NOTE ON THE PRESERVATION OF PERSIAN FAUNA

From Colonel R. L. Kennion, C.I.E.

As it is my misfortune not to be able to be present on October 21 to hear Mr. Skrine lecture on his journey across Persia, I am venturing a few remarks in writing about a subject in which I am sure many members of the Society are feeling some concern. I allude to the gradual disappearance of wild Persian fauna, both birds and beasts. In a book of sporting reminiscences published twenty years ago I wrote: "As usual, game in different localities is plentiful or scarce, according to the distance from inhabited centres. The effect of the importation of modern rifles has already become apparent in some parts, and unless measures are taken to preserve game its disappearance is a matter of time. It is not easy to see what can be done to avert this deplorable contingency. To press game preservation on a Government that in some provinces at least is unable to collect its own taxes would seem futile. Mere laws, moreover, in the present state of Persia would do no good. In some parts they would be simply inoperative, in others only a fresh weapon for extortion in the

hands of officials. It is one of Persia's questions, albeit a minor one, and the solution hangs on that of other and graver problems. Meanwhile, birds and beasts will have to wait—if they can."

Well, under the present progressive and energetic régime some of the graver problems referred to have been solved, others are in process of solution. But so far as I am aware nothing has been done to protect Persia's birds and beasts. Yet the protection of indigenous fauna is undoubtedly one of the trusts that devolve on civilized Governments as stewards for posterity.

It is indeed a depressing thing when travelling through Persia to notice the deforestation that is going on in so many parts, and along with deforestation the careless destruction of game animals. Is there one pair of lions left in Persia? A writer in the Field a few weeks ago reported that a pair had been seen near Dizful by-I think-an engineer on the new railway. May it be true, for if so, there may vet be a chance of saving the Persian lion. At one time lions in Kathiawar were similarly reduced to a single pair, but happily steps were then taken just in time. Is there a single pair left of the fallow deer that used to exist in the same locality? What a tragedy if these races were to disappear altogether! The wild ass is bound up in one's mind with Persian fable and history, but the few that remain owe nothing to humanity. Shot over water-holes or in any other unsporting way, a remnant have been driven to the remotest corners of Persian deserts. The same is true, perhaps to a less extent, of another animal that figures in Persian romance, the gazelle, formerly numerous everywhere. The beasts of the Elburz, the unique Persian tiger, the maral stag, that splendid wild sheep, ovis arkal: if, as I believe to be the case, order has now been established in Mazanderan, these animals can hardly survive for long. Kurds and Turkoman, relieved from the obligation of shooting one another, will make short work of them. Yet Mazanderan-indeed, the length of the Caspian littoral, with its forests and its fauna-might be a Persian Kashmir. As for the Persian wild goat (the famous bezoar goat) and the wild sheep formerly found on every hill, they may hold out for a time on the remoter ranges, but without game laws their disappearance is none the less certain. What chance has any animal against man armed with modern rifles, "his wanton will his guide"? All nonmigratory game birds in Persia are threatened with the same fate.

Not only from an ethical and humanitarian point of view is this state of affairs regrettable, but for economical considerations also.

Game animals and birds form a useful source of food supply and are also the means of attracting money to the country through the tourist and the sportsman. In Persia, moreover, unlike some other countries, I think I am right in saying that the existence of game animals and birds does not in the least conflict with the interests of the peasantry.

As to what ought to be done, I suppose that the initial step should be the introduction of laws for the protection of animals and birds; that is, to regulate by law, or in some cases to prohibit, their killing and taking, both as regards methods and reasons. It is, of course, one thing to pass laws and another to enforce them, and it may be admitted that in Persia there are great difficulties in the way, particularly in tribal areas. But the same was true of Kashmir, especially the remoter parts "beyond the passes," before game laws were introduced there, and introduced with the greatest success. On this point, as on the desirability of subsidiary measures such as restrictions on the possession of firearms, sanctuaries, licences, and so on, it is not for the foreigner to make suggestions. Given the will, however, on the part of Persia's ruler, one can hardly doubt that measures suitable to the country's needs could be devised.

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ISLAM IN NORTH-WEST CHINA TO-DAY*

By THE REV. G. FINDLAY ANDREW, O.B.E.

ANSU is considered the most north-westerly of the provinces of China, but if one looks at a map of China - carefully and draws diagonals across China and its dependencies you will find that they intersect in the very heart of this province of Kansu, a few miles east of the city of Lanchow. Kansu is therefore, I claim, one of the most interesting and important provinces of China, although one of the least known. I have had the pleasure of working as a missionary there for some twenty odd years, and during the last two or three years Kansu has been put upon the map by the occurrence of one of the most tremendous famines imaginable. I was recalled to Kansu from a position I was then occupying temporarily in the China Inland Mission School in Chefoo, to try and determine the causes of the famine and the prevailing conditions and to formulate, if possible, some means of relief. In 1929 and again in 1930 I was up in Kansu passing through scenes and experiences which I will describe as concisely as possible, but which were unbelievable and inconceivable. Kansu is, as far as Moslem interests are concerned, the most interesting province of the eighteen, as being the home of "Hwei-Hwei." Throughout China the name Hwei-Hwei is applied generally to Moslems, but whereas in many of the provinces nearer the coast you will find that the followers of the Prophet are generally those who have been converted to the faith of Islam, in Kansu you come in contact with a people as foreign in origin as those who are to-day visitors to the country, as foreign as you or I, although they have been resident for some hundreds of years. "Hwei-Hwei" means "to go back upon one's track," or the returners. There is no need to remind you that in the early centuries of our era China had

^{*} Lecture given on November 4, 1931. In the absence of Lord Lloyd the chair was taken by Sir Harry Fox. In introducing the lecturer, the Chairman said: No one is as fit to speak of this innermost and far-off province of China, a province known by name to so many but accessible to so few, and lately shattered by a terrible earthquake and by the repeated incursions of bandits. No one could visualize the scenes through which Mr. Andrew has passed in his work. The Society was most grateful to him for lecturing while on his short leave.

a very definite intercourse with the West and with Arabian and Persian culture as Sir Aurel Stein and other archæologists have shown. An interesting side-light was thrown upon those early times through that great earthquake which occurred on the night of December 16, 1020, and which has been rightly described as the most terrific shock ever seismographically recorded. I was sent up to do the reconstruction relief work following that catastrophe, a catastrophe which wiped out a million people in ten minutes' time. I found that one of the shocks had opened an ancient grave, and from that grave we took some six pots absolutely foreign to any Chinese culture of its kind, alike in shape of vessels, colour, and design. Professor J. G. Andersen, the Swedish scientist, in his book "The Dragon and Foreign Devil in China," describes his sensation when he saw those pots, for they are of pure Babylonian culture. We have his guarantee that these pots belong to exactly the same period as those unearthed in Susa, and he traced on them the most elementary hieroglyphics. Those pots are from 4,000 to 4,500 years old, and the British Museum as well as the Metropolitan Museum in New York and the Stockholm Museum have complete sets, for we unearthed a large number of them. In early times, therefore, this great trail from the Caspian Sea through Central Asia to China was a known route, and in the early centuries of Christianity it was a welltravelled road.* As early as the fifth and sixth centuries we know of Arabs who penetrated China by this route as well as by sea. We have one record of the visit of an Arab embassy to China during the lifetime of the Prophet. The embassy, which landed at Canton, visited the court of the Emperor at Ch'ang An in Shensi, and from there the ambassadors attempted the overland journey through Central Asia and Persia to Arabia. In accordance with the common usages of the Chinese the Emperor sent an escort to accompany them for several days on their journey, and these Arabs, who knew none of the finer terms of courtesy, when they begged the escort to return, used the words "Hwei-Hwei," to return, instead of the more polite terms; and from that day to this they and their descendants have been known as the Hwei-Hwei, the returners.

Passing down through history I need only touch upon the relationships which, you remember, existed between China and Arabia in those early years. We know, for instance, that during the T'ang dynasty from A.D. 618 to 907 there were frequent embassies travelling

^{*} Dr. Andersen calls it the Eurasian highway. See C.A.S.J., 1929, Vol. XVI., p. 191.

between Arabia, Persia, and China, and at one time a Persian king, Firuz, came to Ch'ang An, where he sought refuge and later his son accepted a position in the imperial bodyguard, and is buried outside that city. It is from the Arab-Persian source that we have evolved one of the three distinct classes of Moslems resident in Kansu to-day, a people who have retained through the centuries to the present day their distinct facial features, customs, mannerisms, and have a common vocabulary of Arabic and Persian terms, which is current among them and covers all the usages of ordinary social etiquette. I understand that in that vocabulary the Persian predominates. Whereas in the mosque you always hear the sacred name of God used, outside it is Hudda, which I understand is Persian. You will never hear the mullah referred to outside the mosque by any other name but ahung, Persian for teacher. So with tohsi for brother, which is always used as a greeting still running current in that far away province among these people. This is one branch of the Hwei-Hwei in Kansu. The second and possibly more interesting is known as the Salar branch. It is of purely Turkish origin, having come out from Samarkand in the fourteenth century. The story goes that in Samarkand they had proved themselves such uncongenial neighbours that they were expelled by their then ruler, a descendant of the Prophet, who sent them out of the country under a leader. He gave them a white camel, a bag of earth, and a cruse of water. They were to follow their leader on the white camel, and he would take them to a place where the earth was of the same nature as that given them and the water of the same nature as that in the cruse. There they would make their new home. After months, and possibly years, of wandering through the deserts of Central Asia they came to a site just south of the Yellow River, where they found an outline on the side of the hill in the form of a white camel, and while they were gazing on that their own white camel, which had lain down, turned into a white stone, also in the perfect form of a camel. Applying their tests and finding them both to hold good they appreciated the fact that they had now arrived after this long wandering at the site of their new home. That stone is still in existence and I saw it last year. In their mosque are deposited two of the sacred volumes they brought on that long trek; the tomb of their leader is also preserved. One of the most noticeable things about these people is that they have retained throughout the centuries their own distinct and ancient form of the Turkish language, which can be readily understood by a visitor from

Turkey to-day. During the war people without any knowledge of Chinese were able to come from Europe, land at Shanghai, and pass on from Moslem community to Moslem community until they arrived in this far distant part, two thousand miles from Shanghai, where they found themselves at once in familiar surroundings, among a people who spoke their own language, and with whose customs they were thoroughly conversant. Down to the present day the women have retained the peculiar dress of the Samarkand women, and wear the great turban which used to be common in Samarkand. women in this "Turkish" district of Kansu are a striking contrast with the weaker breed of Chinese women, not only in their dress but in their physique; they have large feet, and are able to go out on the road and follow the armies in the field. They wear a broad style of trousers heavily braided, and retain exactly that costume and form of dress which they brought with them in the fourteenth century. They have held this district since they settled there and refuse to be absorbed by the Chinese or their co-religionists. By reason of their fanaticism and their fierce nature they are feared, not only by the Chinese but by the two other classes of their co-religionists.

The third group of Moslems are to me the most interesting. I have not sufficient data to prove it, but I think their own tradition is true, and they are the descendants of the Uighur branch of the Hun family. They have the hilly district just south-west of Lanchow. They speak an ancient form of the Mongol dialect that, as far as I know, is not understood by any Chinese scholar of note or any foreigner. Going into their records, and as far as I have been able to communicate with them through interpreters, I find they were in Kashgaria in the sixth century. They were then Buddhists. Later, they were converted to Christianity by the Nestorians and moved to Hami, where they were living in A.D. 732 at the time when the Battle of Tours settled the question of Moslem ascendancy in the West. They moved to Tarfan and there became converted to Islam, at a later period they moved down to the district which they now occupy, a district which they have retained, holding it against all comers and all challengers. The names there are absolutely free of any Chinese influence: Ch'ih-si-la-wu is one of the big market villages, Ie-song-ta-pan is another. K'oh-tso and So-na-pa are other names, and there are many such names entirely of foreign origin to Chinese. From these three sources has evolved the present-day Kansu Moslem. Possibly out of a total of ten million people in the province some three million are Moslems, and they are rapidly gaining the ascendancy in political power. Up to the beginning of the Manchu dynasty they lived more or less at peace with their neighbours, but from 1644, when the Manchu dynasty came in, there seems to have been one long series of troubles with the Moslems. They have been welded together in the bond of fellowship that is in Islam, but they are divided into many sects, and their sectarian differences have ever proved their weakness, and whereas so many of these disturbances, revolts (call them what you like), seem to have generated through Chinese interference in their own religious quarrels, without exception those disturbances have been quelled by their own sectarian differences, which gave the Chinese Government an opportunity of dividing their ranks. Thus the sectarian quarrels among them have been really the margin of safety for the Chinese Government. But whatever the situation in Kansu, the Moslems have always wielded considerable influence at the Central Government in China, alike at Peking or at present at Nanking.

A few words as to the different sects will bring us up to the main theme of the evening, the present-day history of Kansu Hwei-Hweiism. I think I have stated that these sects are many and arise from the most trivial differences, such as whether they should conform to Moslem custom in the wearing of side whiskers, for no Chinese should wear a moustache until over forty years of age, and so on. The pilgrimage to Mecca will bring back pilgrims with an innovation which they want to introduce into their own homes, and all this results in the formation of endless new sects, so that whereas most of the Hwei-Hwei remain members of the old sect, there are almost numberless new modern sects. One of the most recent and interesting of these has arisen in the south of the province in T'aochow. It is centred round a man who in his lifetime passed through an experience very similar to that of Mohammed. There was the retirement to a cave where he saw visions, the Hejira, which meant for him a long pilgrimage up to Central Asia and the return; he professed to receive revelations. This man died in 1914 and his nephew, a man named Min, took his place as leader of his followers. I made his acquaintance in 1917 in a Chinese prison where I had gone to interview a man claiming British nationality. My attention was attracted to a double line of Moslems standing in front of the bars which shielded off an inner section of the prison. I noticed them going through all the prostrations of their worship. I went up,

looked inside the bars, and saw two men sitting on a brick divan surrounded by valuable furs and furnishings. I asked who they were. One man seemed to be accepting the devotion offered to him in the most matter-of-fact way. I was informed that he was Jesus Christ. The second day I sought an interview with him, and he said that "Hudda had invested him with his nature and sent him back to do the work of Jesus Christ as the forerunner of Mohammed," and that he had come to inaugurate the reign of the millennium; that as Christ had suffered so he too was passing through the period of his persecution and would win through to victory. This man is established in the south of the province, where he has built a fortified stronghold. Thousands have gathered around him; he is at present a force and possibly will be an increasing problem with which the National Government will have to deal in China. That is one rapid story of one sect; there are many such causing problems which almost always result in bloodshed.

To get on to the more recent history of Kansu. It has always been the ambition of the Kansu Hwei-Hwei to get and to hold that province for themselves. In 1920 their chance almost came. One of their leaders in such a sectarian quarrel as I have outlined had been exiled to the south to the province of Yunnan. He had returned in 1901, received the clemency of the Empress Dowager during the period of her residence at Sian, and returned to establish himself in this eastern section of Kansu. He was a man who had attained to a Moslem position of saintship and was worshipped by a large following in Kansu, and his influence extended from Yunnan to Kashgar. He told me that if I wished to go to Kashgar I could start in Yunnan with letters furnished by him and travel all the way to Kashgar, being passed on from Moslem community to Moslem community, without expense to myself, simply on presentation of those letters. That man in 1920 was heading a Moslem rebellion which had planned to put in a Moslem Governor-General to the province, into the position then being vacated by Peking's last nominee. Just at the time this Governor-General left, this Moslem revolt was already planned, and they were waiting for the word to go out on the war path. On the night of December 16, the night fixed for the rising—when the rising was so far under way that they had already commenced slaughtering Chinese on the streets-the earthquake occurred. Ma Yuen Chang with his followers had just come out of the cave then being used as a mosque and place of meeting, leaving all the other leaders in the

cave, where they were buried alive. Ma Yuen Chang, contrary to the usually accepted story, had made his exit from the cave and was in the house of a son-in-law when the building crashed and broke his back. He spoke a few words and passed away. I have visited the site where they have erected his tomb. The old Chinese wiseheads say, "Better to fall into the hands of the living God than into the hands of man." They say the earthquake was an act of God. It cost a million lives in ten minutes, but was to be preferred to the Moslem rebellion. But that Moslem rebellion was only deferred and In 1912 occurred another of those seemingly broke out in 1928. trivial incidents which have led to great things. The establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1912 called for the appointment of a man name Li Chien T'ing, who was then the chairman of the first Provincial Assembly in Kansu, to the position of Governor-General. His appointment was not acceptable to the Moslems, as he was strongly anti-Hwei-Hwei in his sympathies, and took every opportunity afforded by his position of denouncing them and their misdeeds, threatening retribution when the opportunity came to him. He was persuaded by his friends to retire from public life for a short season to his home in the south of the province; and there on the fifth night of the fifth moon in 1912, as he stood at the door of the family mansion, he remarked on the angry nature of the sunset. That very night some Moslems got access to the city after dark, dug through the walls of the family mansion, got into the room where he was, and after a severe struggle killed him. He so severely wounded one of his assailants that the man died the next day whilst crossing the Tao River. The room was boarded up in accordance with custom when I visited the place, so I was able to corroborate the facts, and I was one of the first persons admitted to the room. The disordered furniture and so forth showed the severity of the struggle. He was buried on the sixteenth day of the tenth moon. On that very evening Ma Tong, the Moslem suspected of having done this deed, suddenly arose from the chair where he was sitting. He advanced to the middle of the courtyard and shouted to his underlings that His Excellency Li had come to pay him a visit. Arrived in the centre of the courtyard he collapsed. That very evening into his family was born a son, given at a later period of his life the name of Ma Chong Ying; and the father for the remainder of his lifetime showed a great aversion to this lad, claiming that his coming into the world presaged no good for the family. Ma Chong Ying is a name which has come to be feared

as much as that of any Black Douglas on the English border. At the present time he is only a youth of about nineteen years of age, but he wields a tremendous influence. I will hasten on to the last rebellion because I think this affects the situation of the Hwei-Hwei in Kansu at the present moment more than any other experience I could cite. In 1928, owing to the oppression by Kuoh Min Chuin troops and, arising out of the acute food shortage, Ma Chong Ying with eight boon companions left the city of Sining on April 19 and took to the war path. Within five days he raised thirty thousand Moslem troops. Conditions there on the border must approximate to those on the north-west frontier of India: every man has a weapon in his home, and these Moslem leaders can call a fairly well equipped army out into the field in a few days. Ma Chong Ying had all Kuoh Min Chuin's troops arrayed against him but they failed to quell the rebellion. The siege of Hochow followed. That city has been the Mecca of Islam in China for centuries, and the whole of the southern suburb, with thirteen mosques containing priceless treasures, was razed to the ground. The fighting was of the fiercest nature, and when I visited the place last year a Moslem took me to one corner outside the city in which there is a large cemetery, and told me that seven thousand of Kuoh Min Chuin's Chinese troops are buried in that cemetery. In the relief work I was doing last year, putting straight the devastated areas, we came upon numbers of bodies of men who had fallen in the fighting around that city; but Ma Chong Ying found himself at the head of an army in which most of the men possessed a modern rifle and a horse. He traversed the province with remarkable rapidity. Wherever resistance was offered his troops wreaked their fell vengeance upon the Chinese. On February 15, 1929, they appeared outside this little city of Tangar, the last city on the Tibetan border, a trading centre to which the Tibetans bring their wool, and where foreign trading firms from the coast have their agents to purchase the wool. A resistance was put up by the population. The Moslems gained possession of the city and were in possessesion for two hours. From a missionary and his wife who were in the city during that period of time I heard the story. Some of their leaders perambulated the wall shouting to their followers not to burn down the premises of Messrs. William Forbes and Co.—the great British firm of wool merchants-not to hurt the missionaries, but to kill every Chinese male over seventeen and under seventy. In that period of two hours they killed 2,170 males between the ages of seventeen and seventy. From there they went on to Chenfan, which they practically wiped out of existence. They took the city of Ninghsia, but were driven out into Mongolia. As late as last August they were taking cities down in the east and south. Last August I got into the town of Anting, then being besieged by a large army of Chinese under Moslem leadership. They had taken possession of the city but had been driven out by Government troops. We had to get into the city. I was unaware of the situation when I set out, and I found myself about fifteen miles distant with the most severe fighting proceeding with machine guns, those latest toys of the Chinese, trench mortars, and all sorts of small arms. There were 20,000 outside the city and probably 1,500 inside. On the following morning I managed to make contact with a body of Moslems who had sallied from the city and I went in with them. The Moslem leader, whom I knew, made me welcome and invited me on to the city wall. They had driven 7,000 brigands to a particular range of hills outside the city. He sent out 500 men, nominally cavalry but only half with horses. The men without horses preceded the others as they went up the spur of the mountain. The brigands were blazing at them, but they did not heed. When they got to where the gradient was less steep the men with horses mounted, and in ten minutes' time there was a most perfect rout among the 7,000 Chinese and the Moslems worked their will. I relate this to show the difference between Moslems and Chinese in that part of the country. Every Moslem is brought up to fighting and turns readily from the sword to prayer.

Yet there is a great deal in the Hwei-Hwei nature that appeals to one: I may mention my own experience of the past two years. I was sent up there with half a million dollars, Mexican money, which money had to be moved on mule-back in silver bullion through districts overrun by these and other bandits. Every mule sent with that money was given immunity, so that we lost not one single dollar en route. Merchants who tried to travel under the protection of those silver trains were taken out and shot on the road, but the silver passed through. When Shensi was looted by a Moslem leader with a large following, 5,300 dollars of our money was taken, and in the city of Anting we lost 1,100 dollars. On both occasions, by direct appeal to the man in charge, the money was recovered in its entirety, and in the second instance with profuse apologies for having shot our workman, who had refused to give up the 1,100 dollars.

Towards the end of 1929 I was forced to do a very long river trip

down the Yellow River on a raft made of inflated sheepskins. We knew the whole army of Ma Chong Ying was encamped somewhere out in the desert into which they had been driven by Government troops when these retook the city of Ninghsia. We hid in the day during the more dangerous parts of the journey and travelled largely at night. Unfortunately one morning we were caught by a party right on the river bank and forced to come in. It seemed doubtful whether they would not carry me off, they had brought two horses for the purpose. However, finally a better mind prevailed and I was able to get away from them; with two of their number as escort we were hoping to be able to manage the rest of the passage, but about three o'clock our raft grounded on a shallow. A party of Moslems appeared on the river bank and opened fire; we formed barricades, and behind these we crouched for twenty minutes until we managed to get the raft free. All through that night we seemed to be the target for various stray shots from the river bank. When we were stopped next morning by a sentry I asked about the young gentleman Ma Chong Ying, the General, and by a most happy coincidence I found that the youth had arrived at a farmhouse which was just appearing on the horizon; he had arrived there that very night about midnight. So for that farmhouse with one of the bandit escort I made. We had a nasty experience getting through, but we arrived at the entrance and went into the room where the aides-de-camp and other officers were sleeping. There the first face that pushed itself out from a coverlet hailed me by name. It was one of my old schoolboys, a lad in the mission school in Lanchow, where I had been headmaster. The second man present I had known also in Lanchow, and with such friends at court it was not long before the young General was aroused; for several hours in that little farmstead I had one of the most interesting experiences in my life as I got the whole story from this almost fragile, effeminate-looking youth of about seventeen years of age, or eighteen according to Chinese reckoning. I had to inform him that while I was in the city of Lanchow his father had been taken out and shot. According to the last advices from China, Ma Chong Ying has been driven out of the province into the Gobi Desert, and whether that means temporary eclipse or total extinction time must show. Since 1930 the Kansu Hwei-Hwei have won through to one ambition of theirs in having the first Moslem Governor-General of the province appointed, a man of the name of Ma Hung Pin, and in this connection for those who have been in China I can give a little interesting information hitherto unpublished. Those who remember the siege of Peking in 1900, or who have read the history of it, remember that on the section of the wall outside the American Legation a Boxer leader was shot at close range. That man's name was Ma Fuh-lu, he was the brother of the present Ma Fuh-hsiang who holds a strong position in Nanking. Ma Fuh-hsiang's son is in charge of one of the Nationalist armies north of the Yangtse, and his nephew Ma Hung Pin was the first Moslem Governor-General of the Kansu province. I received a letter yesterday saying that, following one of those rapid turns of the fickle wheel of fortune, he now has been imprisoned by the Chinese military official next in rank to himself up there, is being held on various charges, and is awaiting the decision of the Nanking Government. Perhaps that is going to be a check on the Hwei-Hwei power in Kansu. Whether eventually the Moslems in that province are going to outnumber the Chinese, for they make far more rapid recovery from famine and earthquake because of their sheer industry and intelligence, or whether they are going to lose their identity and become more or less absorbed by the Chinese, time alone can tell. (Applause.)

The CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen,—I think you will agree with me that Mr. Andrew has left us almost breathless with his most extraordinarily interesting lecture. There is one question, I am afraid it is rather a simple one, that has occurred to me. Why is it that so many of these Moslem chieftains have the name of Ma?

The LECTURER: The Chinese language is monosyllabic, and I think in the transliteration of sound it is the best sound to represent Mohammed. Ten Moslems in ten are all named Ma, and if there happens to be one over call him Lah and you are quite safe.

A Member: Mr. Andrew has referred to a Moslem leader having a connection in Yunnan; is there much connection between the two Moslems in the two places?

The Lecturer: The Kansu Moslems claim that whereas the Yunnan Hwei-Hwei were well established centuries ago, still they have influenced them so considerably that it might be said that the Yunnan Hwei-Hwei-ism is almost a radiation of Kansu. Whether that can be justified or not I cannot say.

A QUESTION was asked as to the number of Moslems in China.

The LECTURER: I think that the total which can best be sustained is probably somewhere in the neighbourhood of eight million: owing to the lack of satisfactory census methods I think you can only go

upon the claims of the Moslems themselves, and they will claim eight million rather than the twelve million which is credited by some authorities.

A Member: Is it true that the Moslems in China leave the wall facing Mecca unbuilt?

The Lecturer: No, they have the prayer niche there but the wall is all built up.

Another QUESTION: Are they Sunni or Shiah?

and completely persistent to be provided by

The LECTURER: I should think the old sect are Sunni: how much of the new are Shiah I cannot say. They claim themselves sympathy with the Sunni sect rather than the other; but I think by their coreligionists of the West they would be ranked as Shiah.

The Chairman in closing the meeting spoke of the valuable work Mr. Findlay Andrew had done in the famine areas and in other districts in Kansu; he had done everything that it was possible for a British citizen to do. The Society was most grateful to him for his lecture. (Applause.)

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA: GLIMPSES AT BOTH*

By COLONEL SMALLWOOD

LTHOUGH I have travelled a good deal in both the areas of which I am to talk to you to-night, I wish to make it clear that I do not want to pose as an authority in an audience such as this, in which there may be members far more qualified than I am to speak to you of these two-countries-I had almost said. As Manchuria covers an area of 360,000 square miles and Mongolia a million more than that, and considering the geographic and ethnographic differences between the two, the use of the word "country" is perhaps permissible. There is a certain association between the two, and a certain precedent for coupling the two names together; I found, when in China, that whenever Japan addressed a note to China on any matter connected with Manchuria (a sufficiently frequent occurrence, I may mention) there was always a reference to Japan's special position in Manchuria-and Mongolia. Mongolia in this case referring to Inner Mongolia, the districts of Jehol and Chahar. Actually, I think you will find that when you hear of Manchuria you will think more of Japan than of China, and when of Mongolia more of Russia than of China, though, of course, China is officially the Sovereign Power in both countries.

Manchuria consists of what are usually known in China as "The Three Eastern Provinces"—namely, Heilungkiang, Kirin, and Fengtien. The railway zone of the South Manchurian Railway runs through Fengtien and Kirin; that of the Chinese Eastern Railway through Kirin and Heilungkiang; and the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula is in Fengtien. Some two thousand years before Christ we hear of this country as occupied by an aboriginal race called the Tungus. It is believed in some quarters that this race was the common ancestor of both the Japanese and Chinese. Later on these Tungus mixed with the Mongol Tartars, and it was against these tribal races that the Great Wall of China was built during the years 255 B.C. and 214 B.C.


In 37 B.C. the Fuyu kingdom came into

^{*} Notes on a lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on December 2, 1931, Sir Harry Fox in the chair.

being, lasting till A.D. 494. These people maintained friendly relations with the Han Dynasty of China, but the Kaoli kingdom, lasting to A.D. 668, seems to have had few relations with China and many clashes with Japan. The Kaoli kingdom was followed by the Pohai, Kitan, and Kin kingdoms covering the next six hundred years. These were followed by the later Kin, bringing us to the year 1644. Manchuria came under the Chinese Ming Dynasty in 1368, but the Ming control was never complete. When the Ming Emperor committed suicide in 1644 the Manchu leader of the Taching Dynasty marched into Peking, his dynasty only ending in 1912. It will be seen, then, that through the ages sometimes China has belonged to Manchuria and sometimes Manchuria to China.

Russia comes into the picture in 1689, when China signed her first treaty with Russia, which was also her first treaty with any foreign Power. This brought Russia to the northern boundary of Manchuria, and in 1858 the Aigun Treaty gave her a huge tract of land stretching to the Behring Sea. After the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 Japan demanded the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula. This did not suit Russian plans for railway extension through Manchuria, and pressure was brought to bear on Japan by Russia, France, and Germany, which resulted in Japan's surrendering her claims to Liaotung. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 the railway to Dairen and Port Arthur was practically completed, Russia having spent nearly six hundred million roubles on development in the Far East. After Russia's defeat by Japan the Treaty of Portsmouth gave the Manchurian line from Dairen and Port Arthur, as far as Changchun, to Japan. It will thus be seen that Japan acquired her South Manchurian Railway interest from Russia as a result of a victorious campaign, and not from China at all. This is, I think, very often lost sight of.

Though it may seem outside the scope of a "glimpse" at Manchuria, I feel that it is impossible to avoid a reference to the situation there to-day as it is so much in the public mind. China's case has been well put to the world in general, and the League of Nations in particular, by Mr. Alfred Sze, whereas Japan's has not. I have the privilege of knowing both Mr. Alfred Sze, and Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese Ambassador in Paris and Japan's representative at Geneva. It would be hard to find two people in any one assembly more widely differing in character. Mr. Alfred Sze is Westerneducated, rapid-thinking, and volubly oratorical. Mr. Yoshizawa is



Japanese-educated, slow-thinking, and almost inarticulate in English and French. In conversation with him, though he doubtless understands, one hardly feels sure of it. Though Mr. Yoshizawa is an extremely nice man, and deservedly popular in diplomatic circles, he is not the man best fitted to put Japan's case before the League of Nations, and I believe he would be the first to acknowledge it.

The present situation has arisen as the culmination of a series of pin-pricks, petty annoyances, bandit raids, and infringements of treaties. Japan contends that there have been no less than three hundred cases of infringement of treaty rights, and four hundred bandit attacks on the railway zone of the S.M.R. during the last two years. Three hundred Koreans-Japanese subjects, rememberinhabiting Manchuria have been murdered by Chinese bandits. Two thousand houses have been looted and a Japanese settlement at Shanshan on the S.M.R. raided and the residents shot. Summarized in this way it is easy to realize that the patience of Japan is exhausted. China has got into the habit of regarding all treaties that she does not like as being unequal, and therefore infringements of them are quite in order. The world at large, though not quite subscribing to this point of view, has been extraordinarily indulgent with China; and Britain more so than most countries. China's Foreign Minister abolishes extra-territoriality with a stroke of the pen, but behind his hand he may whisper: "Don't think I really mean this, I am being pushed on by the young hot-headed nationalists who put me here." But just as China is not to be taken au pied de la lettre on the extra-territoriality question, so must one look with suspicion on her promises to protect the foreigner within her gates. Japan knows full well that these oft-reiterated promises of protection for life and property are quite worthless. Worthless, not for the lack of the goodwill to protect, but because of China's complete inability to control her bandits, communists, disbanded soldiery, hunghutzes, and other outlaws who pay no regard to the Nanking Government. It is a matter of considerable regret to me that the Japanese case has not been put with greater fairness by a section of the British Press. I think they have been badly informed and that they have passed on their misinformation to the British public, with the much-to-be-regretted result that Japan is feeling very badly used by Great Britain, her former ally. The endeavour to keep the spirit, if not the letter, of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has become difficult, if not impossible. On November 10 His Excellency the British Ambassador did at Tokyo

inform Japanese journalists that there was no pro-Chinese sentiment in England, but this statement is hardly borne out by the tone of British newspapers. There is, of course, no doubt that the boycott of Japanese cotton goods in China has had its repercussion in Lancashire to Lancashire's advantage, but it must be remembered that we have suffered from the boycott in the past, and may again. I fear that Japan has put herself in the wrong with the League of Nations and has rendered her signature of the Kellogg Pact nugatory, but one must regard with sympathy her patience during a long provocatory spell.

To add to the causes of friction enumerated above, I should point out that there are over three-quarters of a million Koreans living in Manchuria who are Japanese subjects, and therefore possessing extraterritorial rights. These Koreans are largely cultivators who work side by side with the Chinese, and it is easy to imagine how difficult for the Chinese is the administering of areas with a mixed population where part is governed by Chinese law and part by Japanese. There have been outrages by Chinese on Koreans; the Koreans have retaliated on the Chinese residents in Korea; reprisals have followed, and the situation becomes more and more strained.

Railway development, again, is one of the main causes of bad feeling. Japan as Russia's successor to ownership of the S.M.R. denies the right of China, under the treaties, to construct railways which compete with the S.M.R. China has gone ahead with her railway construction in Manchuria in defiance of treaties and the competition from some of these lines is hitting the S.M.R. hard. From many parts of Manchuria to the coast, freight on Chinese lines is 25 per cent. less than on the S.M.R. Japan's investment in Manchuria is stated to be over two hundred million sterling, and this sum has been sunk in the country as Japan considers that the raw materials which she gets from Manchuria are vital, not only to As an outlet for her well-being, but to her very existence. Japan's surplus population, Manchuria has not been the success that Japan expected. There are only about a quarter of a million Japanese in Manchuria altogether, and these do not work side by side with the Chinese. They are traders, railway employees, mechanics, miners, etc., but seldom cultivators.

Another of the causes leading up to the present clash is that the Chinese contend that Japan did not inherit the right to station troops as railway guards along the S.M.R. from defeated Russia. The original contract did entitle Russia to establish a civilian police force limited to one man for every fifteen kilometres of line. Japan's justification for the continuance of military railway guards is that the prevalence of banditry renders their presence necessary. Japan contends that, apart from the murder of Captain Nakamura, the first warlike act was the blowing up of the S.M.R. by the Chinese. The Chinese point to the bombing of trains by Japanese aeroplanes, and to the memorial addressed by General Tanaka to the Japanese Emperor in July, 1927, as evidence of Japan's policy of aggrandizement and conquest. The publication of this memorial has undoubtedly harmed Japan's case, but the memorial is more than four years old, and certainly only represents the views of a part of the Japanese nation. China also contends that Japan has taken advantage of a moment when Canton is in rebellion against Nanking, when China is torn by civil strife and harassed by floods and famine. As China has suffered from internal strife for something like four thousand years of her six thousand years of history, this cannot be taken too seriously. The fact remains that China's case has been well put to the world, and Japan's badly.

Though the fierce light of publicity has been turned on to South Manchuria lately we must not forget that North Manchuria, though comparatively quiet at present, has the potentiality of adding to the cauldron of strife. From 1895 to 1905 Russian influence was supreme in both North and South Manchuria. Since the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth at the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Russian influence has been confined to the railway zone of the C.E.R. in Northern Manchuria, stretching from Changchun to Manchouli, the Manchurian-Siberian border. From the moment a loan was made to the Chinese by Japan to build the Taonan-Tsi-tsihar line, a new complication arose. Japanese money was financing a line, nominally owned by the Chinese, which crossed the C.E.R. right in the middle of Northern Manchuria at Anganchi. This was hitherto looked on as essentially a Russian, or Sino-Russian area, and not Japanese or even Sino-Japanese. Here you will appreciate a fruitful source of trouble, the struggle over the River Nonni Bridge being a ready example. Japan also has a growing interest in the city of Harbin, that truly Eurasian city of North Manchuria. Though her population is small there, she has been buying land, and peaceful penetration has been proceeding for some time. Harbin has little of Japan about it on the surface. It is the home of the

Chinese Railway, the sanctuary of the exiled White Russian, and has grown up into a town which has the worst characteristics of East and West, a hectic night life, and a sordid existence by day. Brightly lighted shops on the Kitaiskaia shed their radiance on the dregs of Slav humanity, Russian faces look from under the caps of Chinese police, typical fur-clad moujiks drive their fares in Russian droshkies, American cars whirl along the streets in a flurry of snow; a hint of the middle western mining town is to be observed in the midst of this welter of Russian and Chinese civilization. It is busy, yet idle, cultured, yet sordid. A very cocktail of a city. Many Russian churches alternate with gay restaurants and night clubs.

The railway club is an extraordinary institution, a restaurant rivalling anything in the West; an open-air Kursaal with a first-class orchestra reminiscent of some German or Austrian spa. An operahouse with a permanent company, a Russian ballet of high quality, and loitering about the city more beggars to the square yard than in any other city I have visited, except perhaps Moscow in 1925.

The contrasts on the Sungari, too, are striking. In the summer gaily lighted river-steamers, speed-boats, yacht clubs, bathing-places, where the Russian women appear in smart costumes, or in a state of nature. In the winter foot-thick ice, sleighs, horse-drawn and motor-driven, parties of horsemen, the water highway becomes a high road.

But I must not keep you too long in North Manchuria; let us fly back to the sea and land at Dairen, a busy and thriving port with a first-class foreign-style hotel, quays, and warehouses, hundreds of acres of stored soya bean dumps and depôts. Docking spaces for mighty liners and all the equipment of an up-to-date port. When we land there we are to all intents and purposes in Japan and not in China. The territory is leased to Japan, Japanese restrictions are in force; no one may own land, within certain city limits, except Japanese. You may not even take a few innocent snapshots without a written permission from the police—and this is not easy to come by. It is a special area and must not be flown over. British banks who wish to own their own bank buildings have to do so outside the centre of the city. Here, as also in Mukden and Changchun, one gets the impression that the town has never quite grown up to the stature that its begetters anticipated. One also feels that the policy of the "open door" means that the door must be a little wider open to Japan than to anyone else.

Before we leave Dairen we must run out to Port Arthur, past the golf course, Star Beach (Hoshigaura) and Ogandai, charming seaside resorts, past the Old Russian barracks, to the town which still retains its unmistakable Russian air. We must pay a short visit to the Port Arthur positions and climb 203 Metre Hill. Here the Japanese lost ten thousand men merely to take the hill for artillery observation purposes. A dozen years later the same information would have been available from a half-hour's aeroplane reconnaissance.

From Dairen to Mukden, Manchuria's Capital

Passing through hilly country at first we see a determined Japanese effort at afforestation within the S.M.R. zone on either side of the railway.

When we leave this hilly area we pass through a rolling land where soya bean and kowliang reign supreme. Kowliang (millet) and soya bean, soya bean and kowliang, mile after mile of it, reminiscent of the wheat belt of Canada, past the enormous coal and iron mines of Fusan and Anshan, and so to Mukden.

I remember once travelling through Manchuria during a cholera epidemic. On the platform at Mukden Japanese sentries were solemnly walking up and down, each man had a mask on, consisting of a small curtain soaked in permanganate of potash hanging down in front of his mouth, as a protection against the raging cholera germ.

One espied a Chinese melon-seller hawking cut-up pieces of water-melon. This water-melon was the stalking-ground of a multitude of flies, and I should say the best cholera-carrier one could imagine. The Japanese sentry stopped, purchased a piece of this fly-ridden melon, and, lifting the antiseptic curtain in front of his mouth, contentedly buried his teeth in the luscious, but wholly septic melon—I dare say that he did not die of cholera, but it struck me as being an interesting sidelight on the mentality of this sentry.

Mukden itself is an ungainly, half-grown colt of a city. This was the home of Chang-tso-lin, and, until recently, that of his son and successor, Chang-hsueh-liang. It consists of the old Chinese city, the Japanese concession, and a modern foreign-style residential and shopping area.

Chinese barracks and drill grounds, arsenals, and aerodromes sprawling wide over the Manchurian plain.

It is not an attractive place; its only beauty spot being the Manchu

tombs at Peiling. But its history is in the future. As Manchuria grows in commercial importance so must Mukden.

It is the junction of three railways, and the distributing and concentration centre of South and Central Manchuria. It has one of the finest and most up-to-date broadcasting plants in the world, a French-built production which would be of great value, except for one pathetically absent essential, that there is absolutely nothing to broadcast!

In spite of Manchuria's very real prosperity she has suffered a good deal from fluctuations in her currency. Some years ago the "fengpiao" or Fengtien paper dollar, stood at about half a Mexican. or Peking dollar, but the printing press was invoked and the rate of exchange tumbled. When the buyers of the soya bean crop went out into the districts, a somewhat Gilbertian situation arose. Representatives of those financing the crop travelled up and down the land buying the crop as it stood. A representative of the bank which was looked on as Chang-tso-lin's own bank appeared on the scene. He offered 10 or 20 or 50 per cent. more than any of the other buyers, and so succeeded in practically cornering the soya bean crop of that year. As his bank had an almost inexhaustible supply of paper money it did not really much matter what he paid. Such things as reserves for note issues and trifles of that kind were beneath his consideration. I was up in Mukden at that time and was informed that seven tons, cubic shipping tons, of notes had recently been landed at Dairen from America for Manchuria. I must say I found this difficult to believe at the time, but shortly afterwards in Peking I met the agent of the American bank-note company, who had sold these notes, and I asked him if there was any truth in the seven tons story. He said that it was approximately true. The people were sensible enough not to hoard their fengpiao, but hastily converted them into agricultural implements, cattle, etc., and the chief sufferers were the financiers who had not got command of the printing press.

Manchuria has been the scene of one of the greatest immigration movements of modern times. From 1922-1925 the number of Chinese immigrants was about half a million a year, but from 1926 this number jumped to 600,000, and in 1927 to well over a million. From 1927 it is estimated that the influx has been at the rate of about a million a year. Whereas in the past—i.e., before 1925—more than 50 per cent. of the immigrants returned to China at the end of the season's work, this percentage is rapidly decreasing, and

it is now in the neighbourhood of less than 25 per cent. When the Chinese immigrant arrives now he is accompanied by his family, and with all his worldly goods, and prepared for permanent settlement. The reasons are not far to seek; civil war, military domination, famine, and flood all play their part in driving the Chinese from their own provinces. They come from a poor, worn-out country to a virgin land which promises them an adequate return for their labour and freedom from the oppression they have been enduring. The S.M.R. and the C.E.R., realizing the value of this access of cheap labour, provide transportation at less than half the ordinary rates. Children and old people are carried free, so that the adult labourer is able to bring his family with him, and he may settle down in the country for good. A large number of these people are engaged in the cultivation of the soya bean. It is difficult to realize that the first shipment of the Manchurian bean was only made in 1908 to Liverpool. This shipment was the forerunner of a new industry, and now the mills of Liverpool and Hull, Copenhagen and Rotterdam are kept busy crushing the bean, turning out oil for human consumption and beancake for cattle and for fertilizer. The bean is crushed and the oil extracted for the manufacturing of margarine and soap, leaving the residue as a very valuable fertilizer and cattle food.

Manchuria produces well over half the world's supply of soya, and its importance may be realized when it is known that it is the soya bean which supports Denmark's enormous export trade of butter, cheese, eggs, bacon, and livestock—some 70 per cent. of her total export trade. Japan, of course, is a large consumer and relies on the beancake, so full of nitrogen content, to fertilize her rice fields.

MONGOLIA

When I first went to Mongolia in 1919 I found it hard to believe that this wind-swept plain had been the cradle of the race that had conquered most of Europe and had ruled a world empire extending from the China seas to the Caspian and the River Dneiper, and this only some seven hundred years ago. This lonely plateau, this treeless waste (for I was crossing the Gobi Desert), this nomadhaunted tableland was the home of Genghis Khan, and others whose names ring through history. The Yüan Dynasty of Kublai Khan had long vanished, and I was on my way to Urga, Mongolia's capital, the home of the Living Buddha, on an aerial mission for the Re-

publican Government of China. It seemed that incongruity could go no further. At that time the Chinese, Russians, and Mongols were all contending for supremacy in Mongolia. Imperial Russia could only present an imposing façade, with nothing behind it. The Imperial Russian barracks at Urga had been evacuated and the Mongols, finding themselves released from tutelage, proceeded to gut them, removing every piece of timber which had gone to their building. When I got to Urga the Chinese had a precarious hold of things and, wanting to bridge the centuries in weeks, as is their wont, proposed to erect a wireless station at Urga and to establish a regular air service. It was my lot to lay out an aerial route between Peking and Urga, via Kalgan, the gateway to Mongolia. I set out from Peking accompanied by an official of the Ministry of Communications and some servants. At Kalgan we left the train and loaded ourselves into five cars, which were waiting for us. We had to take everything necessary to eat and drink, as the wells on the Gobi Desert are infrequent, and very brackish, indeed almost undrinkable. Neither Mongol tea, heavily laced with butter, nor mare's milk recommended themselves to me as beverages; on the desert mutton is usually available and sometimes venison, but little else. As we penetrated into the desert Chinese cultivation was left behind, and soon the only variation of the gently sloping plain was an occasional string of camels and an infrequent herd of ponies. The desert here is carpeted with "Gobi stones," bright coloured transparent pebbles which travellers collect and put into dishes and vessels for growing ferns and bulbs. The pebbles when wet are bright and translucent.

Our route lay along the telegraph line, which runs like a ruled line across the desert. The telegraph posts are made of wood, and the penalty for removing them is death. In a country devoid of timber, where the only fuel is argal, or camel dung, the temptation to chop down a nice dry telegraph pole is a very present one. A small shrub grows in patches and must have some nourishment as camels, ponies, and unnumbered herds of antelope seem to subsist on it. At night we slept at telegraph stations or in Mongol yurts, which consist of a wooden collapsible framework round which is wrapped a thick, coarse felt. The roof is made of the same material, and it certainly serves to keep out the wind and weather. It is equally efficient in keeping in the smoke from the camel dung fires inside the yurt, which are not easy to put up with; streaming eyes and much coughing is the lot of the person unaccustomed to them. One of the most attractive dwellers on the plain is the perky little marmot, which abounds. They stand in their hundreds upright by their holes, and dive into them on the approach of human beings. When crouching on the ground they form a very difficult target, as they lie so close. There are herds of antelope and mobs of galloping ponies sweeping over the ground, manes and tails streaming out in the wind. Off the main routes the wild ass and even the wild camel may be seen, but apart from the animal life there is little to distract the eye. Skyline after skyline, horizon after horizon, no hills, no valleys to vary the monotony of the unbroken plain. The meeting of a camel caravan is an event, but the party scurrying across the desert in a car has not the time to stop and exchange stories and experiences of the road in the spacious manner The actual surface of the desert changes from of the past. pebbles to sand, from sand to a sort of salty earth, which only supports the camel bush. In the whole seven-hundred-mile journey there is About halfway there are a few mounds at Udde, which appear to take on the importance of a mountain range, by virtue of their unexpectedness. The last day's journey into Urga the scene changes. Hills appear, the Tola River is crossed and the Russian barracks are on the right of the road, some five miles before entering the Chinese city of Urga. The slopes of the hills are clad with pine and spruce forest, and on the left of the Urga Valley "God's Garden" clothes the hillside. Here roam a countless number of the sacred Asiatic wapiti; so sacred that the eyes of laymen must not rest on them. Thousands of Llamas guard this forest, and death visits the disturber of the wapiti's peace. Venturous spirits sometimes penetrate the forest to collect the wapiti-horn, which is considered to be a very powerful medicine. It is made up into an aphrodisiac powder of considerable value in Mongolian and Chinese markets, and for it the marauder risks death at the hands of the priestly guards.

A British official in the service of the Chinese Government, who was a very keen shikari, once asked for permission to shoot in "God's Garden." Permission was at first refused, but granted afterwards on pressure from the Chinese. The official in question made the arduous trip across the Gobi for his shoot, only to find that neither head nor horn remained in the forest—every animal had been driven out of the forest by the Mongols in anticipation of this brutal foreigner's arrival. I nearly got into trouble by peering

through a stockade where some wapiti were kept. Dozens of Mongol policemen descended on me, covering their eyes and intimating that I had committed a quite unpardonable breach of Mongol etiquette. A few cigarettes, however, seemed to condone my offence.

Urga consists of three distinct cities, representing three distinct civilizations. The first city is the Chinese, a typical Chinese town with its high-walled compounds; after that the Russian town, ordinary foreign-style houses surrounded by timber stockades, and log cabins similar to those in Siberia. Another open space and we come to the Mongol city. Not enclosed like the Chinese, but sprawling and alternating between huddled buildings and open spaces, strange stores and market-places. Mongol horsemen gallop clatter-clatter down the main street, snarling dogs bicker over tasty morsels in the gutters. Silk-clad Llamas stroll by, half-naked beggars slink along, while the sun gleams on temples roofed with pure gold. Splendour and squalor march cheek by jowl, poverty and riches mingle. The rich man's silken coat is greasy with mutton fat-a greasy coat denotes a wealthy man because it is evidence of his frequent consumption of meat. The poor man's coat hardly covers him. The Mongol policeman in his high and clumsy boots walks round armed with a Russian-made sword. A stern and rugged civilization, untouched by Western culture. The Mongol dogs are fierce flesh-eating brutes, and no one is rash enough to walk through the bazaars without a stout stick to keep off these semi-wild animals. When a Mongol dies his relations take him out to the nearby valleys between the hills on a rough bier. There the corpse is left to be consumed by the dogs. After a decent interval the place is visited, and if the body has disappeared all is well. If, on the other hand, the body is still there, the Llamas are called upon, and for a satisfactory fee the Llama will drone the necessary prayers. A bad omen indeed if "even the dogs will not eat him."

I feel that I may tell you here a story that a French friend of mind in the Colonial service told me of some cannibals in French Indo-China. French law apparently provides no punishment for cannibalism, and the local administrators were at a loss for legal grounds to punish the cannibals. It was, however, an offence to bury corpses except in allotted cemeteries. The cannibals were accordingly punished for breaking the law as to "burial in an unauthorized place"—the unauthorized place in this case being the cannibals' tummies.

When I was in Urga the Bogdo Or, or Hutukhtu, or Living Buddha was still alive and was the spiritual and temporal ruler of Mongolia. His presence was so holy that when he drove out, his subjects would fling themselves prone on the ground with their heads in the dust, and after his passing would fight and struggle to collect some dust which the wheels of his carriage had gone over. He was supposed to be a living incarnation of Buddha, though there were rumours in the palace circles that his celibacy and holiness did not prevent him from keeping a harem and a well stocked cellar of French champagne and highly coloured and flavoured liqueurs. He was the proud possessor of an elephant, certainly the only one in Mongolia, which had been sent to him as a work of merit by worshippers from Burma.

Mongolia's wealth is in cattle. In 1925 it was estimated that there were nearly two million horses, one and three quarter million cattle, eleven and a half million sheep and goats, and over a quarter of a million camels, totalling about fifteen and a half million head. The resulting exports are therefore sheep and camel wool, horsehair, sheepskins, goatskins, hides. Furs, too, are exported in great numbers; in 1925 about ten million dollars' worth. Mineral wealth is represented by coal, iron, copper, gold, lead, graphite, and salt. Mongolia has few trading centres. The main trade routes are Kalgan-Urga, Uliassutai-Sairoussou-Kalgan, and Kobdo-Uliassutai-Dzain-Shabi-Urga. Cars can be driven over these routes and motor transport is replacing the camel for many classes of goods.

Trading is largely by barter amongst the nomad Mongols. A bull is worth ten grown-up rams, twenty full-grown sheep, or thirty one-year-old sheep. Brick tea is also used as a currency to a certain extent, but its value fluctuates. The Chinese Yuan-Shih-Kai dollar was the popular form of currency in Urga and the trade centres, but there is now a Russian-minted silver coin in general use in Urga.

The Mongol method of bargaining is peculiar. The first day of a fair is devoted to inspecting and appraising the cattle, and in pony racing. At night in the yurts the buyers and sellers will sit near one another and the buyer will put his right hand into the wide sleeve of the seller. By pressing different parts of different fingers of the right hand the buyer conveys how many oxen or sheep he wants to buy and how much he will pay. This bargaining is unseen and unheard, and sheep quotations are not the property of the public like the price of war loan.

An actual bargain is as follows:

Buyer: Three pressures of the right hand (Do you want to buy?)

SELLER: One pressure (Yes).
SELLER: Two pressures (No).

The buyer then indicates the number or unit by pressing different fingers of the seller, each finger indicating a different unit. After five the fingers are hooked to indicate 6, thumb and two first fingers placed together 7, thumb and index finger pointing in different directions 8, the index finger hooked 9, first the thumb and then the little finger pressed signifies 11. As all these pressures take place under cover of the wide sleeve, the onlookers learn nothing of the bargain.

The foreigner in China is perhaps more interested in the export of horses than in anything else, as the racing, hunting, and polo depends entirely on Mongolia for its source of supply. The Chinese cavalry is entirely mounted on Mongol ponies. These ponies vary from twelve to fourteen hands and are tough and hardy, though perhaps they do not delight the eye as does an English thoroughbred. They carry almost any weight almost any distance, and the more one has to do with them the greater respect for them one has.

The export of mares is forbidden, and it is usually only geldings which come down into China. The breeding of these horses is casual to a degree. No control is attempted, but stallions are usually gelded at three; sires are therefore, as a rule, between two and three years old. Gelding is only done in May and has some unexplained religious significance. The owner of the gelded ponies is not allowed to sell anything, give anything away, or carry anything from his yurt for four days. I was never able to find out the reason for this. Suggestions for the improvement of the breed of the Mongolian pony are many and frequent, but it is quite possible that cross-breeding with a higher type might result in a loss of hardihood.

Though the greater part of Outer Mongolia is flat, it is mountainous in the north-east and south-west. The country round Urga has wooded hills to break the monotony.

The Mongols have been nomads from time immemorial and have led an independent, detached existence for many centuries. In 1919 they officially renounced their autonomy in favour of China, chiefly owing to pressure brought to bear by the Chinese General, "Little Hsu," who was afterwards assassinated. In 1921 Outer Mongolia declared its independence under the sovereignty of the Hutukhtu, the Living Buddha. This political change was the result of the campaign

of the half-mad White Russian, Baron von Ungern-Sternberg, who took Urga at the point of the sword. A short time later his troops were defeated by the Soviets, and a people's Government was formed, which exists to-day, under Soviet tutelage, though China has never acknowledged that Mongolia is not an integral part of the Chinese Republic. Five-eighths of the whole male population are Llamas. They pay taxes and were formerly subject to military service, but they are parasitic and have to be supported by the rest of the nation. The religion is Llamaism, or a sort of Llamaistic Buddhism, whose spiritual centre is Tibet. The population is about three million, and industry is non-existent. There is no agriculture, the people are pleasant, simple, honest, and humane to the weak, but indolent and pleasure-loving. The Mongol legal code is attributed to Genghis Khan, his maxims are known as the Yassa. The Yassa and the Oirat regulations (dated A.D. 1640) form the bases of the customary law of to-day. These codes have been modified by the Khalka Djirom of the late seventeenth century, but of this last-named there is apparently no text extant; the laws resulting from it are less strict than those of the Oirat and the Oirat than the Yassa. What we know of Genghis Khan's Yassa comes to us through a Chinese translation.

Marriage was forbidden to members of a clan bearing the same name. Officials were forbidden to contract marriages with daughters of their subordinates. Widows of officials were forbidden to marry again; brothers were forbidden to marry sisters-in-law, and marriages with female musicians were forbidden—this seems hard on those who happened to be fond of music. There is no private ownership of land amongst this nation of nomadic shepherds.

In addition to the Yassa, a list of Genghis Khan's maxims still exists, but they are not distinguished for any markedly original thought.

Certain superstitions of the Mongols are difficult to explain. It is a sin to thrust a knife into the fire, to touch a fire with a knife in any way, as this means cutting off the head of the fire. It is a sin to lean on the whip with which a horse is beaten, to spill milk or other food or drink on the ground. Whoever does any of these things intentionally must be either killed or purified by a sorcerer. If a piece of food taken into the mouth cannot be swallowed and be spat out, an opening must be made in the tent and the man offending dragged through the opening and mercilessly killed. The same must be done to the man who steps on the threshold of his chief's yurt—

presumably without permission. The washing of clothes was forbidden. God grows angry when this is done, and thunder will come if clothes be hung out to dry. I can vouch for the fact that to-day the Mongol does not subscribe to the theory that cleanliness is next to godliness. Punishment for offences to-day is severe, though the death penalty is not so frequently enforced as in olden times. The punishment for sacrilege, immuring in stone coffins, is far worse than death. The wretched offenders are put into stone coffins with a hole just large enough for the head to be put out. They are kept in these coffins till they die; the more friendless ones die of starvation and are perhaps the luckiest. Those with friends to feed them may support this lingering death for months. Formerly the death penalty was frequently enforced. Maxim No. 3 I am rather in favour of. It says, "Whosoever intentionally lies, or practices sorcery, or spies upon the behaviour of other people, or interferes between two people who quarrel, and helps the one against the other, is put to death." Death could be escaped though, for maxim No. 29 says that in the case of murder, the murderer can ransom himself, if a Moslem, for forty golden coins, and if a Chinese, for one donkey! It appeared that it was better to be a Chinese if one was going a-murdering. Horse-thieving was treated severely. A man found with a stolen horse had to return it, with nine others. If unable, his children are taken instead of horses, and if no children, he shall be slaughtered like a sheep. Gluttony was looked on with disfavour, for a man choking from over-eating "shall be driven from camp and immediately killed." This sounds a little harsh, but clemency was permitted to the wine-bibber. "If one is unable to abstain from drinking, one may become intoxicated three times a month, if one exceeds this number, one is culpable; if one drinks twice a month this is better, if once a month, this is still more laudable, and if one does not drink at all, what can be better? But where can such a man be found?"

Outer Mongolia offers the game of North China, such as pheasants, geese, and antelope; bighorn sheep and ibex in the Altai Mountains in Western Mongolia. On the borders of Shansi and Mongolia there is some splendid shooting; there is, in particular, an "island" of hills in from the Peking-Suiyan-Paotow Railway where the bighorn sheep and the Asiatic wapiti are available. The sheep heads are not to be compared with the ovis ammon of the Himalayas and Kashmir in length, but they are very large at the base and are beautifully symmetrical. A good head runs up to nine-

teen or twenty inches in girth at the base. The sheep are found on open down-like country, and the wapiti in the higher hills. I left my wapiti shoot rather late and found myself in the higher hills about the middle of December. Though I have been up on the Mongolian plateau in January, with the temperature at 40° below zero, I never experienced such cold as in these "Wapiti" hills. My Mongol hunter and camp followers only resisted the cold by frequent indulgence in opium, and I found it difficult to turn them out in the mornings. Jam was frozen solid inside the tins, and had to be chipped off like toffee, a slice of meat broke crisply like a biscuit. I was camped in a small balloon silk tent near a little hill stream, which, though fast-running, had to be broken through each morning for water. When out stalking I wore two pairs of gloves, removing them for a shot, and then my hands were so cold that I could hardly tell whether I was pressing the trigger or not. But after five weeks scrambling about those hills I returned to civilization feeling as fit as man could be. I recommend a dose of the same medicine to anyone feeling themselves getting soft. I had a Männlicher-Schoenauer 256, and I know of nothing to touch it for this kind of shooting. These sheep and wapiti are very much shot at by the Mongols and Chinese for meat and horns, and I fear that in a few years they will be exterminated, especially here where the hills do not communicate with any other range.

Before Sven Hedin started on his Gobi trip in 1928 I had several conversations with him in Peking. His travels are described in his recently published book "Across the Gobi Desert." I remember asking him how long he intended his expedition to last. "At least a year," he replied. "What good would my meteorological observation be worth otherwise?" An example of thoroughness and grit hard to beat. Sven Hedin's route was a good deal south of mine, and his descriptions differ very much from the Mongolia I have been telling you of. His journey from Faotow through Sinkiang to Urumchi was a more interesting one, though perhaps not so entirely Mongolian.

The work of exploration ir Mongolia has been mostly undertaken by Andrews, Stein, Hedin, Kozloff the Russian, Père Chardin, and other Jesuit Fathers. Important archæological and palæontological discoveries have been made. Professor Henry Fairfield Osborn, the great American authority, has long stated his belief that Mongolia is the cradle of the human race, but so far this is not yet borne out. Pre-historic animals of astonishing size have been unearthed, the eggs

of dinosaurs, as you heard from Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews some years ago. Dr. Hedin's palæontologist has discovered fossilized fishes and insects stated to be one hundred million years old. The Palæobotanists contend that the Mongolian plain was once a waving forest, but now not only is the Gobi practically dry, except for certain great salt lakes, and these lakes are drying up and getting appreciably smaller year by year.

Sir Charles Bell: After the vivacious and particularly charming talk to which we have just listened, I hesitate to intervene with a somewhat dull political question. At the same time it is one that has an important bearing on the politics of Central Asia. And, therefore, I should like to put it to Colonel Smallwood.

It is this: Does Soviet Russia control Mongolia merely by brute force, or has it won over any large section of the people to the form of administration that it has imposed on Mongolia? What, in fact, do the Mongols themselves feel about it?

In the past the Mongols had a great admiration for Tsarist Russia. But their devotion to their religion transcends everything; in fact, they and the Tibetans are two of the most religious nations in the world. And the Soviet Union have attacked their religion. For instance, the Llamas in Mongolia were formerly all-powerful; now they have a representation of only about seven per cent. on the State Council, which has been established by the Soviet and governs Mongolia. More than this, the Grand Llama of Urga has not been allowed to reincarnate, so that the Soviet have deprived the Mongols of him who is both their king and their god.

A Russian gentleman whom I met the other day told me that he thought the Soviet were probably working Mongolia through Buriats. But when I was in Lhasa ten years ago, a highly intelligent Buriat priest there told me that many of the Buriats themselves wished to rejoin the parent stock in Mongolia and shake off the Soviet control from Mongol and Buriat alike.

It is for these reasons that I would ask Colonel Smallwood whether, in his opinion, the Soviet Union controls Mongolia merely by force, or whether it has won over any large portion of the people. And if so, how it has managed to do this.

The Chairman has invited me to say something about the relationship between Tibet and the Mongol Llamas. Mongolia obtained her Buddhism entirely through Tibet, and there are usually several hundred Mongol Llamas studying in the universities and monasteries of Lhasa. The late Grand Llama of Urga was himself a Tibetan, born at the foot of the Potala, the Dalai Llama's great palace just outside Lhasa. But, ladies and gentlemen, it is becoming late, so that I think I had better detain you no longer.

The Lecturer: I hesitate to make an authoritative reply to Sir Charles Bell's question, as it is now some time since I was in direct touch with any Mongols. It is my impression, however, that the Mongolian Government is chiefly controlled through the Buriats. Certainly force is behind the control, but I do not think "brute force" describes it exactly. Though the Llama representation is small on the State Council I think the religious interference is perhaps rather exaggerated.

In reply to a question as to whether Japan did not wish to make further demands on Manchuria, the Lecturer said he did not think Japan wished to annex any part of Manchuria. The country was not suited to Japanese colonization. In his opinion Japan was only protecting her legitimate interests.

The Chairman closed the lecture with a hearty vote of thanks.

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY PAST AND PRESENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ASIA*

By VLADIMIR DE KOROSTOVETZ

HAVE serious difficulty in selecting the material for this talk, but have come to the conclusion, through my war and revolutionary experiences, that it is not what people say in conferences and suchlike meetings of this time but how they think and the aims they cherish which matter. We can study all the archives possible, secret and open, but if we do not know the mentality and the human side of those who wrote them, we shall never be able to give any useful diagnosis of events and shall move, if not entirely in the dark, certainly in a twilight. More especially is this true in our day when "hot stuff headlines" are forced down our throats to tear away our individual minds and reasoning and to turn us into one or other category of human beings rather than encouraging our individuality. It is, then, on this side of Russia's foreign policy that I am speaking to-night.

What was the interior character of Russia and of those in whose hands lay the destiny of that empire, an empire which occupied one-sixth of the globe, and now, in the hands of the Red leaders, is turned into a springboard (rather a large one at that) towards social revolution for the remaining five-sixths of the world?

Without understanding these internal springs of Russian reality, of the past and of the present, it would be difficult to follow the development of Russia's foreign policy.

I shall divide the Russian problem into two elements: Russia itself and Russia's rulers.

About Russia. First, one must bear in mind that Russia has not been and is not a country which can be regarded as a Monolite unit having one structure all over her area with the same population and the same classes. She is not in the strict sense of the word a National State, but a continent *sui generis*; formerly under the sceptre of the Russian White Tsar and now for over thirteen years under the yoke of the Communist rulers of Moscow. Forty different nationalities

^{*} Notes on a paper given at a members' meeting by Mr. Vladimir de Korostovetz, October 28, 1931, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the chair.

with a different historical, cultural, and social past are all in one piece of territory, a continent rather than a State. This continent lies on the borders of Europe on one side, and on the other is deeply rooted, geographically and psychologically, in Asia. The pressure of both those worlds is, and has always been, felt considerably in the Russian territories. With crystallized principles and traditions of a thousand years of history behind them, these two worlds concentrate their pressure on the Buffer Russia. Therefore Russia has either to occupy a sufficiently strong position, in order not to be absorbed by these two worlds, or if she does not get this unity, to split up, part of her to become a "soil good for European manure," as Bismarck liked to term it, and with the other part of her to turn her face to Asia and find a comfortable solution and modus vivendi with that continent.

The leaders of Russia had to choose which of the two continents, Europe or Asia, was the more important at the moment; Europe was a hard nut to crack, apart from the money loans which could be raised there, and could, moreover, force Russia into taking part in European activities against her will. The locus minoris resistentiæ was Asia. Playing the part of a connecting link did not appeal to many of the leaders, and was just as repugnant to the leaders of "Holy Russia" as it is to the present Red leaders. They seemed to themselves to be too important to be satisfied with the rôle of middleman between two worlds. Imbued with dream Utopias of a gigantic scale they have all thought they were called upon to force their ideas not only on their own country but on the rest of the world. Hence the mad idea of the Slavophiles, the attempts to plant the Russian cross on the top of Hagia Sophia, hence the campaign against Napoleon, the "usurper," the campaign in Hungary which saved Franz Josef's throne; hence also the idea of saving the "proletarians" of the whole world. And to this end they forced the modest but second-rate teachings of a German professor on their country at the cost of millions of lives.

But the making of Russia in the past was not an easy task. It was necessary to build up inside Russia a strong unit, acting as a Monolite, notwithstanding the fact, as we have said before, that Russia was characteristically not a Monolite. The strenuous struggle for liberation from the Tartar yoke, the rise of the Moscow Tsars, the necessity of repulsing aggression on the part of their neighbours, unprotected by natural frontiers, and acquiring territories giving an outlet to the sea, turned Russia into a military power of the first rank.

The turning points for the last two hundred and fifty years of Russian history concentrate round two historical figures, Peter the Great and Lenin. Peter the Great forced Russia to adopt European standards; he built a fleet, built up a first-class army, suppressed the aristocratic opposition, abolished the Patriarchal See, turning the Church into merely an Instrumentum Regni of his power, and after victorious wars he, as he termed it himself, "opened a window to Europe," building up his own capital St. Petersburg, which was far from Asiatic Moscow and was a capital of a European character. Wars with Turks, Ukrainians, Swedes, etc., moulded Russia into a military empire, and from then on Russia's motto was to be "With Europe." But having consolidated Russia by a strong iron drill system within, occupation outside had to be found for the military power; and step by step Russia was raised to the state of an empire occupying one-sixth part of the world. The method of rule was absolutism and nothing in the world would seem to stop or hinder this development, for the time being, either inside the country or outside of it.

The whole policy from the time of Peter the Great to Lenin was directed by this one idea, one action, that of supporting absolutism and monarchism, just as all actions since Lenin are but to attain world revolution.

But Europe did not want Russia to expand at her expense, and therefore the *locus minoris resitentiæ* for Russia's expansion was Asia. This process of expansion started long before Peter the Great, and since his day the expansion in Asia has turned into a codex of "Belief and Behaviour." The Black Sea coast, the Amour, the Caucasus, Turkestan, all were brought on the end of the Imperial sword to the feet of the Russian White Tsar. This was the more possible as Russia gained European civilization, or, rather, her technical power.

Russian psychology, remember, is not adapted to colonization; if she retained territories they had to be next to her, they had to be less civilized than herself, and they had to be far from the reach of Russia's European competitors. She had forgotten that another country, Japan, also passed through a period of gigantic expansion and development, and the clash was bound to come; the Russo-Japanese War was but one small step in this struggle. But even with all Russia's successful development, she had to go through serious blunders on her way to expansion, and it is curious to see how, after suffering failure in one part of the East, she would give it up tem-

porarily and would immediately concentrate on some other part. Thus a defeat in the Far East would immediately increase her appetite in the Middle and Near East and vice versa.

Russia was also forced into touch with Europe, and European ideas were bound sooner or later to clash with absolutism. Progress became a slogan and a sort of religion, especially in the twentieth century. The reigning class of the holy absolutistic Russia had to adapt itself to changed conditions. The "Anointment of God" was good in bygone days and was perhaps good for the Eastern mentality, as it added to the prestige of the White Tsar. It may be here said, in passing, that the Europeans themselves have done everything in their power to undermine their own prestige in the East, especially during and after the Great War. Absolutism was well enough supported by a strong disciplined army and a strong united reigning class who bore in themselves the recognition that they, and only they, were the salt of the earth. But the technical, philosophical, moral, and social achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could not be kept outside Russia, and Russia could not blockade herself hermetically from these new influences and new modern currents. The effort to close the window to Europe seemed to be belated, and, as we shall see later, it could only be done by heavy sacrifices, such as giving up Russia to an essentially Asiatic element called Bolshevism. For absolutistic Russia and for her reigning class, it needed genius to combine and find a solution for these two distinctly opposed and diametrically different currents-namely, progress and Asiatic absolutism. Peter the Great acquired through "the window of Europe" European science, which he enforced by purely Asiatic methods, whilst Lenin later tried to apply the Marxian theory to Russian life by purely Asiatic Bolshevik means.

But the progress of the nineteenth century demanded that the ruling class should acquire new potential strength with new ideas, and there appeared people of a new quality, coming from non-privileged groups, who achieved deeds on the outskirts of the empire, doing useful work for Holy Russia; these were given wealth and position, their children grew up with new aspirations, newly formed traditions and outlook, and these obviously clashed with those of the tired and elderly representatives of the holy absolutism with whom power was more a tradition than a personal achievement. Notwithstanding the great merit of these people in the consolidation of the empire within and without, they were looked upon as newcomers and

outsiders. Such examples could be mentioned by dozens, but it suffices to name people such as Count Witte, Stolypin, etc. Thus in the country itself was formed the "intelligentsia" which acquired the position of an official opposition to the Imperial absolutism and its Government, and fought hard for progress until the revolution put it for a short time into the saddle. Long before that the opposition was also strengthened by the creation of the "Semstvo," the self-government of the municipalities and rural life. The struggle between absolutism and the old aristocracy and this intelligentsia never stopped, although it varied in intensity. At the same time Russia had to face more and more difficult problems in dealing with progressive Europe and with the Eastern countries which were becoming restless after having been stirred up by Europe. These external difficulties with which absolutistic Russia had to cope became a weapon and ally for the opposition. The defeat of the reactionaries would mean a signal for the opposition to force the Imperial Government to concessions, giving way to liberal groups inside Russia. On the other hand, a victory outside would mean the victory of Absolutism in the country and a pressure to put down liberalism and progress of thought inside the empire. This connection of Russia's interior policy with her foreign one is a characteristic trait.

So the defeat of Alexander I. by Napoleon brought to Russia the code of laws of a preacher of liberalism, but as soon as the wounds inflicted from outside had healed, the absolutistic and reactionary groups immediately took the opportunity to strike a blow and to regain their lost position, and to suppress the so-called "hydra of revolution." The Decabrist revolt, which broke out after the period of reaction at the end of the reign of Alexander I., and his assistant drill-sergeant, General Arakchew, who suppressed every liberal thought, and whose ideal was to turn Russia into a barrack of well-disciplined soldiers (he introduced, by the way, obligatory military service for the lower classes for a period of twenty-five years), was put down by the young Emperor Nicolas I. The opposition was then torn up by the roots, but they hoped a clash from without would give them a chance. This opportunity materialized in the Crimean War. The defeat of Russia ended by the Emperor committing suicide, and by the reforms of the liberation of serfs and the introduction of a most modern and up-to-date liberal code of laws on European lines by Alexander II., successor of Nicolas I. The success in the Turkish War, the bombing of the Emperor Alexander II. in 1881, led to an extreme outburst of

reaction of Alexander III. He tried to cancel the liberation of serfs by introducing courts of landowners over the peasantry, and tried to take the law out of the hands of the courts and place it into the hands of the police and ochrana.

Peace in Europe and a concentrated expansion in the East then became the watchword, especially as the Congress of Berlin was a defeat, after the Russian troops had signed the San Stefano armistice practically at the foot of the walls of Constantinople. After this the Near East seemed to be closed, owing to European opposition, to Russian penetration, and Russia turned her eyes to the Far Eastern problems, where she thought she would not have to fear so much from the opposition of European Powers, the more so, it seemed, that these territories were on the borders of her own empire. China was weak and Europe was far away. It was decided that the formula to be applied be as follows: Russia is interested in an indivisible monarchist China, Europe tries to bring unrest and disruption of the Chinese Empire, thus Russia has to join China and protect her, and by doing so expand to China's borders herself. The intervention of Russia in the Sino-Japanese conflict and the insistence of Russia that Japan should not acquire Chinese territories, material assistance on the part of Russia rendered to China to meet the Japanese demands, with all this began the era of Russo-Chinese co-operation. The building up of the Eastern Russo-Chinese railway, a spearhead in the hands of Russia, served the purpose of deepening the friendship of both countries by helping and protecting each other's interests. Even an entente with Japan was foreshadowed. This policy, carefully planned by Witte, had been partly fulfilled when Nicolas II. ascended the throne, and his entourage initiated an adventurous policy which swung the pendulum to the other extreme. Russia took part in quelling the Boxer Rebellion, acquired Port Arthur, partly by bribery, partly by force, and this was the beginning of the end of the success in her policy of expansion in China. The inevitable clash came between Russia and Japan; meanwhile the reactionaries at home openly hoped that a victorious war in the East would bring down the liberal opposition inside Russia, and that in the enthusiasm following on victory they could crush once and for all their opponents, but, when the defeat came, revolution broke out in full swing, and a Constitution had to be granted. A Duma in the form of a very curtailed Parliament was authorized.

Seeing this, Imperial Russia began, according to its usual tradi-

tion after having received a blow in one of the Eastern countries. immediately to concentrate her attention on other Eastern countries. She had already begun her activities in the direction of Afghanistan and in Persia in the project of railroads and military concentration of troops. The careful Witte understood how useless and dangerous that game was, and he raised the suggestion that instead of building a railway to the frontiers of Afghanistan it would be better to come to a sort of understanding with Great Britain on the basis of commercial profits of such railways for both countries concerned, especially as, so he said, this would shorten the way for British goods to India. On the other hand, Russia was afraid of Persia falling under the influence of her European competitors, and so in 1890 she tried to force the Persian Government not to allow anybody to build railways for the coming ten years, and their agreement was later prolonged for a further period. But here already new European constellations were ripening, in which much more important European interests were at stake, and in order to prepare that part of the programme the wellknown agreement was made in 1907 which drew a line of demarcation between the chief competitors, England and Russia, in Persia. By the reactionaries this agreement was looked upon with a distrustful eye; they said Russia had given away her interests to the British in the South and that this could have been avoided as Russia had already full control de facto over the Northern part of Persia without needing to settle it by agreement. In order to distract Russia's attention from Persia, it was Constantinople that was moved forward as a bait, and Russia jumped at it, forgetting her defeat at the Berlin Congress. It was taken for granted that the fate of Constantinople could be settled only by a European war, and this war became the slogan in the hearts of the Russian rulers. Here again and again the internal split between the reactionaries and the liberals and the struggle of the opposition came to the fore.

Russia was by that time vis-à-vis Europe a backward country, culturally and technically, and such a war with the Central Powers with the help of France, and presumably England, would need a supreme effort from the whole empire. Imperial Russia could not manage it without the strong support of the Duma and the liberal party. On the other hand, revolution was brewing all over the country, and the reactionary entourage of the Emperor thought that in a patriotic outburst Russia would help them to settle once and for all the Duma and do away with self-government, opposition, and the

whole bag of tricks. But, as we now see, the strain was far too great for both the Imperial Government and the liberal and Duma groups, who were, after all, a part of the system of Imperial Russia. All this was swept aside by the forces, which such talented people as Count Witte foresaw long before the revolution and of which he warned the Emperor. I have recently published this letter of his to the Emperor, a letter so prophetic that you will allow me to quote some parts of it: "Police measures cannot stop the development of a spiritual belief. The slogan 'freedom and reforms' must be taken up by the Government; the initiative to introduce this must come from the Government itself." He then prophesies: "The historical progress is not to be held back. Either the civil rights will come through reforms or through revolution. In the latter case, these rights will emerge only much later out of the ashes of a thousandyear-old historical existence. A Russian revolution, senseless and pitiless, will sweep away everything and turn everything into ruin. In what form Russia will come out of this unprecedented experience surpasses the capacities of our thoughts. But the horrors of the Russian revolution will surpass anything known to history. It is very probable that owing to foreign intervention the empire will fall to pieces. The new rulers will try to enforce the ideals of theoretical socialism, their efforts will fail, but, nevertheless, will have enormous consequences. These efforts will destroy family, destroy the religious life, cancel the property rights, and will but bury all the foundation of law." He finishes his prophecy by adding: "The State must take the lead in the movement for freedom. There is no other choice." And this power, which was like a terrible spectre to Witte, was unshackled in November, 1917. I shall not depict what happened, as all of you know the development of the war and revolution, but I want to underline what Lenin (then Ulianoff) said to me in 1908 in Zürich. Why, he asked, could I not organize my three hundred thousand nobility to reign over Russia as the reactionary nobility of Nicolas II. did, and enforce socialism first on Russia and then on the rest of the world. I answered that Russia was backward, the large majority of the population illiterate, and that if socialism were enforced millions would perish. But, with the cynical smile of the maniac, he answered: "Yes, that I know, but what are thirty to forty millions of people if their death brings humanity nearer to socialism." And he added: "I hate the peasants for their reactionism; they are our chief enemy. I know we will not keep the power in our hands

for long, but I earnestly hope that, after we go, a reaction extreme in form will set in, for that will prepare the ground for us once more and we shall come to power and carry on our work from the point where we left off."

At first the "regenerators of mankind" were full of Utopian ideas; my uncle had a curious talk with Chicherin and Karahanthe latter his former secretary, now playing an important rôle in Soviet diplomacy. Calling at the Foreign Office for some private papers, he was received very amiably and, unexpectedly, brought straight into the private room where they were; here he saw portraits of the former Ministers (and his own among them) hanging on the wall with red patches on their faces and an inscription, calling them the "bloodsuckers of mankind." Karahan asked my uncle what he thought of the Soviet policy. "We are," he said, "freeing the Oriental subjects still under the yoke of capitalistic countries." He pointed out to my uncle that the Persian-Russian State Land Bank, of which my uncle had been president, was a great weapon for subjugating the Persians, and that the Soviet had done away with it and made all treaties on equal terms. My uncle therefore reminded them of the Shariat-therein it is stated that all Europeans are dogs and unbelievers and could never be treated as equals. My uncle then spoke with them of the Brest-Livotsk Treaty, saying that no Government had ever dared to impose such a disgraceful peace on its country. Karahan said, however, that the Treaty was of no value, for revolution was coming in Germany, and Europe was divided into two warring camps. "We are not afraid of Europe," he added.

The first Soviet envoy to China, Joffe, also emphasized to the Chinese that his Government wanted to give back all that "the bloodsucking Imperialists" had taken, and the Chinese after some thought asked for a large tract of Siberia back, as it had been taken from them in the time of Ivan the Terrible. But now, in less than ten years, we see that not only Siberia, but the whole of Outer Mongolia is occupied and run by Soviet agents and turned into a dependent State of Russia. I do not want to cite other examples, but want to point out that the Soviets, in their Red Imperialism, have done far more than Tsarist Russia, and that only lack of funds and organization stop them going yet farther. One thing is clear—they have closed the window opened by Peter the Great to Europe and are working mainly in Asia.

The speaker went on to say that the present rulers did not want

war, although they were preparing the whole country feverishly for war. They wanted to stir up revolutions to form Soviet socialist republics. These would work under the Moscow Soviet either direct or through the Third International. In this way they had made Soviet republics of their own dominions, giving them certain very strictly limited rights but without any intention of allowing the third clause of their Constitutions to be anything but a dead letter—they could not separate from Moscow. In some cases the Orientals trained at the Oriental academy in Moscow had been better trained in preliminary principles than Moscow intended, and had gone away determined to free their countries from Russian as well as from all other aggression. Here the arrow had shot farther than it aimed.

Whether the present rulers would try to get unity in the Russian dominions by a foreign war, as their predecessors had done, was difficult to say, and depended on their successes elsewhere. Even when the Bolshevik absolutism crumpled, as it must sooner or later, the Russian problem would still be there. Russia was the highway from Europe to Asia, from Asia to Europe. Could a disunited Europe face an Asiatic invasion, pouring through the highway of Russia with Russia as a spearhead? At present Japan had stopped Russia's progress in Manchuria, but who knew if by exerting pressure on Russia and China in the Far East she would not force Russia to look elsewhere? The Far East was no longer her locus minoris resistentiæ.

Questions were asked as to the situation in Mongolia and Manchuria and the relation of the governments of the Asiatic Soviet republics to Moscow, etc.

In conclusion the Chairman spoke of the effect of Russian propaganda on the Moslem States adjoining the Asiatic Soviets, who must of necessity bear the brunt of the policy of aggression and expansion. Never in the history of the world had such a state of subjection of a nation to its rulers been achieved.

A FORGOTTEN EXPLORER OF ARABIA: G. A. WALLIN

By M. TRAUTZ

lournal of the Royal Geographical Society (Vol. 20, 1850, pp. 293-344; and Vol. 24. 1854, pp. 115-207).

S. G. Elmgren, "Georg August Wallins Reseanteckningar fran orienten aren.

1842-1840" (Helsingfors, 1865).

Knut Tallqvist, "Bref och Dagboksanteckningar af Georg August Wallin" (Helsingfors, 1905).

D. G. Hogarth, "The Penetration of Arabia" (1904), especially chapter vii.

H. St. J. Philby, "Arabia." 1930.

"One might spare something of his successors' narratives to have more of Wallin's" (D. G. Hogarth, op. cit.).

ACH decade of the middle of the nineteenth century is marked by one name of capital importance in the history of Arabian exploration: Wallin in the '40's, Burton in the '50's, Palgrave in the '60's, Doughty in the '70's; to three out of the four we have owed, down to quite recent years, the chief of our knowledge of Central Arabia. It is perhaps too much to say that Wallin's name is forgotten; rather is it embalmed in the dusty files of the Royal Geographical Society's Journal, and in histories of Arabian exploration, where much that is known about him is known wrongly.

He has been called a Swede (he was a Fenno-Swede, Swedish by blood and speech, but a native of Finland); a political agent in Arabia of the Egyptian Government (he had nothing to do with the Egyptian Government; there were idle rumours to that effect in Arabia and presumably at Cairo, but they are ignored by Elmgren in the biographical sketch with which he introduced the "Letters" and in Professor Tallqvist's "Life." When the latter saw the statement, he denied it vigorously [Ztschr. f. Assyriologie, Bd. 27, p. 103]). Indeed, the negative evidence of the diaries and letters is overwhelming. Wallin has been called an unsympathetic observer of desert life (he was the very first to write a pæan in praise of the Arabian desert and the life in the black booths). The reason is not far to seek: outside Finland and Scandinavia Wallin is only known by the two papers in the J.R.G.S., for his copious letters and diaries have never

been translated. Since Wallin's place among Arabian explorers is admittedly high, some account of his life in English seems to be called for.

George Augustus Wallin was born in Finland in 1811, two years after the final conquest and absorption of the country by the Russians. When he was six the family removed from the Aland Islands to Abo, the old capital. George was sent to the cathedral school, where he became a leader among the boys, more especially in town and gown rows. It is said that he made up his mind as a child to see Jerusalem and the Pyramids, but the ruling passions of his boyhood were sailing and visiting the shipyards, and music. He was at home in the mazes of the Abo Skerries, whether learning seamanship among the outer islets-a bleak world of waves and low-lying, windswept granite-or exploring the delicious wooded solitudes of the inner sounds, where drifts of meadow-sweet sweep down to the tideless water and fir cones drop on the seaweed rim of the tiny beaches. Here he got that "eye for country" which enabled him, the learned Orientalist, to make his contribution to the geography of inner Arabia. In the Skerries the boy learnt to be self-reliant and selfsufficient, sometimes spending the short Northern summer night on one of the uninhabited islands alone. He and two others were wont to sail back up the river Aura playing a flute trio. The sea was his delight; as only chance prevented a still greater devotee of Arabia Deserta, Charles Doughty, from entering the navy, so only chance kept Wallin from going to sea. At the end of his life in the lecture room he is said to have looked like a weather-beaten Finnish skipper. It is easy to see how this upbringing fostered the characteristics which later made for his success as a traveller; the ease and simple pleasure with which he could foregather with uneducated men; the constant observation of natural surroundings; the resourcefulness and habit of prompt decision.

In 1829 he followed his family to Helsingfors, then also a purely Swedish town, where his father had been made överkommissarie at the court of appeal, and entered the university. He read the classics in accordance with the rigid curriculum and learnt modern languages for his own satisfaction, French and Russian, English and German. It is not known whether he spoke Finnish. Under Professor Geitlin, later his intimate friend and correspondent, the foundations of Arabic and Persian were laid.

With sailors, fishermen, peasants, students, and even professors,

Wallin was always on good terms; society he never could endure. In spite of taciturnity he was a popular and respected figure among his fellow-students, and in the town-Helsingfors was still very small—where his feats of rowing and especially swimming became legendary. There is an oral tradition that Topelius' story "Vincent Vågbrytaren" (V. the Breakwater) was suggested by Wallin's character and adventures at this time; some sentimentality apart, it gives an admirable picture of the milieu. (The other great figure in contemporary Swedish literature, yet another Fenno-Swede, the poet Runeberg, was also an acquaintance and was to mourn Wallin's early death in a fine elegy.) There were conflicts with the university authorities, even rustication, but hard upon that the rector of the university made him tutor to his own son. Wallin and his young charge seem to have enjoyed their holidays in the Aland Islands; on one occasion he preached a sermon, for there was some idea of his entering the Church, on another gave a tremendous thrashing to a parson caught cheating at cards, with the parishioners' entire approval. In 1839 he became Docent, on the strength of a Latin dissertation "On the Principal Differences between Classical and Modern Arabic."

After his father's death, in spite of the straitened means of the family, he managed to spend nearly two years at the Oriental Institute of the University of St. Petersburg, where his chief teachers were a Persian *mirza* and the Arab Shaikh Muhammed at-Tantawi (of the Azhar "university" at Cairo), who became a lifelong friend.

The turning-point of Wallin's life was the grant of a travelling scholarship at Helsingfors in 1841. The plan of the journey he presented is important. He proposed, "for the advancement of the university and science in general," to travel in Egypt and Arabia, chiefly for the purpose of the comparative study of Arabian dialects. After consulting specialists in Europe, he wished to stay at Alexandria and Cairo to perfect his Arabic, afterwards going up the Nile, making excursions on both sides of the river; from there to go to the nearest Red Sea port and cross to Arabia. About six months were to be spent in the Yamen, to carry on the studies begun by Fulgence Fresnel, French Consul at Jidda, in Himyaritic. Wallin hoped to spend a month at Mecca and by then be able to travel in the interior without self-betrayal. (He soon realized that Mecca was hardly a safe finishing school.) A visit to the Wahabi country was to be the chief aim of the journey. From Dar'iya in Najd he hoped to reach Qatif or some

other port on the Gulf; from there, either direct or via Basra, to recross Arabia to Madina, and so home by way of Palestine and Constantinople. A tremendous programme!

At the suggestion of a medical colleague, he determined to travel as a doctor and vaccinator. Characteristically, he put off the journey for six months to prepare as well as he could for the part. Even this short study and clinical experience may well have made him a better doctor than Burton, Palgrave, or Doughty. Burton, indeed, wrote Wallin a long letter full of questions when he was preparing for his own pilgrimage, and before hearing of Wallin's death.

He was kindly received in Paris by Quatremère, and spent some time over Arabic MSS. in the libraries. An adventure led to serious consequences. He happened to make the acquaintance at Père Lachaise of a young man from Marseilles, later called "that devil," who spoke a little Arabic. They arranged a meeting. The diary breaks off for six weeks; Elmgren believed that Wallin was attacked, beaten, stripped, and left to die in a lonely street. At all events there was a serious illness. "Both in health and character the Paris adventure left deep traces. Into his bold and generous mind was born a certain suspicion and bitterness" (Tallqvist, op. cit.).

After consorting happily at Marseilles with Finnish and Swedish seamen, Wallin sailed to Constantinople on a Finnish brig, and began to recover health and spirits, delighting in the glimpses of Hellas on the leisurely cruise through the Levant. From Constantinople he reached Alexandria in December, '43. Since Le Havre he had been careful to have his name endorsed as "Wali" on all passports, a name afterwards changed to "Abdolwali." This was at Shaikh Tantawi's suggestion, but probably also owing to the study of Burckhardt, whose influence can be traced in matters great and small. January 24, '44, was his Muhammedan birthday, when he put on the Eastern clothes he was to wear for the next few years.

The real schooling began at once in Cairo. Every thought, every faculty was bent to the one purpose: learning to pass among Muhammedans as a fellow-believer. Only so could he carry out his plans. As unobtrusively as possible he had to slip into the stream of native life. In detail we hear of filthy wekales, various private dwellings, rascally servants, innumerable coffee-house acquaintances, and learned shaikhs. Among the latter, Tantawi's introductions were useful, though he postponed using them, and they then led to a transient suspicion that Wallin was a spy in the Russian service.

His acquaintances were all of the middle and lower classes, which was very much to his democratic taste. There is no trace of any connection with the Turkish official class; from a casual remark later, we gather that he always avoided Turks where possible.

Much time was taken up with lessons in colloquial Arabic, grammar, caligraphy, the elements of Islamic law and theology, the Arabic flute, and-most important of all-intoning the Koran. The flute was very difficult owing to the great number of intervals in the Arab scale. Camel-riding came easy, he wrote on his first journey, because his Koran teacher had made him bow constantly during the recitation, and the time happened to be the same as that of the camel's paces. Untold hours were spent in chat in the mosques and coffeehouses. Gradually Wallin learned "to sit, walk, talk, and use the correct compliments, as became a learned shaikh" (of the Hanafi sect). One imagines that he found the last habit hardest to acquire. After a time he entered many houses as a doctor, and spent three months in the house of an Arab friend. He had to accustom himself to the heat of the Cairo summer, unfamiliar food, fasting in Ramhdan, boils, vermin, dirt, perpetual watchfulness, home-sickness, and, above all, want of privacy. He endured it all with Finnish doggedness. The one recurring question was: Has my Islam been called in question? With the minuteness and almost the regularity of a fever chart, the answers, positive and negative, are entered over a long period.

The letters and diaries record each step he took in outward conformity; first the ceremonial washings, then the daily prayers; after many months the Friday mosque; later still he took part in zikrs, "calling upon Allah from the depths of my throat." "I always marvelled at the deep and resonant tone of the 'Allah'; it is like the deepest note of an organ, with a vibrating, silvery note that only an Arab's throat can produce." Wallin was ready at need to repeat the Muhammedan credo; if directly questioned he would not have denied being a Christian (though he would not have made the mistake of calling himself nosrani, a name, he says, reserved in Cairo for Greeks and Armenians wearing native dress). But his outward conformity had been so thorough that witnesses were always ready to testify for him; he had only to hold his tongue. This was especially the case on journeys, when rafiqs felt their credit bound up in his. Wallin was a sincerely God-fearing man, but nothing leads one to suppose that his specific Christianity was more than traditional, "the

faith of my fathers." The assumption of Muhammedanism may have cost him an occasional qualm, hardly a conscientious scruple. But the necessity for deceiving Arab friends was really painful. "Again I felt the greatest disgust at playing my liar's part; but," quoting a Finnish proverb, "he who takes the Devil into his boat is bound to land him safely."

This life was only made possible by avoidance of European society. A few rare exceptions were made for travellers in the East and for the Russian Consulate, through which he received letters and remittances. It could be visited without arousing too much suspicion, and, indeed, Wallin made no great secret of being a Russian subject; were not many of the Faithful subjects of the Czar? Wallin would have liked to make Lane's acquaintance, but Lane was still more strenuously avoiding Europeans. He saw a good deal of the Bavarian doctor Prunner, who had been with the Egyptians in the Hijaz and had travelled among the Wahabis. He also saw something of Adolf von Wrede, then busy writing the account of his travels in the Hadhramaut. Wallin disliked Wrede's talkativeness and boastfulness, despising a man who had lived for twenty years among Arabs without learning more than a smattering of Arabic; but he granted Wrede courage and promptitude and did not doubt his travels. Wrede probably had the uneasy self-assertiveness of the partially déclassé—he had run away from home at an early age—and no doubt felt far from certain of obtaining the recognition that was really his due. Docent Wallin, on the other hand, had a definite if humble place in the academic hierarchy; he had influential backing at home; and even in his Eastern disguise there was nothing ambiguous in his position in the eyes of Europeans of education. Fresnell, then on his way home from Jidda, is always spoken of with respect. He gave Wallin information about the Northern tribes, and told him about the ruins, not yet seen by any European, although Burckhardt had mentioned them, at Madina Salih. At various times Wallin considered the possibility of going there, but at Ma'an, on the first journey, could get no information. At Taima, on the second, he did hear about them from Badawin, but had then no choice but to push on to Hayil. Before leaving Cairo, Wallin decided to put off the Himyaritic studies in the Yamen till he could hope to spend some years there. Fresnell and von Wrede foretold his success in Arabia, so thorough had been his Orientalization and so un-European was his appearance. He looked as though he had Tartar blood, though the

nose was Caucasian.* (The idealized portrait published by Elmgren and Hogarth has not much value, for it was painted on the basis of a slight pencil sketch made on his death-bed.) Fresnell strongly advised Wallin to approach Arabia from Syria or Iraq, not Egypt, on account of the suspicion felt for everyone who came from there. "The Pasha's liberality was all-too-well-known and hated." The great Muhammed Ali had left a name in Arabia whose reverberations had not yet died away; even in the extreme South, von Wrede had just been suspected of being an Egyptian spy. But the prolonged stay in Cairo had cost so much that Wallin was reluctantly forced to take the nearer route. Fresnell then advised him to go via Aqaba. He had spoken more wisely than he knew in giving the first advice, though in the event it was not Wallin's life that was endangered, but his reputation as a disinterested explorer.

Long before starting for Arabia in April, '45, Wallin was heartily tired of Cairo and the Cairenes "... this people has no manliness of body or soul." But Arabic had proved harder than expected, a trip up the Nile, then commissions for Helsingfors, collecting books and anatomical specimens, had caused further delay.

The chief part of Wallin's scanty luggage was an imposing medicine chest; the only European book he dared to take, a small German medical compendium; his sole instruments for geographical purposes, watch, compass, and thermometer (precisely von Wrede's equipment). As it was, they, or perhaps the surgical instruments, gave rise to suspicions of his orthodoxy, even of his being a Frank. Without a barometer, Wallin's theorizing over the relative heights of the Arabian peninsula was necessarily guesswork. It was just too early for the aneroid, and an ordinary barometer was ruled out by the conditions of the journey. It must be borne in mind that the original object of the journey was mainly philological, not geographical, nor was he trained for geographical work. Even the self-taught Wrede had more notion of geology, and had studied Forskåll's botany of Arabia. With absolutely no training in natural science, if we except the short medical course, he yet contrived to make large additions to geographical knowledge, for he possessed the seeing eye and in a high degree the scientific conscience. His own remark after the first journey is bitter enough: "I am very vexed (det grämer mig) at not owning astronomical instruments; for I could probably have deter-

[•] It is a moot point whether Wallin was of pure Swedish blood, or partly Finnish (Tallqvist, op. cit., p. 1).

mined the position of the places I stayed at, if I had had the instruments and had known how to use them, which I suppose does not need much practice." But they were probably not to be had at Cairo, and in any case he had very little money.

The two English papers in which Wallin described his Arabian journeys are models of compression, so that we can hardly quarrel with a certain dryness; a more impersonal account of travel was surely never written. Something is due to the unfamiliar language in which he was obliged to write; he compares it to walking in tight shoes. In a matter-of-fact way he recorded the important actual results, attaching his own observations wherever possible to the existing literature, mostly Arabic. No fault can be found with the method, yet certainly the apparatus of learning displayed is unattractive. His own adventures-for instance, the intense sufferings from thirst on the way from Gubbe to Havil, and the two occasions on which he was robbed by Badawin-are passed over; nothing is said of the background of hopes and fears and shifting plans. "Here," in Arabia, "one must act as if one were cautiously sailing a coasting vessel, waiting for and spying after every breeze and little cloud, often lying for weeks and months in harbour, before daring to put out to sea."

But the tone of the diaries and letters is refreshingly natural. Wallin soon found it impossible to keep a diary in the desert, but was reduced to taking "very brief and aphoristic notes," worked up afterwards, when he could command some privacy, into immense letters to some intimate friend or friends at his own university. Unfortunately, Elmgren often suppressed the addressees' names, and the letters he used have disappeared. They are real letters, but are also evidently meant as aides mémoire and as informal reports to the university authorities. From the Consulate at Cairo they were to be forwarded by the Foreign Office at St. Petersburg to Finland, but were apt to lie there forgotten for months at a time.

While acknowledging the great merits of Burton's and Palgrave's narratives, one must admit Wallin's superiority in style. They are perpetually glancing over their shoulders at the audience, away from their object. Fashions change, and the jaunty, man-of-the-world pose that was one fashion of the '50's and '60's did not suit descriptions of the desert and the Badawin. Wallin kept his eye always on the object. He is never brilliant; he is always truthful; when he does allow himself a generalization his reader is compelled to feel that his insight has pierced right down to the roots of the subject. He had not Doughty's splendid gift of description; yet he, too, besides integrity of vision, had the power of vivid phrasing. Nor was the highly Latinized English then current so good a medium as Wallin's plain but vivid Swedish; he was not driven, like Doughty, to fall back on archaisms to avoid a style that jarred with the subject-matter.

Wallin was the first to give a full and first-hand account of the Badawin. Burckhardt had collected a store of sound information, but his direct contacts with them were limited to the border lands and the pilgrim routes near the Holy Cities. Wallin's experience of desert life was much shorter than Doughty's, but by temperament he was at least as well able to appreciate its bare grandeur. A deep satisfaction wells up again and again, as when he talks of "the perpetual monotony of the desert and the strange patience it engenders. A desert journey is like a sea voyage"; after the first camp: "Was it merely the pleasure of novelty, or was it the strange, magical, sagalike, patriarchal life, as of our first fathers-I do not know what it was that pleased me so, but I thought I never spent so happy and pleasant an evening." Wallin had an ingrained belief that he, the son of a barren country, bred up to hardness and adventure, was somehow akin to the Badawin. With him, criticism was apt to tread on the heels of admiration, yet they always remained "the free and noble sons of the desert." He did not sentimentalize unduly. "There are two ways of getting on with the Badawins; either give them sugar and sweet words, or treat them with severity and manly seriousness; I have found the second method the better one." But, he adds, up till then he had had no experience of the pure-bred tribes. "The Badawin is almost always the same; one becomes his friend and brother at once"; but: "One can live long with him and be convinced that nothing can now upset the good relationship; but if by chance the Badawin's hatred, envy, avarice, or any other of the passions is stirred, which are the drawbacks of his unbridled nature, in a second everything is changed." Later still he wrote: "I do not know where my love for the desert comes from-all too well I know that nothing awaits me there but hunger and thirst; the hot sun without shade; every hour the fear of being snapped up by my friends the Badawins, and being left, cruelly stripped, to die of hunger; or else the prospect of having to pit my strength against a nature that is as cruel as the sons of the desert; yet I know that in all Persia's luxuriance, and the superfluities of the English colony at Baghdad, as among the flesh-pots of Egypt, I longed continually for the desert."

Wallin naturally devotes much attention to desert hospitality and the code of manners. His medicine chest was always placed in the women's part of the tent, so that he had free access to them, and he praises their relative freedom. The Badawi husband, too, had a better time than his brother in the town; according to Wallin, husbands were hen-pecked in direct ratio to the seclusion in which their wives were kept; it was a matter in which he took a keen interest everywhere; his sympathy was all for the husbands. Children were exceedingly well-behaved, they were often as sensible as their elders. The desert speech, "with its metallic sound" . . . "almost the pure Koran speech," was hard to understand at first; Wallin took Luther's advice and listened to the women and children, once playing "visitors" and "market" for hours with the children in the deserted camp. Desert law and the conflict between it and the "Shariat dauli" amongst the tribes nearest the Turco-Egyptian lands interested him profoundly. Wallin longed to return and make a collection of desert laws; on the two journeys he had neither time nor sufficient familiarity with the language and customs to think of attempting it. He stored up every fact he could about rainfall, pasture, personal relationships, realizing that in the desert such knowledge enormously increased a traveller's prestige. The absence of fanaticism or of a parade of piety among the Badawi pleased him at first, but later he was mildly shocked by their ignorance of Islam: "They have absolutely no religion."

II

In Arabia Wallin tried at first to practise medicine without taking payment, partly because he wanted to repay hospitality, partly because he looked on himself as hardly better than a quacksalver. But this departure from custom led at once to trouble. He was suspected of being a Frank, or, since his orthodoxy seemed above reproach, a spy from Egypt. Taking payment also had the advantage of keeping down the swarm of patients, and the gifts of flour, butter, and marisi were welcome. To keep up the character of a learned shaikh from Cairo, Wallin was sometimes obliged to write charms—any Swedish words that came into his head—in Arabic script, a thing Doughty could not bring himself to do. Wallin consoled himself with the thought that at least they did no harm, and that in this case he refused payment. "I need not tell you how revolting the business

was, but I could not do otherwise; I was forced to it." A sense of the grotesqueness of the situation was some compensation.

The ailments he was asked to cure were nearly always of long standing, requiring prolonged treatment, which he could not give, and of which the crassly ignorant patients could not understand the necessity. He did what could be done in a hurry for ophthalmia and toothache and made many medical observations. With one exception, the only cases which he seriously undertook were at Jauf, where he stayed four months, and Hayil, where he stayed for two.

The northern desert which Wallin passed through from Ma'an to Jauf through the Wadi Sirhan, afterwards crossing the Nafud to Hayil, had been visited by no European. There is no need to repeat the itineraries, given by Wallin himself in the two papers. His instinct, from the first, led him to Najd; his main object, never reached, was S. Najd, the true Arabia of the Wahabis. He saw Najd as a sort of focus of the life of the peninsula, a rallying-point, from which waves of physically and spiritually rejuvenated Arabs had twice swept out to the border lands: after the birth of Muhammedanism in the Hijaz, and at the great Wahabi revival of Muhammedanism in the eighteenth century (Letter to the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, Tallqvist, op. cit., p. 327). The amazing rebirth of the same power of late years would probably not have taken him altogether by surprise. Though S. Najd in his time was in a wretched state, barely beginning to recover from the tremendous impact of the Egyptian attacks, culminating, though not ending, in the destruction of Dar'iya in 1818, Riyadh and the teaching in its mosque were what interested him most in all Arabia.

On his first journey Wallin spent some time at Jauf as a welcome guest. At first he spent the evenings with the youths of the town, lying on the soft sand listening to their singing on the one-stringed robaba, but he had to give up this unorthodox society when he made friends with a Wahabi katib, sent by Ibn Rashid to keep the people of Jauf up to their religious duties. From him Wallin learnt much of the history and contemporary state of Najd, in repayment arduously teaching the elements of arithmetic; from him, too, he learnt about Wahabism on the theological side; with its militant aspect he never became acquainted. Wallin reports: "They never call then selves Wahabis, it being a term of reproach used by opponents, but simply muslimin or muhvahhidin (Unitarians)." The strange fact of a relative tolerance towards Christians and Jews, as against other Muslims,

is mentioned. Like every other traveller, he noted the occasional hypocrisy which always accompanies Puritanism. He agreed with Burckhardt in looking upon Wahabism as Muhammedanism, pure and undefiled, its tenets not differing from those of the orthodox Hanbali sect.

Travelling over the Nafud with weak camels and an incompetent rafik, Wallin reached Hayil after great hardship. There is a description of the great Amir Abdullah, doing justice familiarly in his own courtyard. Wallin had been asked at Jauf to deliver a letter; he handed it to the prince, who took it carelessly, his attention "fortunately" fixed on two Badawin he was trying to reconcile. After six days of Ibn Rashid's hospitality, sleeping in the mosque, for there was no private hospitality, as at Jauf, Wallin took a penniless old Persian dervish into his service, and hired a small house in a garden. Privacy was more prudent, as well as pleasanter. He enjoyed this companionship, saying that Persians and Europeans have much in common; the Persians have much of our chivalry and point d'honneur, besides liking a joke. "Not so the Arab; he is Understanding itself . . . and would never be tempted to fight windmills; which leads, to our minds, to a certain shamelessness . . . which one sees among Arabs everywhere."

In Havil Wallin spent two very happy months, living on the fat of the land, which was needed after the date diet of Jauf and the short commons of the desert, and enjoying the good air and water, even the homely granite of the landscape. Wallin had a clear enough appreciation of the dual nature of the Shammar, half townsmen, half Badawin. "The Shammar are at present the mightiest Badawin tribe," "Ibn Rashid goes himself every rainy season into the desert with his beasts." Abdullah, a very able ruler, was the virtual founder of the Rashid Dynasty. There was peace within his borders, but not much for his immediate neighbours; he was victorious and freehanded, so that his friends outnumbered his enemies among his own people. He had steered a difficult course among the claims of the different potentates who at various times had exacted his allegiance: the Sharif of Mecca, the Pasha of Egypt, the Porte itself, and his old friend Faisal ibn Sa'ud. He acknowledged Faisal's formal claim, but the Shammar State, not S. Najd, was the centre of power.

From Hayil Wallin wished to go to the Qasim on the way to Riyadh; but, as Ibn Rashid's brother had just returned from a bloody raid there, it was thought too unsafe. He also considered returning by way of Taima and Madain Salih, but since it was the time of the pilgrimage, with accompanying unrest in the desert, that, too, was given up. The pleasant life at Hayil had cost money, and finally the cheapest and probably safest course was chosen, which was to join the Persian pilgrimage passing through Hayil, though Wallin no longer considered the visit to Mecca worth the risk involved, and had written of the childish vanity of wanting to be among the four or five Europeans who had been there. He could not afford the heavy fee to the Shammar Amir al Hajj, and so passed a time of great anxiety; the journey, too, was physically exhausting. At Madina he hoped to leave the pilgrims and make for the coast, but again the insecurity of the country and want of money forced him to remain. At Mecca he performed all the ceremonies, without being impressed, and described them shortly: Burckhardt had been exhaustive enough. Wallin was unwell, only anxious to leave "the Gehenna air" of Mecca before an open sore began to fester. He reached Jidda hungry, ragged, with but the value of 45 kopeks in his pocket, but with the pilgrim's large and clean turban, and able now to reflect that the title of "Haji" might prove useful later. Fortunately, a small letter of credit could be cashed. A sixty days' voyage up the Red Sea on an Arab vessel, packed with fanatical pilgrims, in bad weather, was a further test of endurance.

At Cairo there was a great disappointment: no news from home, since all his letters from Arabia had gone astray. Wallin was depressed by seeming neglect, tormented by anxiety for the future. Finally, he got into touch with Helsingfors, the letters were recovered, 1,000 roubles were "graciously granted," and hopes held out for the renewal of the original scholarship. At the end of nine months, since he had not the means for a long stay in the Yamen, he decided to visit Sinai and Jerusalem. Wallin noted the corruptness of the three holiest cities he visited.

Then came another long stay at Cairo. He prepared for the second Arabian journey, reducing the size of the medicine-chest and improving the coffee equipment, with a nice adjustment to their respective popularity values. An ordinary passport, tedzkere, was procured through the consulate, and the name "Abdolvali" changed to "Abdol Maula," out of deference to the saint-hating Wahabis. Unfortunately, he also asked, through the consulate, for a general letter of introduction for use in Arabia. This was refused. From Hayil he intended to go, either via Sedeir or the Qasim, to Riyadh. This time Wallin

had letters to "Feysal, son of Turki of the Sa'ud family," and to two learned shaikhs of the family of Abdul Wahhab, from one of their relatives, a Wahabi shaikh in Cairo. "I hope to be well received, and in that case would spend some time there, so as to hear the lectures which are said to be held in the mosque at Rijad. . . . If I can, I shall make an excursion to Baghdad, Alhassa, Bahrein, possibly even south to the great empty desert, which I imagine lies between Nejd and Yemen."

Wallin started on this journey with high hopes, better equipped than before, not indeed in good health—he was suffering terribly from boils—but looking forward to travelling through the spring pastures of the desert. "I am too much of a Badawin to put my trust in any preparations, or in aught else than Him who protects the faithful and the unfaithful . . . as well as on alnije alneize (the pure intent), as the Badawins say, for the Lord knows that my intent is pure."

The next news was given in a letter from Baghdad of August 2, '48. Landing at Muweila, he had travelled slowly, doctoring among various tribes, especially the Ma'aze, where he spent a month treating a mortally sick chief, afterwards reading the burial prayers. A vivid picture is given of the poverty-stricken little town of Tebuk, only to be approached at night for fear of thieving Badawin. Wallin could induce no one to go with him to the ruins of old Tebuk; a guide might have gone for money, but it was not safe to admit owning money on such a journey. He then went a roundabout way to Taima, as camels had to be fetched. Here in the black booths he fell in love, not for the first or last time, and even played with the thought of marrying and settling "far from Europe's pomps and vanities and over-education." But he realized in time that the idyll would not be lasting, and pushed on to Taima.

The events which followed must be given in some detail, for they were crucial, both for the success of Wallin's plans and for the estimate in which he has since been held.

"Some hours before our arrival a man called Beshir, a slave of Abbas Pasha* in Cairo, had arrived on his way to Egypt, with a string of Negd horses which he had bought for his master at Hail." While Wallin was still drinking coffee at his host's, another slave of the party, a rude fellow, came in, upbraided Wallin's Badawin companions for convoying a stranger, and fell on Wallin with threats and the accusation that he had called himself a servant of Abbas Pasha.

Wallin denied it, holding his pistols ready under his cloak: "Thank God I am no one's servant, but God's and my own. . . . I am no vagabond or fugitive," and showed the tedzkere. The whole affair was caused by the gossip of the little place, which accounted for Wallin's appearance with seven companions, by saying that he was on his way to Najd with ten chests of gold, to buy horses for his master Abbas Pasha, named as the only Egyptian magnate who had connections with Arabia. Wallin went straight to Beshir, who was reasonable, and wrote under his eyes a letter to Cairo, begging his friends there to deny any injurious reports, " for I was seriously afraid of the consequences of the meeting." The friends were the Wahabi shaikh and the consulate. He even expected the letter to be forwarded to Helsingfors, no doubt to the Arabist Professor Geitlin. There were men of Hayil in Beshir's party, and Wallin feared they would enquire about him at Cairo, and perhaps return to Hayil before he had left. "Nor could I be sure what messages and orders Abbas Pasha might send to Hayil, for even if he knew nothing of me at the time, which I misdoubt, he would be sure now to make enquiries, and one can never trust a Turk."

But another unlucky meeting took place near by. A party of Faisal's men was returning home to Riyadh from Cairo, whither they had brought the Pasha a present of horses; their leader was a pleasant young man called Hazzam. As it turned out later, another slave of Abbas Pasha, sent to Najd to buy a certain famous mare, was of the party. "I thought I could not go to Faisal in better company, and asked if I might join them; they were willing and said they knew me; at first I thought they had heard of me from the Arabs I had come from, but later I gave their words another meaning." They reached Hayil by forced marches on May 2, and old acquaintances flocked to see Wallin. News came that Ibn Sa'ud was on a raid; his men decided to go after him. Wallin wished to go to Riyadh and to avoid their forced marches, which gave no opportunity to observe the country, and so, fortunately, remained at Hayil.

Mi'tab, the young brother of the new ruler of Hayil, came ostensibly to see Wallin's fine pistols. The courteous prince complimented him on the luck he had hitherto had on his travels, but warned him not to expect it in Ibn Sa'ud's country, "where unrest and anarchy now reign." On leaving, he gave a plainer message to Wallin's host: "Tell him he should on no account go to Feysal, for he and his people hate and despise all that comes from Egypt; he has no business there

whatever, and I am persuaded that they will take his life, either by the sword or by poison; tell him, finally, that we know he is a Christian, but he is a child of honour (valad el-helal), and therefore we honour him and I send him this friendly advice."

This recognition as a Christian was a great blow. Wallin connected it with the refusal of the letter of recommendation at Cairo; through Abbas Pasha both Ibn Rashid and Hazzam, and therefore Ibn Sa'ud, had almost certainly been warned. The way to S. Najd was barred for the present. We cannot be surprised that Wallin did not expatiate on these events in the J.R.G.S. As long as he hoped to visit Riyadh it was plainly a case of least said soonest mended, not to speak of the duty of reticence as to the friendly warning at Hayil.

On June 3, by the first opportunity, he left for Baghdad; the trying journey is briefly described. Wallin had about 130 roubles left, and was further fortified by a draft on the French Consul Geoffroy. After enduring the heat for about three months in the company of poor Persians, who fortunately turned out to be lax in keeping Ramhdan, he gave up the hope of letters from home and left for Persia to

recuperate.

Without attempting to describe this journey, something should be said of his impressions of the Persians, for afterwards comparisons between them and the Arabs are constant. In their own country he found them antipathetic, "the vainest and most spoilt people I have seen in the East." "Art and knowledge are more esteemed than among the Arabs, but their semi-education is worse than none, for it leaves no impress on their souls and characters." "The Arab, at least in the desert, may go forward on the path he has chosen; he need not be ashamed of Islam, as he confesses it, nor will he ever be anything else but a Muslim. . . . He need feel no shame in the face of his poverty or of his great historic past, for he still has a certain youthfulness left. But the poor Persian has sold his birthright to the Arab and still chews the peas his stomach cannot digest. For a thousand years he has ploughed his field with a strange plough, which he has not the strength to drive, and weeds have covered up the field." Wallin held that Islam is essentially a desert growth, unnatural among Persians and Turks. "The Persians are shaky and uncertain in their articles of faith, whereas the Arabs are as firm as the mountains; in Persia there are almost as many creeds as there are individuals."

Strangely enough, it is not till after the Persian journey that Wallin makes any significant remark about Muhammad Ali of Egypt. "But who can understand the East's deep hatred for the West? and who has known how to quench it? I would tell you: one man only, that is Egypt's Mohammad Ali—if I did not fear the declamations of philanthropic Europe. But I venture to say so much: that one does not get far here with sermons and moral suasion, for the birch and the ferrule, which by degrees can be laid aside at home, are still needed to the full in the East, although I own to a shudder of horror and disgust every time I see the karbas dancing on the soles of the bare feet."

In January, '49, Wallin reached Basra, "that rubbish-heap," and longed more than ever for Europe or the desert. Hurrying to the French Consul, an Oriental Christian, he presented the letter of credit, as arranged. It was not accepted. Wallin wrote at once to Baghdad, and sat down, with what courage he could muster, about two ducats, and supplies of rice and flour left over from the Persian journey, and calculated to last two months. No reply came. "I had to avoid acquaintances, deny myself fruit and candles, wear dirty clothes or wash them without soap. . . . I found my only pleasure in the laments of discontented Persian poets. . . . And, worse than all, for more than two years I had had no news from home. Would it cost you so damned much trouble to scribble me a line? Have all my university friends forgotten me?" (Money and letters were waiting at Cairo and Aden.)

After more than a month, news came of Geoffroy's death, and Wallin almost despaired. "At the French Consulate they did not care if I starved." He was finally saved by the Indian navy, as Doughty in similar case at Bombay was saved by the British. He turned in desperation to the captain of the Nitocris, then surveying the floodland of the Tigris and Euphrates, and begged a passage to Baghdad. "They did not know what to make of me at first; after the first day these English gentlemen were extraordinarily polite and pleasant." In Baghdad Wallin met with great kindness from the small English colony, "so that it will be harder than ever to return to my dirty Oriental life." "Mr. Rawlinson, a mighty Orientalist and famous decipherer of cuneiform, is the English Resident." In the middle of April Wallin left with the English post, a single Arab, for Damascus, not the least dangerous of his journeys. Going by sea from Beirut to Alexandria, he reached Cairo, his home in the East, on June 1. He had already decided to put off the visit to the Yamen, and go back to Finland to rest, "knocked to pieces as I am by the

fight I have had to put up against an unkind fate." "Whether I come home with a white or a black countenance, you must judge."

Wallin determined to break the journey home by a stay in London to better his English. He had grown a stranger to Europe; hearing Fidelio at Cologne first gave him some faint sense of home-coming. He spent the winter very quietly in London, reading Arabic MSS. in the British Museum, occasionally allowing himself an oratorio or a visit to the docks, suffering acutely from the damp cold, and in general busy collecting data as to the habits of the natives as patiently and dispassionately as in Cairo or Jauf. In Cairo one had to put up with the Khamsin and the nuisance of the Friday mosque; in London there were fogs and "a little music" in the evenings from Miss Emily. there were fogs and "a little music" in the evenings from Miss Emily. The luxury of Bond Street and Regent Street scared him; the squalor of slumdom was appalling; neither Finland nor the East had prepared him for either. "How humane, how well brought up, are the poorest classes in the East compared with the poorest classes here!" The refrain is impassioned: "Dear East, how shall I get back to you?"

Major Rawlinson's return in the spring opened the doors of various learned societies and the India House, where "a very interesting and learned societies and the India House, where "a very interesting and learned man, Colonel Sykes, Director of the Cartographical Department," busied with a new map of Arabia, which "had not gone beyond Berghaus' old map," was glad to use his results. The "little paper" on his second journey which Wallin read before the Royal Geographical Society (Journal, XX.) cost him "incredible trouble," but he had every reason to be satisfied with the recognition and helpfulness shown on all sides. Rawlinson wrote a laudatory article in the Nautical Standard, placing Burchbardt and Wellin in a place apart Nautical Standard, placing Burckhardt and Wallin in a place apart among Arabian explorers. Naturally, Wallin was pleased. But though all his hopes were turned towards another journey, resignation rather than elation is the note of his letters. That overworked instrument, his body, was giving obscure warning. "In the day's journey of life I had a goal: to reach the spring in the far desert before sunset; but my beast was starving, its hump without fatness, the serab (mirage) on the way led me astray; so now that night has overtaken me I lay me down, hungry and thirsty, with a Badawin's quietness and grateful al hamdo lillah, in the pit I scraped in the sand, to abide what the Lord may send me when dawn breaks, life or death."

Wallin returned to Helsingfors as professor of Oriental languages. But the emoluments of the first year were almost non-existent, so that the returning traveller, faced with half-forgotten debts, incurred for the journey, was in no enviable position, although he was again living with his mother and sister and surrounded by old friends and new admirers. There was small demand for Arabic in Finland, and students arranged that he should lecture as well on English. During one term he expounded Washington Irving's "Life of Columbus," so earning a little money. He seems to have intended writing a popular account of his travels; one fragment was published after his death. Wallin's best energies were spent on raising funds for another Arabian journey. His own poor country, with no interests in the East, could not in fairness be asked to contribute further. But the R.G.S. was much interested in the plan, and offered assistance of all kinds, besides getting a grant of £200 from the East India Company. Since this sum was quite insufficient, the R.G.S. asked the Imperial Russian Geographical Society for its co-operation. The Russians were very willing. The rough copy of a long French letter of Wallin's to the vice-president has been kept. Wallin asked first of all that his small debts should be paid, so that he could feel free as an honest man to leave Finland; above all, he asked for astronomical instruments; then for means to spend about a year in Europe in preparation, learning to use the instruments, acquiring quelque teinte de geologie, and learning enough about drawing to be able to sketch ruins. After visiting libraries and Orientalists in Europe, five years at least were to be spent in Arabia.

Najd was again his central problem, unexplored by any European. From there he wished to visit Mahra, to test Fresnell's supposition that a dialect of ancient Himyaritic was spoken there. Landing this time at Wajh, Wallin once more hoped to visit Madain Salih, and expected, from what the Badawin had told him, to find many inscriptions there, traces of an ancient Christian or Jewish civilization, which he also hoped to find in the Hijaz. Ela, in the midst of four powerful tribes, with all of whom he stood since the second journey in the relation of brotherhood, was to be visited; also Khaibar, chief home of the ancient Jews in Arabia; finally, Yamen and the borders of Hadhramaut. Three generations of Arabian explorers have carried out most of Wallin's plan.

On his side Wallin made conditions, asking, among other things, for £400 a year while the journey lasted. In copying the letter, Wallin, the conscientious, the master of detail, made a slip: he left out the words "a year." The Russian society granted everything, marvelling at his moderation. The negotiations went on for some

time before the misapprehension was noticed. The society, having passed a formal resolution as to the grant, could not afterwards increase it. Wallin was determined not again to run unnecessary risks and forgo valuable scientific results by travelling with insufficient means. The bitter disappointment and anxiety increased his melancholy and probably his ill-health. Yet the case was not quite hopeless. To save their face and enable themselves to grant the larger sum, the Russians proposed that Wallin should also visit Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva, and other parts of Central Asia, which were of great interest to them politically. Wallin hesitated. He knew that they had no conception of the risks and labour involved. He pointed out that the time left for Arabia would be so shortened as greatly to damage the prospects of success there; that his explorations in Central Asia were not likely to be very valuable, as he did not know the native languages and did not expect to like the people. He was willing to compromise: should time and health allow, after the Arabian journey, he would cross the Gulf and collect information, and, according to the result, apply or not for means for a journey in Central Asia.

One point should perhaps be noticed: the R.G.S. privately stipulated that Wallin should not carry out political work in Arabia. This was natural, but most probably unnecessary, for the Russian society, except for faint symptoms of interest in Arab horses, does not seem to have had any ulterior motive in supporting the Arabian journey. In view of the great interest shown in the plan, even after the Russian deadlock, it seems likely that means would have been forthcoming in London to send Wallin somehow to Arabia. But it was not to be. On the evening before his forty-first birthday, as he was sitting at his mother's tea-table, he was seized with pains in the breast and lay

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down. A few hours later he passed quietly away.

THE DEATH OF HERR WASSMUSS

THE recent announcement in some of the daily papers of the death of Herr Wilhelm Wassmuss of the German Diplomatic and Consular Service, at the comparatively early age of 51, must have recalled to the memories of many members of this Society his sinister activities during the Great War as one of the group of agents-provocateurs, composed of Germans, Turks, and Indian revolutionaries, which the Central Powers despatched to the Middle East soon after the commencement of hostilities, with the double purpose of stirring up a jehad in that region and of inciting the rulers of Persia and Afghanistan to enter the lists against the Allies.

As we know, the affairs of the "Mission" were destined to gang agley, and none of those ambitious objectives were achieved; but Herr Wassmuss, though originally ear-marked for Afghanistan and India, broke off from the main party at an early stage, and with one or two companions made his way into the province of Fars, where he happened to have spent some months in 1913 and with the chiefs and the topography of which he was generally familiar.

In that field he rendered stout and remarkable services to his country; if, indeed, they can be measured by the degree of worry and preoccupation which they involved to those concerned with the protection of British subjects and interests in the ostensibly neutral territory of Southern Persia. His name itself, unlike most European names, was one easily assimilated by the Persian peasant, and for the next four years "WOSSMUSS" and his exploits, duly embellished, of course, in the telling, provided an inexhaustible source of gossip among the tents and teashops of Fars.

During the two or three years preceding the war, his permanent post at that period being, if I remember right, Vice-Consul at Zanzibar, Herr Wassmuss had twice held charge of the German Consulate at Bushire during the absence of the permanent incumbent on furlough. In private life he came to be regarded as a good fellow, and was well liked by ourselves and the British community in general. On the other hand, as a consular colleague, I found him somewhat troublesome and truculent to deal with, as he was inclined to make up for some lack of tact and diplomatic amenity by an early recourse to threat and bluster. This made business dealings with him difficult,

especially during his second sojourn at Bushire in 1913, as it was a juncture when our respective Governments were endeavouring to negotiate a settlement of their interests in the Persian Gulf sphere, and the discussion of many difficult local details and aspects devolved upon us as consular representatives on the spot. Apart from official business, however, his relations with me and mine were friendly enough, and I have even some reason to feel grateful to him, in that he sized me up very fairly, not to say generously, in a despatch addressed to his Government on the occasion of my relinquishment of the Bushire appointment. The document was one, among others, which fell into our hands during the war.

In the summer of 1914 Wassmuss was apparently on leave, Dr. Listermann being at his post at Bushire. At any rate, he is known to have been at Cairo shortly before the war and in Constantinople when Turkey actually entered the lists. Having there been mobilized, with some twenty others of his contemporaries possessing Oriental experience, to form the Middle East Mission above referred to, he presumably left some time during the autumn of 1914 for Baghdad. He was next heard of at Shuster, which he had reached via Pusht-i-Kuh with one or two companions, and where he was occupied in inciting the priests and notables of Arabistan to declare a jehad against the British. His next objective was said to be Shiraz, where the pro-German activities of the Governor-General (who had had a German education) and certain Swedish officers of the gendarmerie were already causing us concern, and the situation was now considered, from a military standpoint, to be sufficiently serious to call for the arrest of any Germans coming within our reach. About the same time reliable information was furnished to the Bushire Residency to the effect that the German Consul, Dr. Listermann, was actively inciting the petty chief of the small smuggling port of Dilwar, a few miles south of Bushire, to make an attack on the Residency, which occupies an isolated position to the south of the Bushire peninsula. It was accordingly decided to arrest him forthwith. This was carried out without incident, and the consular records seized at the same time provided ample justification for the action taken and also some indication of Wassmuss's programme. It now became more than ever important to arrest the latter, and arrangements were accordingly made to have the movements of his caravan towards Shiraz closely watched and reported. The party soon reached a point in the hinterland within the jurisdiction of a local chief who was an old friend of the British, and with his co-operation the arrest was duly affected. Unfortunately, however, the local tufangchis deputed by the Khan to guard the prisoners (Wassmuss, Dr. Lenders, and an Indian) during the night, succumbed either to sleep or the almighty dollar, and the redoubtable Wassmuss succeeded in escaping in his pyjamas and reached sanctuary with the Khan of Borasjun, who was an old acquaintance of his and, incidentally, on bad terms with the local government at Bushire and the British authorities. Wassmuss's companions, Dr. Lenders and the Indian, failed to get away, and were delivered into our custody the following morning, together with their baggage, which included a mass of inflammatory pamphlets in various Indian vernaculars, intended to incite our Moslem Sepoys to mutiny and jehad; and also, among other things, an important cipher code.

As may be imagined, Wassmuss's evil experience excited his bitter animosity, and it was taken for granted that on reaching Shiraz he would leave no stone unturned to make trouble for us. After staying for a few days with his friend at Borasjun, during which he foregathered with other disaffected Khans of the Bushire hinterland, he passed on unmolested to Shiraz, where he received a warm welcome, and found his comrade Wustrow just arrived as German "Consul." For a short time Wassmuss made his headquarters with Wustrow, but he found that the existing situation at Shiraz, though volcanic, was not yet ripe for eruption, so he decided to return to his friends in Tangistan, determined, no doubt, to wreak his vengeance on the British authorities at Bushire for his abortive arrest.

During this phase of his activities he behaved with consummate skill and assurance, in the endeavour both to maintain his own prestige with his Persian hosts and to keep them firm in the belief that Germany was winning the war. I am not aware whether he formally embraced Islam, but he undoubtedly posed to them as a Moslem and was accepted as such by them, wearing a beard and dressing and living entirely as a Persian. I have a photograph of him taken about this time, in which he is indistinguishable from other Persians in the picture. One of his devices for keeping his friends up to the scratch was a bogus wireless installation which he erected outside his habitation and with which he pretended to hold communion with Kaiser "Haji Wilhelm," and even to arrange personal interviews for his hosts with that exalted personage.

By July (1915) he had succeeded in working up the Tangistanis to concert pitch for an attack on the British Residency, and local report

credited him with a force of nearly 1,000 men and two guns. On July 8 a small reconnaissance party which went out to probe the vicinity under the command of Major E. H. Oliphant, and accompanied by Captain J. G. Ranking, of the Residency Staff, fell into an ambush of these gentry and unfortunately both officers were killed, Major Oliphant losing his life in the attempt to help Captain Ranking away.

But though the Bushire outposts were again assailed a little later the main attack never materialized, and the tribesmen for the time being dispersed. We heard little of Wassmuss until the ensuing November, by which time the situation at Shiraz had reached a climax in the arrest of the British Consul (Major O'Connor) and the entire British community and their expulsion from Shiraz. The men were consigned to the Khan of Tangistan for internment at Ahram under Wassmuss's supervision, while the ladies were sent in to Bushire and from thence proceeded to India or home.

Major O'Connor—now Sir Frederick O'Connor—has given a most interesting account of the whole of this most trying period in his recent book "On the Frontier and Beyond," which all interested in that queer phase of the war should read. It is also dealt with briefly, from the historian's point of view, in the 1930 edition of Sir Percy

Sykes's "History of Persia."

It is not possible to follow Wassmuss's fortunes in any detail during the next two years. The difficulty of getting supplies of money and material in the way of war news with which he could hope to keep up in the minds of his Persian friends belief in Germany's ultimate victory must have got more and more acute; but he continued to play his now lone hand with great determination, and managed soon to be on the spot wherever any trouble might be brewing for British authorities in Fars. Though he had opportunities during this period of surrendering and being repatriated on favourable terms, he never availed himself of them, and held out until long after the Armistice, and it was not until March, 1919, that he and his countryman Oertel, who had lately joined him from the Kerman direction, endeavoured to make their exit from Persia via the north. Their movements were reported, however, and they were arrested at Kum by the Persian gendarmerie and handed over to me (then acting as British Minister in Teheran) for disposal. It seemed rather an irony of fate for Wassmuss that after the lurid events of the past four years he should have found himself in my hands, and in the thought that it might be humiliating to him I decided not to have any séance with him in person. Accordingly, he and his companion were sent on without delay to Kazvin in our military custody, and from thence repatriated via Baku. But Wassmuss seemed determined to play a fighting rôle to the end. He struggled violently with his escort when conducted to the conveyance which was to take him from the British Legation in Teheran to Kazvin, and finally had to be frog-marched, and he made a last and rather pointless attempt to escape from custody during his night at Kazvin.

The papers which announced his death gave no indication of the cause or place of it, but stubborn character that he was, I doubt not that had he had anything to say to it he would have chosen to go down fighting. R.I.P. The story of his four years' adventures and vicissitudes in Southern Persia would make good reading, and it is very much to be hoped that he kept a diary during his exile which will some day see the light.

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P. Z. Cox.

THE ART OF RAJPUT CHIVALRY

Himalayan Art. By J. C. French. Oxford University Press, 1931. The frame in which Mr. French sets his Himalayan paintings is subtly adapted to their style. The first breath of the hills that greets the traveller from the stifling plains, the lightness and brightness of the snows, combined with the exhilaration that comes of æsthetic exploration run through his delightful book. "The bounds of the æsthetic horizon have extended. Instead of a quiet trip through

Western Europe, with Athens as its limit, the seeker after something new in art faces the caravans of Asia. And now year by year Indian art is arousing greater interest. But there are still unknown regions in it which arouse something of the excitement of exploration."

Mr. French carries his reader with him through an enchanted country, from one little court to another, over newly made precarious motor roads cut into the face of the cliffs, along dangerous paths of slipping shale, across strange bridges spanning deep ravines that echo to the roar of mountain torrents—streams that after many wanderings spread out far below into the broad, placid waters of the Punjab. And such is the fascination of the narrative that the book will appeal to many unfamiliar with Indian art, while to those already interested in the subject Mr. French's knowledge and keen observation will be evident and give his work an authoritative value.

Rajput art is a subject that gains immensely by such a treatment. Aspects that seem alien and remote, viewed from the Western standpoint in a London museum gallery, fall into place and take their true significance when related to the daily life, the architectural and scenic background of the people who inspired them. Under present methods art criticism has tended to become so cut off from life and specialized it is a relief to find this book on Himalayan painting treated in the spirit of the Grand Tour. But instead of a young eighteenth-century squire setting out leisurely to absorb classical culture in Italy, bringing home marble Cæsars and mythological tapestries to adorn the family seat, we have a busy Anglo-Indian civilian devoting his spare time to arduous travel in the Himalayas, studying and collecting the delicate paintings that form the last phase of Hill art.

On the same quest the writer penetrated into the Kangra Valley one day in March. After leaving Pathankot, a dusty little railhead town whose sole attraction was the blue mist of ageratum flowers lining the irrigation channels, the road, crossing the Chakki River, rose at once and wound up steeply, mile upon mile, until it passed under the rock of Nurpur Fort. The long, hot journey from the Punjab plain only added to the charm of an evening spent at the Dâk bungalow, exquisitely placed on the spur of the hill behind the castle. The sunset flush on the vast rampart of the Daulah Dagh held one spellbound, until the cold grey shadow crept up the rose and violet mountain wall. Then, the pageant of the day over, the moon rising through the encircling pine trees shone with increasing radiance on the high castle gateway, recalling old tales of Rajput chivalry and paintings of the Divine Story of Krishna and Radha.

Plate III., women feeding cranes, comes from Nurpur. And the dress resembles those of the women in the frieze of Krishna's exploits carved on the ruined temple in the fort.

The next great fortress to dominate the Kangra road is at Kotal, where two rivers meet. But the old palace enclosure that crowns the rock two hundred feet above the narrow highway is now deserted, except for passing Gujars. From a little shrine by the roadside, steps lead up to a romantic postern gate. After a series of rocky gorges, the main valley opens out, and from Shahpur onwards the perilous road to the capital becomes a smooth processional path bordered by avenues.

Arrived at Kangra, the writer was fortunate in obtaining some paintings by Huzuri Lal, the direct successor of Kushan Lal, painter to the great Maharaja Sansar Chand. And among Huzuri's studies of Krishna and Radha in the local style, and his portraits of Mughal Emperors, was one of those strange traditional pictures of Alexander, mentioned by Mr. French. Ever since the great world conqueror reached his southern limit at Jullundur in the plains below Kangra his portrait has been painted and the subject handed down as a precious heirloom. Each generation has repainted him against a background of its own time and place. Little by little, Alexander the Macedonian has become a Rajput prince, but the fair hair, the cleanshaven face, the Greek helmet, and the square-cut tunic persist, also the hand with the two fingers and thumb raised in blessing, that symbol of mysterious power known over the Afghan border as the "Dast-i-Sikandar," the Hand of Alexander, and throughout the Christian world as the Blessing of the Trinity. There is also a tradition, mentioned by Mr. French, that Alexander actually visited Kangra and set up an idol which was the image of his wife; but more probably it was a figure of Niki (Victory) that the Greeks set up to mark their

turning place.

Following his title, Mr. French confines himself to Hill Rajput painting, with a last chapter looking back on the mountains from Mallabhum in Bengal. But the Muslim drive down to Delhi split the Rajput clans in half, and Rajput painting cannot be studied without some reference to what is left in the Western stronghold of Udiapur, that closely guarded and magically beautiful valley in the Aravali Hills. In that gay mediæval world, free from the shadow of Muslim or Christian conqueror, colour is the dominate note, colour in dress, in architecture, in all the hundred and one affairs of daily life. Here at last is the gorgeous East of Western fancy, the East so disappointingly to seek where Western influence has made itself felt. The frescoes on the outside walls of houses are the finest of their sort left in India. And so strong is the influence of this typical Rajput art that miniature paintings are not confined to books and folios. In H.H. the Maharana's private rooms they are let into the walls and with frames of dark blue glass mosaic surrounded by pale pink plaster, repeat the traditional border in an architectural way.

It was in the plains that the Vaishnavite revival of the sixteenth century found its first expression. There the religious love poetry of the Rajputs crystallized round the pastoral of Krishna and Radha. But when the Kangra painters turned their attention to the theme, its familiar setting is changed. Krishna, with the Gopis, the fairy milkmaid, and Radha, their Queen, have left the plains behind them. Gone are the dun-coloured fields, the slow-moving rivers, the lotus tanks shaded by heavy-branched mango trees of their birthplace at Mahaban, the Divine Story is now reacted against a background of alpine meadows fringed with fir woods and watered by hurrying mountain streams. Plates VIII., XII., XVI. are charming examples of this transmigration.

One of the most striking passages in a book full of keen observation illustrates the difference between primative and provincial art.

"The contrast between the provincial and the primative is shown with singular clearness in the Kangra Valley School, but throughout the whole history of art it can be seen. The primative is the complete expression of the spirit of its age in art. In it the highest culture of the time is to be found. The provincial, as its name implies, is something local and isolated, and whatever originality it may possess is due to the fact of mere rustic conservatism which sticks to outworn methods long after they have been discarded elsewhere. The primative is the mighty source of future art, just as the Himalayan snows give rise to the rivers of India. The provincial is the feeble and undeveloped descendant, which retains some resemblance to its great archaic ancestor merely because it has not the strength and energy to keep up with the main stream of artistic effort. . . . Mere time has nothing to do with the primative. Enormously old art may be as dull, lifeless, and decadent as some of the things that are produced to-day. The great and vital periods of art which we call primative, and which make such an intensely strong appeal to modern taste, are always preceded by cataclysms in culture resembling the geological changes which produce the mountain ranges. Thus the great Byzantine and Romanesque arts succeeded the dull and outworn Græco-Roman, but between the two was the rise of Christianity. Similarly in China the beautiful Wei art followed the introduction of Buddhism. The splendid primative art of mediæval India, which is as yet hardly known in the West, arose during the convulsions consequent on the Mahomedan invasion. Some violent cataclysm is always required to sweep away the hollow and lifeless conventions and illusions which tend to cluster round an old civilization like barnacles round a ship, and to shake society out of its routine and bring it face to face with elemental reality. The way is clear for the primative, or, in other words, great art."

The way in which the author can enter into the Indian artists' feeling is shown all through the book, as, for instance, his observation on the Oriental method of composing a crowd with no central figure or group to dominate the scene. "It is the natural relation of all the figures which gives the scene unity and coherence." This applies to the fine decoration from Haripur chosen as a frontispiece. Only once does Mr. French's instinctive judgment fail him, when he says on page 108: "Wonderful though the colour of Kangra art may be, still it is an Oriental art, and, therefore, linear to its essence, and cannot complain of injustice if it is judged by line alone." Colour is just the force in Eastern art that so often eludes Western critics, prone, as they are, to confuse its qualities with light and shade. The delicate unusual scheme of the Kangra painters, more nearly allied to French and Japanese taste than to Indian or Persian, cannot be left out in any estimate of the art of the Hill Rajputs.

CONSTANCE MARY VILLIERS-STUART.

ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY LIBRARY

MEMBERS are again reminded that good management of the Library is impossible unless the rules are observed.

The following books have been abstracted from the shelves without being entered in the register of issues. Their immediate return

is requested:

"The Report of the Simon Commisssion." 2 vols. (bound in red buckram). "Loyalties," by Sir A. T. Wilson." "Through Mesopotamia in Disguise." Soane. First edition, with author's signature.

J. K. Tod, Hon. Librarian.

Marco Polo Travels. Translated into English from the text of Professor L. F. Benedetto by Professor Aldo Ricci. 83/ ×51/2." Pp. xviii+438. George Routledge and Sons, Ltd. 21s.

The travels of Marco Polo, the first explorer of the heart of Asia, appeal strongly to the members of the Royal Central Asian Society. The classic work on the amazing journeys undertaken by the illustrious Venetian was published in 1871 by Sir Henry Yule, who embodied all the information available at that period, and elucidated his theme with notes of exceptional value. A generation later, in 1903, Henri Cordier, the well-known authority on China, brought up-to-date Yule's second edition.

He dealt with the new information that had resulted from journeys of Sir Aurel Stein and other travellers in this work, and still more so in "Ser Marco Polo," published by him in 1920.

Italians recognized the great importance of Yule as a commentator, but rightly desiring to throw fresh light on the "Father of Geography," the Comitato Geografico Nazionale Italiano of Florence commissioned Professor Benedetto to prepare a national edition of "Marco Polo." He thereupon visited some fifty libraries in various cities of Europe and found many unknown MSS. during his patient search. Of supreme importance was the discovery in the Ambrosian Library at Milan of a Latin manuscript. This is a copy, made in 1795, of a manuscript written in the fourteenth or fifteenth century, which is derived from a Franco-Italian original. This manuscript, termed Codex Z, is abridged for one-third of the text, but, in the unabridged portion, it reproduces the text of the famous manuscript (fr. 1116) of the Bibliothèque Nationale, generally known as the Texte Géographique.

Benedetto published the Texte Géographique collated with the newly discovered manuscripts in a splendid work under the title of "Marco Polo: Il Milione" in 1928. The title Il Milione, I would mention, was given to the illustrious Venetian by his fellow-citizens, to whom his descriptions of the teeming population of Chinese cities appeared to savour of exaggeration, and the soubriquet is retained in the Corte del Milione in which the house of the Polos may be found at Venice.

The more important additions, due to the discovery of Codex Z, include an account of the old kingdom of the Uighurs, who were 161

the teachers and advisers of the Mongol Kaans, and there is also a reference to a "race of people of whom no one knows what law they follow." The Polos went carefully into the question and decided that they were Christians, whereas there is no doubt that they were followers of the pessimistic Manes—so far east had Manichæism spread.

Yule sagely remarked that the puzzles presented by the text of Marco Polo were one reason for the deep in erest shown in the work. We know that, in 1271, he started on his travels with his father and uncle from a port opposite the island of Cyprus and that he made for Tabriz. But did he visit Baudas or Baghdad or go direct from Tabriz to Saveh, Yezd, and Kerman. Yule and Cordier consider that Baghdad was visited, but in view of the fact that he does not mention the name of its river—incidentally he terms the Volga the Tigris—and, for other reasons, I opposed this view, and my view is generally supported.

It is, of course, sometimes difficult to know whether Marco describes a province from a visit or from hearsay, but Yezd and Kerman lay undoubtedly on his itinerary, and an interesting addition is a description of the effect of earth brought from Isfahan, where "the people are so wicked and treacherous that they constantly kill one another," on the people of Kerman, who "are good, very humble, and peaceful." When the Kermanis sat down to a banquet on the Isfahan earth "they began offending one another with words and deeds, and wounding one another mortally." I vaguely recollect reading a similar story relating to an Armenian prince.

The journey southwards from Kerman when, after riding "seven days across a plain, one reaches a very great mountain," lay across the district of Sardu, which I explored many years ago down to the low-lying valley in which Camadi or Komadin was situated. Reobar or Rudbar was then traversed, where Marco escaped a band of robbers, "but many of his companions were taken and sold, and some were killed."

The Polos reached the Persian Gulf at Hormuz, a port on the Minab River, which is undoubtedly identical with the Harmozia, where Nearchus beached his fleet in safety. Probably finding the season for voyaging had passed, they decided to pursue their journey by land and retraced their steps to Kerman, and thence marched north to Cobinan (Kuhbenan). There they entered the Lut, the Great Desert of Persia, and Marco feelingly describes the water as "so bitter that no one could possibly drink it." This description I

can fully endorse as I suffered severely from thirst when crossing the same section of the Lut.

Reaching Tunokain (Tun and Kain), on the northern borders of the Lut, Marco gives a delightful account of the Assassins, whose chief stronghold had been captured by Hulaku Khan a few years previously.

The travellers thence swung eastwards across what is now Northern Afghanistan and reached Balkh, known as the "Mother of Cities." Farther east, following up the valley of the Oxus, the Venetians reached Balashan or Badakshan, the classical Bactria, with its memories of Alexander the Great. Marco mentions its rubies, which he referred to as balascus, the name by which he called the country. It has come down to us as "balas," a delicate rose-red variety of the spinel ruby. He also mentioned its lapis lazuli, lumps of which were brought me for sale at Kashgar.

Steadily rising "one ascends so high that they say it is the highest place in the world. It is called Pamier. . . . There are wild sheep of very great size. Their horns reach a length of quite six spans." This is the first description of the celebrated wild sheep which are rightly named after Marco Polo.

Did not Kipling write-

"Do you know the world's white roof-tree—do you know that windy rift

Where the baffling mountain-eddies chop and change?

Do you know the long day's patience, belly-down on frozen drift, While the head of heads is feeding out of range?

It is there that I am going, where the boulders and the snow lie, With a trusty, nimble tracker that I know,

I have sworn an oath, to keep it on the Horns of Ovis Poli, And the Red Gods call me out and I must go!"

When travelling in Marco Polo's footsteps I stalked one of these mighty rams, whose horns I presented to the Royal Central Asian Society, hoping that the ovis poli, the representative game of the very heart of Asia, will in due course be adopted by the Society as its crest, as is surely most befitting. From the Pamirs, the Polos descended to the vast plain on which they visited Kashgar, where Marco reported the existence of "a few Nestorian Christians." When living at this city I inquired whether there were any traces of this Christian sect, and was informed that if a horse were taken to a fair and not sold, its owner made the sign of the cross on its forehead, to prevent its luck being spoilt.

From Kashgar the Venetians visited Yarkand, where Marco commented on the goitre that is such a distressing complaint to-day, and so to Khatan, where no mention is made of jade. Probably, owing to a lapse of memory, "the stones called jasper" are referred to in connexion with neighbouring Pem. Actually Khotan, the Chinese form of which is Yu-Tien, signifies "the land of Jade," and I was shown the dry river beds from which the valuable boulders were extracted.

Marco describes the city of Lop and the desert, now termed Gobi, which "where the width is least, is a month's journey. . . . There are neither beasts nor birds, for they find nothing to eat."

The Polos finally reached the court of Kubilai Kaan, where they were very well received, Marco being sent on missions to Burmah and India and to many provinces in China.

The years passed and the Polos wished to return home with the considerable wealth that they had amassed, but the Kaan would not hear of it. After seventeen years permission was granted, and the Polos were despatched with envoys who had come from Persia to seek a bride for the Il-Khan Arghun. They reached Hormuz in safety and there heard that Arghun had died. Nothing daunted, they traversed the Lut once again and handed over the Princess Cocachin to his son, and finally reached Venice in 1295, after accomplishing the most famous journeys ever made by man, by which the veil was lifted from Central Asia and the Far East.

The book under review is an English translation from Benedetto's great work, made by the late Professor Aldo Ricci, while Sir Denison Ross has contributed a short introduction and a valuable index. As my review shows, there are some points not finally settled as to the itinerary across Asia, but, at the same time, practically the entire route is known. It is therefore regrettable that no map showing the routes is given instead of those supplied, while the introduction might well have been extended to furnish fuller indications to the reader.

P. M. SYKES.

Mustapha Kemal of Turkey. By H. E. Wortham. (Makers of the Modern Age Series.) $7\frac{1}{2}$ " × 5". Pp. xi+216; frontispiece, map. The Holme Press. London. 1930. 5s.

London. 1930. 5s.

This work stands in agreeable contrast to a book upon the same subject, the work of an itinerant German journalist, which the Book Society, with noteworthy lack of judgment, recently had the temerity to recommend to those

simple souls who in literary matters are content with "the club dinner." Turkey, says Mr. Wortham, is still part of Asia, in that "the individual is a heresy." The phrase, like most generalizations on Asia, is a half-truth, for a passionate individualism is part of the inheritance of Afghans and Persians, Arabs, and even of Turkomans, of whose tendency to be Kulak-minded their Soviet masters are at the moment complaining bitterly. "The Englishman," adds Mr. Wortham, "mistrusts and fears power . . . our history is hardly more than the Englishman's reactions to his hatred of the accursed thing . . . of which he remains eternally suspicious." This is the language of the middle decades of the last century, and he would be a bold man who claimed to find support at the present day for such a thesis; for the people of this country are to-day more deeply enmeshed in the toils of bureaucracy than those of any European country outside Russia. In other words, they are more prepared to accept power, if it be presented to them in the specious guise of law. We laugh at Wahhabis who proscribe tobacco; we are surprised at the readiness of Turks to abandon their headdresses and comfortable clothes at the bidding of a dictator. Yet we tamely submit to laws which forbid the sale of fresh milk or fish after 8 p.m. and to similar absurdities.

Mr. Wortham suggests (p. 72) that the possession of Mosul was "demanded by the British," long after the armistice of Mudros, as an afterthought. This is contrary to fact. The evacuation of Mosul was required by the terms of the armistice (vide League of Nations Commission Report on frontier between Turkey and Iraq, 1924). Such statements, and others of less import, suggest that Mr. Wortham has relied too much upon one-sided statements of the Turkish case. More serious, from an historical point of view, is the studied meiosis of his references to the fate of non-Turk minorities under his hero's heel and the consequent renascence of tribalism. This revival of nationalism was a product of the war, fostered in Turkey by President Wilson's twelfth point and by the unwisdom of the Allies in the moment of victory. But it has had permanent effects which are not wholly favourable to Turkey. By eliminating, by methods from which Chingiz Khan would have recoiled with horror, all non-Turkish elements, the rulers of Turkey have made the rebirth of the old Turkish Empire impossible, though until 1924 there were many, both in Iraq and Syria, and even in Arabia, who hoped for such a solution, and it might in the long run have made for peace.

For the rest, Mr. Wortham's book is well written, lucid, and as well documented as such a study can be. He brings out the salient points of Mustapha Kemal's career, and of the ambitions which he cherishes for the Turkish race, and the extent to which they are being realized. Of the effect upon other countries of the policy now being pursued, and of the economic results of the problems which are being created, for Turkey and Europe, by the militant tribalism of modern Turkey, he has nothing to say, nor have we any right to expect it in a study of limited scope. "More brain, O Lord, more brain," says Mr. Wortham, "is the prayer of the President on behalf of his people." Will this desire be vouchsafed to a people who have ejected from their midst the industrious if unlovable peoples whose cerebral activities were so notably greater

than those of the dominant majority?

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An English Lady in Chinese Turkestan. By Lady Macartney. Pp. 231. Illustrations. Benn. 10s. 6d.

Lady Macartney belongs to the band of pioneer women who have braved hardship and discomfort to make a home for their husbands in out-of-the-way parts of the globe. She was the first Englishwoman to live at Kashgar, the capital of Chinese Turkestan, where Sir George had the post of Consul-General: it is perhaps the most inaccessible consular post in the world, and she was cut off for years from her relatives.

For an untravelled girl of twenty-one it was a great adventure to traverse Europe and Russia, crossing the Caspian and taking the Trans-Caspian railway to its terminus at Andijan. A tarantass jolted the travellers to Osh, where the long trek on horseback over the Tien Shan range began. Rivers, luckily not then in flood, had to be forded, and the crux of the journey was the crossing of the Terek Diwan Pass, covered with ice and snow, over which the Macartneys, suffering from mountain sickness, had to struggle.

The writer of this vivid narrative coped bravely with all that befell her. There was a disconcerting incident when she believed that her husband had failed to board the Russian train and she was left without money, passport, or a word of the language. Then came the fatigue of riding to onc who had never mounted a horse, and a thin camp mattress between her and the bare ground was a poor exchange for a comfortable bed! After six weeks of travel Kashgar was reached, and Lady Macartney started her new life in the mud-built native house with oiled paper instead of glass in the windows—a very different abode to the imposing-looking Consulate which rose later on the same site.

The first part of the book will interest all women, as it abounds with details of the difficulties of housekeeping, tells of the manners and customs of the Kashgaris, and of the writer's intercourse with some of the Chinese officials and their wives.

To give a dinner-party meant days of preparation beforehand, and even so we learn that at an official dinner given to the Russians the table-boy whispered that the joint could not appear as the meat was bad, and his mistress had to hurry to her store-room and empty out the contents of various tins to fill the gap.

The writer travelled to Kashgar and back six times, and after their first leave the Macartneys returned with their baby boy and his nurse, and the difficulty of travelling with young children nearly turned into a tragedy five years later, when they returned to England by the little-known route via Naryn and Chimkent.

The first part of the 800-mile journey was done on horseback, the two children being carried in sacks on men's backs over the difficult Karatecki Pass. Then came the At-bashi river in full flood, the party plunging in together, men holding up Lady Macartney's and her nurse's arms while others carried the children, one man fainting as he touched land, but Sir George caught his son in time. When Chimkent was at last reached by tarantass both children were dangerously ill with dysentery, and it was over a month before they could proceed with their journey.

One interesting chapter describes the Chinese Revolution of 1912, when the Ambans in all parts of the Empire were assassinated. The revolutionaries said that all Europeans were safe, and soon a number of Chinese refugees of the official class fled for sanctuary to the Consulate, round which the Union Jacks were flying, and these guests stayed for many weeks, as a price was upon their heads. One day the Macartneys heard that the mob were out of hand and

marching on the Consulate, but fortunately the preparations made for defence were not needed.

Sir George and his brother rode from the first about the city in order to show the revolutionaries that they trusted them, and they even took Eric with them on his pony. But it was an anxious time, and it must have been a relief when a Russian regiment arrived to defend the European colony.

Throughout this six months Lady Macartney showed a courage and resource that never failed, and it is good to know that the first Englishwoman to make her home in Chinese Turkestan always rose to the situation.

ELLA C. SYRES.

The Religious and Hidden Cults of India. By Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O. 9" × 5\frac{3}{4}". Pp. xii + 244; map, illustrations. Sampson Low and Co., London. 1031. 155.

It is a vast field through which Sir George MacMunn conducts us, so vast, indeed, that he finds an adequate bibliography impossible. His story covers great spaces of time, a densely populated sub-continent, history ranging from the emergence of civilized man to the present day, thought from the grossest superstitions to pinnacles of philosophical speculation hardly ever equalled, morals varying from atrocious cruelties and vilenesses of animal lusts to the loftiest and most self-denying altruism. Sir George handles his immense mass of material with remarkable skill and sense of proportion, he steers an unerring course, and he displays all the picturesque and vivid colouring for which his writing is well known. His tale is supported by a wealth of illustration; perhaps the finest picture is the frontispiece, the famous Kailas of Ellora, the unbuilt temple which is unique in engineering and a monument of beauty.

The Aryans brought into India from the north a religion of the simple heroic pattern, owning the gods of nature like the Air and the Fire; food gods like the Bear and the Fish and, most of all, the Cow, and with practical rules of marriage and hygiene. The two great epics of Homeric fashion, the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, intercalated and adapted from time to time, served and still serve as a common literature and a common scripture. Then relaxing climate, material ease, security, and race conquest began to tell. The religion developed a lofty philosophy and ethical ideals, meticulous caste rules, and an unrestrained sexuality expressing itself in the dreadful images and practices which the book describes. Sir George is outspoken, but the half is not told us. Sexuality is a failing from which no people can claim to be free, but all the other great religions at least exert a restraining hand; Hinduism sets no bounds.

This is the primary religion of India, and it claims to be the only legitimate one. Nationalist Indians who know what they are talking about, and their European and American supporters, who commonly do not, habitually identify caste Hinduism with "India" and "the people of India." All the rest, more than half the population, are the "minorities," which perplex the Round-Table Conference. There is some lip service paid to the interest of these "minorities," but this does not apply to the rural and urban masses. These tell the Mahommedans that when the British go they will have their choice between taking their place as untouchables or returning to their native Arabia. Many English writers assert that when Indian Home Rule comes the virile Muslims will overrun the unwarlike Hindus. Such races as the Rajputs, Sikhs, Jats, Nepalese, and, most of all, the Mahrattas, do not think so. The lists are set, or nearly so, and the odds are heavily on the Hindu.

Islam, it is said, has been too long in India to be uprooted. Yet it has not been so long as Buddhism, which had a run of over a thousand years. Sir George's description of Buddha's religion, its rise, predominance, and fall, is one of his most brilliant chapters. Its disappearance is one of the unsolved mysteries of history, though something like it seems to be foreshadowed in the relations between Protestantism and Catholicism in Europe. It was followed by a creed even more anti-sacerdotal and equalitarian. This last quality has always been the strength of Islam in India. The great majority of Indian Muslims are the descendants of converted untouchables, who welcomed the invader's creed and often do still. The raiders from the north had little racial effect in India. They were comparatively few in number, and they did not bring women with them. There are Hindus, like Mr. Gandhi, who preach to their people unity, equality, and emancipation, but they are in this matter as voices crying in the wilderness.

For the "hidden cults" Sir George has a good sub-title: "A Chamber of Horror." They are as numerous as they are horrible, but we must beware of over-colouring. India has its asceticism, its decorum, and its self-restraint as well as the reverse of these. One of the strong points of Islam is its æsthetic and conversational decorum. It can be felt at once in turning from the Black Temple to the Taj Mahal, and it is well expressed in the story of Mahmud the

Idol-breaker at Somnath.

Sir George ends with the question many lovers of India have asked themselves—What is to be the future religion of India? Will there be any, in the sense of recognition of a Personal Deity to be worshipped and obeyed? The signs are against it. Atheism is much more an Eastern than a Western speculation. Buddhism has gods but no God. The *dharma*, or righteousness of the East, is self-existent; it does not derive authority from any divine command. Japan, Russia, and Turkey have renounced supernatural religion, and many Indians of the intelligentsia see in this a solution of their secular religious feuds. Time will show.

A. L. S.

2. Modern India. Edited by Sir John Cumming. $7\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5''$. Pp. vi+304. These two little books exhibit an impressive contrast of India past and present. Mr. Iyengar has compressed into a small space a résumé of Indian history from the earliest times, an achievement which inevitably involves omissions and broad generalizations, but gives a sense of continuity rare in a history of so vast a country. His English is excellent, he has resorted—many Indian writers fail to

country. His English is excellent, he has resorted—many Indian writers fail to do so—to a good printer and publisher, and his treatment of racial and communal questions is fair. The reader's chief impression is that India has throughout the ages been a battlefield, a scene of poverty and distress; orderly periods intervene, each limited to a portion of the country and to a century or two of strong rule. In certain passages Mr. Iyengar is not entirely fortunate; Muslims will not welcome the title of Muhammadans, nor the British the name of Britishers. It is, morever, incorrect to say that the British in India see as little as possible of the people, and that the trenches on the western war front extended across France to the Baltic Sea. But these are minor points; in general, Mr. Iyengar is objective and good, though offering only an outline of his subject.

^{1.} A Short History of India. By P. T. Srinivas Iyengar. 7½" × 5". Pp. 214. Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1931.

"Modern India" contains eighteen chapters by individuals of high authority in their respective fields. Each deals with a single aspect of Indian administration or society at the present day, and provides invaluable material for an answer to unfriendly critics of British rule. Such an exposition of knowledge

must always be instructive, but seldom makes easy reading.

The style of the writers shows a wide variation; some are over-concentrated, others brisk and attractive. The Editor's chapter, for instance, on Law and Order, and that by Lord Meston on Finance, are bright and clear without being superficial. Several contributors describe difficulties in the way of self-government—e.g., the attitude of Pathans and Gurkhas; the practical obstacles to such reforms as the prohibition of liquor are similarly explained. The information given, on the other hand, is not always up to date; the importation of grain into India is no longer free, and figures of opium cultivation are available, from India or Geneva, for several years subsequent to those which are quoted. A few errors, however, are not important. The ammunition stored in "Modern India" will be of great service to speakers and writers, and any openminded reader will grasp the benefits which have been conferred on India by British administration. He may also gain an inkling of the causes which move articulate Indians to express or profess a dislike of so massive and unexciting an institution.

C. F. S.

India in Crisis. By Arthur Duncan. 7\frac{1}{4}" \times 5". Pp. xi + 271. Putnam. 5s. The author in his preface disarms criticism by writing that the book is intended for the general reader with little or no knowledge of India, and that he is as well aware of the faults of the book as any critic can be.

There is much need to enlighten the general public about India by a plain statement of facts such as is here given. The book is avowedly written to correct the ideas of many who are "so desperately anxious to be 'fair' to India that they are eminently unjust to their own country." The brief and concise form in which the book is written should commend it to many who wish to know the truth but who either cannot or will not give time and attention to a careful study of the situation in India.

The first chapter gives a brief history of the people of India, with statistics which need no apology, for they show plainly the diversity of the races that inhabit the sub-continent and how far they are from becoming a homogeneous nation.

The next chapter tells the story, in as few words as possible, of the British connection with India. The author then deals with the so-called National Congress, proving how little real claim it has to represent India as a nation, and goes on to describe the most prominent personality of the movement, Gandhi. It is in no sense an unfair picture that is drawn of this strange character; the writer has much that is good to say of him, but proves to any important reader that "Gandhi's hatred of the British régime is senseless and implacable," and truly says that "Not to understand that fact is not to understand the situation in India to-day."

Beginning with the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, the writer traces the development of the political situation during and after the war years, showing how all concessions and all efforts at conciliation have only evoked renewed hostility from the Congress, and that Gandhi is the individual who is more responsible than anyone else for trouble and unrest in India to-day. The

course of events is followed up to the formation of the Simon Commission, with a summary of their report, and to the first session of the Round-Table Conference.

A chapter on "The Indian States" explains concisely the importance of giving due consideration to the rights of the ruling Princes in planning a Constitution for India. The proposal from the Princes themselves for Federal union in some form came after this book was written.

As an antidote to the flood of false propaganda from Congress sources, it is to be hoped that this simple, straightforward record of developments may be widely read.

J. K. T.

Seringapatam. By Constance E. Parsons. $7\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5''$. Pp. xiv+164. Map. Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 5s. net.

This little book fully bears out the object with which the authoress his composed it. It is a guide book of that kind which requires to be read carefully both before and after the objects which it describes are seen by the traveller, and that is to say that it endeavours to give to the sightseer something more than a superficial understanding of a portion of India pregnant with memories of some of those early stirring days before British rule in India became consolidated. The authoress has dealt faithfully with Tipu and Haidar Ali, if perhaps a trifle too kindly. But she has described something of the sufferings -hideous and sustained-of those British soldiers and others who were so unfortunate as to fall into the power of a very cruel foe. The hero of Seringapatam was Sir David Baird, he of whom his mother in Scotland said, when she was told that her son, then Captain Baird of McLeod's Highlanders (afterwards the 71st and now the 1st Battalion Highland Light Infantry) had been captured and was in prison in the dungeons of Seringapatam manacled to another unfortunate officer: "I'm sorry for the man who is chained to our Davie!" The authoress tells us something of this splendid officer's career, but perhaps not enough to illustrate adequately his adventurous life. Born in 1757, he proceeded to India in 1779. He was wounded and captured in September, 1780, and remained a prisoner in Tipu's hands until 1874, when he was released. He obtained the Colonelcy of his regiment in 1790, and became a Major-General eight years later. He commanded a force in Egypt against Napoleon's pretensions in 1801, and next year returned to command a division of the Madras Army. He left Madras to return to England in 1803, when he was captured at sea by the French, but was again recaptured, and reached home to find himself knighted and lionized. In 1807 he commanded an expedition against Denmark, when he was wounded, and in the following year, with Sir John Moore in Spain, he had his lef. arm shattered at Corunna. From 1820 to 1822 he was Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, and in 1829 he died peacefully, at the age of seventy-two, at Ferntower, near Crieff, in Scotland. A beloved commander, if ever there was one, and a fine example of the many famous men produced at the time when such men were so needed-when the stern fight against French hegemony of the world brought into existence the empire with which Britain made good the loss of the American colonies.

The authoress, in her book, adopts the system of describing incidents connected with each point of interest on the Island of Seringapatam, and in so doing she necessarily refers to incidents of history a second and even a third

time. But this is unavoidable in a guide book, and must be regarded as a defect in the system of description adopted. Would that other guide books were so full of the human interest. It seems a pity, however, that there is no photograph of Colonel Scott's bungalow, of which history has manufactured so much. Captain Yeldham, of the 18th Hussars, in "Lays of Ind," gave immortality to a story which has essentially many counterparts in India. Colonel Scott's bungalow differs from other examples in that the Maharaja of Mysore's order for preservation were added to the superstition which so often becomes attached in India to a place of tragedy.

The tragedy and the glory of Seringapatam have been often described—both in prose and in picture—and it is well that from time to time the memories should be recalled and re-presented. Miss Parsons' little book, from this point of view also, is a valuable addition to Seringapatam literature. A few years ago we were told that the Nizam of Hyderabad's share of the loot of Seringapatam was still contained in boxes at Hyderabad which had never been unlocked. We have since heard this story denied, but there is nothing inherently impossible in it, and among the Durbar treasures in musty corners of treasuries and cellars it may be that some of the loot still exists. It would probably prove very disappointing if brought to light!

It is suggested that if the authoress brings out a further edition of her useful guide book she should enlarge the Index. A guide book particularly requires as

complete an Index as can be extracted from the text.

H. W. B.

The Imperial Gazetteer of India. Vol. xxvi. Atlas. New and revised edition. 66 maps and plans. Demy 8vo. Oxford University Press. 1931. Price 17s. 6d.

This is the final volume of the revised edition of this Indian encyclopædia, and as twenty-two years have elapsed since the publication of the previous edition, the majority of the maps and plans have necessarily required revision and bringing up to date. Probably none of the other volumes shows better than this one the great advances that India has made in the period; this is brought out in a most illuminating manner by comparing the atlas volumes of the two editions.

The revised edition follows closely the lines of its predecessor, as, except for the addition of two extra plates and the revision of the detail, the two are practically identical. The innovation of printing the number of each plate on the front of each folio is a welcome improvement and a great convenience to the reader, but it is a pity that the small point of adding the date up to which each map has been revised has been omitted. The dates up to which information is given naturally vary, but while some maps are quite up to date, others are more backward, and the absence of dates on the maps lessens the value of the book as a whole. As an example of the need for dates, one can quote Plate 16, which shows the various religions in percentages of the population. This plate is identical with that of the first edition, and shows that the figures of the census of 1921 have not been utilized. A further matter for regret is that on the great majority of the plates the information shown stops abruptly at the frontier. Although the gazetteer deals with the Indian Empire, a great deal of information is known of the state of the countries beyond the border, and even if accurate statistics are not available, if the known information had been given

the value of the volume would have been greatly increased. On one map (Vegetation Features, Plate 5) where the information does happen to have been carried beyond the frontier a curious error occurs. The country to the north of the Himalayas is shown as "area mainly under cultivation"; it must be known to most people that "barren land" would be a more correct description. The Index to Place Names on the provincial maps might also have been extended to include all names shown on these maps, even though the places are beyond the frontier.

In the List of Maps at the beginning of the book, that of Aden, Plate 50 (scale 1:1,000,000), is given with that of Afghanistan (scale 1:6,000,000), under the head "(on smaller scales)." This error, which also appears in the earlier edition, should have been corrected, as the map of Aden is, with the exception of the town plans, on a larger scale than any other in the Atlas, and four times as great as the scale of the provincial maps to which it is supposed to be

smaller. A more suitable heading would be "(on different scales)."

Except for these more or less minor criticisms I have nothing but praise for the atlas. The sheets are not overcrowded with detail, the lettering is clear, and the type well selected. The maps are beautifully printed and the colour registration perfect. One does not expect anything but the best from the workshops of Messrs. Bartholomew and Son, Ltd., the printers of the maps, and in this book the firm have kept up to their own high standard, and are to be congratulated on the excellence of their work.

H. W.

Studies in Early Mysticism in the Near and Middle East. Margaret Smith, M.A., Ph.D. $8\frac{3}{4}$ " $\times 5\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. x + 276. London: The

Sheldon Press. 1931. 12s. 6d.

The object of this interesting and attractive book is to show that the origin and development of early Islamic asceticism and mysticism down to the end of the ninth century of our era were largely due to Christian influence—a view which is now accepted, with more or less qualification, by the majority of European scholars, though the evidence for it may be described as circumstantial rather than definite and direct. Miss Smith devotes the main and most valuable part of her work to a comparative study of the doctrines and practices of the first Muslim ascetics and mystics and those of their Christian predecessors. Among the latter we meet with such famous names as Pachomius, Simeon Stylites, Basil, Aphraates, Ephraim Syrus, Clement of Alexandria, Macarius, Augustine, Dionysius, and Isaac of Nineveh, while the Muslims are represented by Hasan of Basra, Muḥāsibī, Rābi'a, Dhu 'l-Nūn, Bāyazīd of Bistām, and others equally authoritative. These seven chapters, in which the narrative is copiously illustrated by means of translation, give an admirable view of both sides of the picture and bring out many close parallelisms in thought and expression. Naturally enough, the emphasis falls on general and particular resemblances, not on differences, and no attempt is made to deal with the complex technical problems discussed by Professor Massignon, which exhibit the characteristically Islamic features of Sūfism and prove that the early Sūfis were accustomed to handle mystical questions in their own way, and often with great originality. Chapter VI. provides a well-documented survey of Christianity in the Near and Middle East at the time of the Muslim conquests and afterwards, together with an account of the social, professional, and cultural relations of Muslims and

Christians during the period when Sūfism was developing. The effect of these contacts is difficult to estimate, but must have been considerable, though perhaps Miss Smith attributes too great importance to the teaching given to their children by Christian mothers living with Muslims as wives or concubines. In my opinion the influence exerted by Christianity on early Sufism came chiefly through Islamic channels. We need not assume any deliberate imitation on a large scale, for there are strong Christian elements in the Qur'an itself, while sayings of Jesus, texts from the Gospels, and other materials drawn from Christian-Hellenistic sources were very soon disguised in the form of Hadith and welcomed even by many who prided themselves on their orthodoxy. That Christian converts to Islam took an active part in the process of "Christianization" can scarcely be doubted. Direct influence "through the teaching of the Christian mystics, transmitted orally by their disciples and followers or by means of their writings," is less probable. As a rule the early Sūfis were too good Muslims to receive the doctrines of a rival religion from those who openly professed it, but they could without insincerity find the same doctrines in Our anic texts from which they strove to elicit the esoteric meaning. It seems to me that assimilation by the Sūfīs of Christian and Hellenistic ideas was inevitable and (though the contrary has been maintained) that this involves no conscious disloyalty to the Our'an and the Prophet. If Islam was the parent of Sufism, Christianity was its first nurse; and both worked together to form the character of the child.

The author has read widely, and her book is a storehouse of information concerning the subject of which it treats. The open-mindedness shown throughout, and the absence of all dogmatism are much to be commended.

R. A. N.

Mekka in the Later Part of the 19th Century. By C. Snouck Hurgronie. Translated by J. H. Monahan. With 20 plates and 2 maps. Leyden (late E. J. Brill, Ltd.) and London (Luzac and Co.). 1931.

To combine a new edition with the translation from the German into the English of Snouck Hurgronje's "Mekka," since many years out of print, published 1888 in two volumes with an album of photographs, but still the undisputed standard work about the Holy City of Islam, was an undertaking much to be welcomed, especially at a time when the quickly changing events in Arabia and particularly in the country of the Wahhabis are of special interest to the students of the Muhammadan world. While the first volume deals in a masterly way with the topography and history of Mekka, it is the second volume, this being the first to be republished and translated, which is the subject of this review.

Christian Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutchman, was living under the name of Abd-el-Gaffar for six months in 1885—February to August—at Mekka, having spent an equal period in Jeddah before embarking on his venture. He had devoted himself for several years, at the universities of Leyden and Strassburg, to the study of Semitic languages and literature, and was thus best qualified to enter the forbidden city under the disguise of a Muhammadan scholar of Islamic science. Once settled down, he made himself thoroughly acquainted with the social conditions of Mekka, the intimacy of family life, the manysided elements of the population, its learning in the different tendencies of mind, and especially with the affairs of the several thousands of Muhammadans from the Dutch colonies, the "Jawah," who generally stay in Mekka as students of their religion.

During his prolonged residence in Mekka, Snouck Hurgronje was privileged to see the life of the town when following its normal course, not disturbed and considerably changed by the conflux of the pilgrimage. This fact distinguishes him conspicuously from the majority of his predecessors and successors, who mostly spent only a short time during the mass meeting of the Hadj at Mekka. If anyone of all those came near to Snouck Hurgronje, who by profound learning and a rare gift of adaptiveness was so exceptionally well equipped for his difficult task as an ardent student and conscientious describer of Mekka, it was his worthy forerunner the famous Swiss traveller, J. L. Burckhardt (Shaykh Haj Ibrahim), who took up his abode in Mekka during 1814 and in his "Travels in Arabia" gave an ingenuous judgment of the strange surroundings he was living in. Richard Burton (Shayk Haj Abdallah), who as a pilgrim only spent a few days in Mekka (September, 1853), also deserves to be mentioned here on account of his well-made observations.

It scarcely needs to be pointed out that since Snouck Hurgronje's stay in Mekka half a century ago the conditions in that town have changed a good deal. The motor-car and the flying machine, the wireless transmission, and the revolution of economical principia, they all have contributed to alter the fundaments of life in spite of the puritanical doctrine of the present masters of the Holy Cities, the Wahhabis. Under the circumstances it is of outstanding interest to recall to mind how the situation at the principal seat of Islamic culture remained for centuries—partly well up to the present day—practically unaltered and inflexible, and also find in the reaction consequently produced the explanation for so many and far-reaching evolutions in Eastern countries since the days of the Prophet.

The value of the book is considerably enhanced by a large number of reproductions from the album of pictures mentioned above, these being some of the first photographs ever taken in Mekka. A plan of the town and of the great mosque are helpful to the reader. The translation by J. H. Monahan, formerly H.B.M. Consul in Jeddah, bears witness of the good understanding for the

subject of his work.

The publication of the book, which it is to be hoped will before long be supplemented by the translation of the first volume, timely coincided with the meeting of the 18th International Congress of Orientalists at Leyden in September last, which was presided over with great circumspection and rare vivacity by Snouck Hurgronje.

R. SAID-RUETE.

Arabien: Eine Landeskundliche Skizze. By Dr. Walter Lesch. Pp. 153. Mitt. der geogr. Ges. in München, Bd. XXIV, Heft I, 1931.

The author remarks in his Preface on the lack of a comprehensive study of Arabia as a whole from a geographic point of view in its widest sense. He has set himself the task of fulfilling this need, and has produced a useful summary of our knowledge up to the beginning of the current year. The subjects dealt with are:

Part I.—Position and Boundaries, Orography, Geology, Climate, Physical Features, Flora, Fauna.

Part II.—The Arabs, Religion, Towns and Settlements, Communications, Political Conditions, Bibliography.

The work represents an immense amount of intensive study, and the first part of the work contains a great amount of condensed information and data without any unnecessary digressions. His regrets regarding the scantiness of our scientific information do not indicate much appreciation of the conditions under which much of the exploration has been carried out. He gives Philby the credit for being the first European to cross the Arabian peninsula whose results are of scientific value, in spite of his not being by profession a trained explorer. By this the author probably means a trained scientist, but the statement as it stands scarcely does justice to Philby's achievements. Thomas's crossing of the southern desert is, of course, subsequent to the publication of this work.

The author's Bibliography is not as complete as it should be, and in some cases it includes recent references, although in the text he takes his information from earlier sources. His chapter on Geology is abstracted from earlier compilations without incorporating more recent work. He has omitted reference to the explorations of O. H. Little in the Makalla hinterland or to Macfadyen's work on the Asir coast and Farsan Islands, and he might with advantage have referred to the general discussion on the tectonics of Arabia contained in the

"Structure of Asia" (edited by J. W. Gregory, 1929).

The chapter on Climate contains much detailed information, but it is a pity that the author was not able to prepare his own charts of prevailing winds, based on the latest information, instead of reproducing Weickmann's wind and pressure diagrams dated 1913. The chapters on Religion and Inhabitants are less detailed. No attempt is made, for example, to describe tribal divisions. The description of towns and trade is rather monotonous without being sufficiently complete or accurate to be of value for record. For example, no mention is made of the salt-mines of Lohaja, or of the important frankincense trade of Dhofar. The relatively important towns of Dohah on Qatar Peninsula and Sharja and Dibai on the Trucial coast are not mentioned except in the general statement that there are small fishing villages along this coast.

Under the title of Communications the importance of motor-car transport is not sufficiently emphasized; for example, no mention is made of the regular service between Jedda and Mecca. The use of wireless by Ibn Saud to communicate with his distant possessions also deserves mention. The concluding chapter on Political Conditions gives a short account of the rise to power of Ibn Saud. The Royal Central Asian Society has been very fortunate in the past in having many important articles on Arabian questions, but presumably the author did not have access to the Journal, as he makes no reference to any

article from it.

G. M. L.

The Crusades: the Flame of Islam. By Harold Lamb. Published by Thornton Butterworth, Ltd. 1931. Pp. 413, with illustrations and four maps. Price 16s.

In this volume Mr. Harold Lamb, who has himself travelled in the East, finishes the history of the Crusades which he began with the volume, "The Crusades: Iron Men and Saints." He provides us with a narrative from 1169 to the final evacuation of Syria, with twenty illustrations of very unequal value, four maps, a selected bibliography, and a table of the principal places occupied by the Crusaders in Asia. The Syrian list we leave aside: for Cyprus we note the absence of El Kantara; that St. Hilarion has more to show than a cistern and traces of walls; nor do we see why Famagosta is called a city and Nicosia

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only a town, or why the cathedral of Famagosta should be mentioned by name, while Nicosia, where the kings were crowned, has only "several fine churches." For Cos, if the capital is mentioned, so should be the great castle of Antimakhia. And if the remains in Rhodes and Cos, why is nothing said of what the knights have left in the other islands? The tabular list of castles is in itself an excellent idea.

The narrative is not provided with any close references, but we are given instead a selected bibliography. From this we learn that Nicetas has been used only in an Italian translation published in 1562, whereas the Greek text, and even a Latin translation, are accessible in the Bonn series. It is a great deal worse when Mr. Lamb tells on p. 299 that he was unable to obtain Joinville's narrative in French, and so has edited, adapted-but upon what principles?-and condensed the Bohn translation. And Joinville is a school book, to be got in every library and for a few francs in every shop. And this has had its results. He quotes on p. 302 a very famous message, in which the Count of Soissons says to Joinville: "Seneschal, let these dogs howl; for par la Quoife Dieu (for it was thus he used to swear) we shall yet speak of this day's works in ladies' chambers." Here Bohn for some reason writes by the Cresse Dieu, a word whose meaning we cannot discover, and Mr. Lamb follows him: half the charm of the passage is gone. Again, in another passage from Joinville, on p. 307, we hear of the Bahairiz, the Sultan's guard. The word is in Joinville, and the men are the Baharide Turks, so called because their quarters at Cairo were on the river (bahr); just below they are called the Halka-Joinville's word is La Haulaca-or King's Guard. Now Halka is Arabic for a circle, and the Baharides were so called because they surrounded the Sultan's person. Later, on p. 353, Mr. Lamb, again referring to these guards, speaks of "the sultan's circus": is this a slang expression, or is it a translation of Halka derived from some other source, and not co-ordinated with the earlier reference? A few inaccuracies may be mentioned here. On p. 173 we hear of Mass to be celebrated at the Sepulchre morning and evening. We doubt if Shakespeare's Evening Mass and the very early phrase missa vespertina can save this passage. On p. 181 the fine harbour of Candia in Crete is mentioned. A good deal later the Venetians built a galley harbour, but what was there earlier? There is no natural harbour at all; can Suda, near Canea, be intended? On p. 194, after a mysterious reference to the "Emperor of Byzantium" as "basileus of the Orthodox Church," we are told that the Byzantines "still dress the stiff figures of their saints in cloth-of-gold." But ever since the restoration of the icons in the ninth century only flat pictures, never images, have been in use in the Greek Church. On p. 198 we hear of stone bridges in Venice in the year 1202. Still more remarkable is it to learn, as we do on p. 368, that in the year 1310 "the old project of Constantinople was renewed—in print." The italics are ours. On p. 185 we have one of the unfortunate passages of sham impressiveness printed in italics, with which the narrative is punctuated. Here, in reference to the Crusaders marching from Europe to the East, we are told: "They were following the stars to the East." But, alas! the stars appear to move in precisely the opposite direction. The phrase is so wrong as to be grotesque, and is unfortunately typical of Mr. Lamb's literary taste. In his stirring description of the Crusaders before Constantinople, Villehardouin tells us that there was no one of them cui la chars ne fremist: for this we get, on p. 209, that his flesh did not crawl at the sight. The rhetorical use of Flecker's line, Thy dawn, O Master of the World, thy Dawn! on pp. 183 and 196, could in its way hardly be worse. Is it too much to say that this is turning jewellery

to brummagem gimcrack? And a few verbal oddities may be quoted. Isaac Angelos appears as Isaac the Angel; on p. 176 we have to felicit him; on p 194 theologist for theologian; on p. 200 Christianity for Christendom. Kadi on p. 343 seems to be just a mistake for Imam. Then on p. 208 we have the odd remark that "they christened" a town on the Dardanelles "Avie." Put into English, this means that they came to Abydos, and that Villehardouin wrote down the name as Avie. We suppose it is Mr. Lamb's unfortunate love of the dramatic that prevents him from telling his bewildered reader that the place is really the well-known Abydos. It is true that the crusaders knew less about Abydos than we do, but that is no reason for playing us such a trick. It is this turn for the melodramatic that has led Mr. Lamb to write up his narrative in a style of sustained gaudiness that is almost intolerable. The mind is wearied by a mass of intentionally picturesque details, some of which may be, but all of which cannot be, in the sources, and, with no special references given, the unfortunate reader is left without any guide as to what is really known and what is the fancy, plausible or otherwise, of the writer. Examples, though we can hardly say outstanding examples, are the sketch of Baibars on p. 342, the description of the siege of Acre in Chapter LVII., notably the foot of p. 362, and the dialogue of Frederick II. and the Kadi in Jerusalem recorded on p. 264. We have not been able to trace the source of this incident, but we have no doubt whatever that it is in essence genuine. In fact, Allshorn, on p. 100 of his book on Frederick II., Stupor Mundi, has worked up the same material into a dialogue; but into one which has only a very general resemblance to Mr. Lamb's. Which, if either, of them is making a proper use of an original document, or are both of them using a genuine story and writing it up in the way they think suitable to a modern book? This feeling of never knowing where he is, is for the reader most annoying. And such inaccuracies as those to which we have above alluded do not increase his confidence. And Mr. Lamb can, when he chooses, write as plainly and as well as anyone. Most of the last two chapters, the Afterword and the Note on the Mongols and the Pope are written excellently.

Of the actual historical worth of the book not much need be said. The balance between the Crusaders and the Moslems and Orthodox Greeks, whom they so sorely vexed, is held well enough. But Mr. Lamb has been content to confine himself to the externals of the story. Here we may take one point. One of the most involved problems in history is certainly that of the causes which led to the taking of Constantinople in 1204. But we see no sign that Mr. Lamb is aware of this, or that he has read any such discussion of the evidence as he would have found in the second volume (pp. 117 ff.) of Vasiliev's "History of the Byzantine Empire." Of the two contending theories, called by Vasiliev the theory of accidents and the theory of premeditation, he chooses the latter, and names as the conspirators Philip, Alexios, and Boniface. But he gives no hint of the obscurity which must involve the whole problem; a glance, too, at Vasiliev's evidence would have shown him that the strongest evidence, in fact, points in the opposite direction.

But although much in the book, and especially the dress of the narrative, is not to the taste of the present reviewer, Mr. Lamb has chosen a story which has an extraordinary interest and power to stir our minds; nothing can destroy the attraction of this wonderful adventure, and many readers will no doubt derive pleasure from the book taken simply as a story. But they must be readers who do not mind, or who perhaps like, seeing the art of history assimilated to that of the movie and the talkie, with its showy captions and

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wearisome brightness, who do not look for any real enquiry into sources, and to whom literary taste and purity of style are tiresome pedantries. It is a pity that we can recommend this book only to the less critical kind of reader; it is more than possible that of these many will read it with delight.

R. M. DAWKINS.

Eugene Jung.—Les Arabes et l'Islam en face des Nouvelles Croisades et Palestine et Sionisme. Paris: chez l'auteur, 50, Avenue Malakoff (16°). 1931. P. 78. Price 8 francs.

The Preface to this book is addressed to the French, and secondly to the Arabs and the world of Islam; to these France is a synonym of liberty and loyalty, an object of love. The author sees in the world to-day a struggle in which Sionism and the Vatican are allied together against Islam and the Arab world: this struggle reminds him of the Crusades. In Syria everything is done to favour the financiers as against the interests of the Arabs. This is causing strong feeling in the world of Islam, and it is France which stands to suffer heavily from this state of affairs. In the second chapter we have the Arab side of the Sionist question in Palestine. The language the author uses is strictly moderate: Palestine, he says, is a country inhabited by a large population of non-Jews, and it cannot, without the grossest injustice to the established owners, be treated as an empty space in which a Jewish power can be set up. In Tunis, again, the feelings of the Arabs were outraged by the Eucharistic Congress at Carthage in 1900, which the author presents as wilfully declaring itself to the Arabs as a glorification of the crusade of St. Louis; and this in an Islamic country. Here he detects an anti-French action of the Vatican. In Morocco the Berbers have been supported against the Arabs, equally to the detriment of French interests, and in a way that has suggested an attempt to divert them from Islam to Catholicism, again to the disadvantage of France. But in the fifth chapter we hear the bees beginning to buzz in the author's bonnet; we are referred to the famous Protocols des Sages de Sion, and it appears that the League of Nations is one of their sinister activities. The author's enemies seem to be, in order of vehemence, the Jews, the Vatican, and then, in a less degree, Italy and Germany. The general tenor of the book is that it is to the interest of France to support Islam: as is almost inevitable in such books, the interests of the writer's friends and country come to be identified with a lofty political morality. In this case, we are told, the chivalry and loyalty for which France is famed above all other nations, if given the free course to which such virtues have a right, will prompt her to a policy which also serves her own material interests. Other nations are far from being in such a happy condition: their interests can, as a rule, be forwarded only by following the most immoral courses. It is easy to be cynical about such a simple-minded identification of the paths of virtue with those of self-interest, but while few people could refrain from smiling at Mr. Jung's philosophy, it must not be forgotten that Islam has a case, and a very strong one, and nowhere is it stronger than in Palestine. We might add, too, that it is not common to find the interests of Islam exactly the same as those of the various European Powers who have got possession of Islamic countries. Mr. Jung asks us to look at the Italians in Tripoli, and no doubt he can show us some very ugly things; writers of other nationalities might perhaps ask us to cast an eye upon other regions of the earth.

R. M. DAWKINS.

Yesterday and To-day in Sinai. By Major C. S. Jarvis. 5½"×9". Pp. xii+312. Illustrations, Map. London: Blackwood and Sons. 1931. 15s.

The air of Sinai appears to conduce to the writing of books. A few years ago Mr. Kennett, the assistant of the Governor of the district, published a very interesting study of tribal law and custom in Sinai; and now Major Jarvis, the Governor, has written a more ambitious and longer work dealing with various aspects of the history and the present-day life of the Peninsula. His book is racy of the soil, and he writes with a special experience of the country and its inhabitants, since he has been engaged in the administration for six years. He writes, too, with admirable good humour, and he has illustrated the story with some excellent photographs and has added a good map. His is certainly the most authoritative work on the Peninsula, a land which is as historic as the Holy Land itself, and it is eminently readable. It is a pity that the book is not furnished with an index.

Major Jarvis, like Mr. Kennett, deals with the Beduin tribes, who form the larger part of the twenty-five thousand inhabitants, and their peculiar system of customary law and trial, and he has some acute remarks on characteristics of the nomadic tribes, which should correct the popular idea of the "film sheik." "The Arab, he says, is not a first-class fighting man, and he does not claim to be a wonderful figure of romance. . . . He is not addicted to the habit of carrying off white ladies, and his behaviour at all times with European women is a pattern of propriety." He remarks with reason that litigation is the Arab pastime, into which he enters with his whole heart and the true sporting spirit. All who have been concerned with administration in Arab countries will confirm this judgment.

Major Jarvis gives a very interesting account of the history of Sinai from the early days of the Pharaohs who worked the mines to the campaign of 1915-1917 and the locust invasions of 1929 and 1930. He gives a particularly full account of Napoleon's march across the Peninsula in 1799 and of the surrender of a remnant of his force to the British at El Arish. One ancient document appears to have escaped his notice in the pictorial account of the campaign of Seti I., inscribed in the temple of Karnak, that throws remarkable light on

the Egyptian stations on the Via Maris.

He has his own theory on the Exodus and the wanderings of the children of Israel, which is based on his intimate knowledge of the physical conditions. With certain learned scholars he holds that Moses led his people out of Egypt by the coast road along the northern part of Sinai, which is not "the way of the Philistines"; that the Egyptian host in pursuit may have been drowned in Lake Bardawil, the "Serbonian Bog" of our poet, which lies to the west of El Arish; and that the Forty Years in the Wilderness were spent in the triangle formed by El Arish, Rafa, and Kossaima, that being the only part of Sinai in which a host of the size mentioned (even reading with Plinders-Petrie "family" for "thousand") could exist. He finds strong support for the theory in the existence of great flights of quails and manna in this part, and this part only, of the Peninsula. He is more original in his theory about the mountain of the Giving of the Law being Jebel Hillal, a limestone massif near Kossaima. That fits in well enough with the rest of the geographical scheme of the Exodus; but it does not suit the descriptions in the Bible of "that great and terrible wilderness" or the smoking mountain, which suggest a volcanic area. He is on stronger ground when he argues against the identification of Jebel Catherine in the southern range of Sinai with the mount of Moses.

The only part of the book which we do not welcome is the section of the last chapter in which Major Jarvis gives a detailed account of the motor ways in the Peninsula. With the advice about the roads between Cairo, Suez, and Jerusalem there can be no cavil. But it seems a pity that he should have described a car route between Suez and the Monastery of St. Catherine, and so attracted the tourist to do a week-end dash across Sinai from Cairo. The interior of the Peninsula should be banned to Ford and Morris and approached only by camel and horse. It would be, however, ungracious to end on a cavil, and the book as a whole is to be recommended to administrator, to student, to tourist, and to the general reader.

N. B.

England und Palastina. By Josef Cohn. 8½"×5½". Pp. 327. Berlin:

Kurt Vowinckel Verlag. 1931.

It is good to know occasionally how others see us, and this book is a very careful and well documented appreciation by a German student of political affairs of England's policy and aims in Palestine. It is written with characteristic German "Methode." The main narrative of 180 pages of large print is followed by notes and quotations from first-hand authorities extending over 120 pages of small print. The writer is a Jew, and has a full understanding of Zionism: he is at pains to prove that the support of the Zionist aims by Great Britain is no war-time measure of expediency, but a fundamental part of English imperialistic policy that dates back to the time of the settlement of the Jews in England under the Commonwealth. The first three chapters, which trace the history of England's connection with Palestine during the last 150 years, indicate his standpoint; they are entitled: "Spiritual-Religious Relations of the English and the Jews"; "Palestine's Place in the Framework of English Oriental Policy"; and "Anglo-Saxon War-time Ideology." The second part of the study deals with the realization of the general policy during the war and peace conferences 1914-1920, and the third part with the actual development of the administration of Palestine and of the Zionist plans during the decade 1920-1930. The writer naturally indulges in more theorizing and analysis of first principles than would be found in an English book of the same kind, but the theorizing has a foundation in exact knowledge. Dr. Cohn is a wholehearted admirer of Dr. Weizmann, the leader for fifteen years of the Zionist Organization, who is for him the embodiment of the true statesman, combining the three essential qualities of (a) passion or devotion to a cause, (b) responsibility, and (c) the sense of reality. He has, indeed, a fuller knowledge and appreciation of Zionism than of the Arab opposition to it. And the principal defect in his presentation of the movement of ideas in Palestine during the last fifteen years is the inadequate understanding of the forces of Arab nationalism. Arab aims have to be judged in relation to a remarkable revival of national consciousness in the peoples of the East and not simply in relation to the passing conflicts in Palestine. He thinks that the policy of the Jewish National Home must be accomplished, because the unquenchable power of an idealistic and revolutionary movement stands behind Zionism. And he sets out with great persuasiveness the deeper motives which have led Great Britain to sponsor the movement. What he has not sought to give us is a synthesis of the Jewish and Arab national aspirations. Dr. Cohn's study ends

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in time with the debate in Parliament before the White Paper of October, 1930. He wrote before the authoritative explanation of that White Paper was given by the Prime Minister. But if his study is not quite up to date it has the merits of historical perspective and a certain direction.

N. B.

A Persian Journey. By Fred Richards, R.E. 10½"×7". Pp. 240. Illustrations. London: Jonathan Cape. 1931. 15s.

This admirably printed and well-bound book (we note with pleasure the names of both printer and binder on the reverse of the title-page) contains forty-eight etchings of quite exceptional beauty and delicacy. They range from Baghdad and Kirmanshah to Meshed and from Tabriz to Yezd and Kirman. In this respect the book is unique in the abundant literature of Persian travel, for Morier, who alone among previous writers on Persia has adequately illustrated his travels, did not range nearly so far as Mr. Richards, and his engravings on steel show no more detail than the fine pencil photogravures of Mr. Richards, who has, however, not attempted to portray the human forms and faces he met on his long journeys, and to that extent leaves us unsatisfied. Yet his drawings convey, as Morier's failed to do, the elusive, almost unearthly beauty of light and shade and of line which more than compensates for the lack of colour in Persian domestic architecture. It is difficult to single out any particular sketch for special praise, but to the eye of experience those of Yezd specially inspire the pen of praise, and the drawing of the nakhl in the maidan at Yezd is a unique representation of a most remarkable religious rite which, if the present reviewer's memory is not at fault, has never been portrayed or even described before, though it would be rash to affirm that positively until the relative instalment of the "Encyclopædia of Islam" makes its appearance.

His enthusiastic tribute to the beauty of the C.M.S. Church at Yezd, too, is

welcome.

The drawing of Meshed is vivid, the crowd being as well drawn as the architectural detail, and those of Omar Khayyam's tomb at Nishapur, of Resht and Tabriz, are each in their way brilliant in execution, and convey, more

truthfully than any camera, the pageant of Persia.

The letterpress is pleasantly written and informative, and much freer from inaccuracies and misconceptions than most modern books of travel and with much that is fresh and new. Yet we could wish that Mr. Richards had either read nothing at all on Persia before he set out or had read more deeply. He is so good an observer that he would have gained rather than lost by starting with a tabula rasa instead of a palimpsest. He looks on the Persian scene with the eye of one to whom "civilization" and "Europe" are synonymous, and we hear more than we desire of the meaner aspects of life, as though such things were not, alas! as easy to see within three miles of the Mansion House. This criticism made, we are glad to record our opinion that, with the exception of Mr. Pope's "Introduction to Persian Art," which appeared in January, 1931, no book on Persia of equal merit has appeared during the past decade, and that it will rank with the best dozen that have seen the light in the last thirty years. The next edition should be provided with an index, the absence of which is, in a book so full of facts, a grave omission.

ia in 1904, kan dhe kulawa pinambake anakka kan na 81 metapa 1911 ang mengangan mengangan bangan bangan bangan

China in Revolution. By Harley Farnsworth MacNair. Pp. 244. University

of Chicago Press. 1931.

This is a reproduction in book form of a series of lectures given by the author under the auspices of the University of Chicago. Supplemented and revised, it presents a singularly accurate and succinct record of the events which, beginning in 1911 and continuing to the present day, have led to the existing situation in China.

As the author says in his own preface, his approach to his subject is mainly factual, not ideological or idealistic—i.e., it is that of the historical student who

attempts to be objective and who must be non-partisan.

In this object the author has been singularly successful. It would be hard to find a more accurate record of events presented in the more detached and impartial manner. To ardent Chinese patriots, no doubt, the book is scarcely likely to appeal. The analytical process which is applied to the historical facts and events recorded by the author reveals only too plainly the weak points of many of the so-called heroes of the revolution, not excepting Sun Yat Sen himself, criticism of whom amounts almost to lèse-majesté in the eyes of the party following.

In so excellent and detailed a record the author's choice of a frontispiece—the only illustration in the book—is, to say the least of it, somewhat surprising. The reproduction of the grossly exaggerated painting of the "Shakee-Shameen Massacre" does not in the least degree present a true picture of that episode, the facts of which are, of course, well authenticated, and it is difficult to reconcile the inclusion of such a piece of anti-foreign propaganda in a serious

work of otherwise almost unimpeachable impartiality.

Professor MacNair's prediction that the revolution is likely to last for another hundred years coincides with a similar estimate made by the late Marshal Chang Tso Lin, who, after his successful campaign against Wu Pei Fu in 1924, gave it as his opinion that so long as the foreign powers refrained from offering a helping hand there was every prospect that civil war would

continue for at least a century.

One very important point to which the author draws attention is the provincial autonomy movement, which appears to be growing in strength, and may yet prove to be at least a temporary solution of the problem of stable government. A centralized government actually controlling the whole of the vast extent of China is a phenomenon that has rarely, if ever, occurred in practice. Powerful viceroys have exercised despotic control over the regions entrusted to their charge, and so long as subsidies were regular and formalities duly observed, the Throne was usually content to let well alone. To-day, lacking the Imperial focal point, centralization seems to be an ideal for the moment impossible of attainment. There are far too many independent military adventures, all ambitious, self-seeking, and incapable of loyalty to any chosen leader. Planted, more or less securely, with their own particular troops, in one or other of the revenue-producing districts, they are content to live on the country and accumulate wealth by means which would not be tolerated by any less patient and long-suffering a people. From these vantage points they are only to be stirred when the necessity arises to defend their position against a dangerous rival or when, in combination with others of their kind, they unite to crush an antagonist of whose superior position they have become jealous. The sufferings of the people upon whom they have imposed themselves, the almost intolerable burden of irregular taxation which they have placed upon commerce and industry, the constant interruption of already inade-

quate railway communications, the increasing load of domestic and foreign indebtedness and all the other ills for which they are largely responsible, leave them totally unmoved.

To them, and them only, the revolution has been profitable. To the people

at large it has, so far, brought nothing but misery and despair.

When the mother of Mencius was reproached some two thousand five hundred years ago for removing with her infant son to the dangerous proximity of a man-eating tiger, she explained that a tiger was a lesser evil than a corrupt government. This tendency to flee from intolerable conditions has manifested itself in recent years in the growing stream of emigration from the Tuchünridden provinces of North China into the comparative safety of Manchuria. In other areas where wholesale emigration is not practicable, oppression is driving the people into the arms of the Communists, whose ranks are being daily swelled by the discontented and the dispossessed. On these aspects of the situation the author has, wisely, perhaps, in so impartial a work, refrained from enlarging.

The influence of Soviet Russia on Sun Yat Sen, and through him on the revolutionary movement at a critical moment, is well brought out, and the disastrous effect of this unfortunate alliance cannot be better summarized than in the concluding words of Chapter V.: "He had entered upon his last illusion;

happily for him he passed away before it could be destroyed."

J. T.

Seed and Harvest. By Vladimir de Karostovetz. 82" × 52". Pp. 387. Faber and Faber.

"Seed and Harvest" is an important book to the student of Russian affairs in that by recounting the history of three generations of a well-to-do Russian family between about 1800 and 1919 it gives a very good background against

which to study the much-vaunted advances since the Revolution.

The writer's grandparents were born long before the liberation of the serfs, and remained to the last staunch monarchists of the old school, never being able to adapt themselves to changing conditions. In spite of their manifold excentricities, which prove that Gogol did not exaggerate, there was an innate feeling of loyalty to the throne which gave them a sheet-anchor that the following generations lacked. Their children, the writer's parents, achieved maturity after the liberation of the serfs and had a totally different outlook to their parents; in this the writer's mother was particularly remarkable in her liberal tendencies, due partly to being educated in Switzerland.

The life of the family in Petersburg and on their estates in the Ukraine are described with much charm, and bring back pleasant memories of an age now past. They spent a great deal of their time on the estates, where their mother, in spite of much opposition in the shape of the grandmother's old-fashioned ideas, did everything to bring the agriculture, the local industries, and the condition of the peasants up to date. The result of these improved methods was that the estate prospered exceedingly, while those of the neighbouring landlords fell on bad times, many slowly breaking up and falling bit by bit into the hands of the richer peasants. It is particularly noticeable how good were the relations between the family and their Jewish dependants, and the author is later at pains to contradict the sweeping assertions so commonly circulated that the Jews were at the bottom of all the revolutionary movements.

During the first revolution of 1905 the estate did not suffer much, though

many of the houses in the neighbourhood were destroyed. The peasants' complete disloyalty to those who had done their best to help them was most marked, and the family had to be mobilized to defend the house, since even then, when its hands were not tied by a world upheaval, as in 1917, the Central Government proved itself totally incapable of restoring order for several months.

After an education that differed from many others of his class in that he went first to the local grammar school at Kieff, then abroad, and finally to the University and Polytechnic at Petersburg instead of into the corps of pages and one of the crack regiments, the author entered, thanks to "Protection," the European department of the F.O., where he was in a particularly favourable position to study the events of 1912-1917; in common with many thinking Russians he was not in favour of war, and sharply criticizes the actions of Sasonov and Isvolsky, who no doubt forced the pace in what they considered their country's interests.

In reading "Seed and Harvest" one is forced more and more to the conclusion that the anti-war party was right. The old generation of landlords was passing away and being replaced either by more enlightened ones or peasant proprietors; commerce and manufacturers were advancing in leaps and bounds. The rich manufacturers were already getting a footing in society and overtopping the old nobility in riches. The conditions of the work-people, which, as always when a country takes to industrialization, were poor, were already improving, and a generation of Russian skilled workmen and foremen were springing up. The increase of manufacturers had led to a corresponding increase of middlemen and the growth of a middle class. There is little doubt that had there been a few more years of peace society would have been far less top-heavy and far more able to stand the shock of the collapse of autocratic government.

With regard to the collapse of the Tzarist régime, the author has some very shrewd things to say, though he may err a little in attributing much to the Rasputin clique, their chief guilt lying in the way that their machinations helped to destroy all confidence. While condemning the heartlessness, inefficiency, and lack of co-operation of the governing classes, the author stresses the poor quality of the Petersburg garrison. This force was mainly recruited from inhabitants of the town itself, almost entirely untrained, and commanded by young and totally untrained officers with only a few months' service. Owing to the tremendous wastage at the front, there was only a small stiffening of competent N.C.O.s, instructors, and experienced officers. Of the inefficiency, dilatoriness, and perpetual squabbles of the Provisional Government he has much to say. They failed partly because there was no great man among them; it is impossible to replace an autocracy by a democracy within a few weeks, when men by training and inclination adhere more to men than to parties. The only reliable troops they had to draw upon were those divisions intimately connected with their Generals, as in the case of Kornilof. All the time Lenin and other German agents, backed by German money and the programme of "immediate peace and all the land for the people," were making headway every day. The Provisional Government, by trying to avoid a military dictatorship at the hands of Kornilof or others, delayed too long and fell to the dictatorship of Lenin and his gunmen.

After the collapse of the Provisional Government the author retired to his estates and defended them against the various bands of marauders. In this the book is unique, since very few did so, and fewer survived to tell the tale. A great deal of sentimental rubbish has been written about Russian peasants;

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the last part of the book does much to refute it. The Ukrainian was considered as one of the most intelligent of the Russian peasants, yet his actions were such as would have been considered as disgraceful if they had taken place in the Thirty Years' War, not in 1918. In almost all cases they turned against the family that had done so much for them, one of the chief reasons being that they all wanted to get gloriously drunk on the alcohol from the estate distillery. A people without loyalty, gratitude, or courage, since the author, with the aid of his ready wit and a few scallywags, kept them at bay for months, while the arrival of forty Germans at the county town pacified most of the district.

When the Germans withdrew after the Armistice the artificial Hetmann Government crumbled, and the country was once more delivered into the hands of the various partisans; so faced with immensely superior forces, the author was forced to abandon his estate and retire with his family through the disturbed area to the county town. Here he lay in hiding for a bit, but was compelled to run for it, and after a series of extraordinarily lucky escapes he and his wife managed to cross the Polish lines; his mother and two brothers who stayed behind were murdered. In losing him Russia lost a man she could ill afford, a sincere and level-headed patriot who still loves his country in spite of all. He is, in fact, inclined to find fault with the new states that have seceded; no one, not even they themselves, think they are either perfect or permanent, but in them at least life and property are fairly safe, and the owning of more than one cow is not considered a crime punishable with transportation for life.

The Permian of Mongolia. By A. W. Grabau. "National History of Central Asia.—Vol. IV. Central Asiatic Expeditions." American Museum of Natural History. New York. 1931. 10 dollars.

The scientific results of the Central Asiatic expeditions led by Dr. Roy Chapman Andrews in the years 1922, 1923, and 1925 are now being worked out in detail, and this great volume of 592 pages with 68 text figures and 35 plates is

the second of a series of twelve volumes to appear.

Approximately half of the book is devoted to detailed description of the Permian fossils from Jisu Honguer collected by the expedition, and the remainder is a discussion on the correlation of the Upper Carboniferous and the Permian formations throughout Europe and Asia. The large literature on this vexed problem is carefully reviewed, but it is doubtful if the conclusions reached will be generally accepted. The Uralian formation of the Ural mountains gives its name to the youngest division of the Carboniferous system of Europe, whereas the author regards the Uralian as Permian and separated from the uppermost Carboniferous by an unconformity. He proposes Donetzian in place of Uralian as a name for the uppermost Carboniferous.

The Jisu Honguer Permian area is, as far as is known, only about twenty square miles in extent, and its position was fixed by the expedition as Lat. 42° 38′ 15″ N. and Long. 110° 30′ 35″ E. Structurally it is a down-faulted

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block flanked on either side by crystalline rocks.

THE OTTOMAN DEBT: COUNCIL'S REPORT ON TURKISH ACTION

HE Report of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt for the year 1030-31 has now been published.

Rash borrowing and reckless extravagance in the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz resulted in the suspension of payment of the interest on her foreign loans by Turkey in 1875, and her financial difficulties were still further aggravated by internal revolt, the wars with Serbia and Russia in 1876, 1877, and 1878, and the consequent loss of important territories in Europe and Asia. After long negotiations with representatives of the foreign bondholders, an agreement was come to for the reduction of the capital of the foreign debt to about two-fifths of the original figure of £252,801,505 sterling. In December, 1881, the Decree of Moharram authorized the appointment of a Council of delegates of the principal creditor countries, sitting in Constantinople, to administer the six taxes which were allocated for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt. The presidency of this Council was held alternatively by the British and French delegates of the bondholders, and it may safely be said that from 1882 to 1914 the British Presidents, from Sir Edgar Vincent, now Lord d'Abernon, to Sir Adam Block, took a lion's share in the creation of the great and efficient service which served as a model to Turkish administration until it was swept away on Turkey's entry into the Great War.

From November, 1914, there was a further suspension of payments, and it was only on June 13, 1928, that the bondholders' representatives concluded an agreement with the Government of the Turkish Republic, under which the capital amount of Turkey's share of the debt of the former Ottoman Empire was further reduced, and the Government undertook to pay interest thereon at an agreed rate by monthly instalments to the Ottoman Bank. The present report chronicles the failure of the Turkish Government to carry out its undertakings under this agreement, and, incidentally, very questionable attitude of some of the Succession States towards the bondholders.

As early as February, 1930, the Turkish Government declared that the payment of the annual sum due under the contract of June 13, 1928, would seriously compromise the financial and economic situation of the country, and after an exchange of views the Council consented to leave two-thirds of the monthly payments due from June 1, 1930, at the disposal of the Government as a temporary concession, subject to certain reserves for the protection of the bondholders' interests, chief among which was the stipulation that payments at the full rate should be resumed on the presentation of a report on the financial situation of Turkey which was being drawn up by the financial expert, Professor Rist, or at the latest by October 25, 1930.

The present report goes on to describe how the Turkish Government failed to agree to these conditions, and has continued, in spite of repeated protests and further negotiations, to withhold payment of two-thirds of the monthly instalments, while the Council has been obliged to pass the sums paid by Turkey into a reserve fund, as being insufficient for distribution to the bondholders. There followed an exchange of correspondence, resulting in the appointment, at the request of the Turkish Government, of a delegation of the Council, which visited Angora and carried on fruitless negotiations with the former Minister of Finance, Shukri Bey Sarajoglu, in May, 1931, when the Turkish proposals for the permanent reduction of the annual payments, and the counter-proposal for a temporary reduction over three years followed by a fresh consideration of the question, failed to obtain acceptance, and the negotiations were broken off. An annex to the report contains a short summary of further inconclusive correspondence between the parties since the end of the financial year under review on the subject of the possible resumption of the Angora negotiations.

OTHER SUCCESSION STATES

The report shows that Syria under French mandate, Italy as responsible for the Dodecanese, and Palestine, have fulfilled all their obligations to the Council of the Debt, and that Iraq has already paid four of the seven annual instalments of her share of the debt spread over the years from 1928 to 1934 inclusive. Greece and Bulgaria, on the other hand, have refused to fulfil any of their obligations towards the bondholders, on the utterly inadmissible ground that they have a right to benefit by any facilities and reductions which may be granted to Turkey in consequence of her financial difficulties. Yugoslavia has gone so far as to reject the very principle of her liability for any share of the Ottoman Debt, as she was not a signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne. The Council of the Debt has continued to protest against

this attitude, which is contrary to the principle of the non-solidarity of the debtor Succession States as laid down in the Lausanne Treaty, and has appealed to the Governments of the principal Signatory Powers of that Treaty to use their influence for the recognition of its claims.

That Turkey has suffered in common with the rest of the world from the economic depression of the last two years cannot be denied; but the Council of the Debt had already recognized that she is entitled to consideration on this ground by accepting a temporary delay in the payment of interest at the agreed rate, and by proposing in the course of the Angora negotiations further temporary concessions extending over the financial years 1930-31, 1931-32, and 1932-33, after which the whole question could be reconsidered with a view to resuming the execution of the Contract of June 13, 1928, in its entirety. But they could not possibly admit the right of Turkey by a purely unilateral act permanently to reduce her obligations as laid down in the Contract of 1928, seeing that the financial and economic depression may prove to be only temporary, while at the same time she continues to pay in full the sums due to other foreign creditors. Money has been found to pay for the building of destroyers in Italian shipyards, for the construction of strategic railways which are never likely to pay their way, and for expensive improvements and new public buildings in Angora, while the resources of the future have been pledged by the concession to foreign capitalists of various monopolies, such as tobacco, alcohol, matches, and explosives. The Council's present report comes, therefore, as a serious warning to the Turkish Government that its credit and future financial solvency will depend upon the adoption of a more reasonable and conciliatory interpretation of the obligations to which it committed itself by its signature of the Contract of June 13, 1928.

OBITUARY

DEATH OF LIEUT.-COLONEL H. T. MORSHEAD, D.S.O., R.E.

THE death of Colonel Morshead leaves a very great gap in the rank of the scientific mountaineer-explorers of the Himalaya, for his record both as a surveyor and as an explorer is a most remarkable one. He followed, indeed, the family tradition, for his uncle was Mr. Frederick Morshead, one of the best known and hardiest of the pioneers of the Alps in the great days. Did he not among other great excursions make the ascent of Mont Blanc direct from Chamonix alone, and in little more than twelve hours? A type of feat for which his nephew was eminently suited. Like Mallory and Bullock of the Everest expedition, he was educated at Winchester, from there passing into the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich, and so to a commission in the Royal Engineers. Electing to serve in India, he was employed for three years in the Military Works Department, and subsequently joined the survey of India in 1906. During the following six years, whilst holding several responsible posts in that department, he was fitting himself for the work of exploration which was to follow. During the years 1911-12-13 he was attached to the survey party led by Captain C. P. Gunter, R.E., who explored and surveyed the Mishmi country. It may not be realized that owing to the awful climate and the difficulty of the country, want of communication, etc., travel in the Eastern Himalaya probably requires as great stamina and resistance to strain both from climate and from physical exertion as is necessary in any part of the world whatsoever. It was during these two years of exploration that Morshead's capacity in this respect impressed all. In March, 1930, in conjunction with Bailey, the Political Officer (now Colonel F. M. Bailey), he formed a plan to try and discover where the Tsang Po breaks through the great chain of the Himalaya, and also to locate the Tsang Po Falls.

I now quote the survey of India notes of June, 1931:

"But the appalling weather rendered a dash over the Andra or Yonggyap Pass into the Pemakoi-chen Valley (Dihang River) quite impossible until May 26, when it was still under twenty feet of snow. The work carried out by Morshead on this expedition was extremely arduous, yet he not only triangulated the whole area but also completed the computation of almost every triangulated point within a few hours of observation, so that the plane-tablers never lacked points by which to control their work.

"The adventurous exploration in 1913 of the great bend of the Tsang Po, north-east of the Namcha Barwa, the great peak of the Eastern Himalaya, 25,455 feet—itself discovered by Morshead and Oakes the year before—brought Morshead's name to international prominence. The identity of the Tsang Po of Tibet with the Dihang tributary of the Bramaputra was proved beyond doubt

and the Falls of Pemakochung correctly located.

"For his valuable contribution to our knowledge of this frontier Morshead received the thanks of the Government of India and of the Secretary of State, and was awarded the Macgregor Medal by the United Service Institution of India."

During the Great War Morshead served in France, commanding the Royal Engineers of the 46th Division. On return from France he was soon at work again in charge of the survey party with the Waziristan Field Force. In the same year (1920) he joined the late Dr. Kellas in an attempt to climb Mount Kamet (25,477 feet), which is situated in Upper Garhwal, and which has lately been conquered by Mr. Smythe's expedition. Their attempt was altogether a notable one, and in all probability they would have made a very serious attempt on the mountain; but unfortunately their transport arrangements were not sufficiently good, nor indeed was the necessity at that time for highly organized transport sufficiently recognized. However, the attempt was a notable one, and the experience gained-especially of the effects of high altitude-proved later of great assistance to the Mount Everest expedition.

In 1921—that is, the following year-Major Morshead was in charge of the survey party attached to the Mount Everest expedition, led in that year by Colonel Howard Bury. Their contribution to that reconnaissance was of the utmost importance, for they surveyed some 12,000 square miles which was up to then unmapped. During his work Morshead himself crossed the Lhakpa La (22,350 feet), besides climbing the point Kama Changri (21,300 feet). 1922, there being no survey party officially attached to the second expedition,

Morshead joined as part of the climbing party.

Colonel E. F. Norton writes: "The trials and hazards of the mountain expedition of 1922 brought out nothing but the most stirring qualities in Morshead, who was, I think, the most universally popular member of that expedition. Equable and easy to get on with, modest and unselfish to a fault, intelligent and versatile in his interests, he was a charming companion. His two outstanding qualities were physical hardness and courage: I never met a hardier man."

To this testimony I might add that no man by temperament was more fitted to be a member of so trying an expedition as the attempt on Everest. Perhaps his only weakness was his fondness for exposing himself to rather unnecessary hardship and thus making too great calls on his stamina. During this expedition he was one of the four-Mallory, Somervell, Norton, and himself-to make, without the use of oxygen, the first great attempt on the mountain. Unfor-

tunately, he became ill from exposure at their camp at 25,000 feet.

That dramatic attempt and the rescue of Morshead by the climbers is described in the records of the 1922 expedition. Again I quote from Colonel Norton: "I believe that it was Morshead's courage alone which enabled us to reach the camp (at the North Col) by 11 p.m., and to descend next morning to Camp 3 through a foot of new snow, for he could scarcely walk." The results were terrible for him, as he suffered from severe frost-bite in both hands and both feet. I must here quote the words of Colonel E. L. Strutt, who, with Dr. Longstaff and Finch, brought Morshead back to India: "They had to cross some 400 miles of exposed and mountain country, taking some nineteen days to do the journey. He was laid back on a Tibetan saddle on a rough pony, his frost-bitten feet stretched out before him in improvised stirrups, and his mutilated hands strapped to his shoulders, to keep the blood out of his finger-tips. So great was the pain he suffered that Longstaff was obliged in the early stages of the march to dope him at night so that Morshead could get a few minutes' rest. What was worse was the fact that we were short of animals and porters, and Morshead was obliged to walk over several of the 18,000 feet passes, inaccessible to a heavily laden pony. Yet one never heard a word of complaint from him."

Such a record of heroism deserves to be recognized, and sad though it is that it should be included in such a notice as this one, it is worthy of remembrance in the history of the exploration of the Himalaya. Thanks to the great care taken of him by Dr. Longstaff and the skill of the civil surgeon in Darjeeling, his terrible wounds healed far better than one could have expected. Contrary to all expectations his feet were saved, but he lost the upper joints of all his fingers except his two index ones. It was a terrible disappointment to him that he could not become a member of the 1924 expedition as transport officer, as he could not be exposed to extreme cold again so short a time after his wounds had healed. He was able to take part in one further exploration, as he formed part of the Cambridge University expedition to Spitsbergen in 1927 with no ill results to himself.

It is very terrible that such a life should have been sacrificed at the hands of an unknown assailant. His death has never been cleared up, nor has it been discovered at whose hands his valuable life was lost.

C. G. B.

THE CAMERA CLUB

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It might be of interest to members of the Royal Central Asian Society who are keen photographers and are in England, or who come to England from time to time, to know of the existence of this Club. The Club was constituted in 1886, and has of late considerably increased its membership and facilities. As a complete stranger, I became a member of the Club, and at once found myself at home with members who were enthusiastic photographers, and are always willing to help and give useful criticism to those who, like myself, are still only struggling in the very shallows of photography.

The Club Room contains all the latest papers, including every possible paper

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C. E. C. GREGORY. (Captain.)

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
Members wishing for lectures on any special subjects are asked to inform the Honorary Secretary.

Correction (Air Operations on the N.W. Frontier, January, 1932): P. 30; lines 28, 30, 31, and 33, for "Mohmand" read "Mamund."

Messrs. Routledge have now prepared an excellent map of Central Asia to illustrate the new edition of Marco Polo in the Broadway Travellers Series (R.C.A.S.J. rev., p. 161).

JAPAN'S RIGHTS IN MANCHURIA*

By E. M. GULL.



SHOULD like to begin my talk this afternoon by calling attention to its title—Japan's Rights in Manchuria. That indicates that I am not proposing to talk on the Manchurian question at large, but to concentrate on one particular aspect of it. In doing that I shall necessarily touch on other aspects. Indeed, I suggest that a review of Japan's rights, a statement of what they are, and of how they came into existence, is the best means of understanding the Manchurian question as a whole.

Before approaching these rights, however, it is desirable to consider briefly some of the factors which make them important. A right, after

* Lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society on March 16, the Right Hon. Lord Lloyd in the chair.

all, is a right to a particular activity or thing, and cannot be separated from the purpose of that particular activity or thing. So, before concentrating upon Japan's rights in Manchuria, let us glance at the facts which led her to acquire them.

An outstanding fact is geographical, namely her proximity to the Asiatic mainland. That fact is so visible on the map that one need not dilate upon it in geographical terms. It is obvious that were the Manchurian, and more particularly the Korean, coast to be controlled by a Power hostile to Japan her national existence would be imperilled.

People are apt to forget the introductory but inseparable part which Korea has played in the Manchurian question as we know it today. They are apt to forget that from the third to the end of the fourteenth century Japan exercised suzerainty over Korea. Let me quote what the late Lord Curzon wrote in 1896 on that point. During that time, he says, "relations between the two countries, though frequently disturbed, were, as a rule, those of Japanese ascendancy and Korean allegiance. Tribute missions constantly sailed from Fusan to the Court of the Mikado or Shogun, and there grew up in Japanese minds the conviction, which has never been extirpated, that to surrender Korea would be as indelible a stain on the national honour as Mary of England felt it to lose Calais." From the end of the fourteenth to the early part of the seventeenth century Japan's suzerainty over Korea lapsed, but from 1623 to 1832 she demanded and annually obtained tribute from Korea as a vassal state, notwithstanding Korea's recognition of China as a suzerain. Throughout that period suzerainty was claimed by both China and Japan, and in 1876, in order to get rid of China's influence, Japan made a treaty with Korea in which she referred to her as an independent country. In 1885 she made a treaty with China, in which both Powers promised not to send troops to Korea without prior notification to one another.

In the meanwhile, Russia had been advancing towards the Pacific. In 1858, by a treaty made with China, the Treaty of Aigun, the left bank of the river Amur was declared to belong to Russia, while the land lying between the river Ussuri and the sea was declared to belong to both countries until such time as the frontiers between them should be delimited. It was in the same year that a project for a trans-Siberian railway was first mooted, official authorization for the construction of the line being given in 1801.

In 1894 China sent troops into Korea at the request of the Korean king to help in quelling a rising. Thus Japan saw herself threatened

from two directions. Russia had gained control of the country between the Ussuri and the sea. China was threatening to regain control of Korea, which Japan had decided to treat as an independent country in order to have a barrier between herself and her big neighbour.

Now, in order to bring out a little more clearly the significance in Japanese eyes of the facts I have just related, I am going to ask you to switch your minds from Asia to Europe. I am going to remind you of the political significance in our own history of our geographical position in relation to the country now known as Belgium.

I need not recall that it was Germany's invasion of Belgium which finally brought us to the help of France in the Great War. You may say, "Oh! but we had an agreement to honour. We were pledged to maintain Belgium's independence." So we were, but how and why did we come to be pledged? It will not, I suggest, be waste of time to trace that story backwards.

Belgium's independence was the outcome of her revolt against the union with Holland which the Congress of Vienna arranged. The Cambridge Modern History comments upon that event in the following terms:

"Thus was introduced," it says, "into the European family of states a Power of considerable strength, though of secondary rank, deliberately intended to serve as a barrier against France, in the interests more especially of the Low Countries themselves, of Germany and of Great Britain."*

What was British policy towards Belgium before the Congress of Vienna? Let me quote what Pitt said after the French capture of Brussels at the beginning of the French Revolution. He said:

"This Government, adhering to the maxims which it has followed for more than a century, will never see with indifference that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly, the sovereign of the Low Countries or the general arbiter of the rights and liberties of Europe."

What was British policy before Pitt? In the earlier part of the century there were two wars, the War of the Austrian Succession and the War of the Spanish Succession. In both of them we took part in order to keep France out of the Netherlands.

In the seventeenth century our policy was the same. We formed

a Triple Alliance of ourselves, Holland, and Sweden against the French, again to keep them out of the Netherlands. By the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, as you will remember, the chief forts in the Spanish Netherlands, Namur, Ypres, and Menin, were to be garrisoned by Dutch troops.

In the sixteenth century Spain was the country we feared. What was Burghley's policy? In the Cambridge Modern History you will find this statement:

"Burghley, almost on his death-bed, laid down as England's irreducible minimum demand that the United Provinces should be for ever secured against a Spanish attempt to subdue them."*

Thus, from 1598—the date of the Peace of Vervins—down to 1914 this country has consistently fought against any colossus which threatened to gain control of what is now Belgium.

Now I grant you that we never tried to conquer Belgium; nor were our motives wholly self-regarding. We fought both for liberty and for religion. But self-preservation also actuated us, and the idea of having a barrier in Belgium instead of a jumping-off ground for an enemy was always present.

Now, please, switch your minds back again to Asia. In 1894, as a result of the circumstances which I have related, Japan declared war on China. China, who was expected by many people to win, was easily defeated, and in its first form the Treaty of Shimoneseki, which Japan dictated, provided for the independence of Korea and gave Japan the southern part of Manchuria from the mouth of the Yalu river to Fenghuang, thence to Haicheng and thence to Yink'ou or Newchwang. But she was not allowed to keep South Manchuria. Russia, Germany, and France intervened and she was obliged to give it up. And as a reward for her intervention Russia was able to make an agreement with China to build the Chinese Eastern Railway; obtained a 25-year lease of part of Manchuria—the Liaotung Peninsula; got China to agree to a southern extension of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Dalny-i.e., to the building of the South Manchuria Railway, and a year or two later made a preliminary arrangement also—a point which is frequently forgotten-to build a line towards Korea-i.e., from Changchun to Kirin.

Again Japan determined to fight. This time she had a much tougher nut to crack. But she cracked it and pride in her victory

has been as potent an influence in her life as, up to 1914, Waterloo had been amongst ourselves. Korea became a Japanese protectorate and Russia's lease of the Liaotung Peninsula and the South Manchuria Railway were transferred, with China's consent expressed in treaty form, to Japan.

In 1910 Japan annexed Korea, and that has modified the strategic significance of geographical facts very considerably. But that significance has by no means been destroyed any more than it has been in the case of Belgium, by Belgium's independence.

In the meanwhile economic facts have assumed great importance. Iron ore reserves in Japan are so scanty that a per capita rate of consumption equal to that in the United States would exhaust them in two years. Her coal reserves, if drawn upon at the same rate as America's are, would last her no more than 25 years. Her annual production of petroleum has remained at about the same figure since 1913—i.e., about 80 million gallons, which confirms the belief that her supplies are uncertain and relatively small.

In addition to these facts have to be considered Japan's population and capacity to feed it. At the present time her population is between 61 and 62 millions and is increasing at a rate which promises an addition of another 30 million by 1957. In order to feed this population Japan imports about 55 million bushels of rice—between one-fifth and one-sixth of her total supply. Of this importation about two-thirds comes at present from Formosa and Korea. For the rest she is dependent upon non-Japanese sources, and this dependence appears certain to increase.

Now, in order to get food from abroad Japan must, of course, pay for it, just as England has to do. Our population increased from 5 millions in 1700 to 32 millions in 1900. We were able to meet this great increase largely because we made ourselves into an industrial country. That is exactly what Japan has been doing, and she must intensify the process of industrialization if her growing population is to be found employment and fed. But nobody can make bricks without straw, and, as I have just indicated, Japan herself does not possess the straw. Manchuria, on the other hand, does. Manchuria has iron ores, and she has coal. The Fushun coal deposit is said to be the largest single deposit in the world. Japan gets a large part of her pig iron from Manchuria, iron ores produced there being converted into pig iron on the spot. Moreover, Manchuria is also an extremely fertile country, able to produce enormous quantities of wheat and millet.

Such, then, are the geographical, political, and economic facts which make Japan's rights in Manchuria important to her.

Let me turn now to the rights themselves.

They may be grouped under four heads, the first two of which cover what may be termed Japan's basic rights, while the other two include the superstructure of rights which have been built upon the basic rights. It is these two latter classes of rights which have occasioned the

present Sino-Japanese conflict.

The basic rights—the first two classes—are composed (a) of the general rights which she shares with us and the other Powers having treaties with China, (b) of the special rights which she acquired as a result of her war with Russia. Class A, her general rights, need not detain us for more than a minute or two. They are derived from two treaties, one known as the Treaty of Tientsin, signed in 1871, the other known as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, concluded in 1806 after Japan's war with China during the previous year. The two together gave the Japanese all the rights which we ourselves had at that time in Manchuria and China, the right to live and trade at Newchwang, the right to travel in the interior for pleasure or profit, and the right of Japanese subjects to be tried only by their own courts in accordance with their own laws. Additionally, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation opened Mukden and Tatungkow to international residence and trade, and since then a number of other places have been opened.

The special rights must be described more fully. Those taken over from Russia by the Treaty of Portsmouth were, as I have already stated, the lease for 25 years (from March 27, 1898) of the Liaotung Peninsula and the control of the South Manchuria Railway. Rights acquired by the Treaty of Peking, made by Japan with China in confirmation of the Treaty of Portsmouth, included the right to convert a military line built by Japan during her war with Russia from Mukden to Antung into a commercial line and to exploit it for a period of 15 years.

The confirmatory nature of this Treaty of Peking is important, for in it China undertook that, in regard to the leased territory, as well as in the matter of railway construction, she would conform to the original agreements concluded between herself and Russia.

Now, the lease of the Peninsula—i.e., the territory between Yatang or Society Bay and Pitzuwo Bay—stipulated that "the entire military command of the land and naval forces and equally the supreme civil

administration" should be entirely given over to the Russian authorities. Accordingly, with the transfer of the lease to Japan, these supreme military, naval, and administrative powers were transferred also. Moreover, in the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth (Article III.) the Liaotung Peninsula was specifically excluded from the restoration to Chinese sovereignty which Russia and Japan promised as regards the rest of Manchuria. That point is often lost sight of.

The South Manchuria Railway was also transferred to Japan with all the rights which Russia had had in it. These rights were derived both from an article in the lease of the Peninsula—Article 8; from the agreement which Russia made with China on September, 8, 1896, for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, and from the subsequent agreements made in pursuance of it. Amongst those rights were:

1. The right to work the South Manchuria line for 36 years from the time of its completion—i.e., till 1939—at the end of which time China was to be allowed to buy it back, and, alternatively, the right to work it for 80 years, at the end of which time China was to get it back free.

2. The exercise of absolute and exclusive rights of administration

over the lands required for the railway.

The Treaty of Portsmouth strengthened these rights by giving Japan the right to work the coal mines in the lands traversed by the railway, and by giving her the right to police the line. Moreover, to the Treaty of Peking was attached a protocol, alleged to be secret, but known in all the Legations in Peking at the time, whereby China engaged that, prior to her recovery of the line, she would not build any main line in its neighbourhood or parallel with it. In passing, we should note (a) that the terms of this engagement were similar to the clause which we had inserted in 1903 in our agreement for the construction of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, (b) that it is comparable with those of the agreement made between Russia and China on June 1, 1899, whereby China engaged that if she ever used foreign capital to build lines northwards, or north-eastwards, from Peking, she would turn to Russia first for the money.

I come now to the superstructure of rights which Japan has built upon those just described. These, like her basic rights, fall into two groups:

(a) Those acquired between 1905 and 1915

(b) Those acquired in 1915 and since.

To some extent the groups overlap, but broadly speaking the rights acquired between 1905 and 1915 represent logical developments of those taken over from Russia. The most important were:

- 1. The right to work coal mines at Fushun and Yentai on the South Manchuria Railway and the right to work them on the Antung-Mukden Railway.
- 2. The right to supply part of the capital needed to connect Changchun with Kirin by rail and to place Japanese in charge of its construction and accounts.
- 3. The right to finance lines linking the South Manchuria Railway with Taonanfu on the Mongolian border.

A few words are necessary in regard to the Kirin and Taonanfu lines.

Construction of the Changchun-Kirin line was originally provided for by an agreement between China and Russia made on July 11, 1902. As things turned out the line was not built, and on April 15, 1907, Japan made a new agreement to lend China half the money needed for the purpose, the loan to run for 25 years. The line was to be Chinese, but the Chinese authorities were to employ a Japanese engineer and a Japanese accountant. Two years later, on September 4, 1909, Japan made an agreement whereby four places in a region known as the Chientao area, near the Korean border, were opened to foreign residence and trade-i.e., Lungchingtsun, Chutzuchieh, Toutaokou, and Paitsaokou. After the annexation of Korea, which took place in 1910, these places began to fill up with Koreans, who, in virtue of the annexation, were Japanese subjects. The Changchun-Kirin line was completed in 1912, and with the development of the Chientao area, an extension of the line to connect with the Korean railways became highly desirable. On June 18, 1918, accordingly Japan made an agreement with China to finance the construction of a line from Kirin to Huining, through the southern part of Chientao. Construction was begun in 1926 and completed as far as Tunhua in 1928.

Railway building towards Mongolia also has its special history. Before the linking of the South Manchuria line with Taonanfu was arranged various projects had been entertained for the construction of railways in this region by British and American capital. A contract was signed between the Chinese authorities and a British firm for the construction of a line from Hsinmintun to Fakumen. Negotiations were also entered into with the Chinese for the construction with British and American capital of a line from Chinchow, on the Peking-

Mukden Railway, to Tsitsihar and Aigun. And a proposal was made by the American Government for the neutralization of Manchurian railways by the purchase with international capital both of the Chinese Eastern and the South Manchuria Railways. All these proposals, however, cut across the agreements which Russia and Japan had successively made with China, and they resulted on July 4, 1910, in a convention between Russia and Japan "to maintain and respect the status quo in Manchuria as it results from all the treaties, conventions, or other arrangements hitherto concluded either between Russia and Japan or between these two Powers and China." These British and American projects, accordingly, were dropped, leaving the ground clear for Japan, and in October, 1913, she made an agreement with China to lend her money for the construction of three lines:

- 1. From Ssupingkai, via Chengchiatun, to Taonanfu.
- 2. From Kaiyuan to Hailungcheng.
- 3. From the Changchun station of the Kirin-Changchun line, across the South Manchuria Railway, to Taonanfu.

These lines were to connect with the South Manchuria Railway and the Peking-Mukden Railway. The agreement also provided that if in future railways were built from Taonanfu to Ch'engtefu, or from Hailung to Kirin, and if foreign capital was employed for the purpose, Japanese capital would be sought first.

Now, up to this point Japan's special rights, exclusive as several of them were, were limited in respect of their duration and could all be said to be, as I have already described them, logical developments of the rights taken over from Russia. We come now, however, to changes which quite altered their character. In 1915, during the Great War, Japan made demands on China, known as the twenty-one demands, amongst which were the following:

1. An extension of the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, due to expire in 1923, to 99 years—i.e., 1997.

2. Cancellation of the provision enabling China to buy back the South Manchuria Railway after the lapse of 36 years from its completion, and extension of Japan's control over it to 99 years—i.e., 2002.

3. Extention of the period allotted for the exploitation of the Antung-Mukden Railway, due to expire in 1920, to 2007.

4. Freedom for Japanese to live, trade and lease land anywhere in South Manchuria—whereas before they could travel anywhere for purposes of pleasure or trade, but could live and lease land only in specified places.

5. The opening of certain specified areas to Japanese subjects for mining purposes.

6. The opening of certain places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as

commercial ports where foreigners in general might reside.

7. The provision by China of funds for building necessary railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, such funds if obtained from foreign sources to be sought in the first instance from Japanese capitalists.

8. Priority to be given to Japanese subjects in the appointment, at any future date, of foreign advisers or instructors on political,

financial, military, or police matters.

9. Revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway loan agreement on terms which for a period of 36 years made the South Manchuria Railway Co. its manager, whereas hitherto the company's management had been indirect-i.e., through a Japanese engineer and accountant appointed by the Chinese Government after consultation with the South Manchuria Railway Company.

These demands were backed by an ultimatum, and in an exchange of Notes China agreed to them. She tried to get her agreement abrogated at the Washington Conference in 1922, and to one or two relatively unimportant modifications Japan consented. In general, however, Japan insisted that the agreement must stand, and she regards it at the present time as signed, sealed, and delivered.

The Chinese, on the other hand, have never ceased to kick against the pricks, and since 1925 have followed a course which has led directly

to the present trouble.

In 1925 they began building a line from Mukden to Hailung, in defiance of the 1905 agreement not to build lines paralleling the South Manchuria Railway, and in defiance of an agreement made on September 28, 1918, which, following out the ideas of the agreement made in October, 1913, provided for the construction with Japanese capital of four lines:

1. From Changchun to Taonan.

2. From Taonan to Ch'engtefu.

3. From Kaiyuan to Kirin via Hailung.

4. From the Taonon-Ch'engtefu line to the Gulf of Pechihli.

The Chinese carried the Mukden-Hailung line to Chaoyang and built a branch line to Hsian. Then, in May, 1927, they began a line from Kirin to Chaoyang, also in breach of the agreements just referred to, the line being completed in 1928. And in 1927 they completed a line between Tahushan, on the Peking-Mukden Railway, and Tungliao.

This, in Japanese eyes, was their worst offence, and for the following reasons:

On the western side of the Gulf of Pechihli, opposite Yink'ou or Newchwang, is a harbour known as Hulutao. It is a little over seven miles from the Peking-Mukden Railway, with which a branch line connects it at Lienshan. It is, relatively speaking, an ice-free harbour, whereas Newchang is not. With a little dredging and the construction of a breakwater, it can be made at a comparatively small cost, say £1,500,000, into a harbour able to accommodate deep draught, sea-going vessels. It is a large and sheltered harbour with room for a large fleet in addition to commercial vessels, and its immediate hinterland produces coal. The Chinese began to make the harbour into a port as long ago as 1910. But the work never got any distance, and little was heard of Hulutao until about a year ago, when the Ministry of Railways at Nanking announced that a contract had been signed between the Peking-Mukden Railway and a Dutch concern—the Netherlands Harbour Works Company of Amsterdam-for the completion of the work begun in 1910.

Now it is obvious that a port at Hulutao, served by railways tapping both North China, Eastern Mongolia, and Western Manchuria, is likely to compete with Dalny. Moreover, by linking Tungliao with Taonanfu the line would also tap North Manchuria, because Tungliao is connected by rail with Angangchi, a line which the South Manchuria Railway built for China in accordance with an agreement made on September 3, 1924. Furthermore, in 1926 the Chinese began a line connecting Hulan, just north of Harbin with Hailun, a line which taps the wheat-growing district of North Manchuria and could be linked up with Kirin, which, as we have already seen, is linked with Chaoyang and Mukden.

In other words, in 1930 the Japanese, in spite of repeated protests, found themselves confronted with the very thing they had tried, as I have shown you, to prevent, a set of railways threatening the South Manchuria Railway both on the west and on the east, and a port which, when completed, would threaten their port, Dalny.

All of us whose special business it is to study Far Eastern affairs knew that such a situation would inevitably lead to trouble. The only thing which has surprised us has been that the trouble did not come sooner.

The trouble, resulting as it has done in a new situation in Manchuria, has, of course, other sides to it than the one I have dealt with. There is the Chinese side, about which I have said little or nothing. Undoubtedly the Chinese case is a very strong one, apart altogether from Japan's obligations under the Kellogg Pact and other undertakings. China's sovereignty over Manchuria has been recognized again and again. It was clearly recognized by Russia herself, in terms embodied in one of the documents upon which Japan relies for her basic rights, I mean Article VIII. of the Convention for the Lease of the Liaotung Peninsula. That is the Article which gave Russia the right to build the South Manchuria Railway, and which stipulated that all the conditions governing the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway should apply to the South Manchuria line. Now, that Article contains the following words:

"Consent to the construction of the railway on the basis indicated shall never under any form serve as a pretext for the seizure of Chinese territory for an encroachment on the sovereign rights of China."

There can be no possible question that the South Manchuria Railway has been used as a pretext both for the seizure of Chinese territory and for encroachment upon her sovereign rights.

Nor, I think, can there be any question that, apart altogether from international documents, Manchuria is actually Chinese soil. It is true that China's political control over Manchuria as a whole came to her with her conquerors, the Manchus. On the other hand, nobody has ever argued that when China was under the Manchus she ceased to be China. On the contrary, all the basic treaties on which foreigners rely for their rights in China were made when the Manchus were on the Chinese throne. It is true that it was not until after the disappearance of the Manchu Dynasty that the sons of Han began to emigrate into Manchuria in large numbers. But during the past few years they have been pouring into the country by the million. I have endevoured throughout my talk this afternoon to give you a realistic view of the Manchurian problem, and I should be leaving you with a false impression if I left you under any doubt whatever (a) as to Chinese sovereignty over the country, (b) as to the reality, apart altogether from diplomatic documents, of the country being Chinese.

Then there is the Russian side of the question, involving the future of Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway. It would take another talk to deal with that aspect of the Manchurian problem. And there is the aspect known as the Open Door, involving our own commercial interests in Manchuria, which, though not large, are by no means negligible. It is impossible to deal with that matter this afternoon. Finally, there is the question which is foremost in the public mind at the present time, namely the authority and prestige of the League of Nations. Obviously I cannot deal with that this afternoon.

But, in concluding this talk, I want to make three general remarks. The first may strike you, perhaps, as being in the nature of a debating point, though I think myself that there is more in it than that. The point is this, that one of the potential weapons for the maintenance of peace with which the League of Nations has armed itself is boycott. I don't propose to raise the difficult and delicate question as to whether boycott is, or is not, a form of war. If it is, then war to prevent war looks to me very much like a vicious circle which we should do our best to avoid. In either case we can scarcely be surprised if Japan resents any suggestion likely to weaken her control over the supplies of coal, pig iron, and iron ores which Manchuria gives her. To expect her to acquiesce in that seems to me rather like expecting her to agree to a fresh deal in order that the rest of the world may hold all the trump cards.

My second point is this. If the League's purpose is the maintenance of peace—as it undoubtedly is—then the advocates amongst us of action by the League ought not to support their arguments, as they constantly are doing, by reference to interests which are purely British, whether economic, racial, or territorial. I am all for upholding British interests, but I am all against the moral and intellectual muddle which must result from mixing up potentially different, if not actually different, things. Peace is a British interest, but it cannot be pretended that because an interest is British it necessarily makes for peace.

My third point is this. Taking the story which I have related to you this afternoon as a whole, it is, I think, impossible to deny that Japan has been aggressive. But neither is it possible to deny that many of the steps she has taken have been dictated by considerations of national safety, considerations of the most compelling kind.

Now to assess these two facts in moral terms seems to me to be extremely difficult, though many appear to find it pontifically easy. To me it appears that in this Manchurian problem we find ourselves

confronted by issues which, in the present state of our ideas upon nationality, and in the present economic organization of the world, are too elemental to be adjudicated upon moral grounds. On the other hand, those issues do not appear to defy such methods of compromise, of give-and-take, as have hitherto been the working tools of statesmanship. And I would sooner put my trust in them than in logical adherence to experimental pacts.

In short, I would take Peace by the hand, and allowing myself the liberty of a little paraphrasing, I would say to her: "Madam, I love you very dearly, but I will not go crusading for you, fair maid."

A Member: Has not Japan millions of pounds invested in Manchuria?

The LECTURER: Undoubtedly.

The Member: We know Japan has broken the Pact of Paris, to which she had agreed, and we know she has broken her covenant with the League of Nations. Apparently the Lecturer thinks Japan's greatest offence is the invasion of China proper, not what was done outside, but the going into China itself.

The LECTURER: I was endeavouring in this talk not to go outside the Manchurian situation. If you ask me my personal opinion as to whether Japan has been right to take the action which she has taken in China, I say in view of all the facts: No, I do not think she has been. But it would be perfectly possible, and in fact if we were to discuss the situation properly it would be almost unavoidable, to have another hour's talk on the rights and wrongs of that particular situation.

The Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I do not wish to add more than the most brief commentary to wind up this extraordinarily interesting lecture. I would like to congratulate Mr. Gull on the able structure of his lecture. He first of all compared the Chinese situation with our strategic solicitude in the Low Countries, touched first upon Japan's interests in Manchuria and Korea, then on her basic rights; he then reminded us of the Treaty of Portsmouth and many another treaty, and one right we are apt to forget, the right of conquest. You remember the elder Lord Salisbury, in describing the rights of conquest, justified them by saying they were ancient and easy to understand. (Laughter.) I think that is true. Then Mr. Gull touched on the accrued rights due to the growth of economic and railway development, and,

say what you will, all such expansion is indicative of that national activity which is the only alternative in modern times to national decay. Therefore it is very difficult to adjudge very closely upon the rights of such a complex question. (Applause.) If I had been to Geneva lately I confess I should have been tempted to ask a question in regard to the boycott. I should have said: "I do not know whether the Japanese have been the aggressors or not-after all, there are many more ways of being an aggressor than that of marching an army into a country. The constant violation of treaties, the policy of constant pinpricks, the constant negation of all those rights of law and order which a sovereign power, if it wishes to remain such, must give to those who wish to trade and have treaty rights in the country, may all be just as actively aggressive as the showing of a bayonet or sword; and if it is really true that this trouble has immediately arisen out of the boycott by the Chinese of Japanese goods, kindly tell me how the extension of a principle which led to war is now going to lead to peace?" For the League of Nations has been asked that we should extend an international boycott to Japan to punish her for taking vengeance upon a country that has boycotted her. It leads me to one consideration, which I put forward on almost every platform today. Forgive me if it is almost an echo of Mr. Gull's own closing words. I would ask: Great as are the interests of peace—and none know it better than a nation. like ourselves, who are still scorched in the fires of war-there is something yet greater than peace, and that is justice. England has ever stood, her swift sword has always been sharp, not in the interests of peace first of all, but in the interests of justice between man and man. (Applause.) It was not by protocols and pacts that slavery was put down, but by force; it was not by protocols and pacts that the pirates in the Persian Gulf were put down, but by that great agent of pacific force, the British Navy. In trying to come to judgment upon issues between two great and ancient peoples, let us reserve our fire until we know the whole story, but in learning that story I think you will all wish me to tell Mr. Gull that we have had a most profitable and interesting hour, thanks to his most extraordinarily interesting lecture. (Applause.)

IRAQ: THE NEW STATE*

BY SIR NIGEL DAVIDSON, C.B.E.

ET me confess at once that I come before you in the unfashionable guise of an optimist. I do believe that in the welter of world politics and imperial problems the establishment of the new State of Iraq with the discharge of the first Mandate "shines like a good deed in a naughty world." I hold no brief for British policy in Iraq; I have had no connection with it, official or unofficial, for more than seven years; but I would venture to point out that that policy (which combines the honouring of our pledges to the Arabs, the diminution of British commitments and burdens, and the performance of Mandatory obligations) has been steadily pursued by successive British Governments of every complexion-Coalition, Conservative, Labour and National—and that every important step has received the approval and confirmation of the civilized world, expressed through the Council of the League and the Permanent Mandates Commission. The latter has now reported to the Council that it can see no objection to the British Government's proposal for the termination of the Mandate, subject to guarantees which should raise no difficulty, as they are entirely compatible with the existing Constitutional Law of the Iraq State. It cannot, therefore, be alleged with any regard to the real facts that the policy which has evolved the Iraq State is a sudden impulse of sentimentalism or pro-Arab partiality; whether it be right or wrong, it has received the considered approval of every British party when in power and the international authority of the League's confirmation.

The emergence of the Iraq State from the chrysalis stage into full and complete independence depends on two things—the discharge of the Mandate and the new Treaty with Great Britain, which enters into force only on the admission of Iraq to the membership of the League. In order that the position may be understood, I must sketch the history—the constitutional history—of the last few years. I could wish that there were time to tell the whole story, for the establishment of an Arab monarchy in the City of the Caliphs has its sentimental and romantic side—the dramatic situations, the play of personalities, the ups and

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downs of administration—but I must content myself with the dry bones of the constitutional history.

Let us go back, then, to April, 1920, when the Mandate for Iraq was accepted by His Majesty's Government.

One of the many problems facing the Allied Powers was the disposal of territories in the Near and Middle East which had been detached from the Ottoman Empire. Annexation and abandonment were equally barred; and the position was further complicated by pledges of self-determination and independence which had been, wisely or unwisely, given to the Arabs generally and to the inhabitants of Iraq in particular. The new expedient of a Mandate was adopted. A Mandate differs from a Protectorate in three essential particulars—it is temporary and directed to ultimate emancipation; it is an express trusteeship for the inhabitants and not the mere moral obligation which Protecting States profess nowadays to recognize; and the dominant Power or Mandatory is answerable, not to its own conscience, but to the public opinion of the world expressed through the League of Nations, from whom the Mandate is derived.

The principle is stated in Article XXII. of the Covenant: "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development when their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory, until such time as they are able to stand alone."

The Supreme Council conferred that Mandate for Iraq on Great Britain, and it was accepted by His Majesty's Government in 1920. The terms of the Mandate document were never officially approved by the League until they had been superseded by the first treaty with Britain; but they provided for the early establishment of a Constitution to be accepted by an elected representative Assembly of the people. A Council of State was appointed; an electoral law was prepared by a local committee; and the Civil Administration was modified to comply with the spirit of the Mandate. British financial commitments were drastically reduced.

Owing to the repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres by the new Turkey and the long delay before peace was formally concluded by the Treaty of Lausanne, the juridical position of Great Britain in Iraq up to 1926 was that of an army occupying enemy territory. But successive Governments wisely disregarded the *de jure* position and, acting in the spirit of the Mandate, set up an independent native administration,

which in 1921 assumed the form of a constitutional monarchy under King Faisal. The administrative advice and assistance required by the Mandate were (as they are at the moment) furnished by the British High Commissioner, as representative of His Majesty's Government, and by the British advisers and officials employed by the Iraq Government, and not in the service of the Crown. Again, in accordance with the spirit of the Mandate, paramount importance was attached to "the wishes of the community." The monarchy was established on a thoroughly democratic basis, and in 1924 the Constitution was unanimously passed by a Constituent Assembly elected under a law which secured adequate representation for tribesman and townsman, for Arab and Kurd, for Moslem, Christian, and Jew, for all creeds and classes.

The first treaty was also confirmed by the same representative Assembly. It had been negotiated and signed more than a year before by Sir Percy Cox and the venerable Naqib of Baghdad, President of King Faisal's Council of State. As a treaty formally made between a Power occupying enemy territory and the State set up in that territory by the occupying Power, it must be regarded, at least, as an historical curiosity; but as a solution of the difficulties of reconciling the obligations of the Mandatory with the aspirations of the Mandated people it was a stroke of genius. The Mandatory was in this dilemma: the temper of the British public which would brook no further post-war entanglements and expenditure, the self-confident nationalism of the Iraqis themselves, alike debarred her from any attempt at direct British administration, even if on moral grounds such "colonizing" would not have amounted to a breach of pledges to the inhabitants. On the other hand, her Mandatory obligations to the League could not be discharged nor could her financial commitments in Iraq be secured without some measure of control. The solution was the conversion of the Mandate into a Treaty. The British control imposed on the Iraq State by the terms of the Mandate was converted into a number of treaty obligations voluntarily accepted by the junior partner in an alliance. Instead of bonds imposed by the strong hand on a subject administration, the limitations on the complete independence of Iraq figured as part of a bargain between the two States, for which Iraq received as a quid pro quo the support and assistance of her great ally. At the same time the measure of control retained by Great Britain under the terms of the treaty was sufficient to enable her to fulfil her Mandatory responsibilities to the League of Nations; and this was formally recognized and accepted at Geneva. Nor was this change in the Mandatory's

relations merely a matter of words and technicalities; it was a real advance towards the contemplated goal, the discharge of the Mandate by the admission of Iraq to membership of the League.

The step thus taken was subjected to grave criticism at home and abroad, but this is not the place to discuss its wisdom or unwisdom. It was initiated by a Conservative Government, it was concluded by a Labour Government, and it was endorsed by the League. The immediate results were satisfactory. The British public was relieved by the prospect of a limitation of British responsibilities and commitments in Iraq. The Iraqis were reassured of the sincerity of British goodwill towards their aspirations of complete independence. King Faisal took more than one occasion to express publicly his gratitude and loyalty to the "Great Ally." The relations between the British officials and the Arab ministers and public men became as cordial in political collaboration as they had always been in social intercourse. The strenuous and successful support afforded by His Majesty's Government to Iraq's claims in the Mosul Vilayet, a matter absolutely vital to the State, drove home the essential necessity of the British connection.

In spite of the vanity and inexperience of the politicians, in spite of financial difficulties and violent disputes over the army, the Constitution somehow worked; and the exercise of the Mandate by means of the treaty was justified by a large measure of success. But this very success brought with it fresh difficulties, or rather a recrudescence of the old difficulties in a new form. The recognition of the Iraq State by Great Britain and the League, the large measure of independence enjoyed, whetted the appetite and flattered the vanity of all the Parties. The working of the Constitution and the reduction of the British forces and of British expenditure all pointed in the same direction. At the date of the first treaty Iraq had been encompassed by difficulties and dangers on every frontier. In the succeeding years the menace of the Turks in the north had been removed by the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Mosul frontier; in the south agreement had been reached with the King of Nejd and the Hejaz; in the east Persia had at last recognized the status of Iraq. Had not the time already come for Iraq to stand alone?

For the last four years the question of a new treaty to remove all British control and to abolish all the obligations of the Mandate has been canvassed, not without bitter agitation and a renewal of anti-British propaganda. It fell to the late Labour Government and the National Government which has succeeded it to decide that the time approaches

when the last bold step may be hazarded. The ultimate decision, however, lies with the League of Nations, for Great Britain cannot lay down the Mandate without the sanction of the League. This end is now in sight; but Great Britain must remain responsible for Iraq to the other members until Iraq becomes, by virtue of membership, responsible for herself.

The basic provision therefore of the new treaty is the support of Great Britain to the application of the Iraq State for membership of the League. This, as stated categorically in the Preamble, is the condition precedent to all the other terms which define the relation of the two States after Iraq's admission to the League. These may be summarized in a few words as a qualified offensive and defensive alliance with a special status and precedence for the British representative at Baghdad, who is to be an ambassador, and with special provisions to secure the British air communications. As a necessary corollary, all the older treaty provisions by which Great Britain retained some control over the legislation, administration, and finances of Iraq are abrogated. In matters of foreign policy which may affect their common interests the High Contracting Parties agree to full and frank consultation.

Every treaty is a compromise. There are critics in Iraq who view with suspicion the special status of the British Ambassador, the necessity for consultation on foreign affairs, the free grant of bases for the British Air Force and the cost of providing native troops for their protection. There are many critics at home who maintain that we are shirking our responsibilities by surrendering all control, and that we are getting but a paltry return for the sacrifices of blood and money that we have made. Let us for once be optimists and believe that this generous fulfilment of our pledges to the people of Iraq and our obligations to the League will bring its own reward, and that British prestige in the East and elsewhere will not suffer by this manifest demonstration that we grudge no people their independence, that we administer not for the sake of imperial domination or material rewards, and that we are ready to stand aside when in our own judgment and in the judgment of the nations our tutelary task is done.

I now pass to the situation at the present moment and the recommendation of the Permanent Mandates Commission last month.

By detailed annual reports, by the consideration of petitions on every conceivable aspect of the administration, by the examination and crossexamination of the British representative, often the High Commissioner himself, the Permanent Mandates Commission has been kept in touch

with the whole detailed history of the Mandate and the circumstances in which the British application for its termination has been made. Speaking with the authority of such long and intimate experience, the Commission has declared itself satisfied that, so far as the material adequacy of the State is concerned and the machinery of government, the Iraq State is able to stand alone. The Mandatory Power, through its representative, Sir Francis Humphrys, has categorically accepted the responsibility of vouching for the existence of adequate national spirit and political sense. In these circumstances it is hardly conceivable that the Council of the League can order any further inquiry or delay its approval of the termination of the Mandate. When Great Britain and Iraq have been released from the Mandate it would be clearly illogical to refuse Iraq admission to membership of the League. Every consideration which may be urged against the release of Iraq from Mandatory control becomes an additional reason why, if she is so released, she should ipso facto become subject to the obligations of a League member.*

What, then, does the termination of the Mandate mean? It means a good deal more than the end of a chapter in British colonial policy or the attainment of Iraqi aspirations for independence.

For Iraq—for the Mandated Territory—it means the final chapter of its emancipation from the rule of the Turks. It means that complete independence which the vast majority of the inhabitants, rightly or wrongly, desire. It means, moreover, the recognition of its status by the world and such security for its frontiers and its treaties as the League of Nations can afford. It means that, after many centuries of dependence, Baghdad is once again the capital of a Moslem monarchy—but a constitutional monarchy in which the rights of the non-Moslem minorities are no longer dependent upon the well-tried tolerance of Islam, but are guaranteed by the League of Nations as matters of international concern.

For Britain it will mean that in the judgment of the League she has fulfilled in ten short years Mandatory obligations so onerous that many imperial patriots urged her to shirk them; it will mean that her pledges given to the inhabitants of the territory on its occupation have been implemented to the full; and last but not least, it will mean the final cessation of the burden laid upon the British taxpayer.

For the League of Nations the discharge of the First Mandate will

^{*} Since this lecture was delivered the Council has decided and recommended in the sense here foreshadowed.

mean the successful accomplishment of at least one small item in the Covenant, and will have proved not only that the Mandate system can be made to work, but that it provided the solution of a problem which no other procedure could have effected in so short a time or with so little friction and disorder.

Now you may say that I am painting all too glowing a picture; that it is easy enough to sing Te Deum over a great achievement if you ignore the difficulties and the dangers and the doubts. That is perfectly true, and I am not going to ignore them; but I am here to say that all that I have so far stated are facts; and if they are facts, then they are the basic and essential facts of the situation. Criticism of its weak points—such as the adequacy of the Iraq forces, the discordant elements in the population, the unsatisfactory position of some of the minorities, and the like—must be tempered by a due sense of proportion. Nothing is perfect in this imperfect world, least of all political constitutions and national reconstructions. It is idle to demand the ideal in so far as it is incompatible with the real. I do urge with all the force that I can command that criticism of the Iraq State and criticism of British policy in its establishment should be realistic, should have some regard for the facts and limitations which render an ideal solution of any particular problem impracticable, and should give due credit to the considerable measure of success which has been achieved.

The premises on which I base my conclusion are facts. It is a fact that the Mandate aims at the establishment of an independent State; it is a fact that the terms of the Mandate postulate a Constitution on an electoral basis; it is a fact that we promised independence and selfdetermination to the inhabitants; it is a fact that the British public and Press insistently demanded a reduction and the ultimate and early cessation of British commitments and expenditure; it is a fact that if we exclude the townsmen of Basra and some of the non-Moslem minorities, the whole people, tribesmen and townsmen, were out for independence, and prolonged or permanent British control could only be maintained by force. I submit, therefore, that I am stating no more than the facts of the situation when I say that British policy has been bound both in honour and in self-interest to pursue these three aims and ends: (1) To fulfil the Mandatory obligation of maintaining justice and order externally and internally, and, by support and assistance, enabling the new State to stand alone; (2) to confer on the people of Iraq the independence and self-determination to which we were pledged; and (3) to relieve the British people of the heavy burden,

financial and political, which our acceptance of the Mandate and the performance of our pledges have entailed.

Am I going beyond the facts when I say that those three aims have been achieved? The cessation of British commitments is a matter of arithmetic and can be proved by the British Budget—for any further expenditure in Iraq will be for our own advantage to maintain our special interests in that country and the security of our air communications with India and the East. The fulfilment of our pledges to the inhabitants is evidenced by the complete disappearance of any threat of Turkish domination or dismemberment, and by the establishment of an independent monarchy with a Constitution unanimously accepted by an elected and thoroughly representative Assembly. And the League of Nations itself is about to release us from the Mandate on the ground that we have performed to the full our obligations to itself, to the civilized world, and to the people for whom we have been trustees.

I do not think it is necessary for me to labour either the importance to this country of the cessation of commitments, especially financial commitments, in Iraq or the value of the verdict of the League of Nations on the fulfilment of our Mandatory obligations and responsibilities. But I do wish to add a few words more on the acceptance of the Constitution by the inhabitants of the Mandated territory. The Constituent Assembly of 1924 was thoroughly representative. The electoral law was carefully drafted to effect that special provisions were inserted to secure communal representation—that is, representation of the Jews and Christians, who had no district of their own for which they could return deputies. The Kurds, of course, had no difficulty in returning Kurdish deputies for the Kurdish districts. But we were particularly concerned to see that the tribesmen, nomad and settled, were not swamped by the lawyers and politicians of the towns. So successful were the precautions taken that, when the Assembly met at Baghdad, it became apparent that, if anything, the tribesmen were overrepresented at the expense of the townsmen. Another point of importance is that the so-called "Shareefian party" was represented by a mere handful, if by that term is meant the people who were associated with King Faisal and the Hashimite house before the King's arrival in Iraq. The Constituent Assembly was representative of every class and community; it was distinctly unsympathetic to the Shareefian clique as such, and it was notoriously independent and intolerant of any dictation either by the King or the High Commissioner. Yet it was that Assembly which passed the British Treaty after a long and weary wrangle at

11.45 p.m. on the last day of the stipulated period, and which passed unanimously the Law of the Constitution. This establishes a Constitutional Monarchy on modern lines with a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies and Ministers responsible to Parliament. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the Constitution is that it has worked! But for our present purpose I would ask you to notice three points which, as I have said, were unanimously passed by the representative Assembly.

In the first place, it vested the monarchy in King Faisal and his heirs for ever. Whatever may be said about the original selection or election of the Emir Faisal to the throne of Iraq in 1921, it must be obvious to anybody whose eyes are not blinded by prejudice that by 1924 he had made good so far as the Iraqis were concerned. Whether this was due to British influence and support, or to his lineage which made him acceptable to the Shias as well as to the Sunnis, or to his own personal ability, tact, and courage—for myself, I believe it was a combination of all three—he was accepted unanimously as King and Head of the State by an Assembly which was truly representative of every class among the inhabitants, and which was far from subordinate to the influence either of the British Residency or the Shareefian clique.

The second point which I desire to emphasize is that the Constitution was deliberately drafted and presented without any reference to British or international control of the State. It is the Constitution of a completely independent State able to stand alone. It envisaged no sort of external guarantee or protection for foreign interests or for the minorities; by implication it negatived anything of the kind. Moreover, it was passed immediately after the acceptance of the British Treaty, which at that time limited British control to four years. Yet it was accepted unanimously by the Assembly, in which the Kurds had a very substantial representation, and in which the Jews and the Christians were represented in proportion to their numbers. The Minister of Finance at the time was a Jew, and I think I am right in saying that one of the Vice-Presidents was a Christian. At that juncture, therefore, the Kurds at any rate, and to some extent the other minorities, appear to have preferred a free Constitution, containing in itself the usual safeguards for liberty, equality before the law, non-discrimination, freedom of conscience, etc., to any permanent or prolonged control by the British. Certainly, at the time, there were Jews and Kurds and Christians who were just as vocal for Istiqlal el Tam as any Arab.

The third point in the Constitution is what I have already alluded to—the usual provisions of modern Constitutions for "the rights of

man" (personal liberty, freedom of conscience, language and education rights for minorities, equality before the law, and the like). I do not suggest that such safeguards are adequate in themselves; the point is that on the one hand they were accepted as adequate at the time by the minority representatives without protest or demand, and on the other that the Arabs not only acquiesced in their insertion, but were enthusiastic in their support.

I have been at pains to lay stress on the limitations within which British policy has had to be framed and those who have established the new State have had to work, because the result is open to objections

which I believe could not have been avoided.

There are many of us who deplore ab initio the application of democracy and self-determination to an Eastern people. But given the premises—the wartime and post-war pledges, the atmosphere at the Peace Conference when the basis for the Mandate was laid, the nationalist aspirations encouraged by all from President Wilson to Sir Stanley Maude, and on the other hand the passionate determination of the British public to be released from fresh commitments in the East at the earliest moment—was it ever practical politics for any British Government to deny democratic self-determination to the people of Iraq? Again, many of us are apt to assume that the masses prefer the efficiency and justice of British administration because they ought to; but the fact is the reverse, as anyone with knowledge of the Iraq of the last ten years knows full well. It is not practical politics to suggest that we can afford to impose it on them against their will.

And now to the problems and difficulties of the final settlement.

The first is the basic and essential question: Is the new State able "to stand alone in the strenuous circumstances of the modern world"?

His Majesty's Government has solemnly declared its considered opinion that it is. The High Commissioner has amplified that declaration in his reports and in his detailed statement before the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League. I have not the honour of knowing Sir Francis Humphrys or of having served with him, but we all know his record. He came to the problem fresh, equipped with experience of an exceptional kind, and unbiassed by any predilection for the Arabs or for any other interest. If ever a statement rang true, such is his statement before the Permanent Mandates Commission in June. His confidence carries conviction, and he convinced the responsible and accredited Commission of the League.

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On what grounds?

Before considering the particular case of Iraq, the Permanent Mandates Commission was required by the Council of the League to report, and in the end the Commission decided to report as follows:

"Whether a people which has hitherto been under tutelage has become fit to stand alone without the advice and assistance of a Mandatory is a question of fact and not of principle. It can only be settled by careful observation of the political, social, and economic development of each territory. This observation must be continued over a sufficient period for the conclusion to be drawn that the spirit of civic responsibility and social conditions have so far progressed as to enable the essential machinery of a State to operate and to ensure political

"There are, however, certain conditions the presence of which will in any case indicate the ability of a political community to stand alone

and maintain its own existence as an independent State.

"Subject to these general considerations, the Commission suggests that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a Mandated territory can be released from the Mandatory régime-conditions which must apply to the whole of the territory and its population:

"(a) It must have a settled Government and an administration capable of maintaining the regular operation of essential Government

services.

"(b) It must be capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and political independence.

"(c) It must be able to maintain the public peace throughout the

whole territory.

"(d) It must have at its disposal adequate financial resources to pro-

vide regularly for normal Government requirements.

"(e) It must possess laws and a judicial organization which will afford equal and regular justice to all.'

The Commission went on to lay down that certain guarantees should be given—I will deal with these in a moment—but on the question of ability to stand alone, those are the conditions to be fulfilled. I do not say that their authority is conclusive, but they seem reasonable and comprehensive. It is those conditions which the Commission has now declared to have been fulfilled in Iraq. But in dealing with the particular case of Iraq they went rather further. It was very properly pointed out that such conditions were all very well, but the thing that really mattered was the spirit of public order and political good sense which inspired the people. No reports could enable them to judge of that. The Mandatory alone could vouch for it and assume the responsibility of answering for it. The Commission's decision in November shows that they have been satisfied on that point too; but the matter is

so important that I would like to read the question put to Sir Francis, and his answer:

"QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL MATURITY OF IRAQ AND THE SITUATION OF THE MINORITIES*

"M. Orts said that he would be glad to have the British Government's views on one very important aspect of the question now before the Commission. On page 10 of the special report it was said that His Majesty's Government had never regarded the attainment of an ideal standard of organization and stability as a necessary condition of the termination of the Mandatory régime. The report went on to say that the aim of the British Government had been to set up, within fixed frontiers, a self-governing State enjoying friendly relations with neighbouring States and equipped with stable legislative, judicial, and administrative systems and all the working machinery of a civilized Government. This conception of the mission of the Mandatory and the conditions necessary for terminating the Mandate could be accepted without reservation.

"The British Government had shown with legitimate pride that Iraq now possessed all the machinery of a civilized Government and deduced from that that the country was henceforth capable of self-government, without waiting to be in a position to challenge comparison with the most highly developed and most civilized countries. Was it sufficient, however, for a country to present externally the appearance of an organized State to conclude from that that it had attained political maturity?

"That Iraq possessed all the political and administrative machinery of a State and that in its Constitution were embodied the principles on which the majority of modern Constitutions were based were facts which the Mandates Commission could affirm, seeing that they were within its field of observation. It still remained to know whether there existed in the country that spirit which animated these institutions and was the essential condition for their working. This was a point on which the Commission could not itself form an opinion, since it lay outside its field of observation.

"So far as this question was concerned, it must rely entirely on the Mandatory Power which had been intimately associated with the political, moral, and social evolution of Iraq. If the Mandatory Power attested that Iraq could stand alone, it guaranteed that the public spirit, the political morality, had progressed at the same rate as the organization. Was it clearly understood that in the case of Iraq Great Britain took that responsibility?

"The accredited representative knew how anxious the Commission was about the future of the minorities, and M. Orts desired to lay stress

^{*} Minutes of the Twentieth Session of the Permanent Mandates Commission, p. 133.

on the fact that it was, above all, this anxiety which had led him to ask

the question.

"Sir Francis Humphrys thought that he could best reply to M. Orts' observations concerning the spirit which should prevail in Iraq by asking the Commission to glance at paragraph 1, Anglo-Iraqi Rela-

tions,' on pages 11-12 of the special report.*

"As regards tolerance, he might say, realizing the heavy responsibility which lay on him, that he could assure the Commission that, in his thirty years' experience of Mohammedan countries, he had never found such tolerance of other races and religions as in Iraq. He attributed this partly to the fact that Moslems, Jews, and Christians had been used to living amicably together in the same villages for centuries. The present rulers of Iraq had, until the last twelve years, formed a minority themselves, and had every reason now to feel sympathy for fellow-minorities. One of the chief difficulties in regard to the Assyrians was the constant influx of refugees from Turkey, Russia, and Persia. If these immigrants had really felt that the Moslems in Iraq were intolerant, it was hardly conceivable that they should come into the country as they did.

"His Majesty's Government, he declared, fully realized its responsibility in recommending that Iraq should be admitted to the League, which was, in its view, the only legal way of terminating the Mandate. Should Iraq prove herself unworthy of the confidence which had been placed in her, the moral responsibility must rest with His Majesty's

* "Throughout the period under review a definite political impulse is evident behind all these changes. On the part of all responsible Iraqis there has been from the first a marked impatience of Mandatory control and a fervent desire for independence. These are to be ascribed, not to ingratitude nor to lack of appreciation of the efforts of the Mandatory and the League of Nations on behalf of Iraq, but to a growing national consciousness which will not be satisfied until the country is free from foreign control. This desire for independence, which has found expression in continual pressure for a relaxation of mandatory control, is not in itself an unhealthy sign. It demonstrates, at least, that Iraqis generally are willing and eager to accept the burden and responsibilities of self-government and are not content to rest supinely while foreigners discharge those responsibilities on their behalf. The question of the capacity of Iraqis to assume these responsibilities is examined later in this report; but the fact that the desire to do so is present throughout Iraq is in itself evidence of a keen national spirit, without which the grant of independence would be as unprofitable as it would be unmerited.

"The presence of this spirit of independence, coupled with the continuous Iraqi effort to minimize and eventually to dispense with Mandatory control, has undoubtedly added to the difficulty of the task of His Majesty's Government in

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"But this impediment will disappear once Iraq has been granted full independence, and it is not, perhaps, unreasonable to hope that, granted the continued assistance of a foreign element in the Administration, the machinery of government may work more smoothly with the disappearance of the Mandate." Government, which would not attempt to transfer it to the Mandates Commission.

"M. Orts expressed himself as completely satisfied with this declaration on the part of the accredited representative, which was, perhaps, the most important that had been made during this present examination of the situation in Iraq."

I do not propose to say any more on this aspect of the problem. It would be impossible to go into the five requisite conditions in detail. As you have heard, the Permanent Mandates Commission has in its last report to the Council decided implicitly that these conditions have been fulfilled and that it is satisfied with the testimony of the Mandatory Power and her representative that the national spirit of the people was worthy of confidence. Are we qualified to question that decision?

I turn now to the guarantees for the future, with special reference to the religious and racial minorities.

This is what the Permanent Mandates Commission laid down in its report on the general question of the termination of mandates as regards guarantees:

"The Mandates Commission is of opinion that the emancipation of a territory under the Mandate régime should be made dependent on two

classes of preliminary conditions:

"1. The existence in the territory concerned of de facto conditions which justify the presumption that the country has reached the stage of development at which a people has become able, in the words of Article 22 of the Covenant, 'to stand by itself under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.'

"2. Certain guarantees to be furnished by the territory desirous of emancipation to the satisfaction of the League of Nations, in whose name the Mandate was conferred and has been exercised by the

Mandatory.

"The Commission suggests that the guarantees to be furnished by the new State before the Mandate can be brought to an end should take the form of a declaration binding the new State to the League of Nations, or of a treaty or a convention or of some instrument formally accepted by the Council of the League as equivalent to such an undertaking.

"The Commission suggests that, without prejudice to any supplementary guarantees which might be justified by the special circumstances* of certain territories or their recent history, the undertakings of

the new State should ensure and guarantee-

* As, for example, those which enforce recognition of the rights referred to in Articles 13 and 14 of the Palestine Mandate.

"(a) The effective protection of racial, linguistic, and religious

minorities.

"(b) The privileges and immunities of foreigners (in the Near Eastern territories), including consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly practised in the Ottoman Empire in virtue of the capitulations and usages, unless any other arrangement on this subject has been previously approved by the Council of the League of Nations in concert with the Powers concerned.

"(c) The interests of foreigners in judicial, civil and criminal cases,

in so far as these interests are not guaranteed by the capitulations.

"(d) Freedom of conscience and public worship and the free exercise of the religious, educational and medical activities of religious missions of all denominations, subject to such measures as may be indispensable for the maintenance of public order, morality, and effective administration.

"(e) The financial obligations regularly assumed by the former

Mandatory Power.

"(f) Rights of every kind legally acquired under the Mandate régime.

"(g) The maintenance in force for their respective duration, and subject to the right of denunciation by the parties concerned, of the international conventions, both general and special, to which, during the Mandate, the Mandatory Power acceded on behalf of the Mandated territory.

"In addition to the foregoing essential clauses, the Permanent Mandates Commission considers that it would be desirable that the new State, if hitherto subject to the Economic Equality Clause, should consent to secure to all States members of the League of Nations the most-favoured-nation treatment as a transitory measure on condition of

reciprocity."

These, as I have said, are the guarantees which are recommended by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the termination of any Mandate. That recommendation was made in June; at the last session in October, when the Commission reported to the Council on the particular case of Iraq, the Commission has recommended that they should take the form of a declaration similar to that made by Albania on admission to membership of the League.

Now there are three points to be noticed:

- 1. The Commission has decided that a declaration of this kind, to be given by the new State on the termination of the Mandate, the terms of which are guaranteed by the League as matters of international concern, is a sufficient, or at any rate the only practical, safeguard that the Commission found it possible or necessary to recommend.
 - 2. Secondly, these are not mere paper guarantees.

3. In the third place, the Commission has decided that, given such a guarantee, the Iraq Mandate may now be terminated. That is to say, they have not recommended either that Mandatory control or any other modified control by Great Britain must be continued in order to safe-guard the minorities; nor have they insisted that any of the special measures which have been proposed or demanded should be introduced before the termination of the Mandate, such as a Commission of Inquiry, or the establishment of special courts, or the appointment of a resident League Commissioner, or the retention of more British officials, or the formation of enclaves with a semi-autonomous administration. Such projects were all canvassed and considered, and ultimately rejected in the interests, not only of the new State, but of the minorities themselves. This is abundantly clear from the minutes of the June session.

I am very far from saying that we should accept this as a clean bill of health for the minorities question in Iraq. If they are unable to stand alone as an independent State and so cease to be minorities, no system can release them by a stroke of the constitutional pen from the disabilities inherent in their position. On the other hand, as long as they remain minorities within the State, every safeguard and every privilege proposed for their benefit must be very carefully weighed to see that it is practicable and that it will not recoil upon their own heads, either by destroying the structure of the State to which they perforce belong, or by antagonizing the majority and so postponing the day when, like the French in Canada or the Copts in Egypt, they can play their full part in the State without any disabilities whatever, moral, social or political.

I do maintain, therefore, that this decision of the Permanent Mandates Commission should carry very great weight. I even suggest that it ought to be welcomed as a confirmation of British policy by an impartial tribunal which is certainly not unsympathetic to minority claims. All of us who are deeply interested in the future of the Assyrians and the other minorities in Iraq—and who is not?—are in very great difficulties, both in ascertaining the facts and in balancing the considerations to which I have just alluded. We know their sufferings, though these were not at the hands of their fellow-countrymen in Iraq; many of us share their fears and misgivings for the future. There are allegations and counter-allegations, claims and counter-claims, proposals and counter-proposals. On the other hand, you have the British Government, the British Secretary of State, the British High Commissioner, and the responsible British officials on the spot, all convinced that the best practical solution for the whole people of Iraq is the emancipation

of the new State, and that the most hopeful future for the minorities is to be found in equal citizenship guaranteed by the League of Nations. We can hardly say that all these British authorities are not in the best position for judging the real facts of the situation and the merits of the case. Are we going, then, lightly to assume that men like Sir Francis Humphrys, who has entered upon the scene with thirty years' experience of Mohammedan peoples and an unbiassed mind, are guilty of a cynical opportunism which shuts its eyes to the difficulties and dangers and adopts the line of least resistance? I hope and believe not—and yet, and yet, we have an uncomfortable feeling that there must be good grounds for the apprehensions of the Kurds and the Assyrians. Can nothing more be done to safeguard them or to satisfy their aspirations?

Now that is where the decision of the Permanent Mandates Commission is of such great importance. They are an impartial tribunal; they have only one British member; they carry international authority; they have had ten years' experience of the Mandates in the Near and Middle East; they have had detailed information of every aspect and every problem of the administration; they have examined all the petitions submitted and all the allegations made; their questions and their criticisms show not only keen interest and a sense of responsibility, but warm sympathy with the minorities. It is that body which has confirmed the British proposals as open to no objection, and has not recommended any other of the courses which have been suggested or demanded.

In considering, therefore, the claims of the minorities and the question what is the best course in practical politics for safeguarding their future, I do submit that when we cannot judge from direct personal knowledge of all the facts and all the issues involved, due weight must be attached to the judgment of the British authorities on the spot and to the confirmation of that judgment by the League's Commission.

Now, in dealing with racial and religious minorities there are two principles which can be applied. The first is what might be called the decentralizing principle, where the minority is a separate political and administrative unit, semi-autonomous to a greater or less degree; the second is the centralizing principle, by which the members of the minorities enjoy full and equal citizenship without any political and administrative distinction, but with communal safeguards in the cultural, religious, and educational sphere. I mean safeguards for the use of their language, for the exercise of their faith, for the establishment of

their own schools, for the right to administer their own personal law. The first principle undoubtedly has advantages. It preserves intact racial characteristics, racial traditions, racial consciousness (a doubtful advantage in a minority!). On the other hand, it must tend to strengthen and perpetuate any antagonisms which exist with the rest of the people, and so holds out but a poor prospect for the future, unless there is real hope of the minority being able to stand alone by its own strength. It is a particularly hopeless future if the minority can only be maintained by assistance from outside.

The alternative, the centralizing principle, under which the minority is to find its future in full citizenship of the State without any political distinction from the rest, does threaten racial consciousness and tradition, and on sentimental grounds, at any rate, must be distasteful to the remnant of a great people like the Assyrians; and it may also involve a certain subordination of their interests for a considerable period. But it puts the highest premium of self-interest on both parties to drop their antagonisms and to work together in the State for their common good. This aspect of the matter appears to be very keenly appreciated by the majority communities in Iraq, and it has evidently been a governing consideration with the Permanent Mandates Commission. Moreover, it does hold out some practical hopes for the future, which the decentralizing principle does not—hopes which can be supported from the lessons of history and actual instances in our own day.

Well, it is this centralizing principle under which the minorities in Iraq lived together in social amity and equality under the Turks and have continued to live together in Baghdad, Basra, and the predominantly Arab portions of Iraq during the Mandatory régime; and it is this principle which the League through its Commission recommends and confirms. The proposed safeguards are to secure its maintenance.

Now, those who have shaped British policy have not arrived at this conclusion by the study of political science or historical precedents; they have been driven to it by the facts of the situation. This will be apparent if we consider the two cases where there was ever any possibility of a separate or semi-autonomous administration. I mean the Kurds and the Assyrians. In both those cases British policy began by aiming at some such solution. It has been the logic of hard facts and not any partiality for Arab aspirations or the politicians of Baghdad which proved such a solution to be impracticable and caused its abandonment.

Let us take, first, the case of the Assyrians. In such a company as

this I need not enlarge on the admiration which we must all feel for that small, heroic nation, or on our sympathy with their sufferings during and after the Great War. I need only assure you that that was no less the case with those of us who were actually in contact with them on the spot and with their difficulties. Although the difficulties were great-they were too small a people to stand alone, they had no economic resources, many of them were not natives with any claim to a share in the country, and they were split by factions-yet, owing to their strong national consciousness, their courage and self-reliance, and the great claim which they had on the country of their asylum, it did seem possible to settle them as a tribal, pastoral people with a large measure of local autonomy, and this was the policy and the intention of the Mandatory Power. It was definitely accepted also by King Faisal's Government. But there was one essential condition. A suitable area must be found which was mountainous or highland, pastoral, and unoccupied by other inhabitants or tribes. (Obviously you cannot make an enclave by ejecting the inhabitants from their homes or subordinating them to newcomers of a different race and religion.) One such area existed, and, as events have proved, only one such area. It was the highland country on the north frontier of the Mosul Province, where a large portion of the Assyrians had their homes before they were evicted by the Turks. Unfortunately, most of it lay to the north of the provisional frontier, but it lay south of the natural strategic frontier, and so every effort was made before the League of Nations Boundary Commission to get the Assyrians' home land included within Iraq. Dis aliter visum. The area was cut off from Iraq and included in Turkey, and the Turks forbade any Assyrians to enter it. The essential condition, therefore, failed. It has proved impossible to find another area for an enclave. I know that wild suggestions have been made, such as that of forming an enclave for Jews, Chaldaan Christians, Yezidis, and Assyrians. Where? The Jews and Chaldaan Christians are scattered through the large towns-Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, etc.-where there is a large Moslem majority. Are you going to collect and transplant them into a highland pastoral area suitable to the Assyrians? And what is to become of the people who have their homes in that area? There are half a dozen equally strong objections, but I need not waste words over such an absurdity. Nor need I refer to proposals that they should be settled outside Iraq, as that is not within the scope of my subject, Iraq. Mark Marking Commencer in the second

There is no area within Iraq where an enclave for the Assyrian

people can be formed. It follows that the alternative has had to be adopted.

It is quite beyond the scope of the present lecture to attempt to review in detail the settlement of the Assyrian refugees on this principle. A full account is given by Sir Francis Humphrys in the Special Report to the League. There are many disquieting features, but then the difficulties are immense. There are a few hopeful signs. The Iraq Government has complied with all the recommendations of the High Commissioner. There is no sign of persecution or antagonism on religious grounds. Relations between the Assyrians and their Kurdish neighbours and landlords are improving. Assyrians are serving in the army and the police, in some cases under Arab officers. Assyrians continue to enter Iraq from Persia. "In all matters of personal status, in the conduct of their religious affairs, schools, etc., they retain complete autonomy, and His Beatitude the Mar Shimun is recognized as their Patriarch by the Iraqi Government, from whom he receives a subsidy." But the real point is, everybody is agreed that the ideal way of dealing with this would be to establish them in a compact body in suitable country with a large measure of local autonomy. Great Britain has done her utmost to effect that, so have the British representatives on the spot. King Faisal's Government agreed to it. But it failed because the only available area has gone to Turkey, through no fault of ours or theirs or the Iraqis. Since, then, no other area is available, local autonomy becomes unworkable, and if they are to remain in Iraq their only future is as citizens in a common State with the other inhabitants of the country.

It is for that reason that the British authorities and the Permanent Mandates Commission have considered it unwise to adopt any of the safeguards, such as continued British protection, a Resident League Commissioner, etc., which would tend to preserve existing antagonisms and might even create new animosities. As Sir Francis wisely said to the Commission, "Nothing would be more unfortunate than to take any step which might have a tendency to prevent the minorities concerned from regarding themselves, or from being regarded, like the Copts in Egypt, as true citizens of their native State, in which lies the only certain hope of their future welfare."

I had intended to deal now with the Kurdish question, but time does not permit. Since I cannot discuss it exhaustively, it would, perhaps, be best if I said nothing at all; but I cannot refrain from drawing your attention to three considerations. The first is that less than a fifth of the Kurdish nation are within the borders of Iraq. There are roughly a million and a half in Turkey, 700,000 in Persia, and half a million in Iraq. Even the Iraq fraction has shown no disposition to combine. The Kurds of Mosul and Erbil, still more the Kurds scattered throughout the other provinces, have refused to combine with those of Sulaimania, and have always repudiated the self-styled Nationalist leader, Shaikh Mahmûd. Two results follow: the Kurds of Iraq could not form a satisfactory political unit within the State, and if such a separate unit were established it would necessarily form a hotbed of intrigue with their already rebellious brethren over the border in Turkey and Persia. A more dangerous position it would be hard to imagine.

Secondly, it is true that the prospect of an autonomous Kurdish State was held out to them at the time of the peace treaties. The British Government was willing enough to proceed on these lines so long as they were feasible; but such an arrangement was conditional on the Kurds of Turkey being included, and provision was made for this in the abortive Treaty of Sèvres. With the recovery of Turkey and the repudiation of that treaty a true Kurdish State in which all could participate became impossible.

The third consideration is that in the case of the Kurds there is no fear of oppression by, or subordination to, the Central Government at Baghdad. They are in far too strong a position. Not only are they good fighters inhabiting very difficult country, but they have already a considerable share in the central administration. There have been several Kurdish Ministers and others with Kurdish blood in their veins. Moreover, the support of the Kurds, who belong to the Sunni section of Islam, is of vital importance to the educated and governing classes to balance the backward Shia tribesmen, who form an actual majority.

All the arguments, therefore, in favour of a centralizing policy apply with double force in the case of the Kurds; and the dangers to the Kurds themselves are negligible.

I know there are others whom you wish to hear, and I will spare you a peroration. I do maintain that, given the limitations of fact and the hard realities of the world position, British policy has been justified; that the establishment of the new State and its admission to the League without further delay is the best solution; that in seeking that solution Great Britain has not shirked her responsibilities to the League, to the inhabitants, or to herself; and that there is good hope for the future.

Before I sit down there is one thing more I must say. You all know

what this consummation of British aims and native aspirations owes to Sir Percy Cox, Sir Henry Dobbs, Sir Gilbert Clayton, and Sir Francis Humphrys; it would be almost an impertinence to enlarge on that. Nor is it necessary here to recall the services of Miss Gertrude Bell with her unrivalled knowledge of the people and her undaunted enthusiasm. It may not be so well appreciated how much is due to the imperturbable Adviser in the Iraq Administration itself, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, who has been at Baghdad during the whole period of the effective exercise of the Mandate. But all those who have been connected with the discharge of the Mandate and the establishment of the new State would be the first to recognize that the real foundations for their success, if success it be, were laid in the events, the "loyalties," so magnificently described by Sir Arnold Wilson, "himself not least but honoured of them all."

In rising to propose a vote of thanks to the lecturer, the Chairman said that although no member of the Society could look forward to the future of Iraq without some anxiety and apprehension, he thought they must all feel great pride in the way in which Great Britain had fulfilled her obligations and was now sponsoring Iraq as a member of the League of Nations, raising to national status a people who for many hundred years had been subject to the Turk. It was satisfactory to know one definite policy had been pursued ever since Great Britain had accepted the Mandate, and that policy had been brought to a logical conclusion. Sir Nigel Davidson's paper unravelled the steps by which it had been achieved—no mean task, and one for which the Society owed him a debt of gratitude. (Applause.)

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MODERN TURKEY*

I expect that many of you may have read in the newspapers and magazines about the "Europeanization" of Turkey and the multitudinous reforms introduced by Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Ghazi, as he is always called. From 1926 until last year I have been living in the country writing about Turkish affairs and watching the Ghazi and his men at their task. Although I had many facilities for doing my work, I do not believe that as long as I was living in Turkey I was really able to appraise at their just value the changes which have been, and are being made, and the progress which has been achieved. Now that I have been in England for a few months I have a much clearer idea of the conditions in the Republic, and this afternoon I shall try and tell you what I know. The only point I would like to emphasize is that what I say only represents the personal opinion of a most interested and, I hope, impartial observer.

The Turkish Republic has now been in existence for about eight and a half years and Mustapha Kemal has been the President all the time. Unless anything very unforeseen occurs he is likely to remain the President until he dies, although he recently declined the offer of being appointed for life; actually he holds office for four years at a time. Before entering into a description of the reforms and changes which he has accomplished, and before discussing the internal and external politics of Turkey, I would like to talk to you about the Ghazi himself. He was born in Salonika and is a little over fifty years of age. He entered the Army as a young man, and passed through the Military College at Harbie, in Constantinople. He first saw active service against the Italians in Tripoli while he was Military Attaché in Sofia before the Great War. During the Gallipoli campaign he commanded a division, and he came into prominence through a forced march which his division made and which, I understand, led to important results in the defence of the Peninsula.

^{*} An address delivered in the Royal Society Hall before the members of the Royal Central Asian Society by Mr. J. Walter Collins, the former Correspondent of *The Times* in Turkey, the Right Hon. Lord Lloyd in the chair.

But it was in 1919 that Kemal really came into the picture. He was then living in Constantinople, but, like many other Turks, he bitterly resented the occupation of certain parts of Turkey by the Allies, while he also condemned the policy of "Defeatism" which was being pursued by the Sultan and his Government. In the spring of 1919 Kemal left Constantinople secretly and went by sea to Samsun, where he started organizing the revolutionary movement which was destined to meet with such success. When he began his campaign he had few resources. Part of the country was hostile to him, and he was short of money and munitions. But the Soviet came to his aid, while he also obtained assistance from certain countries which were not desirous that the Greek landing at Smyrna should be prolonged. However, it is indubitable that the main credit for the victory over the Greeks in Anatolia lay with Kemal, although several of the Pashas who held important commands under him, Kiazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad, Refet, Ismet—the actual Premier—to mention but a few, played important rôles.

I will not deal further with Kemal's military exploits. When the Armistice was signed at Mudania and the way paved for the Lausanne Conference he showed himself to be a statesman as well as a soldier, and during the past years he has had many opportunities of showing his statecraft. Now let me tell you about the man. He has a great personality and distinct charm. He is so alive, so quick, and his judgment is penetrating. He does not seek the society of foreigners, and I count myself lucky in having talked to him on three occasions. Sometimes he insists on talking in Turkish through an interpreter, but he has good German, and his French is very fluent. His conversation covers a wide range: military history, European politics, farming, archæology, social and many other subjects.

Of course he is autocratic; therein lies the secret of his power. The Turks like an autocratic ruler, provided that he is not a fool, and provided that he is just. Kemal is certainly not a fool, and he is as just as circumstances have permitted him to be.

A good-looking man, Kemal; about five foot ten, he has fair hair and a pair of steely blue eyes, which seem to read your innermost thoughts. He is careful about his appearance, and I feel sure that he patronizes a West End tailor. He lives for the greater part of the year in a small house at Tchan Kaya, which is a few miles outside Angora. His staff is small, and there is little ostentation attached to his daily life, although the Government, very rightly, always takes the necessary

precautions when he goes out. In recent years he has taken to coming to Constantinople during the summer, and there he stays at the Dolma Bagtche Palace, with frequent visits to Yalova, a small village with thermal springs, at the entrance to the Gulf of Ismid, which he is trying to make into a Turkish Karlsbad. The Ghazi seems to require very little sleep, and is fond of a game of cards and the good things of life.

His energy and staying powers are very great, as is evinced by the fact that he once made a speech which lasted a week! His brain is fertile, and he has a vivid imagination allied with considerable courage. He is apt, however, to be impatient, and is handicapped by having few men who can grasp his ideas quickly and carry them out efficiently. He can, indeed, be said to stand head and shoulders above the rest of his countrymen. The Ghazi Pasha is, in fact, a great man, and when the history of the ten years following the Great War is written, his name will occupy a leading place.

Now to the things he has done. I think I had better enumerate them slowly. They include: The abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of the members of the House of Othman; the suppression of the Sheikh ul Islamate; the Sheri (Religious Courts), and the Ministry of Religious Affairs; the dissolution of the Theological Colleges and the Dervish Tekkés (the Monasteries); the adoption of a uniform educational system and the Swiss Civil Code; the replacement of the Fez by the hat; the abolition of polygamy; the emancipation of women; and, finally, the change in the alphabet.

I think you will agree that it is a long and impressive list. Kemal's principal aim in making all these reforms and changes has been to "modernize" Turkey. It is too early yet to say whether he has succeeded or not, as it is obviously impossible to change the mentality and the outlook of a nation within a decade. Nevertheless, it would seem to me that most of the reforms and changes have come to stay, and some of them undoubtedly are popular. The most complex and far-reaching reforms centre round the question of religion. Those of you who have lived in Asia know how difficult it is to estimate accurately religious feelings in that Continent, and I feel a little diffident in approaching this subject. I was not in Turkey in the time of the Sultans and can, therefore, only speak of the situation as I found it under the Kemalists. My considered view is that the authority which the Hojas and religious elements have lost, consequent on the Ghazi's acts, will not be regained. Remember that the Turks are not at all

in the same position as the Russians. They are free to worship. The State is a laic one, but that is all. About a year ago there was an outbreak at a place called Menemen, which is near Smyrna. The ringleaders of the movement, who were members of a Dervish sect called the Nashibenzi, were alleged to have belonged to an organization which was planning to overthrow the Kemalist régime. They paid for their temerity with their lives, but it is very doubtful whether they had many adherents in other parts of Turkey. Certainly there is dissatisfaction among those elements who have lost their power and the attendant privileges, but I do not think there is much chance of any serious reactionary movement breaking out. Nor do I see any chance whatsoever of the Sultanate and Caliphate being restored.

The second change which I would like to talk about concerns the emancipation of women. In some ways this is the most remarkable thing that the Ghazi has done. Those of you who were in Turkey in the old days will remember how many of the women went about heavily veiled. You may also recall the Lotesque-like stories of Turkish harems. All that has gone by the board, and for ever, I should say. To illustrate the change, I propose to give you a brief sketch of how a Turkish woman of good society passed her time in 1912 and how she passes it today.

In 1912 she might be living in a harem. We will imagine that she is. She is one of several wives, although, as a matter of strict fact, not very many Turks had more than one wife. If her husband happened to be rich, she was surrounded by every luxury, and she spent her day beautifying herself, talking to other women, eating sweetmeats, and gradually getting fatter and fatter. When she did go out she was chaperoned, and was completely veiled. She knew next to nothing of what was going on in the outside world. If her husband had tired of her he could send her away, and she had little, if any, redress.

How does this existence compare with that of today? The woman is living in a flat, a modern flat; Constantinople is full of them. She may take up the telephone and make an appointment with her dressmaker. She may drive her car out to Therapia. She will be clad just like you ladies are; her figure may not be so slim, but she keeps fit by playing games. In the afternoon she may go out to a tea party where there will be men, foreigners as well as Turks. If she is having domestic troubles, she can go to the Law Courts and can sue for a divorce under the terms of the Swiss Civil Code.

If the woman in question is not well off, she may go and work.

There are today tens of thousands of Turkish women employed in banks, businesses, shops, and other concerns. Women have also had the professions thrown open to them. There are women doctors, dentists, lawyers, and even judges. It is true, however, that the women in the villages are not yet very emancipated. In many parts of Anatolia you will still find women going about heavily veiled. With regard to political privileges, women have been allowed to vote at the Municipal elections, but the Government has refused to grant them the Parliamentary suffrage. I expect, however, that this will come in time. It is only natural that the women of Turkey should be grateful to Mustapha Kemal for what he has done for them, and it is seldom that one finds an opponent of the Kemalist régime among the weaker sex.

In connection with the change in the alphabet, I do not think that there can be two opinions regarding the desirability of this change. When the census of Turkey's population was taken in 1927—the figures gave a population of close on 14 million—it was found that only a very small percentage of the people could read or write. Turkish was always a notoriously difficult language, and the Ghazi was aware that this constituted a serious handicap to the development of the country. It was in the summer of 1928 that he announced his intention of changing the alphabet. One night he was being entertained at an openair café situated at the point of Serai at the entrance to the Golden Horn at Constantinople. After dinner he made a speech in which he said that a new Turkish alphabet, derived from Latin, must take the place of the Arabian hieroglyphics then in use. A few days later he was giving lessons in the new letters to the Parliamentary Deputies in the Throne Room of the former Sultans' Palace of Dolma Bagtche. He issued stringent orders to the educational authorities regarding the teaching of the new alphabet, and he may be said to "have sent a nation to school." Naturally the change over could not be carried out all at once, and it was only about eighteen months ago that the new alphabet came into universal usage. At first, the newspapers were hard hit, as many of the older readers found it hard to read the new letters. But gradually the difficulties were overcome, and the younger generations have readily adapted themselves to the change. Latin numerals have also taken the place of Arabic ones, and now if a tourist is making his way about a Turkish town, he will find the streets clearly marked in Latin characters, and the houses numbered just like they are in England. Bankers and business men have told me how

beneficial the change is proving, and I can well believe it. The percentage of "illiterates" in Turkey should, indeed, grow less every year.

I wish now to deal with the internal political situation. The Kemalist, or Popular, Party, of which Mustapha Kemal is the leader, is not hampered by any opposition in the Grand National Assembly in Angora. During 1930 Fethy Bey, the Turkish Ambassador in Paris, made an abortive attempt to form a second party, the Liberal Republican Party, but it only lasted a few months. Now practically all the 315 Deputies in the National Assembly, who are elected every four years, support the Ghazi. Such a system of government has both advantages and disadvantages. If the Ghazi, and Ismet Pasha, his right-hand man, consider that any fresh legislation is necessary they can get it passed in a hurry and without any trouble. In Turkey's dealing with foreign Powers continuity is also assured. On the other hand, the lack of a second party has sometimes led to abuse.

The Press, again, was more or less "muzzled" until Fethy Bey founded his party. Then it became free, startlingly free, and for some months a most violent campaign of personal vilification was carried on. Now it has again become controlled and one seldom hears any serious criticism of the powers that be. A great many of the Deputies are ex-officers and, of course, the nucleus of the Kemalist Party has always been composed of military men. When all is said and done, the régime was created in order to bring about a revolution, and in some respects it has retained its revolutionary form. There is a Cabinet of ten men, the members of whom are chosen by the Ghazi, Ismet Pasha, and a few others. This Cabinet does not have very much authority.

On the other hand, the General Staff of the Army has immense power, and Fezzi Pasha, the Chief of Staff, is a close friend of the Ghazi. About a year ago I wrote an article entitled "The Turkish Triumvirate," meaning the Ghazi, Ismet and Fezzi Pashas. In this article I said that these three men between them ruled Turkey, and I am still of that opinion, although, of course, there are other men with considerable influence. Ever since the Republic was proclaimed great attention has been paid to the needs of the Army, which is today an efficient and contented force. Much money is spent on National Defence, which comprises the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Gendarmerie. Critics have complained that too great a proportion of Turkey's Budget goes on National Defence. It is not for a foreigner to say whether this is the case or not, but it must be remembered that Turkey has been at war almost con-

tinually during the last twenty years, and after the 1922 campaign it was necessary to buy new equipment. In addition, Turkey has a long land frontier to protect. No fewer than five countries border on Turkey, if we count Syria and Iraq as French and British possessions, the other three being Persia, Soviet Russia, and Bulgaria.

There has also been some internal trouble during the last few years. There was the Kurdish rising under Sheikh Said in 1925, while in the summer of 1930 there was another rebellion in Kurdistan which, although less serious than that of 1925, took some time to repress, and necessitated the employment of a considerable number of Turkish soldiers. As it is almost impossible for an independent foreign journalist to visit Kurdistan, I do not feel competent to discuss the Kurdish question, but I have gathered that conditions in that province are a little better than they were. A certain Ibrahim Tali Bey, who was sent by the Ghazi to Diarbekr some time ago, would appear to have partially succeeded in pacifying Southern Kurdistan. I also see that long drawn out negotiations between Persia and Turkey regarding the delimitation of the frontier have almost reached a satisfactory conclusion, and that the Turkish Foreign Minister is now en route for Tehran to sign an agreement which will result in Turkey obtaining Mount Ararat in exchange for a slice of territory ceded to Persia further south. This arrangement should help to prevent further trouble among the Kurds, as hitherto their tribal leaders have made use of Persian territory when pursued by the Turkish Army.

It is now time to consider Turkey's relations with the world in

general and with ourselves in particular.

In order to define the diplomatic status of the various Powers represented in Angora, I propose to make use of the following simile. Before the Republic was proclaimed there was in Constantinople a big theatre. The Sultan and his Government were on the stage. In the boxes were the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Czarist Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and France. The stalls were occupied by other Powers. This theatre was the scene of much intrigue and it was played by many actors. There were the dragomans of the Foreign Embassies; there were the Greeks and Levantines, who had influence in pre-war Turkey, and there were the international financiers.

Now the theatre has been closed in Constantinople-for good or only temporarily, who shall say? However, it has reopened in Angora on a more modest scale. And it is probable that this theatre will always be well filled. For, and this is important, the geographical position of Turkey, the racial characteristics of the Turkish people, together with other factors, will, in my opinion, always make Turkey a country to be reckoned with. On the stage we find the Ghazi and his lieutenants, but the dragomans, Greeks, Levantines, and financiers have practically disappeared. In the Royal box is M. Souritch, the Soviet Ambassador. In the biggest of the stage boxes is the British Ambassador; close to him are the Ambassadors of Italy, France, Germany, and America. The Austrian-Hungarian Minister, no offence to him, has gone to the stalls. There is not quite the same atmosphere of intrigue as there was in Constantinople. The air is sharper—Angora stands well above sea-level—but there are rivalries and potential jealousies. It cannot be said that we and Russia see eye to eye. It cannot be said that France and Italy see eye to eye. The German is waiting and the American is watching.

I mentioned that the Soviet Ambassador occupied the Royal box. He is entitled to it for several reasons. He was the first Ambassador to be accredited to Angora. He is an exceptionally able man, who has acquired a position which, in some ways, is unique.

My Lord, Ladies and Gentlemen, Turkey is a small State. She cannot afford to quarrel with Soviet Russia, her ally during the war against the Greeks. Several treaties have been concluded between the two countries and, although it is possible that they would be broken if certain circumstances arose, it is incontestable that Turkey's foreign policy is to a great extent swayed by that of Soviet Russia. Angora, for instance, has followed the example of Moscow and remained outside the League of Nations. But if the Soviet joined the League I believe Turkey would follow suit. "Amour propre" also acts as a deterrent to Turkey joining the League. The Turks feel that, as one of the most advanced Asiatic States, they have a right to a seat on the Council of the League. It appears that the League thinks otherwise, and unless Turkey is assured of at least a semi-permanent seat on the Council she will be disinclined to be represented in Geneva. One possible solution, which I have heard discussed, is that Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey should share a seat on the Council. The Greeks and the Bulgarians, who are members of the League, would sponsor Turkey's claim. It would be a good thing, I consider, if Turkey did join the League. It would bring her nearer to Western Europe and that surely is very desirable.

In any case, Russian influence is at present strong in Turkey, but that is not to say that the Russians are popular. Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire were never very friendly, and I do not think that Soviet Russia and Republican Turkey have so much in common as is generally supposed. It must also be emphasized that Turkey will not tolerate Communist propaganda within her frontiers. Constantinople, because of its proximity to South Russia, has been used as a centre for Communist agents working in the Near and Middle East, but these agents are careful to leave the Turks alone. If they are caught intriguing they are promptly tried, while Turks with Communistic lean-

ings have also been severely dealt with by the police.

Now with regard to our own relations with Turkey. These have undergone a really remarkable improvement during the last six years, that is to say since the dispute over Mosul was amicably settled. That distinguished diplomat, Sir Ronald Lindsay, now Ambassador in Washington, negotiated the Mosul agreement with great skill, and his policy paved the way for a lasting understanding. It is not for me, a journalist, to refer to the present policy of His Majesty's Government towards Turkey, but I can testify that cordial relations exist between ourselves and the Turks. A few years ago the Turks regarded us with suspicion, not altogether unjustified if one considers British policy in the Near East in the years following the Great War. That suspicion has given way to respect, and I believe that friendship may follow. The Turks have realized that we have no territorial designs, and as Turkey, in the words of the Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, "does not desire to obtain an inch of anyone's territory, but will not surrender an inch of its own," all should be well.

I have been asked this afternoon to refer to the question of British trade with the Turkish Republic. One cannot, unfortunately, be very optimistic in referring to this matter. Our trade with Turkey has decreased considerably since the war. I have not got the latest figures, but I know that there has been a considerable falling off in our exports. This is due to a variety of causes: keen competition from other countries, notably Italy, Germany, and other European Powers, the reduction in the purchasing capacity of the Turks, and the reluctance of certain British firms and financial concerns to have anything to do with Turkey. I see that recent reports from Constantinople indicate that Turkey is seeking to revise her commercial treaties with foreign countries in order that a fixed quota may be established for the latter's exports to Turkey. This step would appear to be a natural corollary to the steps taken by the Turkish Government to restrict imports at the end of last year. Concerning this last factor, I am not in a position

to say whether British firms are justified in their attitude, but the fact remains that if we do not take the risks, foreign firms will, and, in fact, have done so. I just, therefore, ask you one question. Can we afford to continue this attitude—and what I say now refers to other countries in the Near East besides Turkey—and let foreigners get the business?

Opportunities exist other than the sale of goods to Turkish merchants.

Take a concrete example, the Turkish railways. The principal development in the economic sphere under the Kemalists has been a vast programme of railway building. Colonel Gribbon gave you a most lucid and comprehensive address on the subject some years ago, and I have not got the time to treat the subject in detail as he did.

When the Kemalist régime came into power there were not very many railways in existence, and they were practically all owned by foreign groups. Ismet Pasha, who has been Prime Minister for most of the time, was of the opinion that railway development was vital to the well-being of the Republic. The Ghazi shared this view and, shortly after the Republic was proclaimed, negotiations were begun with a view to repurchasing some of the foreign-owned railways and building new ones.

I will not bore you with figures, but I think I am right in saying that as many miles of railways have been built during the nine years that the Republic has been in existence as were built during the time of the Empire!

The Turks realized that they would be unable to build the new railways themselves; they did not possess the technical experts, and, as Turkey is essentially an agricultural country, it was necessary to import the material. So German, Swedish, and Danish groups collaborated with the Turkish Government in railway building. Briefly put, these groups supplied the labour and expert advice while the Turks paid the money and provided unskilled labour. More than half the programme has already been carried out, and by 1935 Anatolia should be in possession of a fairly complete railway system. The scheme has been to make Angora the centre of the system, and most of the railways run in either a north-south or east-west direction. It has been said that the main aim of the Government in building these lines is strategic. While I would not wholly deny this statement, I consider that by no means all the lines are strategic, while it is obviously the affair of the Turkish Government as to where they should build their railways. It will, of course, be a long time before the new railways become paying propositions. They have cost a great deal of money to build, and Anatolia is not very thickly populated. The theory of Ismet Pasha is, however, that, "If you build a railway, people will gradually come and live near the railway and use it."

The cost of this railway building has come out of annual revenue and has consequently been a very heavy drain on the exchequer. Some critics consider it would have been wiser to float a foreign loan and spread the payments over a period of say twenty years. The Ghazi and Ismet Pasha have preferred to do otherwise as they are opposed

to the flotation of new foreign loans.

It would seem unfortunate that British firms have not been able to take part in this railway building. The directors of the foreign groups engaged in this work have told me personally that they have been correctly treated by the Turkish Government, and it is to be hoped that when new lines are planned—as they will be—British concerns will interest themselves. Actually, British firms rarely interest themselves in any Government deals in Turkey. Nor do they often try and secure the monopoly of articles like matches, explosives, etc. The Americans are different. They have secured the match monopoly, and they have also acquired a controlling interest in the Constantinople telephone company, formerly a British concern, while they are active in other directions.

Undoubtedly a great deal of the mistrust existing in this country towards Turkey owes its origin to the behaviour of Turkey towards foreign traders living in Turkey. There was a great wave of Nationalism after the abolition of the Capitulations, and many of our business men were harshly treated. Those of them who have remained on in Turkey find the changed conditions very difficult, as indeed they are. Still, I repeat, foreigners are trading, so why should not we? Especially in these times when, as H.R.H. the Prince of Wales said, "It is vital to sell as well as buy British." I mentioned that Turkey was essentially an agricultural country. The grain harvests were poor during the years 1926-1929, but in 1930 and 1931 they were better, and the development of the railways is undoubtedly proving of great help to the peasants. All the same, farming is still conducted under somewhat primitive conditions, and there may be a market for agricultural machinery when the Government is able to spare financial assistance to the farmers. At present the Turkish Bank of Agriculture does what it can, but its resources are limited. The State Bank, the Ich Bankassi, is opening branches all over Turkey, and will, in all probability, gradually obtain the business which the Ottoman Bank, through its numerous branches in the interior, possessed.

Another factor, which has not been without its effect on British trade with Turkey, is the attitude which Turkey has taken up towards the Ottoman Debt. At present Turkey is partially defaulting in respect of the agreement into which she entered in 1928 with the Council of the Ottoman Debt. She should be paying about 2 million pounds sterling gold this year, but she is only paying a third. She pleads that it is beyond her capacity to pay more; her Budget for the present year is about 18 millions gold, and it would seem that she might pay more than a third of what she undertook to do. There are, however, many factors-some of them of a political naturewhich enter into this matter, and I do not feel it incumbent on me to say anything more, although Turkish credit has, of course, not benefited on account of her attitude. Still, it must not be forgotten that the Republic recognized the debts incurred by the Ottoman Empireand did not, therefore, follow the example of Russia-but now she finds herself unable to carry out the undertaking she gave. She is, after all, ladies and gentlemen, not the only country that is doing this today.

I will now revert to Turkey's relations with other foreign Powers. With France relations have been a trifle strained owing to the question of the Ottoman Debt and also owing to the fact that many Turkish political refugees are living in Syria, where there has been a certain amount of frontier trouble. With Italy, Turkey is doing a big trade; in 1930, unless I am very much mistaken, the Italians headed the list of countries importing goods into and exporting goods from Turkey. Italian influence has also made itself felt in Angora in connection with the Greco-Turkish rapprochement, a matter to which I will refer shortly. With Germany, Turkey is also doing a good trade, but German political influence is not very great.

Regarding Asiatic Powers, Turkey has recently shown signs of disinteresting herself in countries like Persia and Afghanistan. The fall of King Amanullah was a disappointment to the Turks; the exmonarch of Afghanistan had copied Mustapha Kemal in many respects, but he had forgotten to do one thing, and that was to pay his army. Many Turkish military and civil advisers had been sent to Afghanistan during Amanullah's reign, but most, if not all, have now been withdrawn. With Persia, Turkey is now on better terms than she was, because, as I have already mentioned, a settlement is in sight

regarding the delimitation of the frontier. With Iraq, relations are extremely friendly, and King Feisal was most warmly received by the Ghazi when he visited Angora last summer. There have been some frontier incidents, but goodwill on both sides has enabled amicable settlements to be reached.

But, as I see it, Turkey is no longer so interested in Asia as she was. She is looking more to Europe, and the rapprochement with Greece is a proof of this. This rapprochement is mainly due to the far-seeing statesmanship of two men; I refer to Ismet Pasha and M. Venizelos. Five or six years ago, even more recently than that, there was a bitter feeling, akin to hatred, between Greeks and Turks. The Anatolian war and the expulsion of over a million and a quarter Greeks from Asia Minor caused much anger, dissatisfaction, and suffering. The treatment of Turkish Minorities in Greece and that of Greek Minorities in Constantinople also left much to be desired. But, during the Lausanne Conference Ismet Pasha and M. Venizelos grew to know and like one another, and for years they worked hard in order to bring about a better feeling between the two countries. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, loyally supported the Turkish Prime Minister, and by 1930 most of the outstanding questions had been settled. In October of that year M. Venizelos paid an official visit to Angora-an act which required considerable courage if one remembers what had gone before—and signed various treaties and protocols. One of these was a treaty of friendship, neutrality, and non-aggression, a form of treaty which Turkey has signed with most of her neighbours and some of the big European Powers as well. A naval protocol, modelled on the one concluded with Russia, was also signed. Under the terms of this protocol, both Turkey and Greece are obliged to notify each other six months beforehand if they intend building, or having built, any men-of-war. Under the terms of the protocol with the Soviet neither Turkey nor Russia may reinforce their Black Sea fleet without warning each other six months beforehand. These two protocols are highly to be commended, as they should prevent a race in naval armaments in the Near East. One cannot say whether the Greco-Turkish rapprochement will be lasting, but I see no reason why it should not be. In the autumn of 1931 Ismet Pasha went to Athens to return M. Venizelos' visit, and I am told that the refugees-who had been the principal obstacle in the way of a rapprochement-gave the Turkish Premier a warm welcome.

I would like now to talk for a few minutes about life in Turkey. Angora is now the centre of political and diplomatic life during the greater part of the year. From the end of June to October, when the Ghazi is in Constantinople, the capital is half empty, but the seat of Government remains there, although as time goes on it is possible that Constantinople may become a sort of "unofficial" summer capital.

Angora is a living example of what the Kemalist régime stands for. The Ghazi chose it as the capital of the Republic because he wanted to make a clean break with the past. In addition, from a strategic point of view, Angora, situated as it is in the middle of the Anatolian plain, has many advantages over Constantinople. When Kemal went to Angora ten years ago it was a small and dirty little town. He had to make everything. When I tell you that something like 15 million pounds sterling has been spent on making Angora into a habitable place you will get an idea of what an expensive proceeding this has been. It was necessary to erect Government buildings and dwellings for the State officials and army officers. Roads had to be made, electricity and water laid on, a proper system of drainage was required, and a hundred and one other things. It is most unfortunate that a proper town-planning scheme was not drawn up at the beginning. Now several German and Austrian experts have been engaged, but it is rather late in the day. I would liken Angora unto a town in the middle West of America, where oil has been struck and where people have been flocking in every day. Many of the buildings that were first erected were designed by architects who thought that an Oriental cum European style would be suitable to the environments. This idea did not last for long, and it was replaced by weird and futuristic looking buildings conceived by Central European architects. Now the architecture is becoming more uniform in design, although German ideas predominate. A fine house is in process of erection for the Ghazi himself. This building will, when finished, look rather like a large Austrian country house, except that it will have broad terraces like some of the old Turkish yalis (chateaux). One of the most picturesque buildings in Angora is the principal hotel, the Angora Palace. Its internal decorations are Oriental, but it is a comfortable and up-to-date hostelry.

The railway service from Constantinople—or I suppose I should give it its new name of Istanbul—has been speeded up, and an express train, composed exclusively of sleeping and restaurant cars, runs every night. Practically everything in the way of foodstuffs and other

articles have to be brought from Constantinople, so you can imagine that Angora is not a cheap place to live in. In fact, it is a good deal more expensive than the West End of London—at least, I have found

it so, if one takes into consideration what one gets.

Practically all the foreign diplomatic missions have now left the former capital and are established in Angora. Life in the winter has a certain element of gaiety about it although, of course, the social circle is not very big. The Turks are great bridge players-it has been said that bridge was first played on the banks of the Bosphorusand there are many bridge parties as well as thes dansants. Whenever a prominent foreigner pays an official visit to Angora there is a State ball, and, as some of you may know, these are great affairs, lasting until the early hours of the morning. The Ghazi is fond of dancing, and he sees that his compatriots dance. There are many good stories told about him at dances. Here is one. Some time ago at a dance in a Constantinople hotel he noticed that some of the Turkish girls were still wearing the tcharchaf. He went up to one of the girls, asked her to dance, and then took off the tcharchaf, telling her that European women did not wear such an article of headgear with evening dress. In a few minutes all the other girls had discarded their tcharchafs.

Angora cannot be called, by any strength of imagination, a pretty place. Ten years ago there were hardly any trees, but the Government has planted millions of shrubs which, however, grow slowly in the somewhat arid soil. The air is bracing, in marked contrast to Constantinople, and malaria, which formerly was very prevalent, is

Meanwhile, a word about Constantinople. It has certainly lost a great deal of its former importance, and until recently the Kemalists used to speak of it as "that den of intrigue and corruption." Since the Ghazi took to spending the summer there, the antagonism between the two places has abated considerably, but there are still a number of Turks in Constantinople who are not too fervent in their admiration for the actual régime. The commercial life of Constantinople has also suffered because of the departure of the Greeks, and because of the virtual closing down of Russia as a trading country. The Turks have tried to take the place of the Greeks in business and in commerce, but they have not really succeeded. Their commercial instincts have not had time to develop, if one may put it that way. Then the maritime trade has shrunk greatly, especially as Piræus has become a

serious rival. This is largely the fault of the Turks themselves, as the Port of Constantinople is run by a Government monopoly company, which means that all the charges are very high and that efficiency is very low. Still, he would be a rash man who would predict that Constantinople is doomed to extinction, and I, in any case, am not of that number. The wave of Nationalism which swept over the country after the revolution is slowly dying away, as many foreigners who have visited the country will attest. There are, however, still some irksome restrictions which the authorities would do well to remove if they wish tourists to visit Turkey.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, let me try to sum up. The Ghazi has done a great deal of good during the last nine years. He took over a country which was thought by many to be "down and out." He has instilled fresh blood into it and he has made Turkey an important factor in Near and Middle Eastern politics. But he has not yet succeeded in materially enriching the country, and I must emphasize the fact that the standard of living, except in one or two of the larger towns, is extremely low. He and his advisers have preferred to carry on without financial assistance from abroad. Whether this policy is a wise one is open to doubt, but, in any case, there are no signs that it will be changed meanwhile.

What Turkey requires is peace for a very long period, and its foreign policy, as carried out by the Kemalist régime, should ensure the preservation of peace. There is, however, one question which is ever uppermost in the minds of most foreign observers like myself. What will happen when the Ghazi dies? He is still a comparatively young man, but he cannot live for ever. It is true that the Government is trying to impress the youth of Turkey with a sense of their future responsibilities, and there are signs that the youth appreciate their task. But what will happen when the Ghazi is no longer there? I cannot do better than relate you the following story: The scene was a ball at the house of the Turkish Foreign Minister. The Ghazi was talking to the French Military Attaché, and he was angry because the day before a leading Paris newspaper had printed a story to the effect that he was very ill and might die at any moment. The Ghazi turned to the Frenchman and said, in French: "My Colonel, even if I die tomorrow, there are a thousand people who can replace me." One of the foreign Ambassadors who had been listening cut in during the silence that greeted the Ghazi's words: "Excellence, you exaggerate a thousand times." (Applause.)

In rising to propose a vote of thanks, Lord Lloyd said that he knew Turkey before the war, in 1906-1907, when British influence was paramount, but was weakening. Since that time Turkey had had a tragic history; the cause perhaps could be found in what must seem to the Turk a series of betrayals on the part of the Western Powers. For instance, at the commencement of the first Balkan war, when it was supposed that Turkey could not fail to be victorious, a solemn declaration was made by the Powers, that no territorial acquisitions by either party to the conflict would be tolerated by Europe. When the Turkish collapse took place and the unexpected victory of the Balkan States altered the entire situation, that solemn declaration was forgotten, and Turkey was shorn of territory with the consent of Europe.

It has been the fashion to abuse Abdul Hamid, but a closer examination shows many virtues and a sturdy patriotism in him which are altogether admirable. "I remember so well speaking after his death to an old gardener, who took me along to a point from which one could see right up the Bosphorus, where he said Abdul Hamid often stood, and whenever the Turkish troopships passed he would salute his country's flag, full of pride. I need not enlarge on the incident of the Goeben and the Breslau, at the commencement of the war, but pass on to the armistice of Mudros, which put Turkey absolutely at our mercy, followed by the Greek occupation of Smyrna, if not with our direct co-operation at all events under the ægis of Mr. Lloyd George, at that time Prime Minister of Great Britain. This was followed by our occupation of Constantinople, and the deportation of some of Turkey's greatest men and best patriots; is it remarkable that they should feel that Mr. Lloyd George was their enemy?" The chairman said he had always believed in the strategic importance of Turkey, the bridge between Europe and Asia, and it is a question whether Constantinople is not as valuable an objective to the Soviet as it was to the Czars.

From the trade point of view Turkey has much to offer; she is still a great Islamic power, and her religious influence is too much neglected.

"Mustapha Kemal has done a great deal for his country, and I should be glad to see a closer co-operation with him, for I believe that Turkey still holds the key to the solution of many questions. May she again count Great Britain among her best friends." (Applause.)

Mr. PHILIP SARELL (for some years British Vice-Consul in Constanti-

nople), who was prevented through illness from being present at the lecture, has communicated the following:

Lord Lloyd's refusal to join in the chorus of abuse which has usually characterized any mention, in this country, of Sultan Abdul Hamid II., and his significant allusion to the potential importance of Turkey to Great Britain from a strategic as well as from a commercial point of view, suggest a comparison between the present state of the country and its condition on the accession of Abdul Hamid.

In view of the part played by Great Britain in the Crimean War the Sultan had a right to expect some sympathy from this country. Abdul Hamid was a very young man; he was confronted by revolutionaries in his own country and by enemies on his borders. Sultan Abdul Aziz had been deposed, and had subsequently committed suicide, while Sultan Murad, who succeeded him, was very soon removed from the throne on the ground of insanity. The Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire were in revolt, and it was an open secret that Russia was only awaiting a favourable excuse for pouncing upon Constantinople.

Meanwhile in England Mr. Gladstone was using the so-called Bulgarian atrocities for the purpose of stirring up an agitation which might enable him to overthrow Benjamin Disraeli. The avowed object of the campaign was, of course, to ameliorate the lot of the Christian subjects of the Sultan. Politicians on the war-path care very little what may be the effect in foreign countries of their oratory, provided that they can delude their constituents into voting for them; and the picture now presented by Turkey, and the complete destruction of British prestige and British trade in that country, dating from Gladstonian times, furnish a very good instance of this truth. Unfortunately a share of responsibility will inevitably be placed by history upon the shoulders of Lord Salisbury himself. He arrived in Constantinople for a European conference in 1876 shortly after Abdul Hamid's accession. He conferred immediately with Sir Henry Elliot, the British Ambassador, who accompanied him to an audience of a most cordial character with the Sultan, and it was decided that in a very few days a further meeting should be arranged when Lord Salisbury would be in a position to communicate the concessions which it was considered desirable that the Sultan should make in order to satisfy Europe. In spite of message after message from the Sultan, asking when the British Plenipotentiaries would dine at the palace, the projected meeting never took place, and the messengers

were sent away without an answer, excuse, or explanation. The whole story is told by Sir Henry Elliot himself in the reminiscences published by his daughter in 1922, under the title, "Some Revolutions and other Diplomatic Experiences" (John Murray). Lord Salisbury's treatment of the British Ambassador was in harmony with his contemptuous disregard of the Sultan. The matter is summed up by Sir Henry Elliot in the following words: "After my conversation with Lord Salisbury on the day of his arrival he never once, of his own accord, entered upon the subject upon which we were associated, hinted at the course he proposed to follow, or informed me of the arrangements he was making with General Ignatiew, till I learnt them at the meetings when they were communicated to our foreign colleagues."

Nevertheless, in the "Life of Lord Salisbury," which has recently appeared, Lord Salisbury is quoted as having said of General Ignatiew and Midhat Pasha: "They are the biggest pair of liars to be found in Europe, but I am inclined (though with much diffidence) to think that Midhat is the falser of the two." While an intrigue of a surprising character was in progress between the Plenipotentiaries purporting to sit in judgment on Sultan Abdul Hamid the latter showed the astuteness which distinguished him throughout his reign by suddenly proclaiming a constitution and with the thunder of the one hundred and one guns still ringing in his ears Lord Salisbury left Constantinople, having paved the way for the Russo-Turkish War, instead of contributing in any way to the regeneration of Turkey. The disastrous consequences of interference from London with the activity of highly trained and properly accredited diplomatic and consular representatives in more or less distant countries is well illustrated by the fiasco of the Constantinople Conference of 1876. Lord Cecil of Chelwood would be well advised to study the exploits of his distinguished father who, though undoubtedly a great Englishman and a worthy representative of an illustrious house, proved himself quite incapable of understanding or still less of carrying out the policy by which the genius of Benjamin Disraeli attempted to spread civilization and promote British interest in near Eastern Europe by opening up those semi-civilized countries to civilization and trade. A casual observer may fail to see any connection between present-day politics and pre-war Turkey. The fact is, however, that the only way to wean people from fighting is to give them an alternative occupation, viz.-trade. The day has gone by when the Levantine middle man

will be allowed to stand between the Turk and trade as he did from the conquest of Constantinople to the Great War. Mustapha Kemal has no love for the foreigner, but the memory of the friendship of England and Turkey has not yet died out. The Turks are already turning their attention to trade, and provided that the association is on equal terms, they would rather associate themselves with British traders than with any other foreigner.


HIRA*

By D. TALBOT RICE, M.A., B.Sc.

MUST begin with a word of explanation. The work which was done at Hira last autumn was no more than a sounding, intended to explore the lie of the land rather than to uncover large areas or to produce considerable finds. It was made possible by the generosity of Mr. Gerald Reitlinger, who not only provided the funds, but who was also present throughout the work, and it was undertaken on behalf of Oxford University. We must begin by expressing our sincere thanks both to the Vice-Chancellor and to Professor Langdon, who acted as director of the expedition at home and who has from the very first taken a keen interest in the work. In spite of the essentially preliminary character of the work, however, we were able to uncover three fairly large buildings more or less completely and to provide the Ashmolean Museum with a substantial collection of tangible results. I shall endeavour this afternoon, not only to describe what we found and what we were able to do, but also to give some idea of the importance of Hira, both in the realm of history and in that of art. And hence, before passing on to the archæology, I will attempt to give a sketch of the town's history.

The city was founded sometime in the second or third century of the Christian era, but we do not know exactly when. It was probably owing to some extent to the fact that Parthian Hatra in the north had become rather too dangerous to hold, placed as it was between the frontiers of the Roman and the Persian Empires, that Hira was founded, and that she blossomed forth so rapidly as an important town. At first Hira can have been little more than a desert camp or temporary settlement, much like one of the villages on the desert fringe of Iraq today. The very name, in fact, is taken by many authorities to have meant a sort of desert camp or palace, and it was only after a certain time that the name came to have a less general character and to become associated with one definite city. We see much the same course of

^{*} Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on February 10, Sir Denison Ross in the chair.



events in the case of the Latin word castra, which, though originally of general significance, came later to be associated with one special camp or city—namely Chester.

In its early days, then, Hira was little more than a camp—the capital camp, as it were—of the Lakhmid Arabs, who were, like all the Arabs, essentially nomads and who dominated the whole of the eastern fringe of the great Arabian desert area. It was among these Lakhmids and their western counterparts the Ghassanids that Arab culture was developed before the days of Islam, and though they were in some ways not very civilized folk themselves, they learnt and adapted a great deal from the great empires which were their neighbours—the Sasanian on the east and the Byzantine on the west. And just as the Ghassanids were within the Byzantine sphere and were supported to some extent by the Syrians and Greeks as a kind of buffer state between them and their enemies to the east, so were the Lakhmids under Persian influence. Their kings were, in fact, vassals of the Sasanians, though they ruled at Hira in more or less independent state, even exercising from time to time a certain control in Persia itself. But more of this anon. Before speaking of the kings, we must say something of their city and of the life which was led there.

It was in its early days, as we have said, little more than a permanent camp. There may have been a few buildings of importance—halls, palaces, or council chambers—but the majority of the dwelling-places were probably only reed huts or tents. By the early fifth century, however, something more definite must have been achieved, for we read that there were already Christian bishops in Hira, and that the Christians there designated themselves by the special name "ibad," or servant (of God). They belong to the Nestorian persuasion, though, as well, there appear to have been followers of the monophysite sect in the town, and about 490 the ardent monophysite preacher, Simeon of Beit Arsam, succeeded in converting several of the nobles and in building some churches at Hira. But the Nestorians remained supreme, and in 510 we see Narses, the Nestorian Bishop of Hira, voting on the election of a new Catholicos.

The Christians thus formed quite a large section of the community, and they were soon responsible for the establishment of definite houses and other minor as well as major buildings, so that in the sixth century Hira had assumed the character of a large and established town. Situated as it was on the confines of the Persian Empire, the town must have been a considerable centre of trade, and along with the trade must

have come peoples from Persia who were followers of the State religion, Mazdaism. And where Christians and Mazdaists were to be found, Manichæans were doubtless present also. Add to these the adherents of the old religious faiths of Arabia, worshippers of Al-Uzza, the Mother Goddess, or of some similar pagan deity, and we are confronted with a superbly heterogeneous collection of faiths-a collection which suggests infinite possibilities in the way of archaelogy. It may well be that Hira will prove to be the key to a period of history of which we know very little, and that results of future work there will solve for us problems in the artistic sphere with the facts of which we are equally unfamiliar, though theory has run wild in more than one respect. The round fire temples of Strzygowski or the Hvarenah landscapes of the Masdaic cult of which he says so much; the wonderful paintings of Mani, which are the parents of Moslem illumination; the final solution of the Mshatta problem, for some authorities consider this to be a Lakhmid building-information on all these and on many similar problems may await us below the soil of Hira. But we must not anticipate. The history remains to be considered.

The first king of Hira whom we know by name was Amr ibn Adi, but we do not know his dates. He is succeeded by four kings of whom we know very little—Imroulqais ibn Amra (?-328), Amr II. (328-358), Aus ibn Qallam (358-363), and Imroulqais II. (363-388). The first of them is important, however, for he was buried near Nemara in the Wadi-es-Sham on the western side of the desert while engaged in fighting on behalf of the Byzantines, and his epitaph has been copied and published by Dussaud. This shows how far to the east these Lakhmid kings penetrated, thus proving that the attribution of Mshatta to them is by no means impossible.

Imroulqais II. is succeeded by Numan I., who was well disposed towards the Christians, and who may even have become one himself. He certainly ended his days as an anchorite, being persuaded of the impermanence and futility of human accomplishments by his vizir. He is famous as the builder of Khawarnaq, a desert castle near Hira, the first of a long line of buildings which were to become characteristic of the early Arab rulers, and which were the outcome of a desire to escape from town life into the deserts. Though Khawarnaq and Sadir are the two most famous of these Lakhmid castles, the former was actually constructed at the instance of Yasdigird, King of Persia, as a desert retreat or "hira" for his son. Its ruins stand a few miles from Hira, overlooking the Bahr al Najaf, and they are doubtless of the first

importance, for they were built according to legend under the direction of a Byzantine architect. He was, in true Oriental fashion, cast from the battlements at the end of the work, but this does not seem to have assured the king's peace of mind, for his dissatisfaction became proverbial, so that Adi ibn Ziad wrote:

"Think on the lord of Khawarnaq—eyes guided of God see clear— He rejected in his might and the strength of his hands the encompassing wave and Sadir;

And his heart stood still and he spake: 'What joy have the living

to death addressed?

For the open cleft of the grave lies close upon pleasure and power and rest.

Like a withered leaf they fall, and the wind shall scatter them east and west."

Numan was succeeded by Mundhir I., who was powerful enough to intervene in the dispute of the Persian succession and to secure the throne for the famous Bahram Gur, who appears to have been educated at Hira. He and Mundhir must have been stout friends, for in 421 the Lakhmid king was defeated by the Byzantines whilst fighting in support of the Persians.

Several rather obscure reigns are followed about the beginning of the sixth century by that of Mundhir III., and this period is probably the most important in Lakhmid history. The first few years of the reign do not seem to herald great prosperity, for Persia was undergoing a communist revolution, and as a result several of her more monarchical dependents fell out of favour. Thus Mundhir of Hira, who had no sympathy with the communist outlook, was for a time supplanted by a Yemenite sovereign, but he drove him out, and a short time after we see him attacking the Byzantine with renewed vigour. He advances as far as Antioch in 529, and makes himself an inveterate enemy of the Ghassanids. He distinguishes himself by sacrificing four hundred nuns to Al-Uzza—an event which can hardly have pleased his Christian subjects. In the next reign, that of Amr (554-569), Hira becomes a literary centre, where some of the most renowned of the Arab writers of "the age of ignorance" met and lived. More than one of them has left us some brief description of the city or of one of the desert castles which appear to have awoken a spirit of romance even when they were being constructed. They certainly had their effect on a later age, and we see spectacular buildings of this nature being erected both by

Ommayds and Abbasids in the Moslem era. Kusejr Amra, Mshatta, Ukhaidir, and many another are all the descendants of these Lakhmid "hira."

Amr himself seems to have been as much of an old heathen as his predecessor, but the queen mother, Hind, founds a Christian monastery in Hira, and soon after it seems that the princes were converted. That their conversion must have called forth all the ingenuity of the preachers is proved by the charming story of Mundhir III., the sacrificer of nuns. He was listening to the Christian fathers, who had just described the death of Christ, when one of his courtiers whispered in his ear. The king suddenly assumed an expression of great sorrow, and when the preachers respectfully asked him the cause, he replied: "I have just heard the most distressing tidings; Michael the archangel is dead." "Nay," said the preacher, "angels are immortal." "Angels immortal!" cried the king, "and ye come here to convince me that God Himself died!"

The two reigns that follow Amr are unimportant; the next, that of Numan III. (580-602), marks the close of the Lakhmid dynasty. The new king was brought up by a Christian family, and he had as his most intimate friend the poet Adi ibn Zaid, from one of whose works we have just quoted. Adi's career was one of marked success, and he seems to have been an exceptional character for his time; not so the king, who put his best friend into prison and left him there to die. Although Christian in name, he was a true old Arab in character, and he met a just and deserved end, being trampled to death by elephants at the instance of the Persian monarch Parwiz. Persian governors were then appointed to rule at Hira, and the town enjoyed prosperity under them until 633, when the redoubtable Khalid set out on his campaign against the western provinces of Persia. He gains a victory after the hard-fought battle of Allis and besieges Hira. But the town, wisely enough, capitulated almost at once and was hence granted easy terms. Such a rapid capitulation by a Persian governor who ruled only a few days' journey from the capital of his empire, Ctesiphon, seems strange, but it is explained by a rapid examination of the ruins of Hira, for there are to be seen there no traces of either city wall or defensive earthwork.

Hira was used by the Moslems as a base for the next few years, and in 637 Sad rested there after the victory of Cadesia. In the following year, however, the final settlement of Iraq was decided upon before any further advance into Persia, and as a result the new Moslem towns

of Basra and Kufa were founded. In 656 Kufa became the capital of Moslem Mesopotamia, and from that day the decline of Hira commenced, although the town continued in use for another century or so. We read that the larger buildings were used as quarries to provide material for the new construction of Kufa, only a few miles away. One may aptly compare the last years of Hira and the early ones of Kufa to the same period in the life of one of those cities of North Africa, where a western city has just been erected a few miles only from the old Arab town. In a few hundred years these old Arab towns will be little more than ruins, unless indeed a more enlightened age or the ministrations of Mr. Cook's tourists serve to keep them alive.

Such in brief was the history of Hira. We must now pass on to a description of the site and of the work which we were able to do there last autumn. The ruins lie some four miles from Kufa, in what is today complete desert. The golden dome of Najaf is to be seen looming up in the distance to the west, and it was always a welcome sight from the dig, especially in the evenings, when the light of the setting sun was reflected upon it. To the east we could see the palm trees bordering the Euphrates, or rather the branch of it on which Kufa lay, and now and again the white sail of some grain or date barge would flit between the green, as though it belonged to some ship of the desert. Four miles to the south of us lay the ruins of Khawarnaq, though the mound is actually not visible from Hira.

Our home during the work was in Kufa, and each day we passed its great mosque on our way to work. Kufa is a small town today, prettily situated on the river bank, which serves as a port of supply for Najaf. Each morning we left for the dig in a hired Ford, driven by a wreckless but charming scoundrel; each evening we returned to sort our finds in the none too commodious lodgings which we were able to procure in Kufa. But the palm trees and the greenery were always a delight to one's eyes after the brightness of the desert.

The ruins of Hira are of very wide extent, covering an area some miles across, though none of the mounds are very high. Two layers of inhabitation one above the other are the most that one can expect to find—a fact which greatly lightens the labour of excavation, though it makes the problems of dating more difficult. The work which we were able to do showed us that buildings, although they had undergone several periods of repair, had never actually been destroyed, to be

levelled over to make way for some later construction. It seems rather that through the centuries the site of the city gradually shifted northwards, till it reached the area occupied by present-day Kufa. The oldest monuments of all are apparently those furthest from Kufa, situated furthest to the south-east. The same shifting is true of Moslem Kufa, and there are extensive mounds to the south and east of the modern houses. They stretch for about two miles and are bounded by the line of a canal, now dried up. Between this canal and what we took to be the northern limit of Hira there is an area some threequarters of a mile across, which appears never to have been inhabited. It was on the edge of this plain that we began our work on one of the larger mounds. And we called this mound 1. We worked at it throughout the whole month, but pushed forth arms both to east and south. In the one direction we first tackled a large low mound, which proved to contain houses of little importance, though in one of them was a well from which we obtained an important hoard of pottery fragments. This we called 2. A rather more extensive mound was called 3. This contained a whole series of smaller houses, the walls of mud-brick faced with white plaster, and as well a larger edifice, part of which at least was in baked brick. This we were unable to excavate. A similar low mound close by was called 4, and a larger one beyond, which proved to contain a church, 5. Another mound, No. 6, which probably contains a fort or castle, stood beyond, and a smaller one, slightly to the north of this, 7, proved to be an ash heap or brick kiln, apparently of later date. Of these mounds 3 and 4 yielded important sculptured plaster, and 5 a fine plan, numerous examples of frescoes and some important objects, both in plaster and of glass, of which we will say more anon. No. 6 deserves closer attention than we were able to give it, though it seems that the main building was of burnt brick.

Such walls of burnt brick have usually been destroyed in greater part by brick-robbers. We know from the Arab writers that material for the construction of Kufa was obtained from Hira, and everywhere on the site there are traces of buildings of burnt brick, the upper parts of the walls of which have been entirely removed. In some cases it is possible to trace the line of the walls by the nature of the debris, not by the presence of the wall itself, and in this case it seems that the removal of the bricks must have taken place well after the desertion of Hira. Rubble and mortar from above fell down into the rooms or on the outsides of the walls, though the walls themselves remained

standing in part at least. Then, at a later date, the walls were pulled down for the sake of the good bricks that they contained, but the fallen rubble was left untouched. It had become so compact that it preserved the line of the wall up to a height of several feet. Finally, sand blown by the wind filled up the space originally occupied by the wall. Such a series of events comes as a surprise in the middle of an excavation, for in this case it is the hard deposit that represents the filling and the soft one that has taken the place of the wall.

But to return to our survey. We made from mound 1, which marks approximately the north-west corner of Hira, the series of five soundings to the east which we have already mentioned and a series of four more to the south. Three of these, numbers 8, 9, and 10, provided us with little information, the mounds being principally composed of ashes. But the fourth, No. 11, laid bare another church, practically identical in plan with No. 5. But before passing on to its

description, I must say some more of mound 1.

We were able to clear the building preserved here more or less completely-completely enough in any case to make a full plan of it. It proved to be a fairly large construction, fort, palace, or large house with fourteen rooms. It had undergone repairs and had been reoccupied at various periods. The building stood to a height of two storeys, the walls of both following exactly the same plan. But those of the lower level had no doorways in them, and the rooms must have served as cellars. At the period during which the upper floor was last in use, however, the cellars had been filled in with sand and earth, and the floors of the rooms rested upon this filling. Below these floors large pottery vessels had been inserted in places, their tops bricked over. They must have been used as drains, the water soaking out through the porous clay into the surrounding soil. These large vessels are definitely of Moslem date, and some small fragments of pottery which were collected from the filling of the cellars are akin to examples dated by Sarre to the eighth or ninth century.

Our upper storey, then, or anyhow the floor of it, is to be dated to this period. Kufa had already become more important than Hira; and our building, with its extremely stout walls, must have served as a defensive castle for the protection of the Moslem town. The entrance at this time was probably on the south, and it seems that the level of the surrounding soil was here already about two metres above the surrounding plain. A few steps only would thus be necessary to reach either of the doors which are marked on the plan. Today the soil has

been so much washed down on this, the lowest side of the mound, that no traces of the approach to these doors remain.

If the last period of occupation was in the eighth century, the first was certainly well in Sasanian days, though there is unfortunately no evidence to tell us the exact date. To this first period we owe the large outer wall of baked brick which is marked in black on the plan. It is the wall of some important building, to which the mud-brick walls of the later structure within have had to adapt themselves, though on the south side they are actually built upon the baked brick wall. But our building within does not belong in origin to the late date at which the large pots were inserted below the floors, for its original entrance was on the lower floor in the corner of room 21, and from here a stair, remains of which still exist, led to the upper level. Opposite the foot of the stair a door led through the mud-brick wall, and, after a slight deviation through a gap, probably once a door, in the baked brick wall. This door was bricked up, and indeed the whole space between the surrounding wall and the outer wall of the actual building was filled in with mud bricks, presumably at the time that the cellars were filled in. The arrangement of these walls can be seen most clearly in the section, taken at the corner, close to room 11. The bricks of all three walls are of different sizes; baked ones can be distinguished to the right of the door into room 11.

We have hence three main periods. To the earliest belongs the surrounding wall; to the second the walls and plan of the building within; to the third the filling of the cellars and the walls of the upper rooms. But to what date are we to assign the decoration which adorns these upper rooms? For here the doorways were adorned with elaborate jambs in carved stucco, six pairs of which were preserved in part in situ. These belong to the upper storey, and are hence above the latest floor, but the upper storey was also used during the second period, when its floor was presumably supported on beams. It is quite possible that the jambs survived when the floors were relaid, so that archæologically it is uncertain whether they must be assigned to the indefinite second period or to the third, which pottery dates to the eighth or ninth century.

The door jambs in building t were not all the same. In mounds 3 and 4 further door jambs of a similar type were found, some of them again in situ. They belonged to small houses and not to such a large building as No. 1, and their presence in these small houses shows that Hira at this date was no longer the glorified camp which it had been in its

earliest days. It also seems improbable that its decline had gone very far, so that one would be inclined to date the jambs to the middle period of building 1 rather than to the last. The early eighth or late seventh century seems the most likely date. In this connection it is interesting to compare our Hira material with the few examples of similar work that we know of this date. Most closely akin is a door jamb which was found by the German expedition to Ctesiphon a few years ago, which is dated to the ninth century. The ornament is practically identical with one of our examples from a room at No. 4, though the style suggests that it is slightly later in date than the Hira example. Less closely, but still closely enough, related is the carving of the wooden mimbar at Kairouan, which belongs again to the ninth century. According to Strzygowski this comes from Baghdad, and his supposition is supported when one compares it with another Hira example from mound 4. The Mihrab at Cordova, which was carved in marble about 970, shows the same motive, more delicately and more elaborately conceived, as a comparison with a further Hira example shows. The stucco of Deir es Suryani in Egypt of the ninth century is again related, but it appears to be more developed than our Hira material, and it would seem that it is to be assigned to a later

Comparisons with the Sasanian plaster-work found at Kish last winter or with newly unearthed material, dated to the sixth or seventh century, which I saw at Ctesiphon just before Christmas, shows without question the parentage of our stuccoes. But they are definitely later than the late Sasanian, and so may be assigned to the end of the seventh or

early part of the eighth century.

As the photographs have shown, we found a number of these door jambs in situ, and we were able to remove these whole by coating them with mud and plaster. Three of the larger ones, amongst them this especially fine example, were retained by Baghdad, but the remainder are now on their way to the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford. And in addition to the jambs which we found in situ, in mound 4 only a few inches below the surface, numerous fragments were collected. I hope that it will be possible to reconstruct some of these to their original height.

And now we come to what is in some ways the most interesting result of our work—namely, the discovery of Christian churches at Hira. We know from the writers that Christians formed a large body of the population—one of their processions is described with cynical

amusement by As Sabusti—but we know little of them. One could only surmise that in a country like Mesopotamia, with a history stretching back for so many thousands of years, a Christian art and culture as advanced and as developed as the Coptic in Egypt was to be expected.

A few years ago the Germans, working at Ctesiphon, found a Christian church, the first vestige of this culture that had come down to us. Now at Hira we have found two more. They found the fragments of an imposing angel sculptured in stucco at Ctesiphon; we have found frescoes and some unique plaster-work crosses. So our knowledge of early Christian art in Mesopotamia is already on the increase.

Our two churches and that at Ctesiphon are of almost identical plan. They are long basilicas with three rectangular chambers at the eastern ends. The roof of the Ctesiphon church was a vault and that of our church at No. 11 was the same, though the presence of brick piers suggests that a small barrel vault covered each of the three aisles. The walls were of mud-brick, the piers of baked brick, and the whole interior was covered with white plaster, which had been relaid at five different periods. The body of the church seems to have been undecorated, but the eastern chapels were frescoed, and in the southern one a cross remained in situ on the wall. In the central chapel of both churches fragments of fresco were found, one bearing an orant, and some others, which could be pieced together, a cross. In both churches the floor of the central, but not of the side chapels, had been raised at several different periods of repair, and some of the frescoes, belonging to an early date, lay in the filling below the upper floor in church 11. Some of the paintings of the earlier period in church 5 remained in situ, and we were able to remove these. The colours were very faint, but enough remained to show that the work was of a much more Sasanian character than that which overlay it. The importance of these frescoes is considerable, for it is to the Christian paintings of Mesopotamia that we must look for the origin of Islamic painting; and it is such frescoes as those of Hira that are the parents of that superb art of book illustration which we saw so remarkably illustrated at Burlington House last year in the exhibition of Persian art.

The plans of these churches present certain interesting problems, for though the three aisles and the three chapels to the east are in no way unusual, the absence of a curved or semicircular apse is significant, and equally striking is the fact that all the doors are on the sides.

There are none at the west end. In Egypt Butler notes that Coptic churches were invariably designed to have triple doors at the west, though in actual fact they were often put at the sides owing to practical dictates. At Hira it seems that the die doors are an original and intentional feature, and not one forced upon the builders by circumstances.

Coptic churches again differ, in that the eastern apse is in most cases rounded, and also in the fact that the nave is differently divided. A glance at the plan of such a church as that of Deir es Suryani shows this, and even though the end walls of the eastern chapels are here straight, there is a small curved niche in the centre of each, a feature which is striking by its absence at Hira. The rounded apse is, in fact, even at this early date a characteristic of Eastern Christian architecture, and its absence in these early Nestorian churches of Hira is especially remarkable, for M. Watelin's excavations of Sasanian buildings at Kish have shown that the semicircular niche was in common use there.

The origin of these square ends to the sanctuary seems to be a feature of far earlier date, for we see such rectangular sanctuaries in Babylonian and Assyrian temples; and a comparison of the plan of such a one as the Anu Adad temple at Assur with that of the Ctesiphon or the Hira churches is, to say the least, suggestive. It seems that we have here yet another instance of the art or architecture of early Mesopotamia exercising its influence in the Christian period.

Finally, we come to the minor objects. Fragments of glazed pottery of various types, akin to that found by Sarre and Herzfeld at Samarra, appeared near the surface on most of the mounds, and some very nice examples of unglazed pottery were also unearthed. A well in mound 2 provided a large amount of material for study, and some finer fragments were found in the filling of the cellars of building 1. Some of this is definitely Moslem, but some, of a more formal and more severe style, is certainly Sasanian in appearance, if it is not actually Sasanian in date. Some of it is of a type hitherto practically unknown. We found, too, in building 1 a small bronze cross with loop at the top for suspension, which may perhaps be of Byzantine workmanship, and numerous coins, which will prove of importance for dating purposes. They have not yet been cleaned. Interesting examples of early Mesopotamian glass were also discovered. Some lamps from church No. 5 show close relationships with Byzantine glass from Jerash and elsewhere.

But most important of all the minor objects were some small plaques

of very fine plaster, bearing designs in which the cross is the essential feature. They are of two types: the design being either incised and coloured in red or else left in relief, the surrounding ground being cut away. These crosses are of a distinctive type, the leaf pattern at the base being especially characteristic. A close relationship with crosses sculptured in stone which appear in Armenia seems certain.

In discussing the elaborate carved ornament which we see developed to such an amazing extent in Georgia and Armenia between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries, Baltrusaitis concludes that there is in Armenian work a great deal of Arab influence. The essentially mathematical character of the art seems to have appealed especially to their particular genius, he notes, and though the origin of the motives is to be sought in earlier remains—in Persia, in Mesopotamia, or in Hittite Asia Minor—the spread is due to the conveyors of Islam. And here at Hira we see these crosses developed by Arab Christians on the age-old soil of Mesopotamia long before they appeared in Armenia. It is to such examples as this that we must look for the parentage of Armenian art.

Mention of Armenia brings to our minds those problems in the history of Christian and Near Eastern art and architecture which are still most discussed, and on which the most divergent opinions are held by the different authorities. Though the work of one month at Hira can hardly claim to have settled any of these questions for ever, it has nevertheless provided much new data on which to build, as well as much material for thought. And it has shown us that the answers to many a vexed question may well await us below the soil of Hira's low mounds. It is only to be hoped that necessary funds for continuing the work so nobly begun by Mr. Gerald Reitlinger will be forthcoming.

The Chairman expressed the thanks of the Society to Mr. Talbot Rice for giving them the first fruits of his excavations at Hira, which had resulted in the discovery of much new material. It must, however, be remembered that it had only been a first trial on the site, and that nothing further could be done to it unless funds were forthcoming. He sincerely hoped that it would be possible to raise the necessary funds even in these days of financial crisis. Obviously Hira had harboured many religions at once, and a parallel could be found in the city of Turfan, where Christians, Nestorians, Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and Manichæans had lived peaceably together until they were driven away by the great inrush of Moslems. The public owed

a debt of gratitude to Mr. Gerald Reitlinger, who had not only financed this expedition, but had himself supervised all the digging on the site. The work was conducted under the auspices of the University of Oxford, and Professor Langdon had been most generous in giving help and advice.

FRENCH INDO-CHINA*

By MONSIEUR MAURICE CASENAVE MINISTRE PLÉNIPOTENTIAIRE

OUR EXCELLENCIES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,
The Colonial Empire of France is second only to the
Colonial Empire of Great Britain and includes possessions all
over the world. I shall therefore confine myself to Indo-China, that
part of the Empire which I know best.

This lecture will be divided into three sections: firstly, Geography and History, secondly, Colonial Administration, and, thirdly, Economic Development.

T

French Indo-China is a peninsula covering a total area of 737,000 square kilometres, joined to the Asiatic Continent, and includes five different countries—Tongking, Laos, Annam, Cochinchina, and Cambodia. Its configuration is very irregular and comprises three distinct portions. The northern part, composed of Tongking and Laos, is very wide. The central part is Annam, which forms a narrow corridor joining the northern to the southern part. The southern part is composed of Cochinchina and Cambodia, whose area is about the same as the northern.

The northern boundary follows the mountains of the Chinese Province of Kwangsi and Yunnan, the western boundary runs from the south-western part of Yunnan along the River Mekong and the frontier of British Burma and is bordered by the Kingdom of Siam. Eastward, Indo-China is bordered by the China Sea and southwards by the Gulf of Siam.

The Colony is divided in two main hydrographic basins, the Red River and the Mekong River, each of which contains a network of streams, all flowing eastwards into the Gulf of Tongking. By reason

* On Wednesday, February 24, 1932, Sir Reginald Johnston, K.c.M.G., in the chair. In opening the lecture the Chairman said the Society was honoured in hearing an address from Monsieur Casenave, the distinguished diplomat, who had represented his country both in China and in Indo-China. He hoped Monsieur Casenave would tell them something of the border country between China and Indo-China, which he had visited many years ago.

elf class and perceptor reco-

of the great variations in their depths, navigation is very uncertain, and they have railways along them which give access into China from the sea.

The more extensive basin of the Mekong River, originating on the Chinese slope of Tibet, and its numerous tributaries, waters part of the Chinese Provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan, a small corner of British Burma, French Laos, a large part of the Siamese Kingdom, then Cambodia and Cochinchina, and flows finally into the China Sea.

By clearing off rocks and buoying the river, navigation of Mekong is now open to steam launches and special shallow boats, except at Khone, on the frontier between Cambodia and Laos, where steep falls

have to be negotiated by a railway 7 kilometres long.

From November to May the depth of the Mekong River is very shallow, but the river rises considerably during the rainy season, from May to November. In the western part of Cambodia a big lake, the Tunle-Sap, communicates with the river. During the dry season it covers an area of 3,000 square kilometres and has a depth of an average of 1.50 metres, but during the rainy season its area increases to 10,000 square kilometres and the depth to 10 metres. Fishes of every kind, size, and description are bred in the lake, giving an appreciable

income to the country.

The water of the Red River, as well as that of the Mekong, contains a large amount of slime. Part of this slime fertilizes the valleys and part accumulates at the mouths of the river, forming the rich Deltas of Tongking and Cochinchina, where rice is extensively cultivated, but blocks at the same time the mouths of the rivers. Thus the navigation by big ships from the sea to the important river ports of Saigon in Cochinchina and Haiphong in Tongking had to be secured by straightening the banks. Between these deltas lies the long coast of Annam, a country narrowly confined between mountains and sea without any navigable river except for motor launches, and then only during the rainy season. Indo-China has been compared to a bamboo rod supporting at either end a rice basket.

The orographic system of Indo-China originated from the Chinese side of Tibet and divides itself in two branches. The first branch separates the basin of the Red River from the basin of the Hsi-Kiang River in China; it pushes eastwards to the Gulf of Tongking.

The second branch divides water running into the Red River from water running into the Mekong River. Dividing Tongking from

Laos, it proceeds first eastwards, and then not very far from the sea it turns abruptly southwards, forming the range known as the Annamite Cordiliera, following the coast and dividing Annam from Laos. This chain reaches the very large tablelands of Laos, Darlac, and Langbian, and ends near the Delta of Mekong.

Westward of the Mekong Delta is an isolated chain, called the Elephant Mountains, which forms the frontier which separates Cochin-

Elephant Mountains, which forms the frontier which separates Cochinchina and Southern Cambodia from the Kingdom of Siam.

All these mountains are of different geological formation. In Tongking they are generally rather richly mineralized.

The coast of Indo-China forms the general shape of an S on a length of 2,500 kilometers between China and Siam, but unfortunately situated off the trade route of ships sailing from Singapore to Hongkong. Besides, it has only two large bays—Along in Tongking and Cam-rang in Annam—which can offer shelter to large ships against the north-western Monsoon. In addition to this, the land lying behind these two bays offers no natural communication with the hinterland. these two bays offers no natural communication with the hinterland, so that the two main parts from which all products of the country can leave—Saigon and Haiphong—are river ports, and, being situated far from the sea, are not visited by big foreign packet-boats. This is a great handicap in the development of France's Far Eastern Empire.

French Indo-China is inhabited by different races, of which the oldest are probably of Indonese-Malay origin. The principal survivors of this race are the *Mois*, who are grouped in numerous tribes headed by chieftains, and live in the mountain woodlands of Southern Annam. They are very superstitious, but brave warriors, and live by hunting, and capturing elephants alive and taming them. A short piece of cloth woven by the women is their only dress; women wear it a little longer than men. More or less sedentary, they build houses on piles, cultivate mountain rice, maize, and pumpkins, breeding a very small but tough race of ponies. When the soil which they cultivate appears exhausted, they emigrate to another district where they begin clearing, burning the forest, and cultivating in the ashes. Ponies and tamed elephants constitute nowadays their only commerce, but before the French settled in the country Mois were under the tyranny of their chieftains, who made them hunting slaves and then sold them to the Annamites. Slavery has been abolished, and French authorities are endeavouring to make the Mois tribes settle permanently in the same place, prohibiting them from burning forests and teaching them to develop their agricultural knowledge.

Chams, a nation closely related to the Mois, have played quite a rôle in the history of Indo-China. They founded in Southern Annam a civilized empire, and, about the time of Christ, received from India Brahmanism and handwriting; later some of them were converted to Islam and adopted Arab writing. Marco Polo visited their country and described it under the name of Ciampa. After long wars they were subdued by the Annamites in the year 1471, and since then have nearly disappeared, a few families only still living in some valleys of Annam, cultivating rice, maize, tobacco, cotton, and peanuts, breeding buffaloes, goats, dogs, chickens, and ducks. Some inscriptions, written on isolated towers, ruined reservoirs, monasteries, and temples, throw a certain amount of light on their glorious past. There exists a curious tradition which seems to be confirmed by facts. The last King of Ciampa, overthrown by an Annamite Emperor, fled to the wild Mois and entrusted them with what he could save from his treasure. It has been faithfully kept until now. It is believed that it has been divided between several tribes. Certain pieces have been seen and even photographed: gold vases, arms, finely chiselled crowns, and head ornaments of the Kings and Queens, tissues of silk, richly embroidered with gold and silver. Some unscrupulous Europeans tried to seize them from their guardians, but the French Government, informed by a Roman Catholic missionary, Father Durand, secured protection for the tribes who furnished such an example of fidelity, and now these treasures are under the protection of the law.

Laos is still inhabited by Thais who came from Yunnan in remote times, and are spread as far as the northern mountains of Annam. They are a cheerful and happy race, elegant and distinguished, but improvident and easily influenced by their neighbours. Their ancient art has not yet been thoroughly studied; unfortunately their main architectural works, having been built with clay and wood, could not withstand the mark of years nor of climate. What remains of it seems to be very much like Cambodian and Siamese art. Thais are skilful wood-carvers. The most beautiful monuments in sculpture are those of sitting, standing, or walking Buddhas, which indicate that the ancient Loatians were fine sculptors and bronze casters. Old families possess gold and silver vases delicately chiselled. Modern buildings in Laos more or less reproduce Burmese, Siamese, or Cambodian temples, pagodas or stupas, covered by big heavy roofs, of which the corners are raised in the shape of the trunk of an elephant.

Women weave tissues of silk and cotton interwoven with gold

threads, producing a gay play of colour. The nation is so careless of trade that they leave all commerce in the hands of Annamites and Chinese. Laos, nearly an unknown country before France conquered Indo-China in 1859, was explored by two Frenchmen, Doudart de Laque and Pavia, since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Siam raised certain indefinite claims upon it, but transferred them to France by treaty in 1893. The total population numbers about 850,000 inhabitants, who all belong to the Buddhist religion.

Certain races—the Muong, the Huong, the Khas—more or less closely related to the Thais, came with them from China; they live in the mountainous regions as scattered tribes under hereditary feudal chieftains; they are not of any importance to the Colony.

The bulk of the population is furnished by 16 million Annamites who came from Southern China about the third century B.C., drove away the former inhabitants, and settled in Tongking and along the coast. They came under Chinese domination during a period of more than eight centuries (first to tenth century A.D.). During that period they adopted the institutions, religion, philosophy, literature, and art of their conquerors. After having recovered their independence, conquering the Chams, they became masters of all the coastal territory comprised between China and Siam, penetrating slowly into the interior.

For centuries the Annamites confined themselves to agriculture and to retail trades, leaving wholesale and foreign commerce to Chinese merchants who settled in the country, but in the last few years some of them, having received a French education, compete fairly successfully in every kind of commerce with the Celestials.

The Annamite art, destitute of originality, is very much like the Chinese art. Annamites are, anyhow, excellent carvers in hardwood, which they inlay finely with mother-of-pearl. They are also good lacquerers, potters, and embroiderers. They supply brave troops, and are patient, intelligent, and laborious. They succeed in agriculture and industry.

To sum up, the Annamites are, in fact, the backbone of Indo-China. They form a strong, absorbing race and have nearly overthrown all other people of their neighbourhood. Had the French not settled in the country, and had they not protected the Khmers, who still inhabit Cambodia to the number of more than two millions, Khmers would probably have disappeared, as did the Chams in Ciampa.

The origin and history of Khmers is rather mysterious, as historical

records do not exist. Their physical characteristics, their art, and a few inscriptions in classical Sanskrit, which have only recently been discovered, prove that they belong to the Aryan races. They probably came from the Godavery Valley in Northern India about the year 600 A.D. and conquered the country where their descendants still live from a nation called Fu-nan by Chinese travellers. The Khmers became very powerful. In a period of six centuries they covered the country with a prodigious amount of temples and palaces, which are still an object of universal admiration. Angkor, probably their former capital, which seems to have been constructed in the ninth century, is their best known, but not unique, achievement, and there are plenty of cities and monuments of which the ruins certify their wealth as well as their artistic sense. Their unequalled art developed, from the gigantic, still suavely expressive figures of the Bayon at Angkor-Thom, to the delicate and decorative chisellings of Angkorvat, probably the largest temple ever erected by men, and of which visitors to last year's Paris Colonial Exhibition saw a small replica.

Suddenly, in the fifteenth century, by a phenomenon probably unique in the history of the world, after an unfortunate war against the Siamese, the Khmers deserted their cities and left them a prey to the climate and to the tropical vegetation. These marvels of art were buried in the forest for centuries and the Khmers seem to have lost all creative power. Even their name was changed, as they are now known as the Cambodians. On the banks of the Mekong River the kings of Cambodia have constructed two new capitals—Oudong and Pnom-Penh, where they lived alternately at different periods—of which only Pnom-Penh survives as a capital. In 1863 King Norodom, having accepted the French protection, struck by the favourable situation of Pnom-Penh at the confluence of the Mekong, the Bassac and the Tunle-Sap rivers, took it definitely as the capital of his kingdom.

The new Cambodian architecture is without any originality and is henceforth inspired by the Siamese art. The French Government has made every effort to preserve at least the minor arts of Cambodia. In the School of Cambolian Arts, an annexe of the Albert Sarraut Museum in Pnom-Penh, young Cambodians of both sexes are taught weaving, embroidery, and the chiselling of metals and ivory by the best skilled workmen.

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In early days the four countries under French power—i.e., Cochinchina, Cambodia, Annam, and Tongking—had no tie uniting them together, and consequently developed independently. In 1887 the French statesman Paul Bert established new conditions by creating French Indo-China. To these four possessions Laos was joined in 1893, when King Lafarine of Luang Prah-bang asked for French protection.

Since then our Empire has been established more or less as a modern state, having a representative in the French Chamber of Deputies and five representatives in Paris (one for every country) in the Consultative Superior Council of the Colonies.

There are two forms of administration—general and local. A Governor-General, residing at Hanoi in Tongking, the capital of French Indo-China, is the repository of all the powers of the French Republic (under the authority of the Minister of Colonies), the chief of all civil and military authority, and of the heads of public services. He is attended by a General Secretary and by three Councils: first, the Government Council, grouping the Members of Parliament, the Members of the Superior Council of the Colonies, and all the highest officials, whose prerogative is the studying and carrying of the General Budget of the Empire; second, the Grand Council of Financial and Economic Interests, composed of French citizens and notables representing Cochinchina and the four protectorates, all elected, discusses the interests of the Empire and advises the Government. Both these Councils pass the General Budget, amounting to about two billion francs. The finances of the Colony are absolutely autonomous, except that they are submitted for approbation to the Colonial Department in Paris. They do not cause any expense to the Mother Country, and are even paying back sums amounting to about two million francs a year for repayment of sundry expenses, such as transportation of troops, opium commission in Geneva, etc. The third Council is the Council of Defence, including all the principal military, naval, and civil officials, presided over by the Governor-General, who has authority over the General commanding the land forces and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Judiciary, Public Health, Labour, Public Instruction, and different scientific organizations, such as a School of Far Eastern Civilization, Archæology and Philology, a Central Meteorological Observatory, and an Oceanographic Institute, are also under the control of the Governor General's services.

We have seen that three prevailing races are existing in our Indo-Chinese Empire: Annamites in Cochinchina, Annam, and Tongking; Cambodians or Khmers in Cambodia; Laotians in Laos. Each of these races differs in civilization, customs and laws, and therefore France has tried to model its administration accordingly.

Cochinchina, being our oldest possession, is alone when we call it a Colony where the French authorities are in a more direct touch with the people, and where France is represented as the reigning power by a Lieutenant-Governor.

Annam, Tongking, Cambodia, and Laos are Protectorates; there the indigenous kings and chieftains have been maintained and still exercise their authority over the population with the assistance and under the control of a "Superior Resident" and several "Residents" representing the protective power of France.

In the countries inhabited by the Annamite races, Confucianist doctrines being prevalent, society is based on the family, and public life is a copy of a family life where the *paterfamilias* reigns supreme, and where the Sovereign is the father of his people.

The village, or "lang," is at the bottom of the whole administrative system. The village is composed of registered and non-registered inhabitants. Non-registered inhabitants are women, children, those who, owing to bad conduct or notorious incapacity, have lost their civil rights. They do not take any part in administration. Among registered villagers twelve notables are chosen; they compose a Council electing a Justice of Peace, a Treasurer of the Community, and a Mayor. This Council takes charge of the administration and police; establishes and collects taxes; maintains roads, pagodas, schools, and the town hall in repair; is responsible for peace and good order, and has to inform the superior authorities of all impending trouble.

Above the village is the district or "long" constituted by several villagers grouped under a "chief of the district"; above again are the Huyen and Phus counties holding each different districts, and still further above resides a Governor or Fongdoo, attended by a Council composed of a Chief of Administrative Services, a Chief Justice, an Inspector of Schools, and a Military Commander. At the head of the state is the sovereign presiding over a Cabinet of Ministers.

The Colony of Cochinchina has been divided into twenty districts,

at the head of which twenty French "Administrators" have been placed. A certain number of Annamite officials are employed, but have only a nominal authority.

The Lieutenant-Governor, named by decree of the President and representing the Republic, has under his authority all Colonial services, prepares the Colonial Budget, and passes all expenditure for payment. He is assisted by a private Council, of which six members are French and two Annamite, appointed by the Governor-General. There also exists a Colonial Council of fourteen French Members, elected by French citizens, by universal suffrage, and ten Annamite Members, elected by Annamite proprietors, certain merchants, and notables. The Colonial Council discusses and passes the local budget, administers the properties of the Colony, and expresses wishes to the French Government on matters of public interest.

In Cochinchina French judges administer justice to French citizens and natives, but the natives are judged according to their own laws, modified as far as penalties are concerned, and conforming to rules prevailing among civilized countries. Torture, of course, has been entirely abolished and corporal punishments have been much mitigated. French judges have to pass a special examination to qualify them to administer native laws.

In all Protectorates there are two kinds of Courts: French Courts with jurisdiction over French citizens and foreigners and native Courts judged according to native laws, but the judges have to be qualified after having followed a course in a special Law School. When a case arises between French and natives, sentence is awarded by a French Court with the assistance of native judges.

The French Government has devoted every effort to spread public instruction as much as possible all over Indo-China, respecting the old civilization and native language of the different races. There is a University in Hanoi, and there are high schools in every capital of the Colony, and the Protectorate prepares young natives to become interpreters and officials. In every county is a school where French is taught, as well as the native tongue, and also a technical school. A geographical service has surveyed the Empire, and the preparation and publication of maps is well in hand. The geological service has begun a complete and scientific study of the soil, and an Oceanographic Institute of the Fisheries is developing the fishing industry, which promises a very big future.

There are some religious schools, mostly Catholic, where mission-

aries and sisters teach French as well as native languages, complete

liberty of religion being secured in the French possessions.

Sanitation has been developed as much as possible all over Indo-China. Pure water has been provided in large cities; swamps have been drained; mosquitoes destroyed as much as possible around the dwellings and villages. This is not an easy task, as natives of every race hardly understand the necessity of cleanliness. Now there are about 600 medical institutions with about 150 general medical doctors and about 250 medical doctors and druggists, about 500 midwives and a large number of French and native sisters of charity and nurses. It is calculated that more than 250,000 natives are treated every year and about 6 millions come every year to the clinics as "out-patients." All kinds of serums are prepared in several Pasteur Institutes. The results is that in Cochinchina, for example, the population, which was about 1 million in 1863, is now more than 4 millions. This is a proof of the success of the endeavours of the Government.

The Government of Indo-China has been severely reproached on the question of making large profits out of the sale of opium. It must, however, be borne in mind that opium-smoking was universally practised when the French took over the Colony. At that time the sale was free and the opium was of such a bad quality that the drug was even more dangerous for the health of the people than the pure one. Since the monopoly has been established only pure opium is sold at a very high price, so as to prevent poor people from indulging in the habit and to eradicate it from the rich by education, and not by prohibition. We have no prohibitionist propensities in France. Our system, moreover, has proved successful: between the years 1916 and 1918 opium produced an average revenue of about 20 million Indo-China piasters a year; since 1918 it has slowly declined regularly except for one year, and is now reduced to 14 million. When French rule first started nearly the whole population smoked opium; now, according to reliable statistics, there are only about 110,000 drug addicts!

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In 1860, at the time of the conquest of Cochinchina, the country was in a state of anarchy. The only two parts open to foreign trade were seldom visited by the few foreign ships. There was only one

road, a few canals, and a few badly built dykes. Cochinchina cultivation was very scattered; the population was very poor and moveable property hardly existed.

Extension of agricultural work was the first result of the conquest. Isolated planters helped by native labour were the pioneers. By clearing and irrigation and by employment of modern methods great improvements were effected. In 1913 the first agricultural bank was established in Saigon, and there are now thirty-two working all over the country. Great Colonial Companies have introduced industrial agriculture, which is now the main source of the income. Cultivated ground increases at an average rate of 35,000 hectares annually in Cochinchina and at 25,000 hectares in Tongking.

Rice is the most important product; it covers more than 2 million hectares in Cochinchina, 1½ in Tongking, and 2½ million in the three other Protectorates. Natives still prepare the ground by hand labour only, whereas the French planters use tractors. Formerly native norials or water-wheels were used exclusively for irrigation, but now, in many places, electric pumps are used for this purpose. Picking out and transplanting young plants must be done by hand. The production of paddy is about 7 million tons per annum, and produces about 4½ million tons of decorticated rice, of which the native population absorbs 3 million tons, leaving about 1½ million tons for export to China, Japan, Philippines, and India. The rice is of mediocre quality, but the Government is making great efforts to improve it.

To native vegetables sweet potatoes, taro, beans, soya beans, cucumbers, squash, melons and pumpkins, have been added. In the high tablelands many vegetables and fruits from Europe, such as cherries, apples and pears, are cultivated. In the south, mangoes, papayas, alligator pears, guavas, and mangosteens are grown. All over the country oranges, shaddocks, and lemons are cultivated, as well as lichis in Tongking.

Sugar cane, coffee, tea, pepper cover large plantations, owned by European planters or large limited companies. European capital is invested in the cultivation of textiles, jute, manila hemp, and ramie. Kapok and reeds are gathered by natives around their dwellings.

Hevea rubber was introduced into Indo-China about the year 1900, and its cultivation has proved as successful as in the Malay States. One hundred thousand hectares are now planted, and production, which amounts to 12,000 tons yearly, is constantly increasing. This industry suffers, as elsewhere, by the fall in prices, although Indo-

Chinese planters are favoured by a reduced tariff on the import of their products into France.

Other latices are gutta-percha and lacquer. Indo-China produces also sticklac, which is not a latex, but a kind of wax of an insect raised in Laos.

Benzoin, lemongrass, patchuli, badiana, cinnamon, camphor, and several tinctorial or tanning plants or trees are also grown in small quantities. There are plantations of tobacco of a common quality, which is used for the manufacture of cigars for native consumption.

Woods and forests cover an area of 32 million hectares; they are of a very different value, some very dense, and others very thinly stocked, with numerous glades. Natives often fire the forests in order to clean the soil. After a time the cleared places are invaded by "tranh," a weed that exhausts the soil and destroys every other vegetation. Precious woods, such as sandalwood, rosewood, tock ebony, certain kinds of mahogany and violet woods, are abundant, and pines, oaks, and chestnuts are found in the mountains in large quantities.

Afforestation and felling of trees are not yet what they ought to be, but a forestry service has been established to take care of the reservations and collect the taxes. About 1 million cubic metres of timber and 2 million cubic metres of firewood are yearly collected. Machinery is used for cutting and sawing wood in some places; in others elephants are employed for transporting trees and clearing stumps.

Elephants are bred in Cambodia, Laos, and Annam, but general breeding of cattle is not carried out extensively. The number of bovines is about 3 millions: small oxen, used for cart driving, and buffaloes. There are no sheep except in the very high tablelands, but plenty of goats; pigs, smaller than European, are also numerous. There exists a race of very small but vigorous rustic ponies, which are of less use since the appearance of automobiles. Contagious diseases are frequent, although the Government are trying to find remedies by hygienic measures and vaccination. Despite these difficulties, exports in raw skins amount to about 20 million francs a year.

A much greater success has been obtained in the fishing industry, of which the main profit comes from fisheries in Lake Tunle-Sap in Cambodia, which exports 100,000 tons of dried and salted fish of a value of 120 million francs, to which is added about 16 million francs of grease and oil. There exists also a small industry in tortoise-shell and mother-of-pearl. Of the Oceanographic Institute has been founded to study improvements in the fishing industry, I have already spoken.

Thirty-three thousand kilometres of roads have been built. The main road, covering the distance of 2,500 kilometres—the same distance as between Paris and Moscow—crosses the French possessions from China to Siam. It is built in asphalt and crosses rivers over steel and cement bridges, like all other roads built by the Colonial Budget. The roads, built at provincial expense, are all macadamized. They are all used by 20,000 public motor-cars, belonging to more than 200 public transportation companies, with a regular service for travellers.

Governor-General Doumer is responsible for the railway system. A main line, following the coast, joins Tongking to Cambodia, through Annam, over 2,500 kilometres; 950 are already built in the northern part and 470 in the southern. Three transversal lines cross this main line. The northern one is already built and penetrates the Chinese Province of Yunnan; the second is only begun, and will penetrate Laos; the third, partly constructed, will reach the frontier of Siam through Cambodia.

Thorough mining prospecting has just been started; the indications are promising, especially in Annam, Northern Tongking, and Laos. 17,000 permits have been given for prospecting, but only 350 mining claims have been granted. Anthracite is extracted to the extent of 2 million tons a year, of which 750,000 tons are for internal consumption and the remaining quantity is exported to Japan and China. The second place is taken by zinc (50,000 tons) and then comestin, wolfram, graphite, and antimony. Iron is only used by native industry, and some but little productive places are existing in Laos.

Industry began only after the French occupation. It began by rice decorticating factories and distilleries. Alcohol is now a Government monopoly. Tanyards and tobacco manufactures, and of recent years saw-mills, manufacture of matches, paper-mills, ceramic and brick factories, cement works (producing 50,000 tons yearly), have been built.

Salt is produced in a quantity sufficient for local consumption and even for exportation to China. Native arts, such as cabinet-making, weaving, embroidery, matting and basket manufacture, metal chiselling, etc., have been renewed and improved. To these industries have been added the making of flax and silk lace, woollen carpets and straw hats.

For the object of financing the industries and commerce generally, banks have been formed. The Banque de l'Indo-Chine has the privilege of issuing banknotes in piasters, the local currency, stabilized (one piaster equals 10 francs). The Banque Franco-Chinoise pour le

Commerce et l'Industrie, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; Ltd., the Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China, and the Yokohama Specie Bank all have agencies in Saigon, and some in Haiphong, Hanoi, Prom-Penh, and other important places. It has been estimated that the French capital now invested in Indo-China amounts to $8\frac{1}{2}$ billion francs.

The increase in commerce is the best proof of the development of the country. The total commerce in 1900 amounted to 132 million piasters, and to 568 million in 1928. The average value of commerce, excluding goods in transit during the last five years, has been 650 million piasters, the average of imports being 250 million and 400 million of exports, of which France's share is about 50 per cent. in imports and 30 per cent. in exports.

The principal imported articles are textiles, yarns, clothes, building materials of steel, motor-cars, bicycles, and railway material. Imported foodstuffs come mostly from China, and petrol from the U.S.A. and Dutch Indies. Exports consist mostly of rice, maize, coal, rubber, and

foodstuffs.

The two main ports are Saigon and Haiphong, not including coastal and river trade, 4,500 ocean-going ships, of which 1,500 were steamers, of a total tonnage of 5,400,000 tons, entered the port of Saigon in 1930, and of which the French transported 1,600,000 tons, Japanese 900,000 tons, and English 750,000 tons. This port is situated 80 kilometres from the sea, but big liners and men-of-war can enter it. It is provided with 3,500 meters of wharves equipped with modern implements. Haiphong in Tongking is only 25 kilometres from the sea, but is less deep. Its wharf, which is only 800 metres long, but very modernly equipped, has also been used by 800 ships carrying a total tonnage of 800,000. Other less important ports play their part in the life of the country.

The above figures represent only the high sea commerce; the coastal

and river trade is difficult to estimate.

The present trade depression has had its repercussion in Indo-China. During the last two years the country has suffered from the general world depression and uneasiness, but its resources are great; the spirit of initiative shown by the Colonists is such that everybody is ready to seize the first opportunity of getting back to business again.

The natives of Indo-China are grateful for the prosperity introduced by the French. During the World War 50 thousand of them came to France and were of great use, if not in the trenches, where they did not appear in great numbers, then in the rear, where they were employed as mechanics and skilled workmen, thereby releasing an equivalent number of French soldiers for the front. No revolt of any sort was made during the war; but some movements, provoked by the neighbouring Bolshevists of China, sometimes took place, but there has never been any danger of serious rebellion.

Indo-China has good facilities for tourists. Good hotels are to be found everywhere, and motor-cars travel over excellent roads to convey people to the wonderful ruins of Angkor and to the picturesque palaces of Annam and Cambodia. There are good theatres in Saigon and Hanoi which are well worth a visit. Dalat and Bokor are refreshing and cool resting-places. Sportsmen find every kind of game, from quail, partridge, wild fowl, and peacock to panther, tiger, wild buffalo, gaur, rhinoceros, and elephant.

The only words I can now add are to thank you for the patience with which you have listened to me, and to ask you to go and visit our Colony and see what France has done for it.

You will be welcome!

The French Ambassador said it was many years since he had visited Indo-China, and his memories dated back to the time of the Chinese Revolution; the border country was then for a few years very unquiet. He thanked Monsieur Casenave for the account he had given of progress in Indo-China.

In answer to a question, Monsieur Casenave said the accounts of Communist troubles had been much exaggerated. The Government

had had no real anxiety on that score.

Sir Reginald Johnston thanked Monsieur Casenave most warmly for his lecture. He hoped, as means of communication grew easy, more English would visit Indo-China, and enjoy its rich variety of interests and its beautiful ruins in Angkor.

OFF THE BEATEN TRACK IN PALESTINE AND SYRIA: RÉSUMÉ OF THE ROUTE FOLLOWED

BY COLONEL H. CROCKER, C.M.G., D.S.O.

(Lantern lecture given on January 12, 1932.)

URING the course of my travels I visited Petra, stopping at Jericho and Jerash on the way, and then returned to Jerusalem. I set off again and made for Tiberias, where I turned east past the Rottenburg Power Station, and, climbing through the mountains of Gilead, emerged on the upland plain of the northern part of Transjordan.

I continued my journey eastwards across the frontier into the Jebel Druse, round the old fortress of Salkhud to the capital, Sueda, and

then along the main motor road to Damascus.

From Damascus I went to Baalbek, where I stayed the night, then

back to Damascus and out into the desert to Palmyra.

From Palmyra I journeyed northwards through Homs and Hama to Aleppo, and the next day I went to Antioch. Then back again to Aleppo.

From Aleppo I commenced my return journey down the sea coast, visiting Latakia, Tripoli, and turned up into the mountains to see the

cedars of Lebanon.

Thence down the coast through Sidon, Beirut to Haifa, and so back to Jerusalem through the great valley of Armageddon, visiting Samaria on the way.

Petra

I then hired a car and engaged my old guide at Jerusalem and started off one fine morning for Petra. We went down the modern motor road to Jericho which follows to some extent the ancient Roman road and passes the ruins of the inn of the Good Samaritan, a desolate, dreary spot, well adapted for the activities of robbers. It is easy to imagine the hold-up that took place a month or two ago on the very road. At one point on the roadside I saw a large opening lead-

ing down to underground galleries, which served the old-time bandits as a refuge from the soldiers of Herod the Great.

We soon reached the plain of the Jordan many hundreds of feet below sea-level and, leaving the Dead Sea away to the left, we turned right-handed along the road to Jericho. The modern town is built close to the ancient city, which was in process of excavation by Professor Garstang. I was able to see the remains of the ancient walls and some of the houses. The site of the city is most impressive, being close under the mighty rampart of the Judean Hills which tower high above the plain. From Jericho we went through the plain, once a land of milk and honey, but now covered with coarse grass on which the Bedawin feed their camels, and so to the Jordan, flowing under the shade of a thick fringe of willows. We crossed the river by the iron suspension bridge, known as the Allenby Bridge, and climbed up through the stern mountains of Moab. Everywhere the wild flowers were marvellous, and made a carpet ablaze with every conceivable colour.

After some distance we ran through the town of Salt and then turned northwards to visit the ruins of Jerash, one of the ancient Roman cities of the Plain. The first indication of the wonders of this city is the ruins of the great triumphal arch, which stands on a slight rise. There are the main entrance and two side entrances. A short distance further on I came to the city itself with a long colonnade and the main street, where the marks of the chariot wheels were still visible, leading to the magnificent temple. On a hill to the left stood the Governor's palace, and close by was the theatre. The view as I stood at the top end of the temple looking down over the ruins was indescribably beautiful, in spite of the utter destruction of the place. In some buildings which had evidently been Christian churches I saw some very fine mosaics.

We stopped the night at Amman, the seat of the Government of Transjordan, where there is an excellent hotel, and continued our journey to Petra the following morning. We followed the ancient Pilgrim route, along which Doughty toiled some seventy years ago, and it was interesting to see that the stone pavings of which he speaks are still in position in the fords of the rivers, where they were placed for the benefit of the camels.

We had sent on ahead to the police at Ain Musa to have ponies ready for us. As we approached the mountainous region at the southeast end of the Dead Sea we passed the spring where Moses is supposed to have struck the rock, and shortly afterwards drew up at the village of Ain Musa, where the car could go no further. Here the police had ponies waiting for us, and after lashing our kit on to the mules, we mounted and rode down a narrow path. It was very bad going, and I soon slipped off and walked. The path gradually descended through the hills, and I could soon see the serrated tops of the original level of the country, eaten away in a million fantastic shapes by the action of countless centuries of rain. We were now among the rocks, and the first rock dwellings of this marvellous place came into view. They stood like great cubes, cut bodily from the side of the hills and hollowed out to form a house. They were inhabited by a wild people without laws or property, who stared at us as we passed. After passing a great façade of a temple we turned the corner close to the fort and plunged into the "sik," a narrow ravine leading to the city. It was a marvellous spot. On either hand the great rock walls towered up to heaven, hundreds of feet above our head, and here for the first time I realized the meaning of the description—the "Rose-red City." The rocks were literally rose-red, and of every shade imaginable, from the palest pink and salmon to deep crimson and indigo and brown. The "sik" was so narrow that I could almost touch both sides with my outstretched arms as I walked along.

Presently, on turning a corner, I found the Temple of Isis in front of me, a wondrous façade hewn out of the solid rock of a pale rose-red colour. The carvings were almost perfect. The sight of this exquisite temple suddenly appearing out of the gloom of the "sik" was overwhelming, and I could well imagine the feelings of devout thankfulness which must have filled the breasts of the weary travellers who had survived the dangers of the terrible desert journey.

Turning sharply to the right, the route widened and I soon passed the theatre, cut in a semicircle out of the claret-coloured rocks in the side of the hill. From the size of the theatre the population must have run into many thousands. Temples were now numerous, and on either hand rose vast façades carved in a severe style. It was not so much the carvings, though they were wonderful enough, but the grandeur and immensity of the conceptions of these glorious shrines that took away one's breath and caused one to halt and gaze with wonder.

I walked on down the watercourse and soon saw the camp in front of me where I was to stay. This camp is run by Messrs. Cook

for the use of travellers, who can stay as long as they like. Guides and escorts, without which no one is permitted to leave the camp, are provided, and the traveller is free to go where he likes with his escort.

It is impossible in a short lecture like this to do anything approaching justice to the glory and the sheer beauty of Petra. For four days I wandered about, scrambling over the rocks, up the half broken stairways, ever finding fresh wonders and delights. Perhaps the spot that impressed me the most was the great High Place, where the people worshipped their god Dushera 4,000 years ago.

From Petra I returned to Jerusalem, visiting several Arab tents on the way. After a few days to have my photographs developed and printed, I set out again on the principal part of my journey, through the Jebel Druse to Damascus and Aleppo. I reached Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee the first night, and visited the ruins of Capernaum, now being restored. The next day I crossed the Jordan south of the lake and made for the hills of Gilead along a rough track that did duty for a road. I passed a good many camel caravans, and after halting for customs at a little village, I drew up at Erbit. Here I enlisted the services of a local guide and dashed off into the wilds to see some ruins, hitherto unexplored. My guide, surely one of the world's optimists, took us by a terrible route and at length landed us among a mass of boulders. At this my chauffeur, Mahmoud, waxed furious: "May your beard grow backwards and choke you!" he howled at the guide; "where is the road?"-"Surely your beautiful car can go here," replied the guide.—" If my car was on your feet, O son of asses, it might!" retorted Mahmoud. Fortunately we had not far to walk, and I had a wonderful day exploring these old ruins. I nearly came to grief in an underground tunnel where the roof had fallen in, but I found my way out by a jackal burrow. The place had evidently been used as a tomb. There were theatres, and remains of various buildings now sadly ruined, with their great columns lying on the ground.

I stayed the night at Erbit, and feasted on goat kababs, "liban," and Arab bread. After a good night, untroubled with "creepers," I made an early start and soon found myself in the Jebel Druse country, crossing the frontier at Daraa, where the French have a post. Here I had to undergo passport and customs formalities, which were soon accomplished, and I sailed away due east through the awful desert of the Jebel Druse. For mile after mile the ground was covered with lava, in blocks and stones. There was not a scrap of vegetation and

no water. How the goats, of which I passed enormous flocks, lived remains a mystery. The people are a fine independent race, very hospitable to strangers when once their confidence has been gained. There were ruins of the Roman cities everywhere, mighty columns rising from the mean hovels built around them, their grandly carven capitals seeking the pure air of heaven as if in protest at the squalor at their feet. Mighty water towers, their pipes still in the walls, rose at intervals, bringing the water from the distant hills to the fountains which are still used by the women, who draw the water in kerosene tins, which have replaced the more graceful pitcher. The romantic story of Rebekah drawing water for the camels has been killed utterly and for ever; you cannot imagine her drawing the water in a kerosene tin.

After crawling over one of the worst sections of road in the country, we rounded the grim old fortress of Salkhud and, turning northwards, we ran to Sueda, the capital. Here I stopped a few days to see the sights and especially to run out to the magnificent ruins of Kanawat. The road was atrocious, but the French with their customary zeal are making a very fine motor road for the benefit of the tourist. Kanawat is built of black basalt, and has a grim sombre effect. The buildings are magnificent, the great temple to Baal-Jupiter being especially fine. The triumphal arch which was falling down is being entirely rebuilt on concrete foundations. I roamed about the city, marvelling at the great reservoirs still in use, which supplied the city with pure spring water, and the great stone aqueducts which feed the flour mills in the adjacent valley, where I could see the ruins of a succession of mills. Down below was the theatre and other buildings. Many of the ancient stone doors, beautifully carved and weighing the best part of a ton, have been built into the modern dwellings. For all their weight they turn at the touch of a finger. They were identical with the doors of many of the underground tombs I had seen in earlier ruins.

I left Sueda one morning on our long run to Damascus. The road was in process of repairs, and hundreds of men, women, and donkeys were busily at work collecting earth. The countryside was extremely dreary. On either hand the gaunt lava plain stretched for miles. Finally turning left-handed, we ran through a narrow gap and emerged on the fertile plain of Syria. To the north loomed a bleak volcanic range, while away to the west stretched the plain, green with corn. Towards evening we ran into Damascus, which we had

seen from afar, a veritable oasis of bright green, overshadowed by the outlying spurs of the Lebanon. Damascus was the scene of the projected massacre of the French by the Druse in the '25 rising. The Druse had gathered in a certain quarter and the massacre was planned for midnight. At ten o'clock the Governor opened fire with his artillery on this quarter and destroyed it. Fortunately the street called Strait, which runs through this quarter, was not harmed by the French shells.

From Damascus I motored out to Baalbek, with its magnificent temples and ruins. The chief wonder of the place lies in the colossal stones built into the fortifications, and a yet larger stone still lying in the quarry. There are many legends as to the origin of this wonderful city, but no authentic records seem to exist.

I stayed the night at Baalbek in order to view the ruins by moon-light, and then, returning to Damascus, I went to Palmyra, far out in the desert. There is no road, but the cars follow the tracks of preceding cars. There had been heavy rain, and we passed a long procession of cars and buses stuck in the mud. Luckily, however, we managed to find a good route, though I often had to walk along in front and find the way.

Palmyra, the city of Zenobia, is for ever steeped in the tradition of that great Queen. Her palace stands on a hill, where it dominates the city at its feet. There is the triumphal arch, now in course of restoration, with a long avenue of magnificent columns leading to it. Away to one side is an exquisite little temple. The great temple of Baal-Jupiter stands close to the miserable village that has sprung up, including a couple of wretched so-called hotels and a few shops. The valleys surrounding the city are full of tombs, built in the form of square towers containing chambers in which the bodies were placed on shelves. They have been long since looted, but nowadays I was glad to see the French are strictly preserving ancient monuments. An Arab who wrote his name on a temple got several months in prison and a heavy fine.

We know very little of Palmyra, or Tadmor as it was called. Solomon, we are told, kept a chariot garrison there as it commanded the trade route between Nineveh and Syria. By keeping to the valley of the Lebanon he was thus able to avoid Damascus, the seat of his enemies.

From Palmyra I made for Aleppo. We had considerable difficulty in ploughing through the slippery mud of the desert until we reached

the high road from Damascus. This was under repair, and should be a magnificent motor road when finished.

We stopped the first night at Homs, where I visited the great reservoir and old Roman barrage. The following day we passed through Hama, with its giant water-wheels and villages with the curious beehive huts. Aleppo is a fine modern city with well laid out streets and shops and hotels. My first interest was to visit the grim old castle built on a mound which dominates the city. Originally built to protect the place against the inroads of the Hittites, it has gradually been enlarged, and has played an important part in the defence of the district against Babylon, Egypt, and other countries. The French are busy exploring the castle, and have discovered many secret chambers hidden within its depths. The bazaars of Aleppo are well worth a visit and compare favourably with those at Cairo. I wandered for hours through street after street of shoemakers, surrounded by rows of red and yellow slippers, while goldsmiths, tailors, and every other merchant thronged the narrow crowded alleys, half hidden in obscurity.

I left Aleppo one morning for Antioch on the Orontes. On the way we passed through a range of rugged mountains, and in the Pass we came across the ruins of an ancient convent, the "kasr Banat." It was a desolate place and I felt sorry for the unfortunate girls who had been incarcerated there. The ancient city of Antioch has been entirely replaced by a modern town with several hotels. I drove out to see the great Roman aqueducts and the stone wall which blocked a valley and served as a defence from the interior. A few miles out of Antioch I saw the lovely valley of Daphne, which has been a picnic resort from the earliest days of Antioch. Hewn in the rock above the town is the church of St. Peter, and close to it are several gigantic figures carved in the face of the cliff. The bazaars are interesting, and here I saw the weavers making exquisite silk and fine cotton cloth. The men wear picturesque scarlet jackets, which lend a striking note of colour to the grimy streets.

I had to return to Aleppo, and the next day I started on my return journey down the coast. I stopped the night at Latakia, where the harbour is being enlarged to deal with the cotton and tobacco trade, and then made for Tripoli with its castle overlooking the town. After leaving Tripoli we turned up into the mountains to visit the cedars of Lebanon. There is a good motor road, which is put in repair after the winter, and we soon found ourselves among the great spurs and shoulders of the mighty hills. Far down below

us I could see the Mediterranean sparkling in the sun, and above rose the crests of the mountains, covered with a mantle of snow. At length we drew into a village where we were to stay the night. After a good luch we went on to the cedars, which grow at the head of a great valley rising from the sea. There is a clump of a few hundred great trees, all that is left of the vast forests that once covered the mountains. The ground was covered with snow, and the dark green of the trees with their background of snow made a wonderfully picturesque scene. It was intensely cold out of the sun, and I only stayed there an hour or two to admire and photograph the trees. Then we returned to the village, where we stayed the night. The French are making a motor road from Baalbek to the cedars through the mountains which will prove a great boon to travellers.

The next morning we left early and ran along the coast road to Beirut, where I stayed the night. All along this road there are countless ruins of towns and castles and tombs, many of which I visited. Away in the hills, too, are old Crusaders' castles, but to my regret it was impossible to visit them on account of the bad state of the roads, which were flooded by heavy rains.

We stopped at Byblos to see the excavations, where they have recently discovered the remains of an extensive city with wonderful tombs containing gold treasures at a great depth. There is a fine Crusaders' church at Tartuz with magnificent arches, almost in perfect preservation. Between Beirut and Haifa we crossed the bridge over the Dog river, with the old Roman bridge some little distance away upstream. Tradition asserts that in olden days there was a figure of a dog placed here, which was made to bark during the night and keep the sentries awake. Close by, carved in the face of the cliff, are numerous inscriptions, placed there by the various armies which have used this great high road. Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian, French, and British, have all passed by and left their records. Close to the road are many old Phænician tombs, hollowed deeply underground and surmounted with solid stone pillars.

We stopped at Sidon, but could not get to the old castle as the stone bridge had been broken in a storm. There is but little trade here nowadays, chiefly oranges and vegetables. Continuing our trip we ran along the sands to Haifa and climbed up Mount Carmel to the German Hospice, where I stayed the night. The harbour of Haifa is being enlarged to allow ocean-going ships to lay alongside. When the transdesert railway and the pipe line for the oil are completed, Haifa will be

a very important place. There will be direct railway communication from Calais to Basra, while the oil will be available for our Navy direct without having to go through the Canal. Both pipe line and railway will be in British Mandated Territory.

After leaving Haifa we ran through the great fertile valley of Armageddon and saw the excavations at the village of Megiddo, where a city of Solomon has been discovered, lunched at Nablus, and reached Jerusalem that evening after a thoroughly delightful tour through the country.

The splendid motor roads of Syria and the care taken of the ruins go far to attract the traveller.

Political Situation in Palestine

I am not a politician, and can only state what I saw myself and heard from those who really know the situation.

The Arabs have a deep-rooted grievance against the Government for allowing the Jews to enter the country and possess the land which the Arabs regard as their own. I pointed out, however, that the Arabs were not forced to sell their land, and that, if they refused to sell it, the Jews could not possess it. There was no answer to this argument. Arabs have a grievance that owners of land, who have sold their land, are not allowed by Jewish regulations to be employed on that land, but I failed to see the justice of this complaint. Again, they need not have sold it.

From what I gathered from Jews themselves, they do not like being settled on the land and prefer to be in the towns. Many told me that they would gladly return to the countries whence they had come if they were allowed to do so, but, of course, they are not allowed.

It is unfortunate that among the Jewish immigrants there are many undesirables, who are impregnated with Bolshevik' principles and do their best to cause unrest among the Arabs. They distribute leaflets urging Arabs to oppose the Government, not to pay taxes, and to defend their land and the honour of their women against the foreigners. They know, of course, that Bolshevism is distasteful to the Moslem, and they cleverly disguise their doctrines under the cloak of anti-Government agitation. So far, however, their efforts seem to meet with very little success.

Government contractors told me that until Jewish labour came into the country, strikes among Arab labourers were unknown. They have learnt the habit from the Jews, and now strikes are the usual thing. Jewish settlements are making great headway in the Plain of Jezreel and just north of the Sea of Galilee and in the great orange plantations near Jaffa. The difference between the Jew and Arab cultivator is remarkable, the one up to date in methods and machinery and the other content with the methods of 4,000 years ago.

Palestine, from an agricultural point of view, has several serious difficulties to contend with:

- 1. Lack of water supply.
- 2. Locusts.
- 3. Apathy of Arab cultivators.

Lack of water and slight rainfall is responsible for serious loss of crops. When I was there the wheat crop near Beersheba failed, and the goats were being fed on the few stalks that existed. Lack of straw and grass resulted in the death of hundreds of sheep and goats. I was told that there is a plentiful underground supply of water in this district, but the expense of tapping it would be very heavy. It is difficult to make the Bedawin work energetically to combat the swarms of "hoppers," even when their own living is threatened.

Finally, the general apathy of the Arab and his hatred of new methods prevent improvement in agricultural activities. He prefers the antiquated plough, harnessed to camels, donkeys, ponies, and oxen, used in the time of the Patriarchs, to modern appliances.

In this respect, by the way, I asked particularly whether the reports spread in the Press were true that women were harnessed to the ploughs side by side with animals. The answer from every Arab cultivator was a decided negative. They stated that they had never heard of such a thing being done.

With regard to the recent massacres of Jews by Arabs, it is a curious fact that Jews made no effort to defend themselves. In one house where over twenty Jews were killed by a few Arabs, several loaded revolvers were found in the pockets of the dead Jews. It seems incredible that not one shot had been fired.

I have read in the Press that the Arabs at Nablus rioted against the establishment of Government sealed armouries for the use of Jews.

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A NOTE ON OUTER MONGOLIA

UP to a few years ago, the fertile if undeveloped province of Outer Mongolia with its capital at Urga—the word only means Yamen or official residence—was one of the outer dependencies of China, whose suzerainty was recognized by an annual gift of sables, and whose authority was maintained by a few officials, although the actual administration of the country was in the hands of the four great Wangs or Chiefs who were recognized by the Mongolian nomads.

The Bogdo Gegen was the supreme spiritual head, the incarnation of the deity, and was remarkable, at least in Central Asia, as being the possessor of a real elephant, said to have come from Siam. Now, alas, both Gegen and elephant are dead.

With its forests, lakes, and pastures, its mineral wealth and navigable rivers, and a fine fur industry, the province was rich and prosperous. The population north of the Great Altai range was chiefly Mongol, mostly Uriankhai Kalmucks, some being lamaistic Buddhists, some Shamanists. To the south, between the Irtish river and the mountains, there were Kirei Kasaks and comparatively few Kalmucks, who usually only crossed to the south of the range for the winter months, and then only in small numbers.

The state of affairs was thus peaceful and satisfactory. The "face" of China was preserved, the Mongols were left alone, and even European settlers were not discouraged. Now, thanks to the occupation of the country by Bolshevists, all is changed. The Wangs are killed or imprisoned, the capital has been moved north to Verkhne Udinsk, the young Mongols are being initiated into the infinite charity of the Soviet régime, and the province is now awakened by the clarions of Red October, to the infinite discomfort and even misery of most of the simple folk.

The only part of Outer Mongolia now left to China is that part, already referred to, between the River Irtish and the Great Altai. This is a well-wooded but thinly populated tract, but can hardly be said to compensate China for the province she has lost.

It may be urged that Outer Mongolia was so loosely held that its value was rather nominal than actual to its suzerain; but, as a matter of fact, quite apart from the serious loss of face, the theft of this

territory is a real loss to the Chinese, for with the advent of the Soviet the former trade with China proper has almost wholly vanished.

Both from Sin-Kiang in the south, and from the coastal ports in the east, a considerable volume of commerce flowed to Mongolia. (It may be noted that practically all Inner Mongolia, which is still in Chinese hands, is desert). Like so many races in Central Asia, the Mongols were very dependent on China, a dependence, too, which could not be transferred to Russia. Silk, tea, porcelain and the like, exclusively Chinese products, are wanted throughout Central Asia, whether the people be Moslem or Infidel, and the Mongols have a very highly developed taste for the luxuries as well as necessaries of China. Thus there was a good and profitable trade to Outer Mongolia, which sent in return hides, wool, gold, and furs, all very acceptable on the coast. Horns and certain vegetable products were also sent for use as drugs. But now, with the almost total cessation of the trade, both Chinese merchants and Mongolian nomads suffer accordingly. An occasional caravan with tea or dried fruit and other local produce reaches Kobdo more or less surreptitiously from Guchen in the Zungarian region of North Sin-Kiang, but, strictly speaking, all intercourse with the lost province is forbidden, and the frontier is closed. This is not a mere piece of abortive vindictiveness on the part of the Chinese, but the unfriendly attitude and conduct of the Bolshevized Kalmucks have brought this about.

Especially near Barkul and Guchen, on the north-eastern border between the two provinces, there is a good deal of unrest. From the latter town the Chinese have laid a telegraph to the frontier, but the difficulties of watching this immense no-man's land with its sparse population are wellnigh insuperable and "incidents" are unavoidable. The immigration into Sin-Kiang from Outer Mongolia shows that conditions are bad, and that the Mongols no more appreciate the Soviet régime than do the Mohammedan nomads in Russian Eastern Turkestan. There have been considerable settlements by refugee Kalmucks on the northern slopes of the Barkul and Bogdo Ola ranges of the Tian Shan in the last ten years. There is, too, a tendency to leave the Sin-Kiang side of the frontier, as the Outer Mongolians are bad neighbours.

As long as Soviet ways rule in Outer Mongolia, it is useless to discuss the future of the country, which is beginning to pass through the lamentable gamut of misery, penury, and final decay, which is the gift of Bolshevist Russia to the peoples it enslaves. The Mongols are

singularly subdued, but what can they do to cast off the yoke? Their placid easy-going nature, wholly inexperienced in political action, and their economic conditions make their subjugation easy. Their wangs are dead, their fatalistic creed sees in their cruel fate the decree of heaven, and until a spiritual leader is reborn, so long will they be thus cowed: and the solemn portent of a white wolf can alone herald the coming of the Bogdo Gegen, the Inspired one of the Mountain, and no one has yet been vouchsafed the sight of this animal.

The part of Outer Mongolia remaining to China, and usually known as the Altai, is now incorporated in the province of Sin-Kiang, and is under a Taotai resident at Sharasume (in Chinese Cheng-Wa-Ssu, the expanding flower), a pleasant town on a brawling stream, a tributary of the Kran (which holds good sterlet). The town has a population of about 2,000, largely augmented during the summer months when there is a steady influx of gold-diggers. The bazaar is very good, but prices are exorbitant, which is natural enough in a mining town, for after all the country produces nothing, and all supplies have to be brought from immense distances. An effort is now being made to grow wheat and barley in the plains on the right of the Irtish, and several new settlements, appropriately equipped with mandarins and yamens, have been established. There is no reason why enough for the present population should not be grown. There is a consulate of the U.S.S.R. in Sharasume, but it is poorly housed in the bazaar.

From the capital of the Altai there is a well-known route over the mountains by the Urmogatai pass to Kobdo, and formerly there was considerable traffic, but since the frontier has been closed this busy track is only used by some rare caravan that manages to steal through.

Sharasume is now a very remote spot, and although connected by telegraph with the south, it is cut off by the deserts of Zungaria. The road is long, bitterly cold in winter, and rendered even more difficult by the mosquitoes and sandflies of summer; but there is a regular and expeditious postal service, which extends as far as Chimunai or Maikapchagai, on the Siberian frontier, where letters are interchanged with the Soviet post office.

The Irtish river is a fine stream, and in spring is a terrifying sight as its great turbulent and turbid waters roll through the plain, flooding the surrounding country. Its tributaries, especially the Kran and the Burchun, are nearly as large. In old days steamers used to come from Russia as far as the junction of the Irtish with the Burchun river,

but now the large Russian house of the trading company is used as a yamen by the amban.

The conditions in the Altai are Siberian and differ markedly from the south of Chinese Central Asia; but this remnant of Outer Mongolia is very lovely in the summer months, and certainly a land of possibilities, and the return of the rest of the province to the easy suzerainty of China is much to be desired.

INDIRECT ELECTION IN INDIA AND THE WOMEN'S FRANCHISE

Notes on an address given by Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.S.I., at a Members' Meeting on January 28, 1932, General Sir A. Montgomery Massingherd in the Chair.

SIR HENRY LAWRENCE:

The principal factor in this problem of indirect election in India is the immensity of the population. In order to grasp the matter more easily, I will speak in round figures which are sufficiently approximate. Let us take the adult population in India at 300 millions. If every adult had a vote, the Simon Commission put the figure of voters at 300 millions; and of this figure, one-half is male and one-half is female—that is to say, there would be 150 million men voting and 150 million women voting, if you have universal adult suffrage. It is, of course, quite possible to argue, as a friend of mine, a Professor of Oxford University, was arguing to me this week, that women should not have the vote at all; that the franchise of women has destroyed the authority of the father in the home and is wrecking the State. But I think we can leave that kind of argument aside and accept the view-probably the only point on which the Simon Commission and the Indian National Congress are in agreement—that adult suffrage is a desirable thing. The Simon Commission add "as an ultimate objective," because they saw no means of making it effective.

Now, when we apply English ideas to Indian conditions, we have to make all kinds of adjustments and adaptations, and I do not wish to suggest for a moment that the adjustments or adaptations which will be necessary in order to secure a workable scheme of adult suffrage will be easy. Neither will they be free from many objections which critics, with the best intentions, are bound to point out. I wish to stress this point, however: that it is essential at this stage, when all administrative machinery in India is plastic and malleable, to provide a scheme which will in the long run make it possible for the humbler classes to organize their own defence against tyranny and oppression. It is quite true that they may not understand how to make the best use of this weapon for some time to come, but I know that even the humblest

classes in India have a great power of cohesion and can work together in groups under their own chosen headmen. I have seen some remarkable examples of their discipline and obedience to their leaders in times of plague, which might well have shattered all cohesion through sheer panic.

I am perfectly willing to grant that the method may not work efficiently for some time to come; I am willing to grant that there are conditions, such as prevail in the great cities or in remote forests, where it may be exceedingly difficult to set up the same machinery as can work well in the villages; but it is on the rural population in the villages that my eyes are primarily set—on the five or six hundred thousand villages in which, as the Simon Commission point out, the great mass of the people live and die without changing their abode.

Let us hark back to that figure, 300 millions. The population of all the towns of a size above five thousand inhabitants represents 10 per If it were found impossible to apply cent. of that 300 millions. this system to the towns, is it not worth while to apply it to 90 per cent. of the population and have some variation for the other 10 per cent.? If you agree with me that adult suffrage is desirable you may well ask, Is it possible? I doubt whether it is worth while to go into the details of how it can be worked. This is a point which is being investigated by the Franchise Commission in India at this moment. But I would say this: This scheme was discussed eighteen months ago by a committee appointed by the Royal Empire Society, a committee which included representatives of all the services in India. These were men who had held high office in each province of India, and after several days of discussion these men gave their unanimous consent to the statement that the scheme could be worked in each province of India. Let me read their report on the point:

"Nevertheless we believe, as we have said, that it is essential that the mass of the people should be represented in the provincial councils if the measure of parliamentary government proposed by the Commission is brought into effect. It is the masses who will suffer if self-government degenerates into mis-government, and it is only fair that the masses should be provided with some means of exercising such influence as is for them possible over the provincial legislature and the provincial executive. One of the chief pre-occupations of the British Government in India hitherto has been the protection of the peasant and the labourer, and if the British Government now relinquishes its power of intervention between the rich and the poor, and between the

powerful and the weak, it is in duty bound to provide the poor and the weak with the means of defending themselves. They require the vote, not solely or even mainly as 'an instrument for political education,' but

as a weapon of self-defence.

"The grant of complete adult suffrage being out of the question for the reasons already indicated, the solution of the problem must be sought on other lines, and we believe that the requirements of the case could, at least for the present and the next generation, be met by some system of indirect elections. What particular system is most suitable is a matter for further consideration, as the Commission have not developed this theme, but of one thing we are fairly certain-namely, that the solution is not to be found in a docile imitation of western systems of franchise. We venture to put forward one constructive suggestion. Representation by a headman (often known as the mukhi, or mouthpiece) is well known in many communities in various parts of India, and is capable of adaptation for the purpose of giving the illiterate millions some voice in the selection of the authority by whom they are to be governed. We do not suggest any restriction of the present individual franchise of the literate voter, but we hold that, in addition, the illiterate masses should be given the opportunity of voting through their chosen spokesmen. We agree with the Commission that the machinery for recording votes would break down if it were required to record 100,000,000 illiterate votes within a few days, but if the 100,000,000 illiterate voters were divided into groups of twenty, each of which would select its own spokesman, there would be only 5,000,000 voting spokesmen to deal with.

"The number of persons to be allotted to each group and the other details of such a scheme would have to be worked out locally. We suggest that for every three or four districts or similar areas of suitable size, a registrar should be appointed, whose duty it would be in the first place to supervise the formation of all the male adults of the villages into groups. It would probably be convenient as a general rule that each group should consist of persons of the same caste or community; but this arrangement is not essential, and the villagers would in many cases be able and should be encouraged to form their own groups by agreement among themselves. After the groups had been formed, each group would proceed to select one of its members as its voting spokesman, and the registrar would enter his name in the voting register, after deciding any disputes that might arise. All the proceedings would be held either in the village or at a centre con-

venient to the village. The voting spokesmen would vote by ballot at polling centres as at the present elections. Similar arrangements could be made in most towns with the advice of ward or *mahalla* committees, though in a few large cities special measures might be required in congested localities with a fluctuating population."

I wish to add a few more words because I have just received a cable from India asking me to furnish some details regarding the method of forming groups, the registration of group-members, and the holding of elections of spokesmen. In my opinion, the election of the spokesmen or spokeswomen is the key to the whole scheme. The register of the spokesmen or spokeswomen should become a regular village document, kept up and revised from year to year by the same machinery which exists in every village for the maintenance of the records of rights of land. No doubt you are all aware of the highly elaborate system whereby every piece of land, however small, is recorded; the method by which it is cultivated is recorded; the rights which people other than the cultivating tenant hold over it are recorded—i.e., rights of mortgage, transfer on sale, or gift. Every minute detail is kept on record by a village officer, is inspected and re-inspected by superior officers, and is the foundation of the wonderfully efficient system of land administration which prevails throughout India. Now, with machinery of this kind it would not be a difficult task in the villages-and again I emphasize that it is in the villages that this scheme is primarily intended to operate—to divide up the houses into groups of five or ten or twenty, according to the unit that may be selected; to have a meeting-in the village meeting house or under the pipal tree—of the men and women of that group, and for the village officer to enter in a register the name of the person, whether male or female, chosen to be the spokesman or spokeswoman of that group. This register would be revised every year, subject to inspection by superior officers, in exactly the same way as the record of rights is kept up to date. The election of spokesmen would not have any reference to the election of the Legislative Council. It would cause some confusion to have the two elections coming on simultaneously; but the election of the Legislative Council would be held on the register of the recorded spokesmen in existence at the time when the Legislative Council was dissolved. I think that the election of the spokesmen might be determined to hold good for a period of five years, but this again is an entirely immaterial detail. The houses forming a group would ordinarily, for the sake of convenience, be houses of close adjacency, and, according to the usual village system, a group of adjacent houses is generally inhabited by the same caste of people. But there is no necessity to lay stress on this point either. It should not be made a hard-and-fast rule that the group must consist of the same caste, for the less official interference—which tends to foster caste cleavage—the better.

I must get back to the primary purpose of my letter to *The Times* of December 10th last, which was to advocate that women should take their share in this group election. This seems to me to follow automatically, if once the two premises are admitted—firstly, that it is desirable that women should be given some means of protecting their interests in the New India, and, secondly, that the system of group election is administratively practicable. When you have established those two points the case seems, to my untutored view, to be proved. And I think it rests with those who object to bring forward good reasons for their objection. In that committee to which I have referred, the committee of the Royal Empire Society, objection was indeed taken. But after the many months of past reflection that I have been able to give to these objections, I still consider them to be entirely illogical and unreasonable. The committee said:

"We can see no object, as matters stand, in enfranchising several million women who have received no literary education of any kind, and who cannot be expected to have the slightest grasp of the political problems with which the country is likely to be faced during the next generation. They would either not use their votes at all, or would use them at the bidding of the men to whose influence they are subject."

On that my remark would be that the women of these illiterate classes are exactly like the men. They will be as fit as the men to grasp political problems, no more and no less.

But you will observe that in this scheme of indirect election, political problems do not enter. These primary voters will be concerned simply with the selection of men or women of their acquaintance in whom they have some confidence. It is immaterial on what grounds they place that confidence. It may be his or her courage, it may be his or her good looks, it may be his or her eloquence; so long as Mr. Ram Das or Mrs. Ram Das, or Mr. Mohammad Ali or Mrs. Mohammad Ali, is considered to be the best spokesman or spokeswoman, let that person be so registered.

It is also to my mind immaterial whether you have the election of one person by a group of 25 or the election of two or three or four persons by a group of 100 or any other variation

in between. It is immaterial to my mind whether the women vote in separate groups from the men or in combination with the men. You cannot expect to establish at one stroke the most perfect system that will work for all time. There must be modifications that will grow of themselves. Let us establish the main principles firmly on a sound basis, and we can leave the future growth to the hand of Time.

But to return to the alleged inability of women to form political opinions, compared with men: I do not say that the men are competent to estimate political problems, but I do say most emphatically that the women are not less competent than the men. If it is considered necessary to give the vote to the men for their protection, it is still more necessary to give the women the vote for that identical purpose, for it is idle to shut our eyes to the recent disclosures of the oppressions exercised upon women in India. I do not refer to the sensational work of a distinguished lady from the United States, but I speak of the investigations of the purely Indian Committee composed of leading members of the Indian Legislature—the Report known as "The Report of the Joshi Committee on Child Marriage." You may be told indeed that the present franchise gives the vote to Indian women on exactly the same terms as to Indian men. Commissioners observe in polite language that this is merely a gesture, "because Indian women do not own property in their own right." Such a gesture might more crudely be called a cruel farce and a fraud. The number of men enfranchised is 10½ per cent. of the adult male population, but the women enfranchised are six in a thousand of the adult female population-i.e., seventeen men have the vote to one woman. To talk of equality in these circumstances is a little inexact.

I submit, therefore, that a just and stable foundation for the new constitution in India can only be established when men and women equally—in sober fact—are given a voice for the protection of their interests against oppression and tyranny.

Points were raised in the discussion regarding the difficulty of getting a good representative nominated, the caste and communal difficulties.

THE BLOOD FEUD IN WAZIRISTAN

WAZIRISTAN, as its name denotes, is the country of the Wazirs, and forms a part of the belt of tribal territory situated between the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province of India and the independent Kingdom of Afghanistan. The Wazirs are divided into two main branches, the Mahsuds and the Wazirs proper, and each branch is again subdivided into numerous sections.

In the following article, which deals almost exclusively with the Mahsuds, an attempt has been made to describe the chronic state of internal feud which exists in Waziristan, together with the spirit that underlies it and the customs that regulate it. It should be remarked that in the greater part of tribal territory no penal code is enforced, and the mutual relations of the tribesmen are regulated only by Riwaj or tribal custom.

In Waziristan and amongst the Pathans generally human life is cheap at any time, and is of no account at all where "honour" is at stake. I use the word "honour" in the restricted sense of the so-called days of chivalry, though in the wild Frontier hills its pursuit is entirely unaccompanied by those niceties and formalities which are said to have graced the lives of the knights-errant. Rather it is a kind of savage deity, a Moloch to which outraged self-respect must sacrifice an unending stream of blood. The least loss in person or property received at the hands of another must be requited in full; forbearance and forgiveness are sheer cowardice.

The emotion which this deity arouses in its votaries is "sharm," or the sense of shame, a feeling composed half of the intense resentment with which any slight or injury affects the Pathan's exaggerated egotism, and half of the fear of a public opinion which expresses itself in "Pighor" or taunts. The man who fails to take up a feud where tribal custom demands it, is branded for life. Wherever he goes and his story is known the little children will cry out, "There goes a

woman and no man."

Probably the majority of Mahsud men go daily in fear of their lives. Either they are liable to be killed themselves, possibly on account of the act of a relation in which they may have had no concern whatever, or they themselves are waiting to take another's life, which is a not less hazardous position, as the man whose life is sought will

naturally take the avenger's first if he gets a chance. In fact, cases occur where all the male members of a family are blotted out in one fell swoop to prevent the possibility of revenge. The vicarious principle is fully recognized, as is usual where the clan system prevails. Revenge is sweetest where the actual man who has committed an injury is punished, but honour will be equally satisfied if a brother or other near relation is made to suffer, and in some cases even any other member of the same subsection may be called upon to pay the price of his fellow-clansman's misdeeds.

This sanguinary code of blood for blood is not without its good points. Though it might seem at first sight calculated to produce murders almost in geometrical progression, it does, in fact, act as a considerable check both on bloodshed and adultery; for the certainty that revenge will be taken sometimes makes a man think twice before knocking his fellow on the head with an axe because he does not like the look of his face, or running away with his neighbour's wife because he does.

However, human nature, and especially primitive human nature, being what it is, the most bloody laws and customs cannot prevent offences. The Mahsud man, though clean in his manner of life compared with many Oriental races, is ever susceptible to the charms of a fair face; while the woman who is never "purdah" is, if we may judge by results, easily tempted. Hence the most fruitful source of bloodshed. Tribal custom with regard to woman is based on the idea that she is private property to be bought or sold much like a camel. She is purchased by her husband from her father or brothers, and if her husband predeceases her she becomes the property of his brothers or other near relations. Usually one of the brothers marries her; if, however, anyone outside her late husband's family wishes to have her, he must pay for her. In the case therefore of adultery, the seducer is regarded as having stolen the husband's property and he must pay accordingly. In the administered districts of the North-West Frontier Province where the ordinary criminal law is in force a monetary settlement is often accepted; in Waziristan tribal territory, however, such a settlement is very rare, and is not normally permitted by tribal sentiment. A man who accepted money for his wife's honour would no longer be able to hold up his head for shame. Where the husband catches his wife and her lover together, the most usual procedure is for him to call in his relations and with or without their help kill his wife and cut off the foot of her lover. In this way the loss of the

woman is compensated by the maiming or halving of the value of the man and everybody's honour is satisfied, neither side pursuing the quarrel. Where the lover cannot be caught in this way, the injured husband will normally await his opportunity and kill him, usually by shooting him from an ambush. He will then publicly divorce his wife and turn her out of the house. In this case also no blood feud lies, the idea being. I take it, that the relations of the lover can, if they wish, claim the woman as their property. Half the price of the murdered man is thus paid by the loss the husband incurred in divorcing his wife, and half by the material value of the woman herself. Frequently the husband acts in this manner on bare suspicion or rumour without proof of any kind, and in that case the relations of the murdered man nearly always deny his guilt and a blood feud follows. If the husband kills both his wife and her lover, he will owe the latter's relations half the price of a man's life. Where a woman is found to be of bad character and the identity of her lover is not known, she will either be killed or else her nose will be cut off and she will be turned adrift.

Though women are at the bottom of much of the trouble, there are many other matters which give rise to quarrels. The tribesman is exceedingly hot-tempered and seizes his rifle or his dagger on the least provocation; if there is none by to prevent it, the most petty dispute will have fatal results, and end in a feud that may last for years. The question of territorial boundaries is a most common cause of friction. Land and water are so scarce in Waziristan that a Mahsud will fly into a rage over the minutest infringement of what he considers to be his rights.

It is not necessary that a murder should be premeditated to start a feud; any injury of any kind received from a fellow-tribesman must be repaid. If a Mahsud is run over and killed by a car driven by a fellow-tribesman, his relations will retaliate in the same way as if he had been deliberately shot.

The worst type of murder in Mahsud country is "Khei," which means the deliberate extinction of a family by those entitled to inherit from it in order to obtain possession of its property. According to Mohammedan law, which in this respect conforms to tribal custom, a man's property is divided equally amongst all his sons. There is little enough cultivable land in the Waziristan hills to begin with, and when an estate has been split up again and again it means that no single individual has a sufficiently large plot to be worth his

attention. In these circumstances either the various owners of a piece of land combine together and let it all to one man at a fixed rent, and then having nothing else to do spend their time raiding, or else the tension is relieved by wholesale murder in the following manner.

Suppose a Mahsud dies, leaving three sons whom we will call Allahdad, Walidad, and Guldad. His lands and cattle are divided up amongst them. Being brothers and having been brought up under the same roof, they may live at peace with one another and make the best out of their respective shares. In due course the three brothers die, leaving six, three and two sons respectively. No bond of affection will probably now exist among the three familes, and in fact cousins are usually regarded as natural enemies in Waziristan. Allahdad's sons have not nearly enough to support themselves and their families. On the other hand, they are numerically stronger than Walidad's and Guldad's sons put together. Why should the weak flourish while the strong starve? They therefore conspire together, and, seizing a favourable opportunity, murder in cold blood their five cousins with any male children they may have, and then divide up their land and their womenfolk. This sort of thing is of quite frequent occurrence, and sometimes a score or more perish, children at the breast not being spared.

Tribesmen, while approving of bloodshed where honour is concerned, often speak with horror of this cold-blooded type of murder. But there is rarely sufficient cohesion in any particular section of the tribe to allow of satisfactory action being taken against the offenders. A case recently occurred where a prominent Malik with repute as a "Shaikh" or man of piety amongst his section was murdered with ten of his near male relations by certain of his cousins. The section, which was a powerful one, took action and banished the offenders from its limits. It also decided that the lands both of the murdered man and of their murderers should lie fallow indefinitely. When I asked why in view of the scarcity of available land in Waziristan it was not arranged that somebody should take the property and cultivate it, I was told that firstly the section could never agree amongst itself who should be allowed to occupy the land, and secondly that if anybody did attempt to sow it, he would at once incur a blood feud with the murderers. The latter, when the scandal of their deed has died down, will probably slaughter sheep by way of intercession to some influential man in the section, and with his help reoccupy not only their own land but that of their victims.

Occasionally one or more individuals escape from these massacres. They then usually fly and become "Hamsayas" of another section. A man for any reason may leave his own kith and kin, and seek shelter with some individual or section. If he is taken in he becomes the "Hamsaya" or protégé of the individual or section concerned, and if any harm befalls him his protector is bound to avenge him as though he were his own brother; in fact, a man's honour is if anything considered to be more impugned by any injury offered to his "Hamsaya" than by the seduction of his wife or the murder of his nearest relative.

It is by no means incumbent on a man whose honour is at stake to take revenge with his own hand. A hired assassin is frequently employed, and this system is known as "Baskar." Anything from one to three thousand rupees is paid to such an assassin. When the murder has been successfully committed it is usual for the man who has inspired it to make the "Zhagh" or public proclamation that the deed has been carried out on his account and that his honour is now satisfied. If the relations of the murdered man wish to proceed with the feud, they can take action against the man who has made the "Zhagh" or against the actual murderer or against both, as they wish. The massacre of cousins for their property (Khei) is often carried out through hired assassins, and a particularly horrible instance of this recently occurred where a man for money murdered the old mullah who had educated him in the Quran when he was a child. The whole tribe spoke with detestation of his act, but as the offender belonged to a very powerful family and had ten brothers, nothing was done

The necessity of exacting blood for blood under the Pathan code gives rise to many difficulties in the case of Mahsuds employed by Government in their own country for the protection of roads, camps, etc. Where a Mahsud is killed by the ordinary Government troops, his relatives usually realize that it is impossible to retaliate upon the soldier or sepoy who has actually fired the shot, and impracticable to carry on a feud indefinitely against the Government as a whole. They therefore usually agree to take compensation in cash if the affair has been an accidental one, or eventually come in and accept the situation if the man has met his death while engaged in a hostile act. Where, however, a Mahsud in Government employ in the execution of his duty kills another Mahsud, the case is entirely different, and according to the code the relations of the dead man must take their revenge.

A case of this nature recently occurred in which a Mahsud in Government employ, who had killed a fellow-tribesman in the act of attempting a burglary, applied to the authorities either to pay blood-money in his behalf or to protect him from the dead man's relations. The payment of blood-money would have created a most undesirable precedent, and the relations were therefore called upon to give security that they would refrain from any sort of revenge. Rather than do this they threatened to abandon their lands and houses and fly to the remotest hills, a course which they eventually adopted, for while negotiations were still in progress they succeeded in waylaying and killing their man. This state of affairs makes the Mahsud in Government employ loath to shoot straight at a fellow-tribesman, and might seem at first sight to render him of little use for protective purposes. But the system cuts both ways, for if a Mahsud employed by Government to protect some stores loses his job, or is fined on account of theft committed by other Mahsuds, he will take steps privately to make good from the actual offenders. Therefore would-be thieves often refrain from committing depredations where their fellow-tribesmen are employed.

I was informed once by an authority on these matters that when a man was killed by a "Tsalweshtai" on duty no blood feud lay. A "Tsalweshtai" means a guard, nominally of forty men, composed of members of various subsections and appointed by the tribe for some special purpose such as to protect an isolated valley from raiding gangs. I consulted some Mahsuds on this point, and they stated that even in these circumstances it was still incumbent on the relations of a raider killed in the course of his misdeeds to take revenge, the only peculiarity being that all members of the guard are held equally responsible for the deed, and therefore are all equally liable to suffer its consequences.

The blood feud in Waziristan is not necessarily interminable, and settlements preceded by a suspension of hostilities are common, though they are frequently made only to be broken. Usually some elders of the tribe or other neutral persons intervene and persuade the parties to meet and set up a "Konrai" or stone of truce, fixing a definite period during which the feud shall be laid aside; a sum of money is named to be paid as a fine to the tribe as a whole, if either party is guilty of a breach of the truce before the stated period has expired. Meanwhile arbitrators are selected from men of position and repute either within or without the tribe, and these summon the parties and other persons interested to a well-known tree or other shady spot where they listen

to the various claims and use every effort to effect a settlement by consent. If they fail in this they generally pronounce an award of some kind, which has no binding power unless the parties have given them their absolute "Waq"-i.e., have agreed definitely beforehand to accept their decision whatever it may be. The actual settlement is largely a question of addition and subtraction. Everything has a fixed price—a man's life (which at present is valued at about £250 amongst the Mahsuds), an eye, a limb, a woman, a sheep, or a dog-and the account is totalled up on each side and a balance struck. If the debtor party expresses its readiness to pay up, an arrangement is made accordingly; possibly a girl will be promised in marriage to liquidate the debt, or a date will be fixed and security given for payment in rifles or cattle or cash, or whatever form may be convenient. Such settlements are generally successful where no loss of human life has occurred, or where the loss of life on each side is even, but not otherwise, as a Mahsud normally considers it a great disgrace to accept any compensation in cash or kind for the life of a kinsman, and even though the head of the family may be willing to effect such a compromise, he knows that it will not satisfy his younger and more hot-blooded relations, and especially the womenfolk. Even where blood-money has been accepted and a formal reconciliation made, the peace is often broken, but in such cases the money is usually returned.

The spirit of revenge is part and parcel of the Pathan's nature, and it is difficult to conceive of any means whereby it can be eradicated. Even in the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province, where the population is more or less disarmed, murders are of frequent occurrence, and when murder is not feasible the feud is carried on by means of false writs and lies to the powers that be and every sort of underhand intrigue. The rough trans-border methods are cleaner and

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more honourable:

NOTES ON EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES MADE BY MR. EDWARD A. WATERS ON A JOURNEY TO KASHGAR

SERVANTS

We took with us a shikari, a cook and bearer, a tiffin coolie, an assistant cook and coolie who was a good pony man.

A shikari who knows the customs of the country, how to procure transport and various supplies on the road, and can act as interpreter, is most essential.

No other coolies are necessary, although one who can do cooking for the men and who can do odd jobs would be helpful. As our coolie was a good pony man we were able to ride on ahead of the outfit on days when going for ponies was not too bad.

A "sweeper" is a great convenience.

EQUIPMENT

We carried two tents for ourselves and two for the men, one of them a cook tent.

One tent would have been sufficient for us, but the second was a comfort.

Do not depend on tents hired in Kashmir. They are most frightfully heavy, and when wet one is almost too much of a load for a pony.

Personally, we should advise Egyptian cotton. A fly is necessary, since without it the sun will affect anyone in the tent.

Clothes for every conceivable sort of weather should be taken. The heat from Astor to Nomal was intense, and one should wear the fewest clothes possible without being burned.

Sun-proof jodhpurs and coats, and light woollen underclothes, are good.

Early in August we crossed Chickiklik and Yangi Dawan in cold snowstorms, where heavy Burberry tweeds and sweaters were none too warm.

We took clothes half-way between sun-proof and tweed, but they are not necessary. Sweaters under the sun-proofs will bridge the gap to tweed. Light and heavy weight woollen underclothes and stockings are necessary.

One pair of boots, one of Fox puttees, and a pair of heavy field-boots should be sufficient.

Heavy Gilgit boots and fur coats make the evenings bearable on the Pamirs, and several times we slept in them.

Topees are, of course, necessary, and must be worn even on cloudy days. We used cork; pith are lighter, but, of course, more perishable. We took no extra topees, but each had a double felt hat, neither of which had to be used. Burberry wind-breaks are most useful on the Pamirs, and complete coverings of rubber are necessary. These rubber coverings should always be available, since storms come quickly.

Take folding camp cots. The Kashmir beds are bulky and heavy. Sheets for the hot places are a comfort, but not a necessity.

Folding canvas wash basin and bath tub we think better than rubber.

Three thermos bottles were enough, but not too many.

SUPPLIES

For supplies everyone should suit his own taste to a large extent. Vegetables are only rarely procurable. We took potatoes with us. They are heavy and bulky, and the dehydrated potatoes would be much better. Another time we should take dehydrated potatoes, onions, and cranberries. Tinned butter suffers terribly in the heat before Gilgit.

Chickens and eggs can be bought below the timber line, and above it sheep are plentiful. In the higher regions there is not enough salt to give any to the sheep and the meat suffers.

Milk can almost always be procured and often cream from which butter may be made.

The native Hunza flour is ground between rather soft stones, small pieces of which often break off and appear in the bread, so it is advisable to take most of your flour with you.

Any tinned goods wanted should be taken from Kashmir. Whisky can be bought at Gilgit and brandy at Kashgar.

MEDICINES

We took, in addition to special remedies given us by our own physician, a Burroughs-Welcome case, iodine, permanganate crystals, epsom salts, aspirin, soda mint tablets, grease, bandages, and a large roll of absorbent cotton. The absorbent cotton, permanganate crystals,

and grease were most useful in treating ponies' backs, rubbed by bad pack saddles.

The Pamir people consider every European a doctor, and when appealed to we gave soda mints or epsom salts. Anyone who knew the word "aspirin" and asked for it had such implicit faith in it that it would cure any ailment.

PRESENTS

The Mir of Hunza always gives his guests presents, so it is well to be provided. Ask someone in Srinagar what is advisable.

On the Pamirs presents will often be better than money. Hunting knives and cheap watches are good. Peggy took needles, bright thread, and large safety-pins for the women. Mirrors also are most acceptable.

Chinese officials appreciate knives, forks and spoons.

FIREARMS

We took a rifle (9 mm.), a gun, and a pistol. The gun was most useful in providing pigeons and chikor at various stages of the trip.

The rifle would have been useful if we had wanted to shoot Ovis poli.

The pistol was only useful for the feeling of assurance it might give one.

CAMERAS

- (1) Bell-Howell 70 D. Three thousand feet of films were sufficient.
- (2) I.C.A., with Zeiss lens; size of picture, $3\frac{1}{4}$ by $4\frac{1}{4}$ inches. Twenty rolls of films were not enough. Thirty rolls would be better.

Use filters on almost all pictures. It is advisable to take 2x, 4x, and 8x filters, and when in doubt cut down the light.

FLOWER NOTES MADE ON A JOURNEY TO KASHGAR

By MARGARET WATERS

THE following is a summary of the notes made on our journey from Bandipur to Kashgar and back. It is most fragmentary in character. Many of the plants that we found growing at ten thousand feet and over were entirely new to us, but they were so beautiful that we were tempted to set down the names of those that we could identify with

the invaluable help of Coventry's book, "The Wild Flowers of Kashmir."

We climbed the first twelve miles to Tragbal Rest House through forests of Pinus excelsa. The high banks along the road were charming with the glaucous foliage of Rhododendron lepidoteum and a wild rose with bright green foliage, whose name I never found. Viburnum nervosum was conspicuous among the undergrowth. We saw the foliage of Clematis montana, although, as it was late June, the bloom had long since passed. This was also true of Anemone biflora.

Around the Rest House at Tragbal grew purple violets, sweet-

scented, Aquilegia chrysantha, and a low-growing iris.

On Tragbal Pass (height 11,586 feet), growing in open sunlight, we saw what looked to us like the red-hot poker plant Tritoma aloides, except that the flower was white. Bailey's "Encyclopædia of Horticulture," edition of 1910, makes no mention of a white variety.

Between Koragbal and Gurais was perhaps one of the most interesting marches we had from a flower standpoint. Tall plants, which looked to me like Althea rosea, grew plentifully. Captain Berkeley told us they were not true hollyhocks at all, but something else. Hollyhocks or not, they were beautiful upstanding plants six to eight feet in height. Delphinium ranunculifolium was very abundant.

A plant with a leaf like Geranium maculatum, but a bluish-purple flower about six to eight inches high, was in full flower, and grew in quantities in the half shade of the chenar groves. Also the yellow

foxglove (Digitalis ambigua) throve under these conditions.

The list of plants that we saw from day to day grew to an amazing length. Old friends-huttercups, butter and eggs, lupin, wild mustard, Queen Anne's lace, and forget-me-nots-enlivened the road. Old enemies, too, as my husband pointed out, such as dandelion and plantain, made us realize that we were on a real holiday, where our object was to ride the day's march and not to uproot weeds from the lawn.

The Kishanganga River rushes merrily past Gurais Rest House, and lovely clumps of Mertensia virginica grew all along the banks. This is what we took them to be, but after looking them up I am inclined to think they were perhaps Mertensia paniculata. With us in Philadelphia, Mertensia virginica flowers the last of April or the very first of May, and it seemed odd to see them or rather a near relative flowering in late June. In America they are called James River or Perkiomen blue bells according to the locality, so we amused ourselves by calling these new friends Kishanganga blue bells.

Burzil Rest House at an altitude of eleven thousand one hundred and fifty feet lies at the foot of the dreaded Burzil Pass, and several tiny streams rush past into Burzil Brook. Masses of *Primula elliptica* and *Primula involucrata*, great bunches of marsh buttercups, and a low-growing, rather dark purple iris lined these streams and made with the magnificent mountains a picture at once gay, beautiful, and grand.

The next day, coming down from Burzil Pass (height 13,775 feet), we were thrilled by the sight of a great mass of *Primula nivalis*, that loveliest of all blue primulas, growing just as Mr. Coventry said that it would grow, along the bed of a glacial stream at over ten thousand feet.

In the gorges of the Hunza, where the only soil that there is has been washed down from the mountains above, every inch is terraced and used to cultivate crops and support the population, yet even there there are many wild flowers, and it is a common sight from the Astor Valley up to Killik Pass to see the men of the region with a gay bouquet of the blue flowers of *Primula elliptica* stuck into the rolled-up brim of their white homespun hats. It struck me as terribly pathetic, this sole attempt at decoration on the part of these primitive people.

Beyond Baltit, where the gorges of the Hunza reach the nth power of austerity, we were making our way on foot along a path where the rocks towered straight above us and that raging river roared below; suddenly the air was filled with that unmistakable aromatic odour of roses, like those the Persians use for attar of roses. Glancing up, we saw its roots in a crevice of the rocks—a wild rose bush in full bloom. It was heartening to find such colour and fragrance above that austere path.

We crossed Killik Pass, and it was indeed a primrose path that our horses trod, but it led to China and not to dalliance.

On the Chinese Pamir the entire lack of trees made the flowers even more of a pleasure than they had been before.

We saw Clematis graveolens (possibly it was Clematis orientalis), Paraquilegia grandiflora, Delphinium ranunculifolium, also Delphinium cashmerianum, Papaver nudicaule, Corydalis govaniana, and I think, Corydalis cashmerianum, also Corydalis thyrsiflora and Campanula cashmerianum, and Fritillaria Roylei.

The various mountain passes that we had to cross on the Pamirs were immensely interesting, for there we found *Chorispora sabulosa*, *Geum elatum*, *Potentilla cuvisetta*, *Saxifraga sibirica*; and on top of a pass about seventeen thousand feet high we found *Saxifraga imbricata*.

We crossed Chickiklik Pass in a snowstorm, and as we studied the ground to find as safe footing as was possible for our horses there were great tufts of *Androsaceæ microphylla*.

At Murkushi on our way down we camped in some woods where gentians were abundant. I gathered the seeds of, I think, Gentiana kurroo, but they may turn out to be Gentiana decumbers, or even Gentiana detonsa (var. Stracheyi). While hunting the Ovis poli on the Pamirs we got the seeds of an aster-like flower, single, four inches high, with bluish-purple petals and a yellow centre.

The variety of flowers was almost bewildering. In the space of three days I counted sixty-four kinds.

Trees rejoiced our eyes when we entered the Kashgar Oasis at Ighiz Yar.

Throughout the oasis sunflowers growing in the dooryards enlivened the landscape. We learned later that the people ate the seeds.

At Kashgar itself the Consulate garden was a delight, so large and well cared for, with great masses of bloom of all the home flowers. Perhaps the fairest sight of all was the lawn of real turf where we had tea every afternoon near the Chinese summer-house.

Every traveller to Kashgar feels that he must pay his tribute to the famous Kashgar melon, and we are no exception. They are infinitely beyond all other melons.

There were, of course, many other flowers and plants that we were not able to identify. I understand that a new and larger edition of Coventry's "Wild Flowers of Kashmir" is soon to be published. Without Mr. Coventry's Series 2, we would have been unable to identify many that we did succeed in placing.

A SOVIET PARADISE À L'AMÉRICAINE

Whatever our views may be about the Bolshevists, at least let us do them justice when they deserve it, and certainly they deserve all praise for their clever window-dressing. Perhaps their propaganda is too sustained and too fierce, but though for domestic use it may have lost power, it achieves abroad no small measure of success. When, a century hence, the curious historian discusses the events of our era, he will be astonished at the naïveté of the simple-minded West which took the self-produced Apotheosis of the East at its own value.

Propaganda has its uses, and the Bolshevists conduct a most successful one, as an examination of a recent book, "The Road to the Grey Pamir," by Annie Louise Strong (reviewed on page 409 in this Journal for July, 1931), will prove, for it illustrates the class of stuff that the guileless West absorbs, apparently with no subsequent indigestion. It is all very amazing, as the authoress herself remarks, when discussing her subject; but as she sees everything in Russia through the rosiest of rosy spectacles—quite a sang-de-bœuf affair—it is too much to hope for any discrimination. There is never any suggestion that the subjects of the wonderful experiments narrated do not stand to benefit in the long run; they must take their medicine, no matter how they loathe it. It is a pretty study in muddled ideals that this citizen of the great republic applauds the dragooning of a simple race, though after all there is no tyranny like democracy. All the same, how the inhabitants of even the Middle West would hate being domineered over by a Bolshevist woman!

The book itself, intentionally or otherwise, is first-rate propaganda for the Soviet, for it records how the idealistic emissaries of the U.S.S.R. spread the light of culture amongst the denizens of High Asia. In this naughty capitalistic world their good deeds shine brightly. And yet why should the West be again chloroformed by this Bolshevist anæsthetic? The lady protests too much; and her book does not give the facts as they are, but as they should be.

All this forcible schooling of a peaceful countryside is true enough, this hateful pragmatic oppression of the East, but the actual state of the people now being harassed is glossed over. Indeed, in a country which is a mediæval torture-chamber, Asiatic Russia has its share of horror. The vast prairies and uplands belonged to the nomads, to

the Kasaks, Kirghiz, and other tent-dwellers, for on these wide, treeless grazing grounds, swept by tearing storms of wind and snow, a pastoral life alone was a possible one, and enabled immense numbers of animals to be supported.

Until the establishment of Bolshevist rule in these districts, the nomads lived in their felt tents much as did the Patriarchs of old. With their flocks and herds, their wives and families, they wandered

about as their forefathers had done for generations.

But no idealist can leave well alone, and crazy, malignant, ignorant Marxism started to Sovietize the nomad, a proceeding which was bound first to ruin and then to exterminate him, with the destruction of great wealth as an economic concomitant, resembling in every respect the devastation which Sovietism has produced in Russia-in-Europe.

The first proceeding was to limit each household (i.e. tent) to what was the minimum number, in Bolshevist opinion, of the horses, cattle, and sheep necessary. The rest of the animals were driven away. The horses were sold; the cattle and sheep, worse still, were eaten.

Any half-wit could have foretold the lamentable consequences. Briefly, the nomads could not support life; the animals could not breed; and so disaster has overtaken the Pamirs and other pastures. On the Chinese side the grazing is indifferent compared with that in Russian territory, but many animals are fed, so that now in comparatively unfertile Sin-Kiang much stock is raised, whilst on the rich and extensive uplands of Russian Turkestan man is starving and cattle are decreasing.

The consequences of Bolshevist folly are seen in the constant exodus to Chinese territory. Swarms of poor creatures (not the despised bourgeois, but members of the proletariat)—nomads, labourers, peasants—flee to Sin-Kiang, only too thankful to escape from the starvation existing in the U.S.S.R.

At the end of the Great War there was probably no country that possessed such an untouched and easy source of wealth as Russia in her eastern grazing grounds; and now, thanks to inexcusable folly, all is gone. It is easy for stock to recover, as the history of Australian droughts has shown, but the danger is that the Kirghiz and Kasaks will not recover, and if they do not, how are these prairies to be utilized?

Nomads alone can successfully raise stock on the Pamirs and adjacent areas, and if they are taken away from their ancestral pursuits, how can they ever learn their former occupations, even if willing to

adopt the life? A man cannot be a nomad and a townsman, and if the children are kept at school they will never learn to herd animals in the Pamirs. This is plain commonsense to anyone who knows the Kirghiz or Kasaks and their conditions of life, and by forcing on these unhappy people the rigid ideals of Moscow, much harm must ensue; for it is this interference with the arrangements of nature which produces insoluble economic problems.

I once sat down and watched from close by a large camp of seventy yurts (felt tents) of Russian Kasaks, representing, say, a population of perhaps 500 souls. There was practially no movement; hardly an animal was seen; the stillness of death brooded over the encampment.

Now it is impossible for seventy tents of nomads with their proper complement of man and animals to be encamped in one place. To begin with, it would be out of the question to find grazing at hand for the number of animals that such an assemblage implied. The water difficulty would often be difficult, and the fuel one still more so. Probably the seventy Russian tents had altogether as many animals as half a dozen tents in Chinese territory. The mere fact of this large camp could tell but one story. What are the real views of Miss Annie Louise Strong and her misguided friends? Do they imagine that by thus destroying a pastoral system that has benefited countless generations Bolshevism will gain in the long run, the old quack remedy of destroying wealth to create new? What is going to be done with these lands that have nourished the sons of Adam since the time of Genesis?

The Kirghiz and the Kasaks are by no means stupid, and have been an asset to Russia, economically and personally, since they were annexed, but they deeply resent the treatment which has enslaved and impoverished them. With proper treatment they would have been as loyal to their new masters at Moscow as to their old ones at St. Petersburg, but the Soviet has only succeeded in producing a new economic failure on her eastern frontiers. To some extent the Chinese have benefited when the nomads have succeeded in crossing the frontier with their flocks, but now these have gone and the influx of destitute refugees is awkward. The nomads produce large quantities of milk products as well as stock; both these sources of wealth have been reduced to a minimum. Once again we contemplate the folly of the muddling idealists of Moscow, well intentioned perhaps but most destructive. No doubt the account of Miss Annie Louise Strong will be read in America, and consequently the U.S.S.R. will receive yet

another meed of unmerited praise and blessing, a cornucopia of enconium. But the finest pastures of the Old World are desolate, their cheery inhabitants are starving, and the one cry throughout Asiatic Russia is "Give us back the times of the Emperor Nicholas." What a satire on Bolshevism!

Arabia Felix: Across the Empty Quarter of Arabia. By Bertram Thomas. With a Foreword by T. E. Lawrence and an Appendix by Sir Arthur Keith, F.R.S. Jonathan Cape. 25s.

In a paper read to members of this society on May 20 last, soon after his return from Oman, Bertram Thomas gave what was necessarily a much abridged account of his crossing of the Great Arabian Desert. In the sumptuous volume now presented to us, which, as Sir Arnold Wilson mentions in another place, is bound uniformly with that fine story, "Revolt in the Desert," by T. E. Lawrence (who, incidentally, contributes a characteristic Foreword), we have the complete narrative. The explorer's earlier volume, "Alarms and Excursions in Arabia," which was yet in the printer's hands when he embarked on his great adventure, proved so full of human interest and literary attraction that his friends have looked forward keenly to the appearance of the present work; and we are richly rewarded.

It is perhaps no matter for surprise that "the desert and the sown" of Arabia should have made a strong appeal to men of Thomas's generation whom the fortunes of the Great War directed to one part of the Arabian peninsula or another, but it is surely phenomenal that of such a comparatively small company so many individuals should have proved to possess the inspiration and marked literary talent which have been displayed in turn by Philby, Lawrence, Eldon Rutter, and now Bertram Thomas. In the present case the author tells his absorbing tale so simply and with such modesty withal that the average reader may well be in danger of underestimating the merits and significance of an enterprise which is without doubt one of the most outstanding feats of exploration of this generation, and which the Royal Geographical Society promptly recognized by the award of their coveted Founder's Medal. In view of the danger which I have adumbrated, allow me a few moments in which to place the traveller and his exploit in their right perspective for the uninitiated.

Bertram Thomas went out to Mesopotamia as a young soldier during the war, and in 1918 was selected for the political branch of the Civil Administration, where he served with distinction, first under Sir Arnold Wilson and later under me. In 1921, when Mr. Philby was transferred to Transjordania as British Representative with the Amir Abdulla, Bertram Thomas accompanied him, and, after a considerable period of service there, accepted in 1925 the appointment of Financial Adviser and Wazir to His Highness Saiyid Taimur, Sultan of Muscat. It will be noted, therefore, that when he entered upon his duties in Oman he had already passed seven or eight years in posts which had brought him into constant intercourse with Arabs and had enabled him to acquire a thorough working knowledge of their language. At the same time his reading had made him familiar with the works of the great travellers in Arabia of the last century; of Niebuhr and Burckhardt, of Palgrave, Burton, and Doughty; while he was already acquainted at first hand with the recent journeyings of Gertrude Bell and those other comrades of the war—victims, alas! two of them—Leachman,

Shakespear, and Philby.

Burton it was, as will be remembered, who, in the autumn of 1852, addressed

2I

himself specifically to the problem of the desert crossing, offering his services to the Royal Geographical Society "for the purpose," as he puts it, "of removing that opprobrium to modern adventure, the huge white blot which, in our maps, still denotes the eastern and central regions of Arabia," but his request for three years' leave of absence to Muscat for the execution of that project was, perhaps not unreasonably, refused by the Board of Directors of the East India Company, so Burton decided to devote the one year's leave, which they were prepared to grant, to an attempt to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina; and the success of that exploit, together with his well-known translation of the "Arabian Nights," earned him lasting fame. Little could he have then recked that another eighty years would pass before his "huge white blot" was removed from the map; indeed, the eighty years might well have become a century but for the flair of Bertram Thomas for desert travel and the accident of his appointment to Muscat; not, fortunately in the capacity of a British Government official, but as employé of H.H. the Sultan-a fact which made all the difference to his prospects of exploration.

Meanwhile, the great blank which Richard Burton had so deplored, and which at that period included a good deal more of the Arabian peninsula than the Great Sands themselves, had become sensibly reduced by the achievements of

later travellers.

Thus, on the west, the learned Frenchman Joseph Halévy and the Austrian archæologist Glaser had touched the fringe of the sands at Nejran and Makhlaf. On the north, Philby, working south from Riyadh in 1918, had reached Sulaiyil and looked on the Wadi Dowasir petering into the haze towards the south-east, being assured by his guides that there was no settled spot between him and the Hadrhamaut, or Oman. Lastly, on the east, Cheesman, in 1924, had succeeded, of set purpose, in lifting the veil from the mystery-oasis of Gabrin, which Bedouin hyperbole had clothed with such glamour for generations past. But though thus threatened with exposure from three points of the compass the genie of the southern sands remained defiantly inviolate until at last there appeared on the scene one who had long nursed specific designs on her privacy. Here let me quote "Alarms and Excursions," the occasion being the author's first expedition with the Sultan in the eastern Batineh of Oman. The party, having done their morning trek, were the guests of a local Shaikh for their midday meal and siesta. Under the mellowing influence of the repast the conversation waxed intimate, and soon came the host's inevitable question to the bachelor Christian: "Why aren't you married, O Wazir?"

In reply, the Wazir expatiated on the difficulties under which a Christian laboured in this regard, especially one serving in the East, and pointed to the comforting doctrine that at any rate for a man it was never too late. Then came

his royal master to the rescue:

"'Ah,' said the Sultan, knowing of my secretly cherished desire, 'quite right, Insha'allah; I will help to marry you, one of these days, to that which is near your heart, "Rub'al Khali" (the Great Southern Desert).

"A virgin indeed,' quoth Khan Bahadur, his private secretary.

"'Amin,' I muttered to myself. (So may it be)."

Having joined the Sultan's service in Oman with this "cherished desire," the fulfilment of it resolved itself into questions of preparation, opportunity, and route. Preparation would consist mainly in learning the dialect and mentality of the Omani and in cultivating the acquaintance of important Shaikhs likely to be of use to him. Thus much might be achieved automatically in the course of his normal duties, which gave him exceptional facilities for travelling in the

hinterland. Opportunity must ever remain in the lap of the gods. There remained the question of route, the most pregnant and fundamental problem of all, and one that has a particular interest for me. Thirty years ago (1899 to 1904), while British representative at Muscat, I did a good deal of travelling in the interior during such brief periods of absence from headquarters as the exigencies of my official functions allowed. On one of these trips I journeyed from Abu Thabi on the northern Trucial Coast of Oman to Ibri, thence along the fringe of the desert to the outskirts of Adam, and from that point back to Muscat over the Jebel Akhdar range. From the crest, at Jebel Khidhar (7,500 feet), gazing downwards over the plain below, I could see the Wadi Halfain and other drainage channels from the watershed of Oman winding their way like little streamers of ribbon into the shimmer of the sands 40 or 50 miles away, and I wondered whose lot it would be to probe their mysteries and by what means. For at that time, the beginning of this century, amateur ballooning was a fashionable pursuit in England, and one of the most distinguished aeronauts, the Rev. John Bacon, was specifically contemplating an attempt to fly over the Arabian Desert. Having good reason to believe, partly on information furnished to him by the late Dr. D. G. Hogarth, that the centre of the Arabian peninsula was swept unceasingly by a strong westerly wind which kept the sands of Libya ever moving towards the Nefood, he was convinced that, granted the liberty to choose a starting ground anywhere along the coast of the Red Sea and the opportunity of a moderately fast wind, the balloon journey across the desert would be quite a feasible proposition, while the Persian Gulf seemed to offer peculiar facilities for sighting and rescuing the balloon at the end of its voyage. The reverend and gallant aeronaut would undoubtedly have made the attempt had not death from some cause quite unconnected with his ballooning activities overtaken him before he could put his plans into action. I have referred to these morsels of ancient history in connection with the question of the route to be decided upon. We have seen that Richard Burton's idea was to tackle the problem from Muscat westwards. No doubt taking the cue from his writings, I based my own enquiries while at Muscat on the hypothesis of the same east-to-west route and of a start being made from the neighbourhood of Adam, the most easterly point of Oman, with Nejran as objective. According to my informants the dangers to be encountered on such a line, apart from the water problem, which they thought surmountable, were mainly to be expected from the hostility of the tribes ranging the western fringe of the sands and the inability to know for certain, in advance, precisely where one would emerge. But, so far, all schemes and ideas for crossing seem only to have contemplated

But, so far, all schemes and ideas for crossing seem only to have contemplated the latitudinal route. It had never occurred to anyone among those interested, so far as I know, until Bertram Thomas entered the lists, that the attempt might equally well be made longitudinally, from south to north. How completely justified he was the sequel has shown; though, of course, one recognizes that, other risks being equal, in this case the initial advantages of the Sultan of Muscat's staunch co-operation in the south, and, as it proved, the chastening influence of His Majesty King Abdul Aziz in the north, weighted the scales considerably in

favour of the longitudinal route.

Well, at long last the spell has been broken. "One of the few remaining geographical enterprises" has been accomplished, and that by a young Englishman, unaccompanied by any European comrade, unaided by any outside assistance, pecuniary or otherwise, or by any preliminary reconnaissance from aloft—disdaining, in fact, the offer of a passage by airship—and pinning his faith on the Ship of the Desert and his own prowess and ingenuity of plan. It is difficult

to overrate the performance. We Britons of the twentieth century are cosmopolitan enough in our judgment and catholic in our recognition of fine achievement in the domain of geographical exploration under whatever flag; let us, at any rate, be ungrudging in the bestowal of laurels richly earned by a scion of our own.

As for "Arabia Felix" (save the mark), it more than fulfils the promise of "Alarms and Excursions." The tale is admirably told in a way to attract, not only the studious reader with a special interest in the geographical and tectonic problems of the Arabian peninsula, but also the general public with a taste for a thoroughly good book of travel. It falls naturally into five sections: (i.) the exploration of the Qara mountain range; (ii.) the crossing of the Nejd and the intervening steppe country between it and the sands; (iii.) the trek westwards along the southern edge of the sands to Shanna; (iv.) the northward dash of eighteen days across the central sands to Banaiyan; and (v.) the final stage from Banaiyan to the shore of the Persian Gulf at Doha, the capital of our good friend the Shaikh of Qatar. The remainder of the volume, about a fifth of the whole, consists of appendices in which the natural history collections and anthropological material resulting from the expedition are briefly dealt with by distinguished specialists concerned.

One of the essential conditions of success was that absolute secrecy should be preserved, at any rate until the traveller had reached his base at Dhofar, and, if possible, until he had made rendezvous with his Rashidi friend Sahail, to whom the year before he had given a heavy retaining fee on his undertaking to return with the necessary camels on a certain date of the lunar month. But, alas! Sahail failed to keep the tryst and the desert news in Dhofar was discouragingly bad. The Rashidi and their neighbours the Saar were at war, and his friends of last year had no doubt hesitated to run the gauntlet with a team of picked camels. However, in a day or two Thomas came upon two members of the tribe in the bazzar, ventured to confide in them, and paid them well to risk the journey back to their tribal tents and to return with the necessary desert camels for the adventure. They might return in thirty or forty days-or not at all. It was a disappointing beginning. After three weeks' trying wait, during which the difficulty of fencing with the curious enquiries of local busybodies as to his real plans daily increased, he decided, by way of escape, to make a short expedition to the Qara mountains, which had been visited by the Bents forty years before, but not fully explored. He soon found himself in one of the beauty spots of the Arabian peninsula. "What a glorious place!" he writes. "Mountains 3,000 feet high basking above a tropical ocean, their seaward slopes velvety with waving jungle, their roofs fragrant with rolling yellow meadows, beyond which the mountains slope northwards to a red sandstone steppe, and peopled with four strange tribes, physically distinct from the typical Arab of the north and using non-Arabic mother-tongues." What a paradise for a keen explorer!

It is in such situations that the valuable mental equipment of a traveller like Bertram Thomas comes so fully into play. He recognizes instinctively what is interesting and what is valuable scientifically and sets to work to get to the bottom of it. Pity it was that he could not tarry longer in the mountain range, but he was getting anxious at receiving no news of his emissaries and hesitated to delay his return to Dhofar, which he reached again on December 3, unfortunately with an attack of dysentery on him which laid him low for the next three days. On the morrow the Sultan's gunboat Al Said was due. Two months had elapsed since the traveller had started from Muscat, and now, if he had not succeeded in carrying out his project, he would have to abandon it and return

in her to Muscat. Just up from his sickbed, he sat ruminating disconsolately at the window of the fort at the utter failure of his plans and the waste of five years' earnest preparation and attendant expense. But, at the eleventh hour his luck turned, and as he looked out into the courtyard below, waiting for the ship's boat to come ashore, behold his two Rashidi emissaries, followed by forty dainty riding camels and as many ragged Bedouin who had come 200 miles at his secret bidding out of the sands of the Empty Quarter! Can one imagine a more dramatic episode!

A few minutes later the captain of the gunboat, Salih al Mandari, whose father, Salim, as captain of a clipper sailing ship, was a good friend of mine years ago, came ashore fully expecting to take the disappointed traveller back with him, but Bertram Thomas, needless to say, relying on the tried personal friendship of his royal master, took his courage in both hands and decided to send the gunboat back without him and, trusting his fortunes to the strangers below, take the plunge with them into the uncharted wilderness. There were still difficult negotiations to be got through as to the details of the proposed journey, and it was only by maintaining the firmest attitude that the traveller brought them to a satisfactory conclusion.

On December 10 he and his company marched out of Dhofar on the great adventure, and from that moment luck was all in his favour. Space does not permit of reference to all the difficulties and dangers of the crossing, the constant risk of trouble with his camel men and attack from raiders, the loval service of his Arab leader, Shaikh Salih bin Khalut, who shares with Bertram Thomas the honours of the first crossing and to whom one would like to pay personal tribute; the extraordinary perseverance of the traveller in his labours in all directions, taking sights, taking excellent photographs, and collecting valuable information on every conceivable subject. With considerable experience of desert travel I know well enough what a great effort is required after a hard day on the camelsaddle and in the sun to turn directly one gets to biyouac to the troublesome tasks of preserving specimens, writing up notes, and so on; and it is only those like our author who have trained themselves to the work who can do adequate justice to their opportunities and real service to science. That Bertram Thomas's achievements in the realm of exploration may not end with his discovery of the key to the riddle of the sands is the earnest wish of his reviewer.

P. Z. C.

The Romance of the Indian Frontiers. By Lieut-General Sir George MacMunn. 9" x 6". Pp. 352. Illustrations. Map. Cape. 16s.

In the "Romance of the Indian Frontiers" General Sir George MacMunn is obviously dealing with a subject which appeals to him strongly, and his service in India gave him many opportunities of acquiring personal knowledge of the people and places about which he writes. It is hardly necessary to say that the book is written in the vivid style and with the vigour which we associate with the author, and which is thoroughly in harmony with the theme. It includes the whole of India's borderland from Persia via the North-West Frontier, Tibet, Yunnan, to Siam, but naturally the Afghan border takes the lion's share, and the narrative would perhaps have been more connected and compact had it been confined to that area. It is difficult to find factors common to the whole of India's land frontier in territories so utterly different as, say, Baluchistan, Bhutan, and Burma, and even Sir George's pen can hardly bring them comfortably into one

composition. The ethnographic chapter is one which might perhaps have been omitted. The mass of names of Pathan tribes and clans will be rather difficult for the casual reader, and the space available inevitably makes the account too sketchy

and incomplete to be of value to the student.

The author sketches vigorously the numerous floods of invasion which have been the cause of India's agonies and glories. From these we pass to the pleasant fantasy of a "Moghul Garden," which provides an agreeable interlude between the heroics of a distant past and the coming of the British, our entry upon the scene being marked by the disastrous adventure of the first Afghan War. The Sikh Wars fortunately came along to restore our prestige and so prepare the way of the stirring episodes of the Mutiny, the period when the high-water mark of Frontier romance within British times was reached. One cannot but mark the contrast to recent events when the Red Shirts of the Frontier Province were seen coquetting with the Bombay Congress. But the times were disjointed, so we can hope that this was merely a temporary aberration and that, given the inspiration, the Pathans of the Frontier would again rise splendidly to the occasion.

Coming to comparatively recent history, Sir George gives us an interesting account of our first dealings with the Pamir borderland and the truly romantic episodes of Hunza-Nagar in the early nineties, followed a few years later by the Relief of Chitral, and so to the more serious and matter-of-fact Frontier rising of

1897.

In dealing with personalities we are given some amusing anecdotes of that strangely assorted pair, Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan, and Sir Salter Pyne, an Englishman of humble origin but of great character. There is also an entertaining account of "Chikai," the Zaimukht freebooter, a contemporary of Roos Keppel's in the early days when the latter was political agent in the Kurram.

The book makes its appearance at an opportune moment when connection with the past and its romance is rapidly being severed, and, failing a chronicler, would likely have been forgotten in its lighter and less historically important aspects. We may well wonder whether there will be any room for romance in the future; it is not often found arm-in-arm with democratic institutions. The North-West Frontier Province is about to be thrust into the position of a Governor's Province scarcely of its own volition—though it has some doughty champions—but rather as a back-wash of the communal feeling which is stirring India. Those who know the area and its people best may well wonder whether this experiment in democracy will prove a success, particularly as the Province will be so far from selfsupporting. Class, village, and family factions are the bane of the Frontier, and permeate all communities. And over and above this is the bitter rivalry between the Khans and the intelligentsia, which absorbs the brains and energies of those who should be the leaders of the people. These factors will produce an atmosphere which is likely to hamper the Legislative Council in its efforts to work for the good of the people. The new Constitution will certainly require most careful and sympathetic handling, and it will be interesting to see the trend of subsequent developments and their effect on the trans-border tribes. Will the tribes and the districts tend to amalgamate, and shall we see the beginning of a Greater Moslem Province which in course of time may perhaps embrace most of the Punjab, Baluchistan, and Sind?

When a new edition of this book is issued there are certain minor errors, printing and otherwise, that might be corrected. For instance, some of the dates have gone wrong. The Mahsud Blockade took place in 1901 and not in 1907; General Willcocks's Week-end War was in 1908 and not, as stated, in the previous year. Also in the third Afghan War the British did not advance as far as

Ialalabad, but Kabul was, in fact, bombed by the one long-distance machine that

happened to be in India.

For the sake of historical accuracy, it may be mentioned that it was Risaldar Moghal Baz Khan who went with Mrs. Starr to rescue Mollie Ellis. The "Kubla Khan" mentioned is no doubt intended for "Kuli Khan," another assistant political officer who played an important part in securing the girl's release. Unfortunately, the leading malefactor has not paid the penalty of his crimes. He fled to Afghanistan and is now being kept at a safe distance from our border on the northern side of the Hindu Kush.

Review of Middle East Section: Survey of International Affairs, 1930.

By A. Toynbee. 9\frac{3}{4}" \times 6\frac{1}{2}". Pp. ix + 605. Map. Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1931. 21s.

This well-known work is indispensable to anyone who wishes to keep in touch

with world problems.

The Middle East section extends over some 160 pages and gives an adequate and impartial survey of such recent events in the Middle East as are of inter-

national importance.

A small but useful map is attached. Some day it may be hoped that a universal system of nomenclature and transliteration will be adopted. The manin-the-street is apt to be both puzzled and annoyed when he finds the place called Al Athamin on an official map given the title of Qasr Uthaymin in a book.

This review is not concerned with those portions dealing with Egypt or

Afghanistan; it is confined to Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.

The introduction to the Middle East section includes a brief description of the rise and fall of Fethi Beg's People's party in Turkey and a good outline of the rebellion against Ibn Saud in the year 1929. Although the latter ended in a complete fiasco, there was at one time much uncertainty as to Ibn Saud's ability to crush the rebels, and the consistent support of Ibn Saud by Great Britain was

a factor of no small importance in his final success.

The author credits Farhan-b-Mashur with greater importance than he actually possessed. He was never more than a leader of raids, and a particularly cruel one at that. He established a temporary reputation early in 1929, but towards the end of April that year his following began to disperse, and eventually he surrendered unconditionally in Iraq territory on December 24, 1929, with his "small party of tribesmen of doubtful nationality." After Ibn Humayd's surrender at the end of March the main leader of the rebellion besides Faysalu'd-Dawish was Naif-ibn-

Hithlain of the Ajman.

To imply that after the fight at Riqa'i the rebel Mutayr and Ajman crossed over the frontier into Iraq and Kuwayt for the purpose of surrendering hardly gives a true picture of the difficulties that faced the representatives of the British Government. For one thing, the rebels had to be prevented from making dakhala to the Iraq Government or to the Sheikh of Kuwayt, for they could then have claimed the protection of these States, which would inevitably have led to serious trouble with Ibn Saud. They had attempted to do this months before the fight at Riqa'i. As early as July 17, 1929, leaders from the Mutayr and Ajman had endeavoured to treat with the Sheikh of Kuwayt, and on October 31 Dawish himself had arrived close to Kuwayt and had asked for protection for the Ajman and Mutayr families.

Further, the rebels had to be prevented from scattering and mixing with the Iraqi or Kuwayti tribes. And again, it was not a question of dealing merely with

fighting men, but with complete tribes, including their women and children. To drive such a motley gathering across a frontier beyond which they expected no mercy was impossible without causing heavy casualties; the only alternative was

to obtain complete surrender.

The events leading to the complete surrender were as follows: After eviction from Kuwayt early in December, the Ajman under Naif-ibn-Hithlain had moved to the Batin, and by the middle of December were partly in Iraq and partly again in Kuwayt territory. The Mutayr under Dawish moved there after the fight at Riqa'i, which incidentally was more in the nature of a big raid than a battle. Armoured cars proceeded to force them back south, and on January 2, 1930, Dawish and Hithlain were interviewed and informed that their surrender would be accepted provided it was unconditional, though they themselves would not be delivered over to Ibn Saud. They were given twenty-four hours for a reply; Dawish refused, and Hithlain returned no answer by the expiry of the ultimatum. They were then given further orders to leave Iraq and Kuwayt forthwith. They made no attempt to go back to Nejd, but moved towards Jahra in Kuwayt.

After a period of continued pressure by armoured cars and aircraft, devoted to keeping the tribes from scattering as much as to forcing them in any particular direction, the Ajman surrendered unconditionally on January 8 and the Mutayr

on the 9th.

The whole occurrence is instructive as showing the importance of foreseeing the possible implications of any policy and the difficulty of doing so. When the original promise was made to Ibn Saud on April 19, 1929, the only commitment foreseen was that of driving back or capturing a few tribesmen fleeing as refugees into Iraq territory; ultimately the Royal Air Force found themselves responsible for rounding up two complete tribes with their women, children and animals wandering in an area about as large as Yorkshire.

It is interesting to note that the only casualties caused in the process were two

amels.

A brief reference is made in the Survey to the meeting between King Ibn Saud and King Faysal in February, 1930. The material results of this meeting were not insignificant, but its real importance lay in the fact that the whole of the Middle

East knew these two had met as friends and had parted as friends.

In the Palestine section the outbreak of August, 1929, and the events leading up to it are treated very thoroughly. An outstanding feature that is made apparent is the lack of adequate intelligence in Palestine at this period. The need for this should not require emphasis, but the fact that intelligence was inadequate in 1929 is a proof of the necessity for keeping constantly in mind how unwise it is to stint either personnel or money on this work. Given adequate intelligence and mobility, trouble can be nipped in the bud and a small force can ensure peace and order; without these two requirements far larger forces may be inadequate.

The importance of the economic factor in Palestine is evident, and, as the writer says, when the Balfour Declaration was published in November, 1917, the maximum capacity of Palestine to support human life was an unknown quantity.

Indeed, most of the difficulties in Palestine seem to hinge on the lack of space and the consequent overcrowding of persons or interests. It is the same at the Wailing Wall, in the places sacred to Christendom, and in the cultivatable land.

Although the purchase of land from Arabs by the Jews caused a feeling of bitter grievance amongst the Arab tenants who were then dispossessed, it was their own Arab landlords who were to blame as much as the Jewish purchasers. These landlords were in many cases absentees and simply regarded their land as a money-making concern without taking any interest in the welfare of their tenants.

The writer points out there were two separate Jewish colonization institutions at work. First, the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association (P.I.C.A.), which has been at work since 1882, and the Zionist Organization, which has been active since 1920. The actions of the former appear to have been guided mainly by the desire to maintain friendly relations between the Jew and the Arab, and it worked, not only for the Jew settlers, but also for Arabs who had previously occupied the land. The Zionist scheme, on the other hand, was governed by two principles—that the land purchased should be Jewish national property, and that none but Jewish labour should be employed on it.

The writer is probably correct when he attributes the fundamental cause of these disturbances, like many other events in the East, to the growth of nationalism—perhaps one should say perverted nationalism, which takes the form rather of jealousy and dislike of all other nationalities than of pride in one's own.

The criticism by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations is unpleasant reading and certainly caused no small amount of ill-feeling at the time; it is as well to remember, however, if we wish to make the League of Nations an authoritative power in the world, we must be content to have our own actions criticized. This section leaves the reader with the impression that the outlook for the future is none too rosy, but one bright spot is indicated—the development by means of irrigation of the Beersheba area, where, according to Sir John Hope Simpson, there is practically an inexhaustible supply of cultivatable land. But where is the necessary capital to be obtained?

Twelve pages are devoted to Syria and the difficulties encountered in forming constitutions for the States under French Mandate in the Levant. One might conjecture that the French are beginning to find the Mandate somewhat irksome and to envy the manner in which we have solved our similar problem in Iraq.

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty is dealt with in the next section of the book. A somewhat gloomy view is taken of the treaty and its future prospects. This attitude is believed to be unjustified. That the change to complete independence will be accomplished without any set-backs is too much to expect; there will doubtless be a reaction which will manifest itself in attempts to depart from the lines laid down by former British advisers; but this will be merely a temporary phase. Iraqi Ministers have sufficient common sense to recognize their mistakes once they have the final responsibility, and we can look forward with confidence to a period three or four years ahead without too much anxiety about the months immediately following the end of the Mandate.

The Survey points out that the great source of difficulties between Great Britain and Iraq lay in the addition of provisos to any promise that was made, especially the one referring to the admission of Iraq to the League of Nations.

Although Sir Gilbert Clayton recognized this and pressed for the omission of this proviso, he did not do so until he was perfectly satisfied in his own mind that Iraq would be fit to stand by herself in 1932; those who know the width of Sir Gilbert Clayton's experience and the soundness of his judgment will realize that none but a very rash man would express a contrary opinion.

The reply from the British Government assenting to Sir Gilbert Clayton's proposal was received, not on September 14, as stated in the Survey, but in the evening of September 11, two or three hours after Sir Gilbert Clayton had died—died suddenly after his return from playing polo. This was the first and the greater of two tragedies that marked the embryonic stages of the treaty.

The second tragedy was the suicide of Sir Abdu'l-Muksin, a man trusted alike by Britain and by Iraq. That the subsequent negotiations would have been easier had these two lived none will deny; that the text of the treaty would have been in any way different is very doubtful.

Many of the criticisms directed against the treaty are mutually destructive, and many of its former critics have now realized the fundamental soundness of its

provisions.

To some the question of the minorities in Iraq still gives cause for anxiety.

There are many minorities in Iraq. They all depend for their livelihood upon the soil of Iraq; they share in the advantages of medical facilities, education, law, and order. Is it too much to expect that they shall regard themselves as citizens

of Iraq?

For economic reasons alone, it is impossible to form separate States of any of the minorities; their welfare rests upon the same foundation as that of the rest of Iraq. Therefore the future of the minorities lies, on the one hand, in their regarding themselves as Iraqis, in working for the good of Iraq, and helping to make Iraq a nation. And, on the other hand, in the Iraq Government recognizing that the minorities are an integral part of Iraq which it is not only their duty but their interest to treat on an equal basis with the rest. Those who have the true interests of the minorities at heart will serve them best not by encouraging false hopes and aspirations that can never be fulfilled, not by fomenting discord, but by promoting mutual sympathy and understanding.

The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923. By Dr. Harry N. Howard. 9½" × 6". Pp. 486. Maps. Printed in September, 1931, by the University of Oklahoma Press. \$5.

The author is described on the jacket as Assistant Professor of History at

Miami University.

The key-note to the book is given in the first words of the preface: "The break-up of the Ottoman Empire was one of the most significant and fundamental results of the World War. In many respects, and without underestimating the other fundamental causes of the war, the great conflagration of 1914-1918 may be considered as a struggle of the Great Powers of Europe over the Turkish question

in all its aspects."

This viewpoint will hardly commend itself to European readers; for the fate of Turkey was, of course, a mere incident. Indeed, if the German battle cruiser Goeben had not been allowed to escape into the Bosphorus in August, 1914, Turkey might have remained neutral, and the World War would then have been waged, and Germany's attempt to secure world mastery defeated, without the Turkish question coming in o play at all. However, the author, having stated his case, sets himself the task of digging into the mass of documents, published and unpublished, White Books, Blue Books, Red Books, memoirs, reviews, biographies, wherefrom he extracts strarge contradictions in Russian, British, French, Italian, and other policies with regard to Turkey, as disclosed in official utterances and correspondnce. His sympathy appears to lean to the Turkish side, and he shows up, with perhaps justifiable resentment, the selfish aims pursued by the Great Powers of Europe, of which Great Britain is made to appear the most perfidious. She was out to secure by any means, fair or foul, domination over all routes to India.

Russia was bent on acquiring mastery of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, "the key to her house," as Bismarck called the Straits.

France coveted Syria, perhaps because French soldiers had once marched to an air "Partant pour la Syrie."

Italy had dreams of expansion in Asia Minor.

The story of the development of these policies, and of the conflicting issues raised after the Armistice by Greek and Arab ambitions, is extraordinarily complicated. The author has spared no pains to record every step and quote authorities. The minuteness of detail is likely to bewilder and discourage the ordinary reader, though to the student of foreign politics it should be valuable for reference.

One criticism must be made with regard to the arrangement of the notes. In the text a small number signifies a note, which is to be found at the end of the book. The fewest in a chapter are forty-nine in chapter eleven, the most numerous two hundred and forty-one in chapter five; but each of the eleven chapters has a separate numeration for the notes, so that the careful reader who cannot pass a note without referring to it has to keep a special book-marker in the end of the book, to which he must continually turn. A smaller matter which seems tiresome is the meaningless stroke of connection between s and t and c and t in the type.

Perhaps the book would be read with most profit as a sequel to Mr. Wickham Steed's "Hapsburg Monarchy." That work, published shortly before the war, described the condition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with its dozen different races. The neighbouring Ottoman Empire was a similar agglomeration of peoples. Although the polite officials of Vienna and Budapest would resent the comparison, there was, in fact, a certain analogy between the two empires which formed the borderland between Europe and Asia; it was an Austrian saying that Asia began immediately east of Vienna.

Just as in Austria-Hungary the only bond uniting Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Italians, Serbs, Croats, Hungarians, Rumanians, Ruthenes, Jews, was allegiance to the Hapsburgs, so in the Ottoman Empire there was no sense of common nationality, but Turks, Albanians, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, Arabs, Jews, were held together under the Osmanli Dynasty. The only name for Turkey in the Turkish language was Ottoman Dominions. The word "Turk" was an insult and never used until the national movement took root in Angora after the Armistice.

The Balkan War had detached from the Ottoman Empire all its territory in Europe save Eastern Thrace; and the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, clinched by the action of the German Admiral in the Goeben, resulted in the loss of the Asiatic provinces, save Anatolia. The disposal of these severed Asiatic provinces, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Arabia, was no easy problem for the victorious Allies. Great Britain especially was embarrassed by engagements taken to the Arab chiefs which were hard to reconcile with the claims of France. In the end, however, the situation in the Arab countries smoothed itself out, at any rate for the time.

The problem of the rival Allied claims in Anatolia received unexpected solution at the hands of Mustafa Kemal. Nothing but the amazing blunder of the Greek landing at Smyrna could have enabled him to rouse the broken Turks to their three years' fight for an independent national existence. The story of that struggle was told in great detail by Mustafa Kemal Pasha himself in his six days' speech to the National Assembly, and is well worth reading. Under his inspiration the Nationalist Turks had the wisdom to confine their aim to the assertion of Turkish independence in the purely Turkish provinces of Anatolia, and to cut adrift the outlying provinces inhabited by non-Turkish races. The one exception was Kurdistan. It is still giving them trouble.

All these happenings the author records in the form of disjointed notes rather than of connected narrative.

Throughout the book the question on which he rightly lays most stress is that of "the Straits." He quotes Mr. Lloyd George's declaration: "The first consideration directing British policy is our anxiety as to the freedom of the seas between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. We do not want a second Gibraltar in the Dardanelles. We want the League of Nations to keep the Straits open for all nations." He then gives the Bolshevik view: "The Russian Government is also a partisan of the freedom of the Straits, but a freedom which concerns only merchant ships, and which frees entirely at the same time the Straits and the Black Sea from the presence of foreign naval forces."

A diplomatic battle was fought over the question at Lausanne. The Soviet delegate claimed that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be permanently closed both in peace and war to warships, armed vessels, and military aircraft of all countries except Turkey. The Rumanian delegation opposed closure of the Straits to ships of war, or placing them in the control of any single Power. Rumania and Bulgaria associated themselves with the Allies in opposing the Bolshevik claim, which really meant Russian domination over the Black Sea and the Straits; and Turkey was not in favour of it either. Finally, the Straits Convention attached to the Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The Bolshevik delegate declared that "if it was signed without Russia, the Ukraine, and Georgia, the Straits question remains, and will remain, open." Nevertheless, a Soviet delegate signed it at a later date.

The author concludes that "Turkey and the region of the Straits are safe only in time of peace. In time of war Turkey, even when neutral, is seriously handicapped, and when at war the entire zone of the Straits is peculiarly subject—as always—to superior sea power. Nor can it be said that the Lausanne solution of the question of the Straits is necessarily definitive." He quotes a speech made

by Trotsky in 1924:

"We must cry aloud that we need Constantinople and the Straits. A country such as ours cannot suffocate for the caprice or the interests of anyone. That is why Bessarabia is indispensable to us. It constitutes the first step on the road of Constantinople. Be persuaded of it, the Straits will belong to us sooner or later, even if England and France, forgetting the promise made during the war, wish to prevent us from obtaining them."

The author's view that the question of the Straits was not settled at Lausanne is that taken by Admiral Sir Richard Webb in the lecture he gave on the subject

to this Society on June 10 last year.

A. T. WAUGH.

The Legacy of Islam. Edited by the late Sir Thomas Arnold and Alfred Guillaume. Sm. 8vo. Pp. xvi+416. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1931.

It is satisfactory to note that this book, which was originally intended to bear as title "The Legacy of Arabia," now appears as stated above. The influence of Arabia was confined to religion and language, whereas the general culture of the Islamic world came from very different sources, as is emphasized many times in the course of the book. Perhaps the two greatest contributors in art and thought were the Persians and the Hellenized Aramæans of Syria and Northern Mesopotamia.

This fact is of great importance, for a misunderstanding of the real historical facts led us into the ridiculous Shereefian entanglement during the War, and was

responsible for the extraordinary idea that "the Glory of the Caliphate" might be revived by setting the most backward of Arabic-speaking peoples over the most advanced ones.

The system adopted, generally speaking, throughout the book is to give, first, a synopsis of the Muslim achievement in the particular field under discussion, and then show the extent to which Europe was affected thereby. The book, consequently, should be of great use to those interested in Oriental and Western civilization.

The subject is treated under thirteen headings, of which the first is "Spain and Portugal," by Mr. J. B. Trend. He claims that the greatest effect exercised on Europe by Islam was exercised through Muslim Spain, compared with which he maintains that the influence of the Crusades was slight. This opinion will probably cause surprise, and so will the statement "Latin was a clumsy language to write compared with Arabic"! Also that "Córdoba in the tenth century was the most civilized city in Europe." Surely the author must have forgotten Constantinople? And what are we to say of the reference to Madinat-az-Zahra as "a group of buildings of which modern excavators can find little except the drains." Has the author seen the Memoria, published by the Junta Superior de Excavaciones y Antigüedades in 1923? And is it not very daring to say that the "Moorish" (read "horse-shoe") arch existed in Spain before the Muslim conquest, seeing that it is almost impossible to prove that any Spanish church dates from the Visi-Gothic period?

And one would have expected that any study of Muslim influence on Christian Spain would have mentioned the remarkable treatise on carpentry, Breve compendio de la carpinteria de lo blanco y tratado de alarifes, of Diego López de Arenas, published at Seville in 1633, in which all the methods of setting out geometrical woodwork decoration are shown, a direct descent from the craft

traditions of the Muslim period.

In his chapter on the Crusades, Professor Ernest Barker takes a similar view regarding the relative influence on Europe of Muslim Spain and the Crusades. It seems to me that he greatly overrates the state of military architecture in the West at this time and underrates that of the Muslim East, and his remark that "it is at any rate certain that the engineering skill of the adventurous Normans, which showed itself in Western Europe earlier than it did in Palestine, was fully competent to arrive at such a development from its own independent resources," is scarcely in keeping with the present state of our knowledge. What had the eleventh-century Normans, whose "motte" castles consisted merely of a tower standing in a stockaded enclosure on top of an artificial mound, to compare with the walls and gates of Diyārbekr (earliest parts date from A.D. 910) or the splendid Pātimid walls and gates of Cairo, built in A.D. 1087-92, before the First Crusade had ever been thought of?

It is certain that the mâchicoulis, which is employed in Muslim architecture as early as A.D. 729 (Qaşr al-Hair, five examples), was brought to the West (earliest example, Château Gaillard, end of twelfth century) as a result of the Crusades, and doubtless also the bent entrance, which is employed four times in Saladin's

work in Cairo, but not until much later in the West.

As for double lines of defence, this system, which was adopted for the landward walls of Constantinople, does not appear to have been employed in Islam.

Mr. Martin Briggs, however, in his interesting chapter on "Architecture," recognizes the indebtedness of the West to Islam for the machicoulis and the bent entrance. He also suggests that some of the later Renaissance campanili of Italy were influenced by certain types of minarets, and gives a table of remarkable

parallels. He also gives his adhesion to the view that the pointed arch came from the East, likewise cusped or multifoil arches, and possibly even plate tracery

and pierced cresting.

Mr. A. H. Christie has contributed an excellent and—most important for such a subject—a well-illustrated chapter on "Islamic Minor Arts and their Influence upon European Work," in which this influence is demonstrated in mathematical instruments (the best astrolabes came from the East), ceramics, silk weaving, enamelled glass, bookbinding, etc. Marbled end-papers were introduced from Turkey, and an interesting passage from Bacon is cited: "The Turkes have a pretty art of chamoletting of paper. . . . They take divers oyled colours, and put them severally (in drops) upon water; and stirre the water lightly, and then wet their paper with it, and the paper will be waved, and veined, like Chamolet or Marble."

And the influence of the East was not confined to the influence of imported objects, for Oriental craftsmen had actually formed colonies in several Italian cities—e.g., Venice, where Mahmud the Kurd worked in the first years of the sixteenth century. A signed example of his inlaid metal work is shown in Fig. 24. One slip—Fig. 56 is printed upside down. Those specially interested in the question of Muslim influence on the minor arts as well as on architecture in the West will find a wealth of additional examples in Mrs. Devonshire's "Quelques

influences islamiques sur les arts de l'Europe."

It is also interesting to learn that Leonardo da Vinci experimented with Oriental geometrical patterns, and that a number of Renaissance pattern books—e.g., those of Francesco di Pellegrino, Peter Flötner, Virgil Solis, and Martinus Petrus—show direct influence of this sort, and that, at an even earlier date (1286), Odericus of Rome had wrought such patterns upon the inlaid marble pavement of the Presbytery of Westminster Abbey.

One of the clearest and most methodical chapters is that of Dr. Meyerhof on "Science and Medicine." The most striking fact brought out by him is that Muslim scientists had already adopted the experimental method at a time when

the Dark Ages in Western Europe were at their lowest ebb.

Islamic medicine, as Dr. Meyerhof expresses it, "reflected the light of the Hellenic sun when its day had fled," and "shone like a moon, illuminating the darkest nights of the European Middle Ages," but in mathematics Baron Carra de Vaux clearly shows that they not only transmitted Greek mathematical knowledge, but made definite additions to it, especially in trigonometry.

K. A. C. CRESWELL.

Oriental Rugs and Carpets: A Comprehensive Study. By Arthur

Urbane Dilley. New York: Scribners. 1931. 63s.

The literature of the Eastern carpet industry is a study in itself. Many books on the subject have appeared during the last ten years, especially in the United States of America, varying in price from a few shillings to some twenty-five golden sovereigns, some illustrated with a few half-tone blocks, others with scores of magnificent collotype plates. The present work challenges comparison with all its predecessors alike in value for money, in the variety and appropriateness of the illustrations (there are seventy-nine plates, of which thirteen are in colour, and seven sketch-maps) and in the dignity and learning displayed in the text. The book is indeed much more than a disquisition on carpets; it is a finely written appreciation of Persia, its position at various periods of history, and of Persian

achievements in what is, after agriculture, the most notable and most respectable of all human activities. It is full of good stories in which carpets figure, of quotations from an amazing variety of sources, so apt that they blend in the

narrative as happily as the designs so lovingly selected by the author.

The book is costly, but is worth every penny charged for it: it will rank, together with Pope's "Introduction to Persian Art" and "The Legacy of Islam," among the most notable contributions of the present century to a better understanding in English-speaking countries of the great contributions of Islam, and especially of Persia, to the deep, slow current of progress which through many tortuous channels has borne mankind along the river of Time.

The only criticism of substance that a lay reviewer can find is that no

consistent system of transliteration of Persian names has been followed.

A. T. WILSON.

Muhammadan Law: An Abridgment according to its Various Schools. By Seymour Vesey-Fitzgerald. Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey

Milford. 1931.

The value of this abridgment and explanation of Islamic law is not to be measured only by its merits as a legal treatise for the use of lawyers. As the preface announces, it is intended for the benefit of the Civil Service in the African dependencies; and one reader, at least, is constrained to express his regret that it was not published twenty-five years ago for his own edification. Nowadays it is an accepted principle that the administrator must have an intimate knowledge of the religion and customs of the people for whom he is responsible. Sympathy, which is the secret of the British official's pre-eminence in administering backward peoples, is not enough; Justice herself will go astray if her eyes are blind to the motives and inhibitions which tradition inspires and custom fortifies. Among the pagan peoples of Africa it is often difficult to ascertain their religious beliefs and even their customs and traditions. But where Moslems have immigrated or Islam has penetrated, religion, custom and tradition find their authority and their expression in the Law. The Law is the religion. The lawyer is the recognized theologian, and not the priest. The Kadi and Musti form the hierarchy, and not the Imam. There is no distinction whatever between doctrinal tenets and legal. principles. Both are binding simply and solely as divine revelations.

Hence, to those concerned in the administration of a Moslem community, the importance of a just appreciation of the Law, not only as it is to be applied in the courts of justice, but as it moulds and colours the whole life and thought of the

people.

All this may appear elementary to those who have served any length of time in a Mohammedan country, but a perusal of the three introductory chapters of this work will convince most of us that if we are to understand the Law and its relation to the life and thought of the people, we have a good deal yet to learn of its origins and development. For only so can the relative authority of its principles be appreciated, as well as the divergence between the Sunni and the Shia schools and their subdivisions. "Though Islam is one," quotes the author, "diversity of opinion among my people is a mercy from God."

To take a practical example, the author alludes to the fact that "the Maliki is the old-established school in the Anglo-Egyptian, as well as in the Western, Sudan." But the Sharia courts of the Sudan Government follow the Hanafi code, which they have derived from the Ottoman Empire through Egypt. This difference has become of some importance now that, under native administration, the tribal sheikhs administer justice themselves in their own courts and may be expected to adopt Maliki principles. If in certain districts or certain important cases this should give rise to friction or dispute between the sheikhly and the professional judges, it is essential that the administrative officers should know, not only that the difference of school exists, but what the main principles of divergence are. It seems worth while to emphasize this point because the lay Gallio is, not unnaturally, disposed to care for none of these things. And it is not too much to say that a few pages of Mr. Vesey-Fitzgerald's book would interest as well as

enlighten him.

The book may, therefore, be strongly recommended for the use of political officers whose duties bring them in touch with Moslem tribes or communities. It will also be of great value and greater interest to British judges and professional lawyers; but, by a curious paradox, in most parts of Africa these latter have really less need than the administrative service to know and appreciate the Sharia law. As a general rule in Africa the courts in which British judges preside and non-Mohammedan lawyers practise have nothing to do with matters to which the Sharia law applies, and which are dealt with by the Kadis of the Mohammedan courts. It therefore seldom falls to the lot of a British lawyer to advise, or a British judge to adjudicate upon, a question to which the law of the Koran is relevant. But that is not to say that a British judge or lawyer would fail to appreciate the advantage of knowing something of the law which is also the religion of the people amongst whom he functions.

If this review is directed rather to the purposes of the author than to the matter of his book, it is because those objects are of real importance and the book is admirably designed to achieve them. Mr. Vesey-Fitzgerald has combined clearness, accuracy, and research in technical matters with much that is of general interest. His book may be read as an essay and retained as a work of reference.

N. G. D.

Bukhsh (S. Khuda): A History of the Islamic Peoples. Sm. 8vo.

Pp. vii+170. Calcutta. 1914.

Marketta (1907)

This book is a translation of that part of Weil's Geschichte der islamitischen Völker which deals with the rise of Islam and the history of the Umayyad Dynasty—that is to say, it covers the period a.D. 622-750. As the original was published in 1866, the translator has added extensive notes in order to put the reader in touch with the results of recent research.

K. A. C. C.

Europe and China: A Survey of their Relations from the Earliest Times to 1800. By G. F. Hudson. 82" × 52". Pp. 336. Edward Arnold.

This is a scholarly book, written by a man who is very well equipped for the task he has set himself, and he writes for those who bring to their reading a sufficient knowledge of his subject to be able to evaluate the statements he makes. and to judge the prestige of the authorities he quotes in support of his arguments.. It is not a large book, but it contains a vast amount of information, culled from all available sources, and there are few, even of those who consider themselves

well informed on the subject of China's relations with Europe, who will not find much that is new to them within its covers.

The title of the first chapter is "Beyond the North Wind," and in it the author argues that the Hyperboreans, mentioned in the Arimaspea of Aristeas (seventh century B.C.) were the Chinese, and that that intrepid traveller was the first European who brought back even a hearsay report of the existence of China, and from that date the curtain falls and China is unknown to the West for more than a millennium. It is a fascinating story, but most readers will award to the author's reasoning no more than the Scottish verdict of "not proven."

In the second chapter we are on firmer ground. We are told, on the authority of Strabo, that the Bactrian Greeks "extended their empire as far as the Seres and the Phauni." "The Phauni were the Hsiung-nu of China, the Huns of Europe." The Chinese were certainly known later as "Ceres," silk men, but in this case the name was probably applied to merchants who traded with China and not to Chinese proper. It was the Chinese themselves who made the next move towards the West. The Emperor Wu-ti sent his Minister, Chang-ch'ien, to form an alliance with the Yueh-chi (Turks?) against the Hsiung-nu in 128 B.C., and from that time China had, at least, a window looking towards Europe.

Chapter three tells us how the silk trade with China, conducted through Greek and Arab intermediaries, drained Rome of its wealth and contributed largely to the decline and fall of the empire. Luxury was sapping the iron sinews of Rome. The women would have silk from China which was unravelled and spun into gauze so thin that satirists declared that they were clothed in glass. There was a debit balance of more than a million pounds sterling on the trade with the East, and the abundance of Roman coins unearthed in India bears witness to the drain of gold that flowed from West to East in the days of the emperors.

Even the Barbarians became infected with luxury, and Alaric demanded, as part of the ransom of Rome, 4,000 tunics of silk, 3,000 scarlet-dyed skins, and 30,000 pounds of pepper. In the sixth century the silk moth was smuggled into

Europe and the monopoly of the Chinese trade was broken.

Chapter five is devoted to the "Pax Tartarica" and gives a spirited description of the marvellous expansion of China under the Mongols. It is an astonishing chapter in the world's history that a tribe of Tartars—"stinking tartars," as the Chinese call them—under their great leader Chingis, should have come nearer to conquering the world than any race before or since that time. These were the days of Kublai Khan and the Polos—the days when, for a brief period, it seemed that China would be Christian.

The world had suddenly grown larger. Friar Odoric declared that China had 2,000 cities so large that neither Treviso nor Vicenza could be named with any one of them. The Hangchow of that day had, according to Marco Polo, a circuit of 100 miles and 12,000 bridges over its network of canals, and its size was only less remarkable than its abounding wealth and delicate luxury. It is difficult for those who see Hangchow in these degenerate days—though it is still a great city—to credit the glories spoken of by those early writers. Yet if the visitor will take the trouble to examine the soil in the suburbs of the great southern cities, Nanking, Suchow, or Hangchow, he will find that, for a mile or more, it is largely composed of rubble, the débris of former habitations.

Three centuries later we find missionaries, under the Ming Dynasty, praising the integrity of the judges, "the which is a great and notable virtue so that few times there is any that doth complain of any ill justice." Alas! nowadays there are few missionaries who have not often heard the proverb "Yamen men shih pah dzi K'ai, Yu li wu ch'ien puh k'o tsin lai" ("The door of the Yamen opens like

the character 8 [wide on the outside, but narrowing as you enter]. If you have right but no money, do not enter in "). Again, we are told: "The ways are gallantly paved with foursquare stone. The streets in this town, and in all the rest of the cities we have seen, are very fair, so large and so straight that it is wonderful to behold. The breadth of the street is such that fifteen men may ride commodiously side by side." Having travelled in many southern cities in China, this reviewer testifies that he never saw a main street in one of them that a taxi could traverse without compelling the people on either side to flatten themselves against the walls to give it room to pass. In the north the streets are wider, but

they are not paved and, when rain falls, are nothing but ditches.

The travellers, though amazed at China's wealth, had a poor opinion of her soldiers. One says: "With five thousand Spaniards, at the most, the conquest of the country might be made. With half a dozen galleons and as many galleys one would be master of all the maritime provinces of China." The praise is too fulsome, the criticism too sweeping, but one is left with the impression that China is infinitely less prosperous, and less populous, today than she was in the thirteenth century or even in the sixteenth. And, one might add, poorer and worse governed under the Republic than ever she was under the Monarchy. There are in her elements that, fostered and encouraged, might yet give her a future as great as those of her palmiest days. But these are repressed and neutralized by an army of self-seeking politicians who have neither the valour of the days of the fighting States nor the virtues of the moralists of classical times. The teaching of the sages has been jettisoned and a generation is growing up that reverences nothing. Confucius told one of his disciples that good government consisted in (1) sufficiency of food, (2) sufficiency of soldiers, (3) sufficiency of confidence between ruler and ruled.

"If the three cannot all be obtained," said the scholar, "which shall we dispense with first?" "Dispense with the soldiers," was the reply. "If both the remaining two cannot be obtained," said the scholar, "what shall we do?" "Dispense with the food," said the Master. "Death is the lot of all men, but if there is no confidence between ruler and ruled the State must perish." So China is

perishing today.

I. DARROCH.

Desideri: An Account of Tibet. Translated and edited by Sir Filippo de Filippi. Pp. xviii + 474. Illustrations, Map. Broadway Travellers Series. Routledge. 25s.

"Two years and four months after I left Goa, and one year and a half since our departure from Delly, and ten whole months since leaving Kascimir, we arrived, by the grace of God, on the eighteenth day of March, 1716, at the city of Lhasa, capital of this Tibet." So wrote the enthusiastic Jesuit missionary, Desideri, then only thirty-two years old. And we English should feel deep humiliation that we have never yet paid him the tribute that he deserved. True it is that the record of his great journey and of his experiences during the five years that he spent in Lhasa had till now been not very accessible and had not been translated from Italian. Still, it was known to exist, and we—the present writer especially—ought to have taken pains to get at it. Anyhow, now, thanks to the diligence and perseverance and patriotism of his fellow-countryman, Dr. de Filippi, the well-known Himalayan explorer, we have translated into English the full report of the wonderful mission.

And extraordinarily good reading it is. Desideri had reached Lhasa by the circuitous route through Kashmir and Ladak and thence up the Indus and down the Brahmaputra, passing the sources of both these rivers. Geography, however, was not his strong point nor his main interest, and not much detail is given. But what is of great value is his account of his relations with the Tibetans and his description of their religion. He started with the assumption that this religion was full of evil, and he frankly told the Tibetans so. He then set down to study it. He was helped in every way by the Lhasa monks, who were evidently captivated by the courage and enterprise and genuine sincerity of this young traveller, for it must be remembered that in those days Tibetans had nothing to fear from the political or commercial enterprise of Europeans. And as a result of his labours a book in Tibetan appeared which he presented in full Durbar to the Prime Minister, and which was to have been fully debated in public if a revolution had not occurred, entailing the death of the Prime Minister and necessitating the temporary flight of Desideri.

Subsequently he was able to return safely to Europe and to compile the report we now at last have available in English. He imputes much of what he saw and heard in Tibet to "the work of the devil." Nevertheless, he does give a highly interesting description of the inner life of the Tibetans two hundred years ago; and as they have not changed much since, that description is still of value today.

Moreover, the book deals not only with Tibet. It has also interesting descriptions of journeys through India. Altogether it forms a very notable addition to the Broadway Travellers series. And high credit is due to Dr. de Filippi for having brought the work of the great Italian traveller to our notice in so carefully edited and presented in so admirable a fashion.

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FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

The Religion of Tibet. By Sir Charles Bell, K.C.I.E., C.M.G. 9" × 6". Pp. xv+ 234. Map and Illustrations. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

This book forms a sequel to Sir Charles Bell's previous works, "Tibet, Past and Present" and "The People of Tibet." Sir Charles is recognized as the leading authority on that country, and his unique and intimate knowledge is expressed in attractive narrative and with great descriptive power. He stayed longer in the country than any other European since A.D. 1745, travelled widely and studied deeply, and won the confidence and liking of the ruler and the people in a very remarkable manner; in Lhasa he was accepted as having been a lama in

a previous existence.

It is an intensely interesting country. The people are sturdy and virile. The men are good fighters in primitive fashion, but they are not aggressive and show small inclination to military service; much of their fighting is done by monks. They are highly literate; monasticism naturally creates a profusion of records, history and scriptures, and the cold, dry climate is favourable to the preservation of books and manuscripts. The beauty and even splendour of the books to be found in monastic and other libraries make a Western bibliophile's mouth water. Sir Charles himself has acquired books of great value by gift from his friend the Dalai Lama and otherwise.

The religion is Buddhist, which came, of course, from India, but has developed special features of its own, partly by absorption of the primitive animism called Pon, partly by special evolution in an isolated and secluded country. It has repelled Christianity and held its own against the fierce onslaughts of Islam. Remarkable resemblances, in dogmas and ceremonies, have been noticed between Buddhism and Christianity, especially the Catholic, but there is little reason to infer direct imitation or adoption on either side; we should rather assume similar

directions of development.

The essential features of Buddhism are well known: the impersonal character of the Supreme Process, the inevitable sequence of reward and retribution, the constant succession of karma, a kind of divine bookkeeping which "carries forward" in rebirth after rebirth, the weariness of existence, the joy of personal annihilation, and the final bliss of nirvana. When the Raja of Bhutan sent his son to be educated at a Christian missionary college, Buddhist co-religionists in Ceylon protested against the young Prince being taught "the abominable doctrine of the forgiveness of sins." It is unlikely that he was any the worse for it. For all its impersonality, Buddhism, particularly Tibetan Buddhism, teems with magic, thaumaturgy, and miracle-working-" the gnome and troll and dwerg, and the gods of cliff and berg, around us and beneath us and above," as Kipling puts it. One form of wonder-working is alien to it. The creed of Madame Blavatsky, Mr. Sinnett, and Mrs. Besant, the tale of the Masters who seclude themselves so effectually, who possess such supernormal powers and never use them to any intelligible end; this theosophy finds no countenance in Sir Charles' book.

The wealth and beauty of the illustrations add to the outstanding merit of

this interesting and valuable book.

A. L. S.

Initiations and Initiates in Tibet. By Madame Alexandra David-Neel. 9" × 6". Pp. 224. Illustrations. Rider. 12s. 6d.

It is doubtful if any other European during the last few centuries has been able to study conditions of lamaism and its attendant mystic rites as has Mme. David-Neel.

For some considerable time Mme. David-Neel lived amongst Buddhists. In Northern Sikkim she built herself a hut near a cave wherein dwelt a very holy and learned lama. Here she studied the conditions imposed on themselves by hermit monks. Mme. David Neel's teacher was famed for philosophy. He undoubtedly also knew something of the mystic teachings. In Tibet all mystic teaching is kept closely secret. The following quotation from Mme. David-Neel's book gives an idea of the difficulties concerning the teachings:

"Most initiates do not teach what they have learned; they even keep secret the fact that they have been initiated. They have taken an oath of silence regarding both these points, and this oath contains such dreadful imprecations that the perjurer would be reborn in the *nyalwas* [*nyalwas* means hells]."

To have learned anything of these rites was a great achievement, but at what risk to the teacher's soul!

We in the West who apply logic, reason, and Western philosophy to the study of mysticism are possibly oblivious to the fact that we are working in an entirely different direction from that employed by the Oriental scholar. In Tibet initiation does not mean that the initiate has acquired knowledge; far from it. Initiation is merely a ceremony, the object of which is to prepare the mind to divest itself of all previous knowledge—to cleanse it utterly. After much preparation by means of meditation, spiritual exercise, fasting, and drastic physical and moral restrictions, the initiate gradually emerges—his mind purified and empty. He now hopes to gain an entrance to the path leading to that clearer, greater knowledge referred to in Mme. David-Neel's book as the "going beyond knowledge."

"Great importance is attached to this 'going beyond' in esoteric teachings. They comment in many ways the 'going beyond' charity, patience, vigilance, morality, serenity, knowledge. It must be understood that 'beyond' the narrow and unenlightened conceptions we have of charity, etc., there exists another way of understanding and practising them. At a higher stage of initiation the insignificance of this second way of understanding of charity, etc., is in its turn exposed."

The student of mystic knowledge in the East studies as a hermit, from within. The savant of the West studies from without, using his previously acquired philosophy as a means of approaching that which in Tibet is considered to be unapproachable through these channels. Both hermit and savant have the same objective. To the Oriental mind, the savant has no understanding whatsoever of that for which he is seeking, otherwise he would surely choose the right direction. To the hermit, meditation, fasting, etc., are the only possible preparations for even the contemplation of the goal ahead. Wisdom achieved at the expense of rigid spiritual training cannot be lightly acquired along the shelves of a library.

Mme. David-Neel, having studied at close quarters the conditions of a hermit's life, is certainly well qualified to write of them. What she has learnt should be of value to the West. Her book represents a great amount of patient investigation, and it is full of information. She quotes freely from old Tibetan manuscripts, and she makes interesting comment on much of what she translates.

The savant of the West may criticise her adversely. He will want to pin her down to facts. He may accuse her of inaccuracy. She may also be adversely criticized by those who have read "My Journey to Lhasa." Throughout her journey her adopted lama son "practised mystically" to such good effect that the almost impossible was achieved—a safe journey. Mme. David-Neel was fully aware of the fact that her son was "mystically adapting" to the requirements of

the moment. At times he was assisted most dramatically and successfully by Mme. David-Neel herself. Therein surely lies much understanding. She will be fully prepared to face her assailants, should there be any. Among the illustrations there is a photograph of her lama son "performing a rite for bestowing prosperity upon a family." A queer conceit this! Our faith is badly shaken! We feel we owe an apology on Mme. David-Neel's behalf to her Tibetan philosopher friends. They gave her their confidence, and treated her with the respect due to a fellow-searcher after truth. The Tibetan philosopher is of the finest salt of the earth. Coming upon this photograph was rather like meeting a picture of Charlie Chaplin, complete with bowler hat, in the middle of a serious book on the Apostles.

"Initiations and Initiates in Tibet" will provide much food for reflection to

all those interested in lamaism and mysticism.

The absence of an index is a great inconvenience.

T. W.

The Life of a Mogul Princess, Jahanara Begam, Daughter of Shah Jahan. By Andrea Butenschön. 92"×5". Pp. xii+221. Illustrations.

Routledge. 10s. 6d.

The subject of this memoir is Jahanara, the Begam Padshah (Princess Royal), eldest of the eight children of the Emperor Shah Jahan and has wife, Mumtaz Mahal, whose tomb and monument is the Taj Mahal at Agra. It is a tale of woe, dealing with the unhappy end of the reign of a well-meaning but self-indulgent monarch, from whose weak hands the sceptre was torn in the later years of his life.

The story opens with the year 1658, at which date Shah Jahan had ruled

Hindustan for thirty-one years, his age being then sixty-six.

The two eldest of the family, the Begam Jahanara and Prince Dara—favourites of their father and close allies, with identity of political interests—being resident at Court, practically ruled the Empire with the acquiescence of the ease-loving and now ageing monarch. The three younger sons, the princes Shuja, Aurangzeb, and Murad, all full-grown men with experience of public affairs, of governing, and, needless to add, of warfare, were at the seats of government in their respective vice-royalties in Bengal, the Deccan, and Gujerat—posts all some hundreds of miles from the central seat of government, whether at Delhi or Agra. Now, history relates that early in the year 1658 the illness and rumoured death of the Emperor gave rise to a feeling of considerable unsettlement throughout the dominions of Shah Jahan, and led each of the Princes to take active steps by intrigue and force to assert his own particular claim to the succession.

In the resulting clash of arms the royal army commanded by Dara in person suffered defeat at Samugarh in June, 1658, when the victorious Aurangzeb

advanced on Agra and made his father and sister prisoners in the fort.

Dara was then pursued and taken, and after being paraded as a prisoner through the streets of Delhi was beheaded. Prince Shuja was also defeated in battle and fled to Burma, where shortly afterwards he was killed, while Murad, cruelly betrayed by Aurangzeb, was confined in the fortress of Gwalior and there executed.

Thereafter for forty-nine years Aurangzeb was the unquestioned ruler of the country, though he was never loved by his subjects.

A strict Mahommedan, his religious fanaticism forbade him to tolerate other

creeds—a misfortune for the State, the vast majority of the population being Hindus, including the Rajputs, who, since the reign of Akbar, had been loyal supporters of the ruling house at Delhi.

Such, dynastically, was the position of affairs—a by no means unusual one in oriental countries—which gave rise to the lamentations of the Mogul Princess,

who shared and eased her father's captivity during many long years.

Yet though captivity be for any human being a thing hard to bear, it is said to have been softened for Shah Jahan and his daughter by the liberality and indulgence with which they and their households were treated. None the less, Jahanara rebelled at her cruel lot. Proud of her lineage and devoted as she had been to her late brother Dara, the heir-apparent and vice-regent, whose policy of conciliation and moderation—a policy adopted with such good results by the great Akbar—might well, had he lived and held the reins of government, have resulted in the consolidation of the Empire by bringing about race fusion and engendering in the land the spirit of religious tolerance, Jahanara entertained a feeling of intense hatred towards her brother Aurangzeb, the usurper of the throne of Delhi, to which the manuscript in her own handwriting, not long since come to light, hidden away behind a marble slab in the Jessamine tower of the fort at Agra, bears witness:

"Alas! alas! when the message of defeat reached Agra I wept as I weep over

thee, my brother, and over him whose name I dare not mention.

"In thy heart lay thy greatness, Dara, and the footsteps of Akbar wouldst thou follow on the way to the unity of Hind. The same law for all, as the same God rules over all. But thy weakness and thy pride ruined thee, and strength lay on the other side, with the fakir. How I hate thee, white serpent, ruler of us all, the Aurangzeb! Thy heart is as hard as thy intelligence is bright, and thy dominating thought is this: 'I alone shall rule far into the souls of men!' Thine eye smiles benignly when thy foot crushes to death everyone that stands in thy way. Truly indeed did the wandering sage prophesy, when thou wast only a child, that thou wouldst be the destroyer of the race of Timur."

But in the course of time the sense of injury and the feeling of hatred gave place in both prisoners to a spirit of forgiveness, father and son becoming recon-

ciled though they never met again; and later the Princess writes:

"My father is dead. The spark has gone out in this world, to be kindled again in the unseen. Now he has been carried down to the white palace, where my mother is waiting for him. In the evening the light will burn in the Taj Mahal for them both, and for both the Koran will be read."

It only remains to be said that, after Shah Jahan had passed away, her liberty, as well as the title of Padshah Begam, was restored to her, and she lived peacefully during the last fourteen years of her life in her palace at Delhi, where she

died in the year 1680.

The pious hope she entertained of being able to influence her brother "to withhold his hand from all this shedding of blood in order to gain more land, and from destroying the Hindu Sanctuaries as if they were fortifications of the Fiend," can never, however, have been in any degree realized. Aurangzeb, the reserved and stern ascetic, took his own line, uninfluenced by friend or foe, though it is true that at the very end of his long life he was painfully conscious of his own sole responsibility for the failure of his reign. Distrusted by their father, no one of his sons was permitted to attend his deathbed—his end being one of distressing suspicion, loneliness, and anguish of mind. Truly a tragic close of life for a man in whose hands had lain the fate of millions of his fellow beings for 50 years. He passed away in March, 1707, at the age of 88.

Madame Butenschön has, through the fortunate discovery of the long-hidden manuscript and its able editing, made a valuable contribution to history. The work is a revealing picture of Indian Court life and customs in the seventeenth century, and should appeal by its dramatic interest to the student of that period. E. STC. P.

Nationhood for India. By Lord Meston, K.C.S.I. Oxford University Press. 5s. net. 1931.

The Power of India. By Michael Pym. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 15s. net. Autumn, 1930.

India and the British: A Quest for Truth. By Patricia Kendall. London:

Charles Scribner's Sons. 16s. net. 1931.

Lord Meston's small book consists of the contents, with formal changes, of three papers read by him in August, 1930, to the American Institute of Politics, with an introduction and an epilogue, bringing it up to the eve of the second session of the Round Table Conference. The root of Indian unrest is, he holds. to be found in a conflict of civilizations, of the Hindu culture with that of the West. While other forces are also at work in India, "the real driving force behind India's discontent and claims is the spirit of Hinduism, eager for the preservation—it may be even for the restoration—of its power." After an interesting account of the origins, history, and characteristics of Hinduism, summing up knowledge collected from many sources, he proceeds to trace the rise of anti-Occidental feeling, which was able to make use of the simultaneous aspiration for political freedom on Western lines. Examining the obstacles to effective nationhood in India, he illustrates, by tracing the history of Indian politics, especially since 1919, the negation of constructive work towards unity on the part of the nationalist leader. This is the baldest outline of his work. There are interesting passages on such subjects as the Dravidian culture, Indian amour propre, relations between Hindus and Muslims, and the difficulties of federation with the Indian States. He announces (without specifying his source) that a complete fresh scheme of reform was on the anvil before the Great War broke out. He observes that Mrs. Besant and (after 1922) Gandhi were respectively thrown overboard and placed under eclipse when they moved towards active social reform as distinct from mere lip-service. His survey of Hinduism would have given a fairer impression had it included some admission of the moral value of some of the Hindu ideas—as, for instance, the responsibility of the individual to his group (which, incidentally has made a Poor Law unnecessary), the value of the family, and the ideal of freedom from desire and self-interest. The strength of the Hindu tradition is not wholly due to superstition and "unintelligible rules." By a slip the area of the Indian States has been sheared of a 0. And there is surely some exaggeration in the statement that "there are not two alphabets in India, but at least a dozen, totally and radically distinct." But these are minor matters. The intellectual power of Lord Meston's writing must have commended his opinions to the members of the Institute, and he has given the British public an interesting and revealing picture of the situation.

The two remaining books are by American women. Mrs. Pym, who either heard or heard of Lord Meston's papers before sending her book to press, disputes, in the course of her book, his main thesis. She points out that, with very few exceptions (she mentions Pandit Malaviya as one), the leaders of the nationalist movement are not only political but social reformers. She also refers

to the political attitude of the Arya Samaj, an unorthodox body, and, in contrast to that of the Sanátan Dharma Sabha, which specifically represents orthodoxy. These facts are not conclusive. The rebellion of orthodox Hinduism is by no means fully organized or even conscious. Here it takes the form of peaceful protest against innovations from within and without; there it avails itself, for political or violent action, of the help of the English-educated and the progressive. We must look, not to the professions of the leaders, nor even to their personal desires, but to the control exercised over them by their followers, who provide

the voting power and the funds. Mrs. (or Michael) Pym, who unites great intelligence with a leaning towards the transcendental, has set herself to describe the power of India without India's weakness. In her stay of "some years" in India she has learned, by wide study and occasional investigation, and by living with Indian ladies, a great deal that is worth knowing about India. She has picked up all sorts of one-sided stories from Indians of various types—as, for instance, that the Hindu-Muslim tension all originated out of Tilak's desire to stir up trouble for the foreign Government, and has been gratuitously kept alive by the institution of communal electorates, and that the Government neglects female education and is a hindrance to social reform. Her portrayal of the races and regions visited by her, including the Frontier and Kathiawar, but otherwise mostly on the beaten track, is vivid and (in the best sense) imaginative. She appreciates some of the essential peculiarities of Indian politics. She is no admirer of Gandhi, with whom she had an interview ending in some heat, at least on her side. Gandhi is not Indian enough. "A Russian Christian, with all the Russian's tendency to dwell on himself," is only one of many penetrating remarks in the course of a number of pages devoted to him.

There is a good deal of the Theosophist in Mrs. Pym, as appears from touches here and there in her book. The metaphysical pantheism of the higher Hinduism, the Indian Muslim poetry with a Sufi tinge, the ease with which anyone in India, rich or poor, can undertake the spiritual adventure of the fakir or the sadhu (she fully admits the fakes), have a special appeal for her. But she is not all transcendentalist. While she found spirituality abundant in India, she saw spiritual beauty and strength in Indian women in particular; and this is the more impressive in that she seems to have seen a good deal of them in various capacities, and, by a rare inspiration, admits them to have faults like other women. The sections dealing with yoga and the spirit of Indian art are good. The section on Indian music, half drowned though it is in poetic enthusiasm and advocacy, covers, with few exceptions, the principal features and ideas of that music.

The bias of the convert to Indian culture, easily excusable in an interpretation of that culture, becomes less agreeable when applied to the action of Westerners in India. That country, in Mrs. Pym's view, suffered a "frightful disaster" in the coming of the British, who represented political Christendom, ruined India's art, and, by the introduction of their own manufactures, the systematic destruction of the nobles and upper classes, and extortion and over-taxation, reduced it by the time of the Mutiny from great wealth to a state of bankruptcy, from which it has never recovered. It has a large public debt and sometimes budgetary deficits (two things which seemed terrible to Americans in 1930). The most notable part of the evidence on which Mrs. Pym bases her statements consists of references to half-forgotten books such as Henry Mead's book on the Sepoy Mutiny, containing criticisms of our policy and administration in India, especially in the first half of the nineteenth century, by British writers. These books, when one goes to them, speak of miserably poor countrysides with fertile soils in some parts

of India, of the ruin of great estates when taken under official management, the favouring of the peasant at the expense of the natural leaders of native society, the drain of Home charges, and ill-behaviour on the part of officials. Though somewhat striking, these reports do not suffice to bear out Mrs. Pym's theses; and she shows no sign of having consulted Mr. Moreland's works on the condition of India under the Moghuls. There is also much as to the wrongs and grievances of the Indian States. There seems to have been little or no reply made to Mr. A. P. Nicholson's book, "Scraps of Paper: India's Broken Treaties," and therefore Mrs. Pym must be excused for repeating his erroneous views. The more modern grievances of the States are less real than she supposes, and some of them are being redressed. The book contains a great variety of subjects and ideas. Mrs. Pym has put a good deal of thought into it. There are mistakes about the salt trade, the Indian prostitute, and (probably) the causes of emigration from Kathiawar, besides many opinions which will be accepted by few.

Miss (or Mrs.) Kendall follows Mrs. Pym somewhat after the fashion of Sancho Panza, with realism and donkey-work. From "India and the British" we learn that, at least according to an American lady doctor who practises in India, the Hindu religion is sex-worship combined with survivals of animism. As for the plastic art, the temple sculptures were suitably censored by Mahmud of Ghazni, whose activities unfortunately did not reach the gopurams of Madura. Miss Kendall toured all India interviewing types and representatives, and studied books about Indian affairs, including a few written by Indian politicians. Her descriptions of scenes and races are excellent. She is a champion of the British. She points out that if the British were as bad as they are painted they would have been turned out of India long ago. With her somewhat limited knowledge she does her best to explode some of the fallacies of the nationalist politician by recalling the facts of history and quoting present-day statistics. Gandhi's life history and childish opinions, child-marriage, suttee, female infanticide (of which she discovered an Indian defender), the minorities, defence, and the Indian States are among the other subjects dealt with, and the opinions of Sir Sankaran Nair in "Gandhi and Anarchy" are effectively quoted. Miss Kendall, it will have been noticed, has not the broadest of outlooks, but she has common sense and is usually reliable, though not so about names, or about firearms, which she thinks are allowed only to the army and police. A book like hers serves a real purpose in the United States. An American business man resident in Bombay told Miss Kendall that the British had done wonders, "but as soon as I say so good folks at home deplore the fact that I'm a renegade American turned Britisher." Miss Kendall, at least, was not long exposed to British influence.

A. F. K.

Indian Dust. By E. P. Richards, $7\frac{1}{2}^n \times 5^n$. Pp. 272. Allen and Unwin. 6s. The letters of Professor Richards, Teacher of English Literature successively at the Dyal Singh and Islamia Colleges in Lahore (1911-1920), throw an interesting sidelight on Indian life as seen by an impetuous but honest thinker, a lively and humorous writer, and an artist in spirit, with a fair share of artistic intolerance. Whatever Richards saw roused him to active thought and feeling. He may be unjust, but is never dull, and the reader is carried forward by his enthusiasm. A flock of goats kicking up a dense dust—Indian dust—on a canal bank against the background of a winter sunset excites his mind as keenly as a view of the snow-clad Himalayas or the news of bloodshed in Amritsar. It is natural that an urban educator should seldom mention the countryside, though a vignette of a Punjab village makes us regret the limitation of the writer's activities. Students filled

the daily picture, and are shown as charming and perverse, stupid and intelligent. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that a few unkind phrases—on students, colleagues, officials, missionaries—should have been allowed to remain in the selection, but the letters were not written for the public eye. They are well worth reading.

The Dawn of Indian Freedom. By J. C. Winslow and V. Elwin. 72" × 5".

Pp. 223. George Allen and Unwin. 4s. 6d.

The authors of this book, two priests of the Church of England, anticipate some objection to their writing on Indian politics. It is, however, open to anyone with a knowledge of Indian conditions to seek to enlighten his fellow-countrymen. What is matter for reasonable objection is that the authors rely solely on one-sided information and quote opinions from one section only. They admit the existence of civil and social evils, but do not care to dwell upon them, as, in their opinion, sufficient publicity has been given them. In other words, they give an incomplete picture of Indian conditions and yet claim to be exponents of the correct policy to be followed.

How imperfect is their outlook may be judged from the fact that they make no mention of the Mahommedan demands or of the protests of the Marathas and the Justice Party of Southern India against the domination of the Brahmanic Hindus. Nothing is said about the question of the States, and almost the only reference to the communal problem is the entirely incorrect assertion that it hardly exists among the younger men. It is claimed that the amount of untouchability has been reduced by the National movement: but no reference is made to the demands of the Untouchables for a real measure of equality, which

were voiced by their representatives at the Round-Table Conference.

It is hardly necessary to add that the authors accept and pass on without a word of doubt all allegations as to the brutalities of the police towards the Congress workers. To the authors Mr. Gandhi is, of course, the embodiment of truthfulness. It is true that the book was written before the Round-Table Conference, when many of Mr. Gandhi's statements were regarded, even by those most favourably disposed to believe in his honesty, as equivocal or puerile. It was also written before Mr. Gandhi's interview with the Italian journalist, the repudiation of which has so seriously shaken Mr. Gandhi's reputation for verbal

accuracy among foreign observers.

The authors may be expected to write with special knowledge of the Indian Christian Church, but here again their views are coloured by their political predilections. Credit is taken for the fact that the Indian Christians have not demanded special representation, and have thus earned the praise of Congress orators. But it is surely disingenuous to refrain from informing English readers that the Roman Catholics, much the largest section of the Indian Christian community, and also the Anglo-Indians, have strenuously pressed for such representation. The writers mention the late Mr. Joseph Baptista as a Christian who joined in the National movement. Those, however, who knew Mr. Baptista will remember that he always proclaimed himself an agnostic Maratha, and not a Catholic East Indian.

The writers rightly advocate the increasing Indianization of the Christian Church in India. It seems, however, hardly reasonable to view with approval a diminution of missionary effort and at the same time to expect that missionary funds should be provided in Great Britain and America. The scarcely veiled intentions of Mr. Gandhi and his followers that active proselytization to Christianity should be prohibited are somewhat slightly dealt with.

It is hardly surprising to learn that one of the authors has recently been deported from the Frontier Province. So one-sided and incomplete a book can do little service, however honestly it may be meant, towards the cause of real freedom in India.

P. R. C.

The Mongol in our Midst: A Study of Man and his Three Faces. By F. G. Crookshank. 81 × 51 Pp. xx+539. Illustrations. Kegan Paul.

The book is an exposition of two separate theses, both of great interest. The first is that there exists throughout the greater part of Europe in varying proportions an important 'mongoloid' racial element, which under certain genetic conditions gives rise to the 'imbecile mongoloids' familiar to pathologists. The second is that each of the three primary racial types of mankind shows special resemblances to one of the three species of ape-the Negro to the gorilla, the 'Mongolian' to the orang, and the 'Caucasian' to the chimpanzee; whence is inferred a polyphyletic theory of human evolution. It is the first of these views rather than the second which falls within the scope of this Journal, and it is incidentally the one which gives the book its title; but both raise problems of the greatest importance for ethnology, and they are brought into close connection

with each other by the author's method of approach to his study.

Dr. Crookshank has arrived at his beliefs, not in the capacity of a professional ethnologist, but from his experience as a medical practitioner; he has studied over a period of many years the homologies, both human and simian, exhibited by the imbecile inmates of asylums, and has made an 'ethnic classification' of imbeciles, according to which the negroid and mongoloid traits found among them are to be interpreted as 'throw-backs' that is, as truly racial in original. His medical colleagues are, it seems, generally agreed in regarding these phenomena as 'purely pathological,' and attributing the racial resemblances to mere accident. Against this Dr. Crookshank argues with great force, as regards the mongoloids, (1) that wherever imbecile mongoloids occur among Europeans there are also nonimbecile individuals showing mongoloid traits, though these are generally less marked than in the asylum specimens and tend to pass unnoticed in the mass of the population; (2) that the proportion of imbecile mongoloids to the total of imbeciles is highest precisely in those parts of Europe which are admitted to have received strong infusions of mongoloid stock in historic times (about 20 per cent. in Russia and Hungary as compared with approximately 5 per cent. in England, also high among the Ashkenazim Jews while virtually non-existent among the Sephardim).

Dr. Crookshank concludes from the evidence he adduces that "imbecile mongoloids are more noticeable numerically in those countries or districts where there is a mixed Mongolian and non-Mongolian population and in proportion to the strength, up to a certain limit, of the Mongolian element," and that maladjustments in racial fusion tend to bring out one of the elements in a crude form or even revive simian traits-in which connection the author points out the homologies with the orang shown by some of his specimens together with

mongoloid traits.

The material collected in this book indicates that the mongoloid racial element in Europe is much more widespread and important than is generally supposed. There has been a failure hitherto, not only of the man-in-the-street, but also of scientists, to allow for all the combinations of traits which are possible in racial mixtures according to Mendelian principles of heredity. The traits which make up collectively a racial type are separable in crossing, and some may occur

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decidedly where others are entirely absent; thus, while yellow skin and black hair are characteristic of the normal mongoloid, the 'Mongolian fold' and slant of the eye may coexist with a perfectly blonde complexion—as often in the 'East Baltic' stock. The observer who is able to dissociate the particular traits from their totality in the relatively pure Mongolian type will soon find them in

abundance in Central Europe and even in England.

To explain the presence of this element in Europe there are two obvious sources. For Russia and the lands of the lower and middle Danube there are the hordes immigrant from Asia in historic times—Scythians, Huns, Magyars, Tartars, and others; for Western Europe there are the crosses from colonies in the Far East and from Asiatic soilors in the ports. But neither of these origins is sufficient to explain the high frequency of 'mongolism' in such regions as Central France, secluded in historic times both from the nomads of the Eastern steppes and from the modern maritime contacts with the East; such cases require the hypothesis of a prehistoric movement, and Dr. Crookshank suggests that the Alpine race, generally considered to have spread through Europe from Asia, brought with it a mongoloid admixture. Similarly, he attributes the appearance of such traits among the Nordics to the long-continued westward drift from Asia, of which the Finns and Lapps are the more recent representatives.

Dr. Crookshank's style of writing is eccentric and often excessively sarcastic and provocative towards those who do not agree with him; the force of his exposition is, on the other hand, greatly diminished by flights of philosophical speculation and facetious allusions which might well have been omitted. The historical statements made in the course of the book are not always accurate; thus the rôle of the Khazars is much exaggerated, and a map shows the Mongol Empire extending west of the Dnieper at a date (1215) when the Mongols had not yet entered Europe. But in spite of these defects the main argument of the work

makes a solid contribution to ethnological theory.

G. F. HUDSON.

Manchuria—the Cockpit of Asia. By Colonel P. T. Etherton and H. Hessell Tiltman. Jarrolds. Pp. 256. 17 Illustrations and folding map.

Economically Manchuria is one of the most impressive regions in Asia, possessing agricultural, mineral, and forest resources which are capable of immense expansion. The population pouring in every year to exploit this natural wealth may be compared to the rush of emigrants to the western states of the U.S.A. some fifty to sixty years ago. Within its boundaries the interests of three great empires meet and clash. Politically the future of this great dependency of China presents the greatest unsolved problem in the world today.

The authors of the work under review have produced at a most opportune moment a comprehensive study of the whole Manchurian question from the Sino-Japanese War to the occupation of Southern Manchuria by the Japanese army. It cannot be said that their views are impartial, as they seem to lean on the side of the Japanese, while some of their generalizations bear evidence of hasty writing and may not stand the test of time; the book, however, is indispensable to all who wish to obtain a general view of this Far Eastern question.

The book starts with a review of the past history of modern Manchuria. After the war in 1904-05 the Japanese took over a good railway and the leased lands in the Liao Tung Peninsula, together with the splendid harbour town at Dalny. Upon these bases they have built up an extensive commercial and industrial organization. Nobody who has visited this part of Asia could deny

that much of the prosperity and stability of this region is due to this effort, and to the exclusion of civil war from its boundaries through the influence of the

Japanese Government.

Some may deny that Manchuria is of vital economic importance to Japan, but after reading the description of the Japanese enterprises given in the chapter entitled "Manchurian Trade Today," they may have reason to change their opinions. Japanese investments already amount to a total sum of 214,700,000 yen. The inability of the Japanese to colonize Manchuria agriculturally is clearly brought out. Insufficient stress is laid on the rigorous climatic bar as well as the cheap Chinese labour. Manchuria thus constitutes a great market for Japanese goods and a huge reservoir of raw materials on which Japan must draw more and more in the future.

We now pass on to the recent conflict. Japan was able to cite 300 cases of disagreements with the Chinese authorities which had defied settlement by negotiation. Of these the most important were concerned with the railway lines built by the Chinese to compete with the Southern Manchurian Railway. Many will agree with the authors' conclusion that, once an alliance had been made between the Manchurian and Nankin Governments, conflict was inevitable. A deadlock arose between the Chinese, anxious to abolish all "unequal treaties," unwilling to grant any sort of accommodation, and the militarist Government of Japan, implacable in its determination to enforce what it considered to be its treaty rights by force, in the face of all international agreements.

The two chapters devoted to an examination of the attitude of the Powers towards the Manchurian question deal mainly with Russia and the U.S.A. Russian propagandist activities in Asia are surveyed, and the general failure of Communism amongst Asiatic peoples is recorded. During the recent events the Government of the U.S.S.R. has been mild and correct. The obvious reason for this is that it dares not provoke any sort of conflict. Much has been heard about

the Red army, but its real efficiency is unknown—as yet.

No attempt is made to minimize the dangers arising out of the ever-growing rivalry between the two great Powers in the Pacific—the U.S.A. and Japan. Prom a general point of view their interests in China are diametrically opposed; the United States stand for the "open door," while Japan stands for a "forward" policy. Nevertheless, emphasis is rightly laid on the fact that both are interested in peace and prosperity in China, while Japan's extensive commercial relations with America reduce the chances of a conflict in which she (Japan) must risk losing all she has gained at the price of such great sacrifices.

If the account given of the military operations is rather superficial, the interest of the narrative lies in the insistence that the Japanese aggression was premeditated and that "when the moment arrived for the armed forces to move, the organization was found complete . . . and the occupation developed according to plan." Such a view connotes a deliberate breach of faith on the part of

the Japanese Government towards its various treaty obligations.

The actions of the League of Nations are too recent to require detailed comments, but it is noteworthy that the authors maintain that the League "has a

more solid achievement to its credit than many of its critics admit."

Lastly, there remains the all-important question of the future of Manchuria. What are the real and ultimate intentions of the Japanese Government in this matter? In spite of the declarations of Japanese public men, these remain obscure. Four obvious alternative solutions are discussed: (a) Annexation, (b) a Japanese mandate, (c) an independent Chinese Government with close relations to Japan, (d) a return to the Nankin Government. The first and last are unlikely. Of the

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remaining two alternatives, the third is favoured and, according to recent news, it would appear to be the most probable solution.

The book concludes with a prophecy which may be summarized by quoting two sentences: "The future of Manchuria will be fashioned at Tokyo," and, "Any settlement which does not include the grant of Japan's minimum demands will be no settlement at all." Japan must have "security" in some form or another for the future; ideals must be set aside and realities must be faced. Such a verdict will bring disturbing reflections. Many may wonder what rôle the League of Nations is destined to play in the affairs of this part of the Far East.

For the general reader the book has the drawback that it contains no general description of the region. No attempt, too, is made to paint the varied scenery, while the account of the inhabitants and their habits and customs is meagre. Criticism of this nature might also be directed to the illustrations. Of the seventeen photos, no less than nine illustrate the military operations and four represent views of Mukden and Kharbin. Views of landscapes and of the homelier phases of national life would have been welcome.

D. B. B.

Across the Gobi Desert. By Sven Hedin. Translated from the German by J. Cant. Pp. xxi+402. 114 Illustrations. 3 Maps. Routledge.

Few, if any, books can be of more immediate interest to the Royal Central Asian Society than this account by Dr. Sven Hedin of his latest exploration in the heart of Asia. It tells the story of a journey which may be regarded as the culmination of a lifetime devoted to travel in Asia. "Forty-two years had now gone by," he writes, "since I set out for Asia for the first time. And still the great continent held me captive." His previous explorations in these regions were made alone. Here he exults in the fact that he was now "at the head of the biggest scientific expedition that had ever set out for the centre of the greatest continent of the earth."

The present volume tells the story of the first period of the expedition. The author promises a second volume if the interest aroused by the first should seem to warrant it. There can be no doubt that this condition will be fulfilled.

Early in 1927, after an interval of many years, Sven Hedin was able to resume the work which has been his life's object. In China, torn by civil strife, it was inevitable that there should be delays at the start. After negotiations lasting for months the opposition of the Peking Government was overcome on condition that a Chinese element should be included in the expedition. The ten Chinese scholars and students, whose participation might have been an embarrassment, gave most loyal and valuable services, as Sven Hedin acknowledges in the warmest terms. Professor Hsü especially, an enthusiastic archaeologist, contributed discoveries of great importance.

The expedition was financed by the Swedish Government, and a fresh grant made recently will enable the work to be carried on till 1933. Assistance was also given by the German Government, and several Germans were included in the staff, some of them aeronauts, by whose aid it was hoped to explore parts that could not be reached otherwise than by air. Unfortunately, the Governor of Sinkiang, though acquiescent in all other respects, withheld, for political reasons, permission for flying.

It was a cosmopolitan party that set out from Peking on May 9: eighteen Europeans (including Swedes, Germans, and Danes), ten Chinese, and thirty-four servants, Chinese and Mongolian. As varied races were met with in the course of the march, occasions arose for the use of no less than nine languages.

The members of the expedition were a carefully chosen band of scientific experts, and all worked together in great harmony under the sympathetic leadership of their talented chief. While he gives praïse to all, the outstanding personalities in the narrative are Dr. Erik Norin, geologist; Dr. Haude, meteorologist; Professor Hsü, already mentioned; and Larson, a Swede with thirty-four years' experience of Mongolia, who, being in charge of the camel transport and their Mongol attendants, is described by the author as his "caravan bashi."

Railhead at Paotow was reached on May 10, but as the rallying-point for detached parties and the spot for final preparations, including the purchase of camels, camp was pitched for nearly two months at Hutyertu Gol, on the border of the desert. From this point the start was made at the end of July for the march through the Southern Gobi to Hami, the frontier town of Sinkiang. The transport consisted of 273 camels. The expedition narrowly escaped irretrievable disaster at the start. The camels stampeded, and their precious loads were scattered about the desert. By great good fortune all was recovered except three camels. Those of us who have had to do with camel transport in the East must wonder that such experienced travellers should have trusted everything to untried, untrained camels with a quite inadequate number of attendants.

The expedition was divided into three parties travelling by parallel routes in order to complete a system of triangulation on a wide front, as well as other scientific research, archæological, geological, and ethnographical. Meteorological observation was one of the main objects. An observatory was erected in camp, and a wireless receiving station established. Permanent meteorological observation posts were to be installed at Etsin Gol, Hami, Urumchi, and in the Lop Nor Desert. These were to be eventually manned by Chinese students trained by

Dr. Haude.

The march of 2,000 kilometres was made under arduous conditions—violent sandstorms or heavy rain in the first part, bitter cold and fierce snowstorms in the latter part. Dr. Sven Hedin himself fell ill from the recurrence of a complaint that would have deterred most men from the risks of travel in distant lands, and

had to be carried in a litter for many stages.

The story is written in the form of a day-to-day narrative. The trivial incidents of the camp and the march are related with a certain monotonous repetition, as the author admits, but his vivid imagination and the fascination that the romantic charm of the desert exercises over him spread a glamour over scenes and occurrences that might otherwise seem ordinary enough. For instance, in a desert expanse he writes: "The landscape through which we march is, with all its cheerless solitude and poverty, one of the most magnificent in Asia. It is full of defiance and pride. With its stiff features it contemptuously looks on us as passing vermin that have ventured upon its paralyzing fearful meanness." And again: "In the evening—a scene that I shall never forget. In the east one could hear in the distance the well-known tinkling of caravan bells which in measured solemn rhythm were approaching nearer and nearer. The full moon poured its silvery-white cold light over the desert. Like shadows the first camels appeared. Powerful and majestic, they strode along with their calm, dignified gait. The feeling was enchanting. Innumerable times already had I seen this spectacle, but I could see it again and again. . . ."

The caravan ran some risk of molestation from brigands, but the bands encountered were intimidated by the strength of the party. The only theft recorded was that by a camel thief within the camp. The skilful tracking and capture of the culprit by two of the Mongol camel men form the subject of a most engrossing chapter. The march was made in two main stages. The

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objective of the first stage was Gashun Nor, the desert lake formed by the Etsin Gol River. The expedition remained encamped on the Etsin Gol from late September to early November, visiting the ruins of Khara Khoto, exploring, by means of improvised boats, the course of the river, with the desert lakes of Solcho Nor and Gashun Nor, and establishing friendly relations with the Torgot tribe and their chief.

On November 8 they "set out on the second great stage, the difficult winter march across the desert that separates Etsin Gol from Hami."

Severe privations were endured from violent storms and intense cold. The exertions demanded of the camels had taken toll, and there was anxiety about supplies. Here, too, Sven Hedin was taken ill and had to remain for some time in a stationary camp. Moreover, difficulties arose which threatened to wreck the plans of the expedition for the exploration of the Lop Nor Desert, where Sven Hedin desired to pursue the investigations begun on his former journeys. The Sinkiang authorities became suspicious that the expedition had political aims. It is noteworthy that the chief cause of their suspicions was a facetious remark in a letter to one of the Chinese students from a friend in Peking. Two of the staff sent in advance of the main party were arrested, and Yang, the Governor of Sinkiang, forbade the entry of the expedition into his province.

By the exercise of great discretion and tact Sven Hedin succeeded in persuading Yang of his peaceful intentions and in winning his confidence, his friendship, and his cordial co-operation. In February, 1928, the expedition reached the end of their journey at Urumchi, the capital, where they were

welcomed and honourably entertained.

The concluding chapter gives a most interesting description of the great Marshal Yang Tseng-Hsin and of his despotic though beneficent rule of his great province—" this old man of sixty-six years, who for eighteen years had governed with an iron hand the greatest province of the earth, Sin-Kiang, six times as big as Sweden." In May, 1928, Dr. Sven Hedin returned temporarily to Sweden, travelling through Russia, Poland, and Berlin. In July he received the news of the murder of Yang by a political rival, Fan Darin, who, as Foreign Minister, had appeared to be the Governor's trusted confidant during the negotiations at Urumchi.

The volume closes with four addenda, dated Peking, December 28, 1930, and Stockholm, July 14, 1931, in which the author records a discovery that he regards as the crowning triumph of the expedition. The discovery was that of the change of the course of the mysterious Tarim River from its bed in the southern part of the Lop Nor Desert back into the northern channel by which it flowed 1,600

years ago.

Dr. Sven Hedin has good cause to congratulate himself on having predicted this change thirty years ago. The change took place about 1921. Its probable effects are far-reaching. The change of the course of the river involved the shifting of Lop Nor, "the wandering lake," back into its old northern bed, on the banks of which stand the ruins of the ancient city of Loulan. "Thereby there have been reproduced anew the same conditions as prevailed 2,000 years ago." The old trade route from East to West by which in the days of the Han Dynasty the silk trade was carried on with the Roman Empire from Peking via Tan-huang, Loulon, and Kacha to Kashgar, and which has lain parched and deserted through so many centuries, may now be resumed at any time. With this difference, however, that the distance from Peking to Kashgar, which in the old days camel caravans laboriously accomplished in four months, should be negotiable by motor-car in two weeks.

Can the annals of geography show any more astonishing development?

This volume is a translation of the German original, "Auf Grosser Fahrt," published in 1929. The translation has, except for one or two grammatical slips, been very well done, the significance of the original being skilfully expressed. It is well illustrated by numerous photographs; there is a good general map on a scale of 1: 12,000,000 and a special map on a scale of 1: 3,000,000 to illustrate the Tarim Basin, Lop Nor, and the routes thither from Urumchi. Unfortunately, the maps being German, the spelling of names often differs from that given in the text. There are instances of different spellings of the same name in the text. There is also a sketch-map of the new Lop Nor.

I. K. T.

The Civilisations of the East. Vol. I.: The Near and Middle East. By René Grousset. Translated from the French by Catherine Alison Philips.

 $9^{n} \times 63^{n}$. Pp. 404. Illustrations. Hamish Hamilton.

We warmly welcome M. Grousset's "Near and Middle East," the first of four volumes in which the whole story of Eastern civilization will be set forth. The time was ripe for such an undertaking, as recent discoveries of considerable importance have been made in various fields, but no writer has, as yet, fitted them into their respective places in the general scheme of world civilization.

The first chapter, entitled "Neolithic Remains in the East," gives a key-note to the system adopted, and both in his lucid exposition and equally by his wellchosen illustrations the author proves that "at the dawn of history there existed a common civilization extending from Egypt to the Yellow River and the Indus ... whose art had ideals, processes, and subjects of a decidedly similar nature."

(p. 25.)

The chapter on Egypt, containing some excellent illustrations, points out how her columned temples served as models to the palaces of the Achæmenians at Persepolis, which, in their turn, "were imitated by the Indians of the Maurya

period in the palaces of Pataliputra or Patna."

The author next deals with the civilization of Sumer and Akkad, and refers to their wonderful goldsmiths' works and other products. His remark that the epics of the Creation and the Deluge, "which have the very note of the Book of Genesis," strikes a true note. The illustrations in this section are perhaps not as good as in other parts of the work.

The Babylonian civilization, which succeeded to that of Sumer and Akkad and was entirely based upon it, reached its zenith under Hammurabi, whose stele, on which is inscribed the famous code of laws, is one of the most precious

treasures of the Louvre. M. Grousset is certainly entitled to claim that these civilizations of the Euphrates Valley were "for many years to inspire the

decorative art of later peoples."

About 1925 B.c. the Babylonian Empire was destroyed by a raid of the Hittites, whose inscriptions have not been fully read. Their capital was Hattushah, situated some sixty miles inland from Sinope in the heart of Anatolia, and their race was a mixed one, possibly dominated by an Indo-European aristocracy. Their chief god was Teshub, whose attributes were the axe and the bull, and whose voicewas the thunder; there was also a goddess, the prototype of Cybele. hardy mountaineers were fierce fighters and finally ruled from the Black Sea to the borders of the Assyrian Empire, in which they were finally incorporated. Their special contribution to the art of the world consisted of the decoration of the plinths of their buildings and even of prepared rocks with bas-reliefs of distinct artistic merit. Incidentally, the two-headed eagle which the Hittites had adopted from the older civilizations was, in much later days, adopted by the Seljuk Turks and ultimately became the cognizance of Austria and Russia, thereby furnishing a typical example of how we are the heirs of all the ages.

Assyria, the last of the great Semitic powers of the Old World, was essentially a nation of warriors. Their monarch was not regarded as a god by his subjects, as in Egypt, but as a lord of armies, aiming at conquests in every direction. Their monumental palaces, constructed on artificial mounds by the labour of thousands of captives, were adorned with bas-reliefs and inscriptions celebrating the triumphs of the victors and the tortures of the vanquished. To quote an inscription, the monarch says: "I flayed the chiefs alive and covered the wall with their skins . . . and my face beams with gladness." Yet this warlike nation made a special contribution to art in animal sculpture, and the horse, the hound, the lion, and the wild ass are all masterpieces of art as represented in the bas-reliefs.

Upon the fall of Assyria early in the seventh century B.c., the empire of the Medes and Persians, representatives of the Aryans, rose to world dominion, and M. Grousset strikes the right note in emphasizing their sense of honour and humanity as constituting a relief after the savage cruelty of the Semitic powers. Indeed, the character of Cyrus the Great, who is praised alike by the Prophet Isaiah, by Xenophon, and by Herodotus, proves that he was worthy of the title "Great"; and we, too, may feel proud that the first Aryan monarch whose character is known to history should have displayed such splendid qualities.

Persian architecture as revealed in the superb ruins of Persepolis embodied the columns of Egypt, with capitals of bulls' heads and winged guardians from Assyria, while their rock-hewn tombs with sculptured façade again recall Egypt; but, to quote the author, "it is a broad, serene form of art, instinct with grandeur."

The author next deals with the art of the Sasanian Dynasty, and refers to the famous Tak-i-Kisra, or "Arch of Khusru" at Ctesiphon, and he also describes the superb bas-reliefs near Persepolis and at Shapur, which I have admired on more than one occasion. He points out that Sasanian art forms the connecting link between the Achæmenian art, based on the older Semitic civilizations, and the dissimilar Moslem art, which it served and influenced deeply. He particularly admires the silver platter showing Khusru Parviz hunting big game of various descriptions, of which he supplies an admirable illustration. He also describes the great rock-frescoes of Bamian, dating from the third to the sixth centuries, which show us side by side with Indian or Hellenistic elements subjects which are, properly speaking, Sasanian. I might add to the list the frescoes of the Sasanian period discovered by Sir Aurel Stein in Sistan. M. Grousset demonstrates that this Sasanian influence can be found to extend into the heart of Asia, as is proved by the finds of Sir Aurel Stein and Professor Von le Coq.

To conclude this somewhat lengthy review, I have dealt mainly with the earlier periods, as the proofs given by M. Grousset that each period inherits from all the periods have never, to my knowledge, been given with such width of outlook, such variety of material, or so convincingly. Thanks to the great Exhibition of Persian Art held in 1931, members of the Royal Central Asian Society need little if any guidance in the subject, and so I commend to them the book and its delightful illustrations.

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P. M. Sykes.

The Knights Hospitallers in the Holy Land. By Colonel E. J. King, C.M.G., M.A., F.S.A., Knight of Justice and Librarian of the British Order of St. John of Jerusalem. With 23 illustrations and 13 maps and plans. Pp. 336. Methuen and Co., Ltd. 25s.

The story of the Religious Military Orders is one that is full of romance and tragedy. It is but little known to the ordinary reader, who feels somewhat perplexed when he finds occasionally distinguished fellow-citizens described as Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Colonel King, who is himself one of these Knights, has done an excellent piece of work in making available for English readers the history of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem and of its Knights down to 1291, when the fall of Acre led to the final collapse of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. In passing it may be mentioned that there are two classes of Knights in the Order. Knights who could show that on both their father's and their mother's side they were entitled to bear arms "were known as Knights 'of Justice' to distinguish them from those few who, not being so qualified, were admitted none the less by favour, and are therefore termed Knights 'of Grace.'" On their dress they all wore the eight-pointed cross we now call the Maltese Cross.

Like their great rivals, the Knights Templars, the Hospitallers were the defenders and chief support of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem and of the other Christian States established as the result of the First Crusade, and it is not too much to say that but for these Orders of military monks the collapse of these States would have taken place much sooner than it actually did.

The Order of the Hospitallers derives its name from the Hospital maintained in Jerusalem for the benefit of pilgrims, especially for those who were in bad health. The real origin of the Hospital, we learn, "is probably to be found in the hospice for pilgrims established by Pope Gregory the Great" about A.D. 600. Destroyed during the Persian invasion, it was reconstructed with assistance from St. John the Almoner, Patriarch of Alexandria, who seems to have been the original St. John of the Hospital. It was under the control of the Benedictines and had as its Rector at the time of the capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders, in 1199, the Blessed Gerard, who was really the founder of the Hospitallers. He formed a new Order, independent of the Benedictines, which was recognized by a Papal Bull in 1113. The chief duty of the new Order was the care of pilgrims, but under Raymond du Puy, the successor of the Blessed Gerard, the circumstances of the times led to a new development, and, in addition to their charitable duties, the members of the Order were organized for military services similar to those performed by the Templars. The Order obtained as its headquarters a Greek convent in Jerusalem dedicated to St. John the Baptist, and the greater St. John thus superseded St. John the Almoner and became the patron saint of the Hospitallers.

Colonel King's book is much more than a history of the Order. It is, indeed, to a very great extent a history of the Crusades and of the Christian States which they called into existence for a time. It is a tragic and pitiable story he has to tell, for the great movement which cost Europe so much was ruined largely by jealousy and self-seeking.

There are one or two small criticisms that may be made. As so much attention has had necessarily to be paid to the internecine conflicts of the Latin States, it would have been well if, in the narrative of the First Crusade, a somewhat fuller account had been given of the principalities established as its result. It would also have helped the ordinary reader if some genealogical tables had been supplied to

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tionships of the rulers, which had such an important bearing on the history of the different States. One would rather like, also, to have another map, in addition to the French one, showing more clearly the chief places mentioned in the narrative, some of which are rather difficult to find in the map given.

Colonel King, as has been indicated, has written a most interesting book, and it has evidently been a labour of love. It is to be hoped that it will receive such an excellent reception that he will be encouraged to continue his work and to give us also the history of the Knights of St. John in Rhodes and Malta, where for centuries they acted as the bulwark of Christendom against Moslem attacks.

E. MONTEITH MACPHAIL.

Turkish Architecture in South-Western Anatolia. By Rudolf M. Riefstahl. 12" × 8½". Pp. xii+116. Harvard University Press. 1931. 17s.

Mr. Riefstahl's book is one of the most successfully produced works of the last few years, both as regards its appearance and as regards its price—seventeen shillings only for a quarto volume containing about 110 full-page plates in half-tone. But it is not only the production that is so thoroughly satisfactory; the book itself contains a vast amount of valuable material, important to the student

of Byzantine, of Seljuk, and of Ottoman art alike.

The region traversed by Mr. Riefstahl is that part of Anatolia which lies to the south of Smyrna, and a separate chapter is devoted to the monuments of each of the more important centres. Of these the first to be mentioned is Manissa, a town which enjoyed its principal prosperity during the Ottoman period, though the numerous Byzantine columns and capitals reused in the chief mosque suggest that there must be preserved there much that is of importance to the Byzantinist, both above and below ground. Some day, perhaps, more elaborate researches in this sphere may be undertaken there, though in the meanwhile Mr. Riefstahl has provided admirable photographs for study. He thus not only greatly facilitates the work of the student of Byzantine Asia Minor or of Byzantine sculpture, but also sets an admirable example to all explorers; though his journeys were undertaken primarily to study Turkish art and architecture, he has in every instance expended much labour in dealing with anything Byzantine that he found in the course of his journeys.

Birgeh and Tireh, two interesting towns whose monuments are principally Seljuk, are next considered, and a beautiful eighteenth-century house in the former town is published in detail. The descriptions and photographs enable us to get some idea of the exquisite charm of Ottoman domestic architecture and interior decoration of the eighteenth century. Much of this delightful woodwork lies hidden in houses all over Turkey, but it is no easy matter to see it even when on the spot; in Europe such work, unfortunately, remains practically unknown.

The Ottoman architecture of Aidin forms the subject of the next chapter, but the monuments there are mostly of late date. At Antalia (Adalia), on the other hand, a fine Byzantine church, reused as the principal mosque, but now in ruins, survives to attest the importance of this harbour-town in pre-Turkish times, while a fine slab bearing the archangel Gabriel, preserved in the local museum, gives some idea of the sculptures which must have decorated the Christian buildings. Mr. Riefstahl's dating of the slab to the sixth century would, however, on first sight seem rather too early. Of the Moslem age a superb minaret and some good Seljuk carving constitute the principal things to be seen at Antalia, though minor material shows that this town is a very important centre for the study both of Seljuk and Byzantine art and architecture. Excavations carried out on the site

of the one-time church or elsewhere in the city would probably prove extremely

Finally, Alaya is discussed in detail. It appears to be a town of unusual beauty and charm, but except for a small Byzantine church it contains little of importance. The absence of any Seljuk remains is surprising when one considers

the town's geographical situation.

Mr. Riefstahl then discusses four fine Seljuk hans at Sarafseh, Evdir, Kirk Guez and Susuz. Though they are not as large and not as elaborate as the more famous Sultan Han near Konieh, they are extremely fine and important buildings. One is prone to forget how many of the Seljuk hans there are in Anatolia, simply because they are mostly in places which are no longer close to the more regular routes. In Persia hans confront the traveller at every stoppingplace, and there is not a book of travels in that country which does not accord them frequent mention. Yet there are few hans in Persia that can compare in splendour, in beauty, or in charm, with even the lesser-known Seljuk hans of Turkey. The map of these hans which Mr. Riefstahl gives is most useful, but it suffers from over-reduction, so that names are wellnigh impossible to read.

The following section is devoted to unpublished material in the Smyrna Museum. Some interesting pottery fragments shown on Figures 128 and 129 are assigned to Seljuk times, and they are important, for it is by means of such fragments that we shall one day learn something of all the links in the chain which binds the ceramics of Byzantium to those of Persia, of Syria, or of Egypt. The Seljuk fragments illustrated here show undoubted relationships with Byzantine material from Constantinople as well as with Persian work. On Fig. 131 a Byzantine slab-again suggesting Eastern affinities-is published for the first time, and on other plates appear objects of importance to the student of

Islamic art.

The book closes with an appendix on the Turkish inscriptions, the work of Dr. Paul Wittek. It seems a model of competent, systematic, and painstaking research.

There are, however, two things that one feels are lacking in this book. Firstly, when everything else is so well tabulated, there is little excuse for the absence of an index. Secondly, although the data has been admirably presented in the most generous manner, it has been left for us to find out for ourselves what there is to be learnt from this material. After the perusal of many a work on Near Eastern art, where facts are few and where only theory runs wild, this is a welcome relief; but in this case one would have welcomed a few more pages devoted to the author's "theory."

D. T. R.

Beyond the Sublime Porte. By Barnette Miller, F.R.G.S. 92" × 62". Pp. xxv+

281. Illustrations. Yale University Press. 1931. Price 31s.

The serai or seraglio of Constantinople is probably one of the most romantic places in the world; it is certainly the one with which the most amazing events and the most sumptuous displays are to be associated. In appearance it is unlike any European palace, consisting as it does of a large series of disconnected single, or at most two-storied, buildings, and it hence comes as somewhat of a surprise to the Western visitor who is unfamiliar with Moslem architecture. But a short visit serves to convey the unusual charm of the place, and a more detailed acquaintance with it awakens in the stranger not only the keenest admiration, but also the acutest curiosity.

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Miss Miller's book comes as a most welcome addition to the literature dealing with the serai and its history throughout Turkish times; it spans a gap hitherto only filled in part by briefer sketches. It traces the history and topography of the palace from its first conception by Mohammad the conqueror down to post-war years, when the last Sultan was deposed and when the place became a public museum. The author has collected much obscure information; she has embodied here the results of careful work on the spot, including the first detailed plan to be published; she has traced the numerous vicissitudes through which the building has passed; and she has summarized the history of monarchical taste in Turkey throughout the centuries.

Everyone who takes an interest in the history of Turkey should read this book; but also everyone who reads the book should, if possible, visit the serai, for Miss Miller, although she puts all the material before us in a masterly manner, does not quite succeed in conveying the gentle charm of the place itself. Perhaps it is only a first-hand acquaintance that can convey its subtle perfume; perhaps it is essential to leave much to the imagination; but one feels rather that, though the tulips of Turkey are there in profusion, the scent is somehow not quite as overpowering as it might be. On the other hand, it is futile to seek only for the scent of the flowers without first becoming acquainted with their colours and form, and the book certainly makes it possible for us to do that.

The study is divided into two parts, the first historical, the second more topographical in nature, and it is the second that is, perhaps, the more successful, for it gives us an admirable picture of the brilliant scenes which were enacted in the serai and puts before us the uses and nature of the various courts or divisions of the palace with striking clarity. Especially good is chapter nine, which deals with the kitchens and the service of the inner palace. The ten domed kitchens with their tall chimneys are from without by far the most spectacular part of the palace, and Miss Miller does full justice to their appearance in her discussion of their importance and their use. The vast number of cooks, the huge quantity of foodstuffs consumed, are staggering, but they cease to be staggering when we realize how vast a concern the serai was and how many thousands of souls lived within its walls even in its decline.

The transliteration of Turkish words has always been a matter for individual choice, but now that the language is written in Latin characters there is no further excuse for not following a central system. It is hence a pity that the text had already gone to press before the new system had become known. In this light some of the renderings in Miss Miller's book do not seem very satisfactory, especially "kiuskh," which in the form "kiosk" has already become more or less an English word. On page 141, too, the French "corps du garde" should surely be "corps de garde."

The book is fully illustrated with excellent plates, in which modern photographs and reproductions of older material are carefully balanced. The general presentation seems in every way satisfactory, though one wishes that the price

(31s.) could have been a little less.

D. T. R.

Charlton. Faber and Faber. 1931. 10s. 6d. net.

This is an autobiography, but of a quite unusual kind. Unlike most books in which a living man sets himself to describe his own experiences and his own attitude towards the events he portrays, the author has neither sought, by a rare

act of self-analysis, to see himself as others see him nor even subconsciously to interpret his actions by the accepted standard of his own day and companions. It

is, at bottom, an example of "exhibitionism."

The book is written simply and without artistry. We are taken rapidly from nursery through school to Sandhurst, where his critical faculties were already, or are, used to good advantage. We see him in his regiment, on a transport, and in Malta, and in lighter vein in Crete. Then to South Africa, to the Caribbean, to France in 1914 and onwards (a disjointed series of paragraphs), to the U.S.A. as Air Attaché, and in 1923 to Iraq. Here he discovered "that an air bomb in Iraq was, more or less, the equivalent of a police truncheon at home. It was a horrible idea and, in his private opinion, work in which no one with a moral standard should be asked to engage. In declared war or in the case of open rebellion no objection could possibly be advanced, but the indsicriminate bombing of a populace without power of selecting the real culprits, and with the liability of killing women and children, was the nearest thing to wanton slaughter which he had come across since the massacre at Dijon in 1914."

He was, he confesses, in no frame of mind in which "to assist the military administration in a country of which the inhabitants in large part were apt to look

anxiously skywards when sensible of having done wrong."

He felt a grave doubt as to whether he could conscientiously maintain in Southern Kurdistan the policy of intimidation by bomb. He "knew the crowded life of these settlements and pictured with horror the arrival of a bomb, without warning, in the midst of a market gathering or in the bazaar quarter or any other populous centre of the town. Men, women, and children would suffer equally, and the agony of wounds would be as great as the agony of death.

"So he ventured on a mild remonstrance, asking if no other means were possible to deal with the refractory Shaikh (Mahmud) than to bomb the town in which he had residence. At the same time he gave his Chief to understand that in his opinion direct action by aeroplanes on indirect information by unreliable informants, whose interest it might be to vilify the Shaikh, was a species of oppression which tended to render infamous the British name for fair dealing throughout the world."

His protest did not avail. "A letter of complaint from the Kurdish Shaikh asking by what right of justice a large number of townspeople, including eighteen or twenty women and children, had been blown to pieces remained unanswered."

On the desert side "aeroplane photographs had been taken while the bombing was in progress, and these told a pitiful tale. The tracks of camels were clearly visible, traced in ever-narrowing circles as the wretched beasts, weakened by wounds and loss of blood, ran round and round until they dropped. This was now more than he could bear any longer. He was quite certain that the young officers who were sent on these brutal quests could only suffer moral harm in the long run."

He asked to be relieved of his duties and returned home, "his feelings still at boiling-point on the subject of bombing transgressors against the Iraq law, and nothing whatever could alter his sense that he had done what was right in his

own eyes at a great cost."

His attitude was officially condoned, and he was re-employed for a time; in

1928 his career in the Air Force came to an end.

The author might have written a much better book; he might with justice to himself, and in justice to his readers, have omitted much. True friendships are sacred things, not lightly to be explained to strangers. Veiled salacity is a poor condiment at the best of times, and there is so much in the book that is good that

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the reader feels that the sauce is ill-chosen. "Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner"; but there is much that remains incomprehensible to the reader.

W.

Décadence de la Liberté. By Daniel Haley. Paris: Bernard Grasset. 1931. 15 francs.

In this modest volume, consisting of four essays, of which the last gives the title to the whole, the author records the fact, rather than expounds the view, that not only is liberty, the power of the individual to shape his ends, a declining force, but that the desire to enjoy it is no longer widespread. Deputies no longer represent the whole country, but the particular interests to whom they owe their place; they are mere agents—"commissionaires," he calls them; they have lost caste, dignity, and influence. Parliament is no longer the principal power in the State—its place is usurped by groups acting in secret, and not under public control. Sooner than face facts, they prefer to pass laws which avoid reality; they have almost lost the power to recognize a fact when they see it, content to indulge in "calm conceptual fooling" as a substitute for a concerted attempt to deal with matters which they realize to be too great for them.

The printing press, an ideal medium of education, is notoriously an instrument of mass suggestion and deceit; lethargy dominates the public mind; a newspaper that upholds a principle, even one formerly dear to the electorate, or takes up a strong line on any public matter, loses readers. Men filled with enthusiasm for a cause, devotion to an ideal, are no longer respected—they are avoided. The fact that certain journals are notoriously controlled by certain

commercial interests is not resented—it is accepted.

The theatre, the ancient home of popular liberty, has given place to the cinema, which labours under a censorship which seeks to restrict the presentation of truth and discourages new ideas. Puerility of thesis and insignificance of motive are the inevitable consequences. The programmes of the radio are but little superior to those of the cinema, and for the same reason. The same eclipse of liberty is apparent in the factory, in finance, and in matters of national policy. The liberally-minded minority is disappearing, and with them will vanish the institutions they have created. The ancient tyrannies reappear under a new name-in Russia the Soviets; on the Mediterranean coast, Italy Spain, and Greece, dictators reign supreme, if uneasy. Labour organizations, with a strong instinct for tyranny, face financial oligarchies. In France the President of the Council of State is a dictator in embryo, but he will be long in coming to the birth, for, in the author's opinion, popular instinct still shows itself hostile to the forces which are seeking to destroy liberty as soon as they are recognized. The tree of liberty is not dead, but sickly; its life is threatened, but it is not past saving. The book is a wholesome antidote to the facile but feeble optimism of Mr. Delisle Burns in "Modern Civilization on Trial."

ATW

A Travers la Russie nouvelle, de Moscou au Caucase. Par Robert Tourly. Paris: Edition "Sirius," n.d. (but 1932).

This volume of 282 pages is a brightly written, interesting, and straightforward account of a journey from Moscow to the Caucasus by an observant French ioninalist

His entry into Soviet territory began with the queue, and he continued to queue up until he was rescued by the official tourist organization in Moscow, which

chaperoned him, competently and completely, for the rest of his journey. To this remarkable (and incidentally very expensive) Bolshevist imitation of Messrs. Thos. Cook and Co. he was introduced by a friend in Moscow, who proved in the heart of Russia to be an ardent, enthusiastic propagandist of the Red Empire, and not the lukewarm, almost disdainful adherent he seemed in Europe. Monsieur Tourly and his compatriots were called superficial by this Bolshevist, but no man who pays 400 francs a day for a very indifferent hotel can be called that, for only a seriously disposed traveller would regard the investment as worth it.

The journey begins with a long, impassioned harangue by one of those fanatical Communist conductors who disgust all Western tourists by their boring, long-winded disquisitions. Travelling in the stolen sleeping-cars of the Wagon-Lits Company, the writer with other journalists visited Nizhni Novgorod, saw the Ford works, which are vulgarizing that town, where the houses are being torn down to be rebuilt in some soulless modern fashion, and then proceeded down the Volga in a comfortable if elderly steamboat. The food was good but eccentrically served. The soup came with the dessert, so did the hors d'œuvres, and the cheese with the sweet. But the steamer, romantically called the Karl Liebknecht, provided provender not easily obtained by the native-born Russians, who were herded anyhow in the steamer.

At Kazan, the capital of the Tartars in European Russia (though the percentage of Tartars is admittedly only 24 per cent. [p. 102]), the writer fell in with a highly conversational and fanatical Bolshevist Tartar, who gave him a lurid picture of what his countrymen suffered under the Czarist régime. According to him, 90 per cent. were relegated to the forests (p. 117) and kept in a backward state (p. 118). Even the University of Kazan did not teach the Tartar language (p. 119), and so on and so on, until certainly poor Monsieur Tourly's head began to whirl. There are now 2,000 schools instead of 37 (p. 120), so presumably teachers proved as easily obtainable as mushrooms.

All this is nonsense. Kazan was the great centre for publishing Tartar books of all kinds and on all subjects. The reviewer has seen hundreds of them, and these books show that the truth was not in this bolshevized Tartar.

The writer gives (p. 135 et seq.) the official account of the Soviet structure of government, a fabric of theory and fiction, which is the façade of a prætorian despotism.

Pages 220-221 describe the fair cities of Samara and Saratov, the scene of the unspeakable butcheries of Trotsky (alias Braunstein), almost too much for the most sadistic "Reds." There is an amusing account of the fortune-teller who used an old and mangy white rat in his business (p. 165), and also of a conversation with peasants (p. 249). It is clear that the Soviet are greatly embarrassed by the attitude of the Mujiks, who have refused to be Sovietized. Stalingrad with its fine new towns, each of 120,000 (p. 227), which the five years plan is to produce, with its electrical power-house of 250,000 kilowatts, and with its elaborate, soulless, devastating industrialization, is a terrible result of Red October, and will result in endless problems. Rostov-on-Don and other great masses of machinery and machinists will add enormously to the future problems of Russia in a world where machinery is already killing its creators. As an Italian journalist observed: "The Russian and the machine. What a paradox!" (p. 65).

The book ends with the remarks of the Bolshevist conductor: "I would sooner argue with a frank reactionary than a rabid bourgeois. At least he would understand. There is no one more pig-headed than a democratic anarchist when he starts spouting his views."

Exactly.

We congratulate the author on his book, and look forward to the account of his return journey to Moscow, to be published in April.

Twelve Secrets of the Caucasus. By Essad Bey. Translated from German by G. Chychele Waterson. $8\frac{1}{2}'' \times 5\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. ix + 328. Nash and Grayson. 15s. The author of "Blood and Oil in the Orient" describes in this book his Motherland, the Caucasus, a land of beautiful mystery and heroic legends, the land rightly called the cradle of humanity. This name is given to it because modern science supposes that the mountains of the Caucasus gave to manhood the different nations which during long centuries, sometimes by way of invasions

or infiltration, swept over the steppes of Russia to Europe.

The Caucasus, this beautiful and picturesque country, has really a great deal to say in the realms of Nature as well as in the histories of different nations; up to the twentieth century its inhabitants preserved their own culture and tradition of many hundred, if not thousand, years' standing. It is really a great pity that the author of this delightful book fails often in his description of Caucasian and Russian life in general, reminding one of the similar very poor improbabilities which fill the book of Ossendovski, written about another cradle of humanitythat of the Far East, Mongolia. The days have passed when Russia, either European or Asiatic, could be described to the credulous European reader as a country where in its capital, Moscow, or in St. Petersburg, wolves would openly gather in the streets, or, as it was stated by Dumas, that in Russia a special tribe of dwarfs existed called the "Malehishki," which means in Russian "urchins," for such stories no longer amuse anybody in our days. One has learnt, if not very much, at any rate enough of Russia to see this. This part of the book really jeopardizes the interest with which one ought to read a talented author describing his beautiful native land. Such stories as that when German troops arrived in 1918 some of the villages in the Caucasus sent out to the troops all the most beautiful girls of the village in order to protect themselves from paying money contribution, can only find their place in the book because the author wishes to make the reader understand that in the Caucasus slave-trading was still prevalent in the twentieth century. Another instance of these somewhat irrelevant and highly improbable stories is to be found when the author describes how at a very fashionable summer resort, a highly cultured place comparable with the best European places, a local jealous husband brought his young wife to the European physicians in order to make them cut away her beautiful nose as a punishment, according to the customs of the country of his forefathers, for a crime against married life. But if one excludes from consideration these "stories for the foreigner," the book gives much interesting information and is written in an easy and delightful narrative style. It is a pity that there is no map showing the geographical and ethnographical character of the region, even if the author cannot point out on the map the places where slavery and nose-cutting still exist. The author often in his descriptions takes the gilt off the ginger-bread on one hand, and on the other does not give enough unity of ideas to form a definite conception of that most interesting country and its heroic population. The book on the whole, is worth reading, but not serious. The translation is excellent, and one does not feel that the original was written in any language other than V. K. English.

First Athenian Memories. By Compton Mackenzie. $7\frac{1}{4}" \times 5"$. Pp. x+402.

This volume forms the second of Compton Mackenzie's war memories, the first being his "Gallipoli Memories." In the preface to the volume under notice the reader is warned that three volumes at least may be needed before Mr. Mackenzie has said all he feels ought to be recorded about the "goings-on" in Athens during the war. We are also told that the material upon which he has worked has largely been drawn from his own memory. It is as well to keep these facts in mind before sitting down to study this volume. "Gallipoli Memories" was definitely a successful book. It was entertaining from start to finish, and though any reader might have cordially disagreed with the writer on a large number of points, nevertheless there was substance enough in the book to make it well worth reading. And again, the characters figuring in the narrative were people of importance-people who mattered-and Mr. Mackenzie in his staff officer capacity at G.H.Q. was near enough to be in a position to reflect in his later writings something of the spirit of the time; and, more than that, he was able to lift the curtain from time to time and let us see what was going on behind and what in some instances all the noise and hammering was about.

In the Athenian story, however, matters are otherwise. The general reader will find some difficulty in becoming interested to any great extent, either in the personalities about whom Mr. Mackenzie writes or in their completely unimportant and generally subterranean doings. Anyhow, he makes up in quantity (there are over 200 characters in this book) for a good deal of quality. This spy business, this "reliable-agent" business, after all is said and done, has only localized interest. The man in the line reads from time to time Intelligence reports and believes very little of them. The reliable-agent to him is a very different being to what he is to the head of the Bureau. The Bureau man to the impartial observer somehow or other generally seems to be too near the ground to get a really good view of the horizon. And so it is with the author's experiences in Athens. The impression one obtains is that there is a lack of perspective. In addition to that, a further striking feature is that we are not told anything quite new. And that impression is to some extent strengthened by the delay that is occurring in the presentation of the other books that Mr. Mackenzie has promised us. We have had ample time to digest this one.

There will be one story, nevertheless, that promises well, and that will be the life history of Trixie, the alleged spy, a waif of war. Mr. Mackenzie admits having written her up once, but the MS. was destroyed when her house was shot up in the Athenian riots, but no doubt we shall meet her again.

It's a queer book. You cannot quite place it. It will find small place in history; it is too personal and too impulsive; nevertheless, it fits into the bookcase, and you get a heap of pleasure taking it down and dipping into it again. You get the glare of Athens, a view of the hills behind the city, the sparkle of the sea down at Phaleron. There is no write today quite like Mr. Mackenzie who can in words so magnificently sketch in a canvas, who can so vividly put before you what he himself sees. And at that one must leave it. The book has in any case a definite value on the shelves of the library of the Society.

OBITUARY

THE RT. HON. SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN, BART., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.

To those who were present at the party given by him in January on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, or who, like the writer, walked with him exactly a fortnight before the day of his funeral, the death of Sir Maurice de Bunsen came as a grievous and unexpected shock. Not only did we all feel we had lost a personal friend, but to each one, no matter his age, it seemed that a contemporary had passed away, for without being what is commonly called a "public character," there were few people in London who had a wider circle of personal friends.

He had entered the Diplomatic Service rather later than many of his contemporaries, and in the earlier stages of his career had been well liked and successful, without any special signs of future pre-eminence. Then came a quick succession of moves from Constantinople to Paris, from Paris to Lisbon, where, for the first time, he became an independent Minister, and whence he was shortly afterwards transferred as Ambassador to Madrid, where he arrived in time to take part in the marriage ceremonies between the youthful King Alfonso and Princess Victoria Eugenia of Battenburg. He was an eye-witness of the dastardly bomb outrage against the young couple, and was one of the first to be at her side after the attempt took place. The presence of her country's Ambassador must have given a sense of comfort and security to the young Queen, which she would have welcomed in the dark days of April, 1931.

Sir Maurice and Lady de Bunsen soon became some of the foremost and best-loved features in Madrid life, and not only Society in the capital, but also English men and women of all classes soon came to look on the British Embassy as a natural meeting-place. All felt at home there, from the Queen herself to the latest-arrived English governess or nurse, while Spaniards knew that they had a sympathetic host in an Ambassador who knew their country probably as well as they did, and who could talk and write their language with ease and fluency. About 1910 Spain was in the forefront of European politics in consequence of the impending dissolution of the Moroccan Empire and the conflicting claims of France and Spain for a share in the

Sultan's dominions, and the following year the negotiations between the two rivals began in earnest. As was to be expected, complications soon arose. Frequently the points of difference were of little importance, but they became questions of honour where neither side could give way; so little progress was made, and at one time a complete deadlock seemed imminent, but the happy idea occurred to ask whether the services as mediator of Sir Maurice de Bunsen would be available, and the Foreign Office agreed that he should, quite unofficially, lend his good offices. From that moment affairs took a different turn; on some occasions he attended conferences, on others he was the confidant for individual heart-burnings; both parties always felt that their secrets would be respected, and Sir Maurice, without giving offence, contrived to offer counsels of patience and moderation. In the end an agreement was reached, and today it still holds good. The general public in France and Spain were satisfied, though they little knew what they owed to the unobtrusive tact of the British Ambassador. It is difficult to estimate the effect of the settlement and its subsequent value to the Allies during the Great War years.

At the end of 1913 he was transferred to Vienna, which until then had been regarded as a post of observation rather than of special diplomatic activities, and Sir Maurice had scarcely time to find his bearings before the storm broke. It is useless now to speculate whether, had he been there longer, he would have been able to exercise in 1914 the same moderating influence as he had done at Madrid in 1911-1912. All that can be said is that a disrupted Austria always looked on him as her friend. After leaving Vienna he was employed at home in war work until 1918, when he was entrusted with a mission to South America, the object of which was, broadly speaking, to reconcile countries which were chafing under allied trade restrictions that hampered their commerce, and to congratulate those who had openly sided with the Allies. It was no light task to undertake; he was now sixty-six years of age, and was to visit, within a few weeks, capitals situated in extremes of climate and altitude; such, for instance, as Rio de Janeiro in the tropics on the coast, La Paz, Quito, Santa Fé de Bogota in the Andes at heights ranging from 10,000 to 8,000 feet. But a robust constitution and a cheery optimism enabled him to overcome all the geographical hardships, even better perhaps than the other members of his staff. His mission was a complete success; everywhere he was warmly welcomed, and he made the situation of the Allies clear to friends and doubters alike. It was no fault of his if in the

post-war years Great Britain did not get in South America her full share of the trade boom.

He got back home shortly before the Armistice and settled in London. Unlike many retired diplomatists, he quickly found his place, thanks to his youthful zest in life and his countless friendships. Learned bodies, such as the Royal Institute for International Affairs, the Royal Geographical Society, and the Royal Central Asian Society, welcomed him on their Committees; the city came in for his attention, and he even found time to interest himself in hospital work, while in the autumn he still managed to indulge in shooting, his favourite sport.

His family life was an ideally happy one. His death came as a painful surprise to most of us who hardly knew he was ill. He bore the last trying days with his customary cheerfulness and fortitude. The crowd that gathered at his funeral in St. Paul's Cathedral on March 25 reflected, to a slight degree, the affection and esteem in which he was held. Our sympathies go out to Lady de Bunsen, his constant companion and devoted help-mate, and to his four daughters.

E. R.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE EGYPTIAN ENIGMA (Vol. XVIII., p. 603)

DEAR SIR,

Sir Nigel Davidson, in his criticism of my book, The Egyptian Enigma, in the October number of the Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 1931, has charged me with misrepresenting the Denshawai incident. On that ground he has thought fit to cast doubts upon the accuracy of the post-war political events in Egypt. I purposely refrained from entering into the details of the Denshawai case, as beyond the fact that, without that case, Mustafa Pasha Kamel, the apostle of Egyptian nationalism, would have had no platform either in or out of Egypt, it had no importance in history. To base a condemnation of the rest of my book on such a sweeping statement, unsupported by proof, is unworthy of the reviewer. I in no way misrepresented the question of Denshawai (see the Denshawai debate in Hansard).

Sir Nigel again specifically challenges my accuracy in regard to the Declaration of February, 1922, which gave Egypt her qualified independence. In reply I say that the version of the failure of H.M. Government to call the bluff of Sarwat Pasha with regard to the Declaration of Independence was told me by the Pasha himself, and I had not then, nor have I had since, any reason to doubt his

statement.

J. E. MARSHALL.

YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY IN SINAI (Vol. XIX., p. 179)

DEAR SIR,

In your review of my book "Yesterday and To-day in Sinai" you refer to the mountain that I think may be the Mountain of the Law as Gebel Hilal. This is spelt in the book as Hellal, and the spelling is important, as Hilal in Arabic means "crescent," whereas Hellal means "lawful." One of the reasons

why I think this may be the mountain is the name.

Also your reviewer suggests that the "great and terrible smoking mountain" must be in the south, where there are signs of volcanic action. It is quite true that there are signs of violent volcanic upheaval in the south, but Gebel Hellal is also volcanic. In any case, geologists state that the volcanic action took place in Sinai very many thousands of years before the Exodus. I am in agreement to a certain extent with your reviewer's remarks about the car road to the monastery, but the Egyptian Government spent £8,000 making this track possible, and the chapter on "Car Routes" would have been inaccurate and incomplete, to say the least of it, if I had ignored this road.

Yours faithfully, C. S. JARVIS.

Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society

VOL. XIX.

JULY, 1932

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NOTICES

THE Hon. Secretaries will be at 77, Grosvenor Street on Wednesdays at 12.30 until the end of July.

Members are asked to notify the office of any change of address.


Members only are responsible for their statements in the Journal.

Corrections: Sir Henry Lawrence wishes the following corrections made in his address: On p. 298, line 4, omit "adult" before the word "population"; line 5, for "300" read "100"; line 7, for "150" read "50."

in i ser den jedog aktilika ngade aktilika kempana di kalandara

The office will be shut from August 1 to 28.

See also p. 536.



ANNIVERSARY LECTURE, ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, JUNE 8, 1932

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, President, in the Chair.

THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS IN ASIA: A SURVEY AND A FORECAST

By LIEUT.-COLONEL SIR ARNOLD WILSON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

HE Council of this Society have consistently endeavoured to secure as lecturers men who have had recent experience of affairs in various parts of Asia, rather than individuals, however great their experience, who have not been in personal contact with current events. In inviting me to address you on this occasion the Council have departed from this salutary principle and I, on my part, have ventured upon ground which not only my predecessors on this occasion, but almost all responsible persons, have hitherto feared to tread.*

It is not my intention to enlarge on present follies, or past crimes, to picture to you the terrors of the future, or the glories of the unknown "Brave New World" with the aid of a "Time Machine," but rather to attempt to deduce from current happenings and from trends of thought now apparent the probable course of events which some of us will live to see, in which men now playing a leading part in Asia will participate, and which our sons and daughters will have to face.

I have not taken into account the possibility, though it clearly exists and has long been predicted, of a catastrophic "Decline of the West," or of the oncoming of "The Chaos," timed to begin this

^{*} I have drawn extensively upon the admirable reports of the Department of Overseas Trade, and have had the advantage of the expert assistance of Mr. H. W. Macrosty, O.B.E., in marshalling certain statistical information necessary for my purpose.

month, if my memory serves me aright, by the prophets of the British-Israel Federation.

"There are fears amongst those who are responsible for Government today," said Mr. Baldwin in January, 1926, to the Classical Association, "fears not yet gripping us by the throat but taking grisly shape in the twilight."

I am no believer in the fatalistic philosophy of determinism: on the contrary I am convinced that, even with the handicap imposed on most Western nations by their political propensities and by the superstitious efficacy which is ascribed to words and phrases uttered at international gatherings, and embodied in painfully sought formulæ, we have the power as never before to control our environment, including our monetary system, which I regard as a secondary rather than the primary cause of trouble. I believe that, as anticipated by Mr. Baldwin,* there will ere long be a reaction. The tendency of the last decade to frown upon voluntary effort, whether of individuals or of States, will be reversed. The rich and various life of spontaneous groupings will be recognized, not as a weakness, but as a strength to society and to the world. It will give that direct expression to human personality which is freedom, that opportunity for diversity which is the only tolerable form of equality, and that association of all the elements in the State which is fraternity. The weakness inherent in the League of Nations, and the ideas that have grown up round it, are, I suggest, due to failure to recognize these human needs.

A sturdy individualism will replace a protean collectivism, not only within the nation, but in international affairs. The passive and static type of internationalism will give way before the realization that trading debts, between countries, cannot be settled, except within narrow limits, without a serious disturbance of ordered progress, unless they form part of a deliberate plan of complementary development between those countries. This means that great political groups, such as the British Empire, must have an economic objective, which will be a decisive factor in their political outlook.

I hope and believe that a survey such as I have attempted to make, with all diffidence, but in all sincerity, can do no harm. Indeed it is necessary for us all to survey the future as dispassionately as we may in the light of current knowledge. Only by looking well ahead from time to time can we avoid losing our way at moments when mists in

^{*} July 14, 1930, at Annual Conference of Brotherhood Movement.

the valleys or floods obscure local landmarks. If we know our general direction and have a compass, it is less dangerous, in the hackneyed metaphor of the platform, to cross streams, explore avenues, or take steps, leaving no stone unturned, in the dark.

In attempting an estimate of what may be the economic future of Asia in the next twenty years certain parts of the Continent will be excluded from our survey. Japan is, both industrially and commercially, much in advance of the rest of Asia and is to be considered rather as a Western economic Power with some special advantages of cheap labour, of discipline, and of organization. The Soviet Republics in Siberia, Turkestan, and the Caucasus are important as producers of wheat, butter, eggs, cotton, oil, and minerals, but it is impossible to prognosticate from the scanty information available what may be the course of their evolution. Arabia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Mongolia may also be omitted from our survey, since from the nature of their soil and climate, the character of their people, or the remoteness of their country, or any or all of these factors, they are somewhat apart from the main stream of life. There remain Turkey, the succession States of Palestine Syria and Iraq, Persia, India and Ceylon, British Malaya, Siam, Netherlands East Indies, the Indo-Chinese Union, China, and the Philippines.

Capital Investment in Asia

I will touch first upon the economic problems which arise from the investment in Asiatic countries of very large amounts of capital, mainly by investors resident in Great Britain. The total sum thus invested is about $\mathcal{L}_{1,000}$ millions, of which seven-tenths is British in origin; the sum paid on this total by way of interest and sinking fund is probably not more than \mathcal{L}_{65} millions, to which should be added some \mathcal{L}_{4} millions for amortization.

Omitting Japan, British investments in Governmental loans and joint stock companies in Asia are about £660 millions, with an income of about £36 millions. By including private investments of all kinds, the total may be about £700 millions, yielding an income of perhaps £40 millions.

The following is a summary of British investments as at December, 1930, in the principal countries of Asia:

	Nominal British Capital at December, 1930. (Thousands.)	Income during 1930. (Thousands.)	
India and Ceylon*	464,951	25,475	
China†	50,105	3,106	
Japan	59,236	2,973	
Malay Archipelago	118,230	6,275	
Turkey‡	16,694	373	
Siam	6,516	320	
Palestine and Cyprus	4,060	197	
Persia and Iraq§	30,000	2,500	
Totals	749,792	41,219	

Note.—It has not been possible to trace any substantial British investments as at December, 1930, in Syria, Arabia, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Chinese Union.

These investments, which have been very conservatively estimated, thus total, including an allowance for untraced assets, at about £766 millions, yielding some £42 millions in 1930 by way of interest and sinking fund, probably reduced during 1931 by 25 per cent.

This sum represents the life-blood which, coursing through a thousand channels, has enabled Asiatic populations during the past century to increase and multiply with a speed which has no parallel in the whole course of the history of the world. It is indeed probable that allowing for a certain timelag there is a direct statistical relation between the growth of capital investments and of population. I make no apology, therefore, for offering you these figures, which I owe to the courtesy of Sir Robert Kindersley (though myself responsible for their interpretation), before turning to the second great problem—that of population.

* Property owned in India, China, and other Asiatic countries by British Nationals permanently resident in those countries is excluded: Government, State, and municipal loans total £238 millions.

† Chinese Government Railway bonds, totalling some £5 millions, at present

in default have been excluded.

‡ This sum is reached by writing off much British capital sunk in Turkey before 1914.

§ Includes £1,115,000 bonds of 1911 loan, of which I believe about £900,000 was held in Great Britain in December, 1930.

|| Of which £320 millions in Government, State, and municipal loans

The Problem of Population

The first and greatest group of problems which confronts the whole human race are those which follow from the growth of population. Europe and Asia constitute a single land mass on the face of which live more than two-thirds of the population of the whole world. The figures for the whole world are: Europe and Asia 1,500 millions (of which over two-thirds are in Asia), N., C., and S. America 250 millions, Africa 140 millions, Oceania 10 millions.

The total for the world is thus about nineteen hundred millions.

Asia.—The following table shows the estimated population of certain Asiatic countries under consideration as given in the latest official censuses or according to the latest estimates or guesses. The aggregate is 935 millions, and, allowing for a moderate rate of increase, we may estimate the population of 1931 at about 950 millions. The omitted countries may have a population of about 140 millions. There are also included in the table figures as calculated by the League of Nations, showing the percentage borne by the imports for domestic consumption and by the domestic exports of each country to the imports and exports as a whole in 1929. The aggregates are for imports under 10 per cent., and for exports under 11 per cent., of the respective world totals.

Country.	Population.		Percentage of World Total in 1929.	
	Year.	Millions.		Exports.
British India and Native				
States	1931	351.5	2.55	3:54
Ceylon	1931	5.3	0.41	0.46
British Malaya	1930	4.3	1.40	1.28
Hong Kong		1.1	*	*
British Borneo	물리가 걸린 그리트, 그림	0.3	+	f
Aden	1921	0∙06	0.07	0.06
Palestine and Trans-			Visit Piliter	0.00
Jordan	1930	1.1	0.10	0.02
Total: British	Carlos S	363.7	4'53	5.66
French Indo-China	1926	20.7	0-29	0.31
French India	1929	0.3	.	+124
Syria and Lebanon	A TRANSPORT AND ADDRESS OF THE CANADISMS	2.8	0.16	0.06
Total: French	et en big	23:8	0.45	0.37

^{*} The trade is mainly entrepôt trade for China.

[†] Not given.

	Co	Country.		Population.		Percentage of World Total in 1929.	
	Commity.		<u> </u>	Year.	Millions.	Imports.	Exports.
Netherla	nds	East	Indies	1930	60.7	1.26	1.76
Turkey			•••	1927	13.6	0.35	0.23
Iraq				1920	2.8	0.10	0.06
Persia			• • • •	1930	10.0	0.31	0.40
Siam	***		•••	1930	11.2	0.24	0.29
China*	***		•••	1929	438-9	2.28	1.97
Philippin	ies	***	•••	1918	10.3	0.41	0.49
	Gra	nd to	tal		935.3	9.83	10.92

The population of British India and the Native States increased from 294.4 millions in 1901 to 315.2 millions in 1911, or by 7.1 per cent. In 1921 the total was 318.9 millions, an increase of only 1.2 per cent, the decline in the increase being mainly due to the ravages of influenza in 1918 and the disastrous agricultural seasons of 1918 and 1919. Improvements in the accuracy of the census and changes in the area covered have also to be taken into account. For the population in which registration of births and deaths is effected the birth rate rose from 33.20 per mille in 1921 to 36.79 per mille in 1928, and the death rate fell from 30.59 to 25.59. In 1931 there was an increase of 10.2 per cent. on 1921 to 351.5 millions. On the basis of the increase between 1901 and 1911 we might reckon on a population of about 390 million persons in 1951, and on the basis of 1921-31 the aggregate in 1951 might reach 427 millions.

The Far East.—The relative increase in the population of Japan is even greater, † and there is reason to think that in the Indo-Chinese Union and in the Dutch East Indies the rate of increase is at least as great as in India. In China the same is true, but earthquakes, flood, famine, and internal wars have been more effective than elsewhere in restricting the growth of population. Yet we are justified in supposing, and, indeed, bound to assume, that the population of Asia will stand in 1951 at not less than 20 per cent. more than at present, and that India,

Including Manchuria, but excluding Mongolia, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan.

t See Crocker, The Japanese Population Problem. The suggestion is here made that Borneo, New Guinea, and some of the Pacific Islands should be given to Japan. He estimates that, when allowance is made for the factors operating in favour of a lower birth rate, it remains likely that from 15 to 20 millions will be added to the population of Japan within the next generation.

in particular, will have to feed from 40 million to 75 million more

mouths than at present.

The significance of these figures may best be gauged if we consider that the United States, with rather less than half the area and only about an eighth of the population of the countries in the table, had in 1929 about 12.5 per cent. of the world's import trade and nearly 16 per cent. of the world's export trade. The census of India may now be taken as reasonably accurate, but most of the others are only approximations. The growth of population in India between 1921 and 1931 was 10.2 per cent., as compared with the 7.1 per cent. increase in the decade 1901-11. Prosperity, even on a low grade, sanitation, and above all security, have, under British rule, raised the birth rate and lowered the death rate, so that we may see a further rise in the rate of growth in the population unless there should be a return of plague or the great influenza epidemic which brought down the increase in 1911-21 to 1.2 per cent. It is true that the increases in 1872-81 and 1881-91 were much greater than that in 1921-31, but something must be allowed for the increased efficiency with which the recent censuses were taken.

When we come to China official estimates vary from 486 millions for 1926, to 439 millions for 1929, but it is uncertain whether there has been actual decrease of the population or whether lack of data pre-

cludes accurate forecasting.

Ceylon, British Malaya, and Netherlands East Indies are countries showing large increases of population through immigration, chiefly from India and China. Palestine has had a stream of entrants from Europe to found the "Jewish National Home"; Syria sends emigrants all over the world, and receives in return a substantial sum in remittances from abroad. The estimates of population for the other countries are vague and the natural increase is probably modest. - In all countries we find a tendency towards improvements, however elementary and fluctuating, in sanitation, tending to increase the rate of growth. We may reasonably assume an increase, as in India, of about 10 per cent. in a decade, bringing the population in our area from 950 million persons in 1931 to about 1,150 million in 1951.

It seems, therefore, reasonable to anticipate that within ten years from now the problem of population will so occupy the minds of responsible statesmen in Asia that the supreme test of a political system will be whether it promotes the productivity of the soil of a country and simultaneously tends to restrict the birth of human beings for whom there is no food. It is safe to prophesy that the discussions which will centre round this and kindred problems, which are today in fact controllable, though the factors are very imperfectly understood and have scarcely been adequately investigated on scientific lines, will have assumed very great importance in 1950.

We may congratulate ourselves that England has led this movement both in theory and in practice, and in consequence will be better able, by virtue of quality rather than quantity* of population, to play a worthy part in the world.

Food Supply.—An increase of over a fifth in population means an equivalent increase of food supply if even the present low standard of life is to be maintained. Over the whole area the predominant occupation of the inhabitants is agriculture; in India the cultivable area increases slowly and seems to have reached the limit except for the further redemption of barren areas by irrigation. The chief food crops are rice, wheat, and native grains. Export of wheat from India has almost ceased and wheat is imported from Australia.

About 6 per cent. of the rice crop is exported and half goes to other Asiatic countries. For the past six years there have been only seasonal variations in the total area of wheat, barley, and rice. There is a moderate exportation of other grains, but sugar, spices, liquors, and provisions are imported in fair quantity. Rice is the staple food in the south and centre of China, wheat, maize, and millet in the north. The rice crop averages 30 to 40 million tons and the wheat crop about 16 million tons, nevertheless in 1929 imports of rice totalled 657,000 tons, of wheat, 336,000 tons, and 709,000 tons of wheat-flour. Soya beans and sesame seed, from which food oils are extracted, are raised in abundance.

India and China are, in fact, barely self-supporting, and there is always the risk of famine, especially in China as at present.

The problem of food supply today is not primarily, as in former times, one of transport, but of payment. Those who get corn and rice abroad must pay by exporting commodities of an equivalent value which some other country (not necessarily the country from which the cereals are imported) is willing to receive and pay for.

There is amply sufficient wheat in store in Canada and the U.S.A. to supply the existing shortage in certain parts of China, for example, but China cannot purchase for lack of acceptable exports.

^{*} In 1950 our population will be static, or declining.

In relation to British India, if I may be permitted to continue to use an outworn political term, the problem of food supply is the sternest of limiting forces and I make no apology for inviting you to consider in some detail this vital question, which in the past underlay all great movements of population, dominated all policies, justified many wars, and was the prime cause in England and Europe of the most appalling epidemics.*

The total arable area in British India has varied very little in the past ten years, the smallest area being 212·3 million acres in 1920-21 and the largest 228·2 million acres in 1928-29, the usual figure being round about 224 million.

The irrigated area shows greater variation; but no appreciable increase; it reached 49.8 million acres in 1928-29, compared with 43.3 million acres the previous year and nearly 49 million acres in 1919-20 and 1920-21.

The area sown with food grains has also varied very little, the total in 1928-29 being 200·3 million acres, or rather more than the average for the decade. About 56 per cent. of the total area under food grains in 1928-29 was devoted to rice, wheat, and barley, and this proportion has varied very little. There is no record of the output of jowar, bajra, gram, and other indigenous grains. The estimated yield of cleaned rice varied from 27·7 million tons in 1920-21 to 33·7 million tons in 1922-23 and 32·1 in 1928-29; in 1929-30 it was 30·8 million tons. The yield of wheat in 1920-21 was 6·7 million tons; in 1922-23 it was nearly 10·0 million tons, but it fell to 7·8 million tons in 1927-28 and rose to 10·4 million tons in 1929-30. The yield of barley has similarly fluctuated, the average being 2½ million.

It would thus appear that the food yield has not kept pace with the increase of population (70 per cent. of whom are engaged in agricultural production), but the gap has been partly filled by a decrease

in exports.

In 1924-25 the exports of wheat were 1.1 million tons, but in 1928-29 they had fallen to a tenth of that quantity and in 1929-30 were only 13,000 tons. Exports of barley also fell from 450,000 tons in 1924-25 to 6,000 tons in 1929-30 and exports of cleaned rice from 2.5 million tons in 1925-26 to 2.3 million tons in 1929-30; about half

* In 1258 one third of the inhabitants of London died of starvation, though there was ample food available from Germany and Holland for those who could buy it. The life of our forefathers was so precarious that in the centuries prior to the Black Death of 1349, hundreds of thousands of Englishmen died of starvation, or of the terrible pestilence brought about by malnutrition. (See Creighton, A History of Epidemics in England, i. 44, and G. B. Grundy in the Quarterly Review, 1932.)

the exports of rice go to other Asiatic countries. Exports of other grains have also declined. Supplies have also been imported in varying quantities from overseas according to the harvests, notably wheat from Australia. The aggregate imports of grain and pulse are recorded in the Statistical Abstract as 160,900 tons in 1927-28, 747,700 tons in 1928-29, and 384,400 tons in 1929-30. No great variation is shown in the area under fruit, vegetables, spices, etc., chiefly for home use—generally from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 8 million acres.

We may, therefore, expect that the export trade in food grains will soon dwindle away and that there will be an increasing import trade -notably in wheat from Australia.* Even so the difficulty of feeding a growing population will be great, and famine must supervene unless the cultivable area is increased so as to grow more food or more marketable crops wherewith to buy food, or unless methods of cultivation are vastly improved. The former method requires much money, which must ultimately come out of the pockets of producers; the latter demands not only a change in the age-long conservatism of the ryot, but organized, scientifically applied and sustained action by Governments. Both conditions seem unlikely to be realized. The areas made fertile by the Sukkur Barrage (9 million acres), by the Sutlej Valley project, by the Cauvery Mettur project in Madras, and by the Damodar Canal Irrigation scheme in Bengal will doubtless be of assistance, but it seems that the gross production of the new areas will not provide for more than ten million extra mouths and will soon be overwhelmed by a devastating torrent of babies. The real problem of the future in India is to feed the people.† One's mind is carried back instinctively to the shores of Lake Galilee nineteen hundred years ago: "In those days the multitude being very great, and having nothing to eat, He had compassion on them."

Fertilizers

With regard to improvements in cultivation, one hopeful sign has been the progressive increase in the imports of fertilizers from 26,400 tons in 1925-26 to 78,300 in 1929-30, and the imposition of an import duty of 5 per cent. in Ceylon is a retrograde step. The whole of India consumed, mainly on plantation crops—tea, coffee, and rubber, which are not food crops—less fertilizers in a year than Germany in one

† The Real Indian Problem, C. M. Hutchinson, 1930.

^{*} Imports from Australia were 529,000 tons in 1928-29 and 343,000 tons in 1929-30.

month. One ton of fertilizer will produce roughly four to six times its weight in additional cereals.

The use of fertilizers, in addition to the locally-available manures,* however, is extending. The United Kingdom has a flourishing trade with Middle and East Asia in sulphate of ammonia—2,100 tons to India and Ceylon in 1913, 35,800 tons in 1929; 1,800 tons to Hong Kong (for China) in 1913, 99,000 tons in 1929. Japan is also an important customer, but Java in 1929 took only three-fifths of her prewar quantity. There are other manures as well, thus Ceylon, which raised her total imports of fertilizers from 104,000 tons in 1925 to 137,000 tons in 1927 (falling to 113,000 tons in 1931) took the major portion from India in manures of vegetable origin. These imported fertilizers are in all cases, except in China and Japan, used on plantation estates.

Besides foodstuffs for home consumption India produces tea and coffee, largely for export, and cotton, jute, rubber, ground nuts, linseed, rape seed, and sesamum, both for home use and for export. The production of tea has grown from 375 million lbs. in 1924 to nearly 404 million lbs. in 1929, and about 90 per cent. is exported. Coffee has varied between 1924 and 1929 very irregularly between 22 and 35 million lbs., and exports have decreased. The approximate crop of cotton was 6,923,000 bales (400 lbs.) in 1924-25, and, after varying downwards, was 6,991,000 bales in 1929-30; exports fell from 3,998,000 to 3,868,000 bales. The increase in local consumption of Indian cotton is not great, but if we go back to 1913-14 we find an increase from 2,266,000 bales in that year to 3,123,000 in 1929-30, or nearly 38 per cent. The jute crop has grown from 1.4 million tons in 1924 to 2.2 million in 1926, and then a fall to 1.9 million in 1929; as exports were 696,000 tons in 1924-25, 708,000 tons in 1926-27, and 807,000 tons in 1929-30, there has been an increase in the jute manufactured at home. Exports of cotton seed have fallen and so have those of linseed, but in the latter case, while total production decreased over 1924-29, home use was on the whole maintained. Sesame, mainly used in India, is a very variable crop, 414,000 tons in 1926-27 and 543,000 tons in 1927-28. The yield of ground nuts rose from 1.5 million tons in 1924-25 to 3.2 million in 1928-29, falling to 2.5 million in 1929-30, and though exports rose from 376,000 tons to 788,000 tons (falling in 1929-30 to 714,000 tons), Indian consumption grew much more. The output of rubber, though relatively small, has grown from 9.1 million lbs. in 1921 to 26.8 million lbs. in 1928, and is practically all exported.

The output of iron ore in India averaged only 300,000 tons in 1909-13, but was 1,400,000 tons in 1924 and 2,400,000 tons in 1929; it is all used in manufacture at home. Production of manganese was

^{*} Such as cattle manure, and oil seed residues, and including the natural composts, prepared on lines worked out by Mr. Howard in Indore.

803,000 tons in 1924, 1,129,000 in 1927, and 994,000 tons in 1929; exports were 639,000 tons in 1924-25, 704,000 tons in 1927, and 816,000 tons in 1929. Here again there has been an increase in Indian consumption. The output of coal in India has risen from 21·2 million tons in 1924 to 23·4 million tons in 1929: exports and imports of coal are now on quite a small scale.

The evidence so far considered shows that India during the present century and particularly in the last decade has been using more and more of her primary products. In 1921* some 16 million persons were engaged in industry, supporting themselves and some 17 million dependents.

Persons employed in establishments with more than 20 persons showed an increase from 558,000 in 1911 to 760,000 in 1921 in textiles and from 71,000 to 165,000 in metals. Indian output of pig-iron rose from 880,000 tons in 1924 to 1,350,000 tons in 1929, and her output of steel from 340,000 tons to 580,000 tons; and her imports rose from 860,000 tons in 1924-25 to 1,170,000 tons in 1928-29, and 973,000 tons in 1929-30. More significant is the fact that bounty-fed Indian exports of iron and steel rose from 402,000 tons in 1924-25 to 648,000 tons in 1929-30. Again, while the imports of rails, chairs, and fishplates in 1929-30 were 26,000 tons, the production of those goods at the Tata Iron and Steel Works in 1930-31 was nearly 120,000 tons. The growth of the Indian cotton industry is well known—from 683 million lbs. of cotton yarns in 1913-14 to 833 million lbs. in 1929-30, while in the same period the mill production of piece goods rose from 1,164 million yards to 2,419 million yards, and the hand-loom production from 1,068 million yards to 1,351 million yards. Our exports of yarn to India for counts under 40s have nearly disappeared and for those over 40s have been reduced by 60 per cent.; imports of British piece goods into India in 1929-30 were only 60 per cent. of what they were in 1913-14 and have since been further reduced by poverty, by the boycott, and by import duties. The mill consumption of raw jute in India was 4,747,000 bales of 400 lbs. in the twelve months ended 30 June, 1923, and 5,794,000 bales in 1927-28; exports of jute bags rose from 414 million in 1923-24 (31 March) to 498 million in 1928-29 and exports of jute cloth from 1,349 million yards to 1,568 million yards.

The principal groups of imports of manufactures besides cotton goods and iron and steel are machinery, chemicals, and petroleum, and in these, except petroleum produced and refined in Burma, India has made no material advance. The protective system now established must, however, lead to further developments in Indian industry, and

^{*} The figures for 1931 are not yet available, but are certainly higher.

the policy of buying Government stores as far as possible in India works in the same direction. Other fruits of the Swadeshi campaign have been increased local manufacture of soap, and while the boycott hit both imported and Indian-made cigarettes, recovery is most likely to take place in the latter class.

Mr. Ainscough in his report on "Conditions and Prospects of United Kingdom Trade in India, 1930-31," says (pp. 56-57): "From an economic standpoint a steady increase in India's population of three millions per annum, three-quarters of whom are directly supported by the land, is likely to raise problems of the first magnitude. Unless rapid and successful efforts are made to increase the agricultural yield of the country the pressure on subsistence will become increasingly acute. While it is true that the yield per acre of India's staple crops is a very low one, the intense conservatism of the ryot constitutes a serious obstacle to improvement." Failing to resort to science, the alternatives are emigration or starvation: to the former there are many obstacles, to the latter none. A continuance of Indian poverty is certain and an accentuation of it highly probable. By force of necessity as well as by racial pride and political propaganda by interested parties India may be driven on herself. She must find large sums for interest and "Home Charges," and low prices make these increasingly burdensome. More food must be imported and all other modes of expenditure must yield to the maintenance of existence, the payment of debts, and the outlay on equipment for factories. Imported cloth must give way to cheaper, if poorer, native cloth; cheap Japanese or homemade bazaar hardware will drive out superior British or Continental hardware; "luxuries" will be imported in ever smaller quantities, and even hand-loom cloth may expand at the cost of the mill-made article. Overseas shipping will probably diminish and become almost a one-way trade so far as Europe is concerned—outwards from India with primary products, inwards principally with machinery and chemicals; imports of wheat from Australia will probably be part of a roundabout trade-Australia, India, China, West Coast of America.

Siam and Cochin China

Siam and Cochin China together probably produce about 9 million tons of rice annually and from 50 to 60 per cent. is exported; exports from Siam rose from 1,115,000 tons in 1924-25 to 1,707,000 tons in 1927-28 and fell to 1,112,000 tons in 1929-30. The low exports in 1929-30 were due to the world depression in rubber and tin, which to a large

extent destroyed the purchasing power of Siam's customers in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. French Indo-China exported 2,300,000 tons of rice in 1928, of which rather more than a fifth went to Europe. Ceylon, British Malaya, and Netherlands East Indies are not self-supporting. About a quarter of the cultivated area of Ceylon is under rice, but in 1929 about 505,000 tons of rice were imported. The group "food, drink, and tobacco" (including rice, fish, wheat-flour, vegetables, sugar, and spirits) accounted for 47 per cent. of the value of imports of merchandise into Ceylon in 1930. The lure of rubber and tin has prevented the development of cultivation of foodstuffs in British Malaya, and the prosperity or adversity of that country seriously affect, in their turn, the rice-producing countries from which it draws supplies. The annual consumption of rice is about 600,000 tons a year, of which only one-third is produced locally; rice cultivation is a Malay peasant industry and there is much suitable land still undeveloped. Netherlands East Indies have devoted themselves to the cultivation of sugar, tea, coffee, etc., and have imported large quantities of rice to feed the imported coolies working on the estates. During the recent slump in tropical produce the native cultivators of export crops have turned to raising food for themselves. During the period of prosperity from 1924 to 1928 the area under rice in Java varied very little, but the annual crop fluctuated between 6 and 6½ million tons. Turkey, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and Persia are in the main self-supporting on a rather low level. About a sixth of the imports into Turkey are foodstuffs, liquor, and confectionery.

We thus have a picture of a vast world with a low standard of consumption of necessaries, pressed between a steady and ominous increase of population and, in the principal countries, a food supply which at best grows very slowly. Other countries have surpluses which are out of the reach of a population impoverished by the world depression. Ignorance, poverty, and starvation go hand in hand, and the safety valve of emigration is at present not working. Yet in every country food supplies could be increased, by a strong and stable government, able to command confidence and raise the capital necessary. We may contrast the increase in rice production in wellgoverned Siam, where the steady development of railway communications has brought cultivators in remote regions into touch with the markets and encouraged them to grow for export as well as for their own use, with the situation in Iraq, where production of foodstuffs is little in excess of pre-war figures, though we have had the mandate for ten years.

Surely the next generation will look back with astonishment, mixed perhaps with stronger feelings, at the speeches made by British

and Indian statesmen, from Mr. Montagu onwards, with their emphasis on "democratic" forms of Government and their apparent indifference and complete silence in regard to the great scientific and economic problems that even before the war were occupying the best, if not the most vocal, brains of the world.

Following J. A. Hobson,* let us assume that the object of a society is to develop and serve individuals in a manner suited to their environment. An impartial review of the system now being elaborated for the better government of India, must, in my humble opinion, lead to the conclusion that whatever the defects of the system which Mr. Montagu and others in this country and India, before and since his day, set themselves to smash, the new system, as outlined to us by the highest authorities, is not likely to fall within Mr. Hobson's definition.

From 1940 onwards, if not sooner, the efforts of governments of Asiatic countries will be primarily devoted to developing supplies of food for hungry mouths, and alternatively to endeavouring to stimulate exports in sufficient quantities to enable them to pay interest on monies loaned from Europe and to purchase more foodstuffs. The surplus wheat of Australia will go to Asiatic countries, if they can pay for it by exports, though their exports will for the most part go, not to Australia, but to other countries.

China

Population.—Both for 1923 and 1924 a "Post Office Estimate," quoted by the D.O.T. Reports, gives the population as a little over 436 millions. This was raised to 485.5 millions by a Post Office estimate of 1926, but the Chinese Customs returns for 1928 gave only 451.8 millions, and 438.9 millions for 1929. The area covered in all these estimates included Manchuria, but not Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan, and Tibet. All the estimates are shaky, and civil war, famine, and floods make all present or projected estimates illusory.

Agriculture.—Rice is the staple food of the south and centre of China, wheat, beans and pulse, maize and millet are grown in the north. The output of rice is estimated at from 30 to 40 million tons, or about a third of the world's production; about 657,000 tons were imported in 1929. The normal wheat crop of China is estimated at about 600 million bushels (60 lbs.), and the area under cultivation is increasing. There are about 100 flour mills in China and the industry has grown rapidly in Manchuria. Imports of wheat into China in 1929 were 336,000 tons and of wheat flour 709,000 tons. Another im-

^{*} Wealth and Life; A Study in Values. Macmillan.

portant agricultural product is the soya bean, of which the oil is used for food and the residue for manure and cattle food. It is principally grown in Manchuria, which produces 70 per cent. of the Chinese crop; in 1929 the Manchurian crop was 5,351,000 tons; the exports of beans rose from 147,000 tons in 1924 to 268,000 tons in 1929. Sesamum seed is used as food and is pressed for oil, used in cooking and as a substitute for olive oil; the average crop runs into about 155,000 tons; and exports, which of late have largely increased, were 57,000 tons in 1929. Tea is traditionally associated with China and the exports of China tea have increased from 45,000 tons in 1924 to 56,300 tons in 1929. Bad cultivation and careless treatment prevent the development of the trade. Opium is extensively grown in Szechwan, Shensi, and elsewhere, and much is imported. Egg products are a modern article of commerce, exported especially to America and Great Britain. important growth in imports of fertilizers should be noted. cotton, and hides are agricultural products used in industry. China is probably the largest silk producing country in the world, mainly for domestic requirements, but Japan is pressing her hard on the Pacific markets. Efforts are now being made to improve the cocoons and the production of eggs which are free of disease. China is also the third largest producer of raw cotton, of short staple suitable for domestic requirements and for export to Japan, the average production being about 600,000 tons. Indian and American raw cotton are imported. American seed has not been successful, but an improved variety of native stock is reported to be equal to "Uplands" cotton. troubles and the burden of the likin tax (removed from cotton in 1928) have impeded the progress of cotton culture. Hides "more than almost any other article have felt the full effects of the worldwide crisis," as they are dependent on the world's tanning industry.

Manufactures.—Textiles are the most important. We have the following figures for 1929:

ting of the contra		Silk.			Cotton.	
	Mills.	Spindles.	Looms.	Mills.	Spindles.	Looms.
Chinese-owned	74	2,087,506	13,907	73	2,099,042	14,735
Japanese-owned	43	1,397,272	13,981	38	1,351,704	11,994
British-owned	3	153,320	1,900	4	161,860	2,562
Total	120	3,638,098	29,788	115	3,612,606	29,291

The capital invested in cotton mills is about 400 million rupees, say

£30 million sterling.

Mines.—Coal production totalled from 23 million to 26 million tons in 1924-29; about 30 per cent. is produced by Japanese-worked mines and 10 per cent. by other foreign mines. The output of iron ore rose from 1,600,000 in 1926 to 2,000,000 tons in 1928 and the output of pig-iron from 405,000 tons; some ore is exported to Japan.

About 43,000 tons of manganese were produced in 1926, 71,000 tons in 1927 and 64,000 tons in 1928; most goes to Japan. 6,000 tons of oil is now produced from shale, and the raw material is available in vast quantities.

Trade.—The following table shows the leading lines of trade in

percentages of total value:

1 0				
Imports.	Per	Cent.	Exports. Per	Cent.
Cotton yarn and pi	ece-		Beans and products of	
goods	•••	14.89	Raw silk cocoons	16.26
Sugar	•••	7.80	Eggs and products of	5.09
Raw cotton		7.20	Skins, hides, and leather	
Metals and minerals	•	5.60	Tea	4.06
Flour		5.06	Cotton yarn and goods	
Rice	•••	4.66	Metals, etc	3.31
Kerosene oil		4.36		
Tobacco and cigarettes		3.76	Coal	3.04
Woollen goods	•••	3.23	Raw cotton	2.92
Chemicals		2.71	Cereals	2.59
Paper	•••	2.70	Wood oil	2.32
Candles, oils, wax		2.62	Hair, feathers, and wool	2.23
Machinery	•••	2.36	Silk piece goods	2.07
Fishery and sea produc	ts	2.08		

Nationalism and Industry.—" The movement in favour of domestic industries and the use of home-made goods, which will gather increasing force as Chinese manufactures improve, is responsible for a tendency to discriminate against foreign imports, and even against goods produced in factories in China operated with the assistance of foreign capital. Such discrimination has made itself felt in matters of provincial and municipal taxation, freights on railways, and the grant to purely Chinese factories of special privileges which are withheld from factories established with or controlled by foreign capital, though in the past these privileges have been granted to all factories established on Chinese soil, subject to certain formalities, whether supported by foreign capital or not. These privileges take the form of a single tax, freeing the products of the factory concerned from all further inland taxation and from payment of coastwise and export duties" (D.O.T. Report, 1930, pp. 22-23).

There will, I am confident, be a reaction, and it may come before 1950: even now the discrimination against foreign goods is confined in its sentimental reaction to the vicinity of Treaty Ports, and does not reflect the Chinese opinion, but such reactions take time to have any effect on legislation.

"There has been on view an exhibition of Chinese domestic products. 90 per cent. of the goods exhibited were 'foreign style,' some of which have been finished with a characteristic Chinese touch. The principal exhibits consisted of tinned meats and fruits, pickles, sauces, etc., biscuits, wines made chiefly in Chefoo, silk and woollen hosiery, cotton piece-goods, shirts, scent, imitation jewellery, suit cases, electric fans, shoes, neckties, spectacles, motor goggles, and toys. All were Chinese products which have largely displaced imported articles. In one of the largest Chinese department stores in Shanghai 15 years ago 70 per cent. of the shoes sold were imported, the remaining 30 per cent. being of local manufacture; the position today is exactly reversed. Fifteen years ago 90 per cent. of hosiery sold to Chinese was imported, whereas today imports are only 10 per cent. Only the highest qualities of cotton goods now sold are of foreign manufacture, while in the case of silks foreign manufactures amount to about 10 per cent. of the whole.

"Foreign manufactured articles are just as much appreciated as ever they were, but the discrepancy in price between the foreign and the local article is so great that only the wealthy Chinese are able to afford the imported article. The reasons for this are, of course, to be found in the higher costs at home following the war, the fall in the value

of silver, and the new tariff" (D.O.T. Report, 1930, p. 43).

Among other manufactured products produced in sufficient quantity to enter into Chinese export trade are wheat flour, silk and cotton hosiery and underclothing, window glass, electric lamps and fittings, soap, soda, soda ash, matches, and cigarettes. There are three shipbuilding companies in Shanghai and an important carpet industry in North China. Chinese window glass is reported to be equal to the Belgian, and electric fans, bulbs, and supplies are produced at half the price of similar imported goods. Except for one factory at Mukden the woollen industry has made no progress. A calico printing works under British management has been established at Shanghai.

Gonclusions.—It is unlikely that even by 1950 any really effective steps will have been taken to restore the political stability of China, and her condition will be much as at present. China will have been split up into a series of autonomous if not independent States, whose existence will have been stimulated by the example of Manchuria, where the autonomous government set up under Japanese auspices in 1932 will by 1950 at last be firmly established and prosperous. These autonomous States will be a feature of the second half of the twentieth century, but by 1950 they will not have been in existence long enough to have affected the economic situation except in Manchuria. The Japanese and Chinese will be no better disposed to each other than they are today, but neither party will feel well disposed towards the

U.S.A. or Europe. They will both remember, and for different reasons will resent, the attitude of members of the League of Nations towards them in 1931-33 at a time when that body exercised a vicarious and by no means beneficial influence upon the affairs of Asia, not realizing that it was then wholly unfitted by its constitution, or by the temperament and experience of the majority of its members, to deal with disputes outside Europe to which it had been shutting its eyes, with results, as in 1950 we shall realize and still remember, which imperilled the peace and welfare of the world.

Netherlands East Indies

In 1920 the population was 49,351,000, in 1930 it had increased to

60,731,000, an increase of about 23.1 per cent.

Agriculture.—After the war Netherlands India was depressed, but recovery came in 1924 with a great demand for tropical products cane-sugar, rubber, tea, coffee, etc.-and a period of prosperity continued for about four years. But it became plain in 1928 that the production of those commodities was exceeding consumption, or more correctly, that the buying power of manufacturing countries in the West was not keeping pace with the steadily increasing output of Strenuous efforts were made by all concerned Eastern produce. to reduce production costs. Full advantage was taken of the science of agriculture, learned from efficient research stations, with the result that rubber, sugar, and other commodities were being produced at prices not thought of a few years ago, but greater production in this and other Eastern countries, however, only resulted in an increase of unsaleable stocks. The slump of 1928-31 affected native producers of export goods less because they had little capital invested and could turn to raising foodstuffs for themselves. European companies were hard hit. Coolies were being repatriated from Java to the outer islands, and at the end of 1931 there was no lightening of the gloom.

The area under rice in Java has varied little between 1924 and 1930, but the crop has varied between 60 and 66 million quintals. There are large imports of rice from Cochin China, Siam, and through Singapore. In 1930 and 1931 imports of "comestibles and luxuries" averaged 27.4 per cent. of the total value of imports. The following table shows the output (in metric tons) of tropical products

entering into world trade.

	7	Sugar.	Tea.	Coffee.	Tobacco.	Palm Oil	Palm Kernels.
1925	194,000	2,261	52,182	62,153	56,682	8,739	1,715
1929	297,000	2,916	75,583	55,280	58,198	35,971	7,065
1930	269,000	1,604	71,991	40,313	60,575	49,752	9,821

Restriction in rubber output has proved impossible, stocks are accumulating, and it will take a long time to eliminate the weakest companies by bankruptcy; the natives will tap their trees as soon as prices attract them. Production of native rubber increased from 88,000 tons in 1925 to 108,000 tons in 1930. Sugar is now restricted for five years—1931-35—and the Javan output must be reduced; stocks also are growing and no benefit from the International Agreement has yet resulted. Tea was voluntarily restricted in 1930 by 10 per cent. and good dividends were paid. The restriction was abandoned in 1931 and exports have increased at lower prices, thanks entirely to the abandonment of preferential or other tariffs in England. Further developments of oil palm and sisal cultivation are expected in Sumatra.

Oil and Tin.—The output of crude petroleum in 1925 was 3,066,000 metric tons, 5,239,000 tons in 1929, and 5,531,000 tons in 1930. Tin output rose from 30,700 tons in 1925 to 32,400 tons in 1930 and was restricted by international agreement of February, 1931, to

29,000 tons. It has recently been still further curtailed.

Trade.—Foreign foodstuffs (which include butter and flour from Australia, butter from New Zealand, biscuits from United Kingdom and Holland, rice from Cochin China, Siam, and Singapore, fruit from Australia, Canada, and California), metals, machinery, piece goods, and chemicals are the chief imports.

In the matter of local manufactures the general tendency, even here, is towards self-sufficiency.

I anticipate that by 1950 the Dutch East Indies will have suffered a severe, if temporary, set-back from internal disturbances, consequent on the "reforms" introduced in 1928, which will have led to a series of legislative deadlocks and much confusion, but the Dutch will have had the courage to retrace their steps and amend their ways, and by 1950, perhaps earlier, their worst troubles will be over. They and their subjects will have re-learned the lesson that the first duty of a government is to govern: that the duty cannot be delegated, and must be exercised effectively or abandoned. They will have profited by rather than followed the example of Great Britain in Ceylon.

The Philippines

I assume for the purpose of this forecast that the Philippine Islands will in 1950 be under the same management as the Island of Yap. The Filipinos will have been given complete independence by the U.S.A., in deference not to the principles of self-determination, but to the exigencies of domestic politics in the States. This step will have been taken before 1940; by 1945 Japanese intervention will have

started; by 1950 the position of the Island will be much as it was when the Americans left it in 1933, but the Japanese will be masters.

The Indo-Chinese Union

The Indo-Chinese Union—Tonkin and Cochin China—will still be under French control. There will be an increase in the population, a decrease of exports and therefore of imports, and no commercial developments of importance.

Federated Malay States

The Federated Malay States, too, will have suffered no serious political change. The increase of population will therefore be very marked, but the Chinese population will not constitute, as Professor Toynbee appears to anticipate,* a difficult racial and economic problem: it will continue, as at present, to consist mainly of temporary residents with a low birth rate, the proportion of men to women being, as at present, as 6 is to 1.

Population.—The population was estimated in November, 1930, at 4,300,000. In 1911 it was 2,700,000; in 1921 it was 3,400,000, an increase of 25.6 per cent. In 1921-30 the increase was 26.8 per cent. The Malay population increased from 1,438,000 in 1911 to 1,902,000 in 1930, the Chinese from 917,000 to 1,575,000, and the Indian from 267,000 to 770,000. In 1921 only a fifth of the Chinese and Indians were born in British Malaya.

Production.—The concentration of capital and energy in Malaya upon the production of rubber and tin has made the economic prosperity of the country dependent upon the state of the industries in Europe and America which consume these two materials. In the past the cultivation of various agricultural products which might have been developed to adjust the balance has been neglected or sacrificed to the alluring returns from rubber. Wide fluctuations in price have made the past history of the country one of alternating periods of prosperity and the reverse. The competition between the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya and between native cultivators and European companies in the rubber plantations is well known, and even the most stringent economies have not made low prices profitable. Potential production is still high, especially in the Dutch East Indies, and new uses for rubber are slow in appearing. The quantity of land under rubber in 1924 was 1,281,000 acres, in 1927 it was 1,452,000 acres, and it was 1,535,000 acres in 1929; out of the 1927 area 818,000 acres were in estates over 100 acres, of which 702,000 acres were in European hands.

* Things Seen, 1930.

Rubber will be far more extensively used in industry and daily life than at present. The growing depletion of the world's forests will have made wood-pulp for paper making dearer than in 1932: its place will in part be taken by paper made from rubber latex. Wall-papers, floor coverings, roadways, insulating papers, among other uses for rubber, will have increased greatly.

Foodstuffs.—"The present position is that the annual production of rice is roughly 200,000 tons as against an annual consumption of three times that amount. Rice cultivation is mainly a Malay peasant industry. There is a considerable area of land still undeveloped which is eminently suitable to rice cultivation" (Report, 1931). In 1927-29 from 500,000 to 600,000 tons of rice were imported annually (mainly from India and Siam) and about 200,000 tons exported, chiefly to the Dutch East Indies. About 63.4 per cent. of the gross value of imports in 1929 was furnished by food, drink, and tobacco.

Conclusions.—British Malaya depends, and will continue to depend, on the conditions of industry in the world at large, but, apart from world conditions, is not unfavourably situated, though by 1950 steps may be necessary to increase the local production of rice.

Siam

Population.—The population was estimated officially as 8,266,000 in 1911, 9,615,000 in 1921, 11,506,000 in 1929, and 11,684,000 in 1930. At this rate of increase the population in 1950 should reach 15½ millions;

on the 1921-30 basis there might be a million more.

Natural Resources.—Siam is not an industrial country and in order to secure supplies of manufactured goods depends on her natural resources—rice, tin, teak, and sticklac. Rice accounts for some 70 per cent. of the total exports, which during the last six years have been as follows:

162443	Th. Tons	in Amerika	Th. Tons.		Th. Tons.
1924-29	1,115		7 1,298	1928-29	
	5 1,328		3 1,707	1020-30	Control of the contro

In 1919 the world demand for rice was so great that exports on new contracts were prohibited in the second half of the year in order to maintain supplies for the population. Since then steady progress has been made in irrigation projects, while rural public opinion generally is being educated not only to appreciate the advantage thereby conferred, but also to interest itself in the value of fertilizers and the advantage of agricultural machinery. In addition to this, by encouraging the formation of agricultural co-operative societies in certain districts, the Government is making a laudable effort to improve the economic

status of the cultivator by making him independent of the moneylender and thus enabling him to market his unhusked rice at the moment most favourable to himself. But the most significant economic fact of latter years has been the stimulus to increased rice production afforded by the steady development in railway communications. Cultivators in remote regions have been encouraged to plant far more than required for their local needs, and the additional amount of rice thus made available for export is reflected in the export figures. The chief destinations to which rice is exported are (in order of magnitude) Malaya, Hong Kong, Japan, Netherlands East Indies. Siam is thus peculiarly susceptible to economic conditions in other countries, and the slump in tin and rubber in British Malaya and Straits Settlements and the fall in silver in China seriously reduced her trade in 1929-30.

Tin ore accounted for 8.1 per cent. of the value of exports in 1928-29 and for 10.7 per cent. in 1929-30. This trade entirely depends on world conditions; wide areas still remain untapped, but their exploita-

tion depends on the world's needs and world prices.

Teak accounted for 3.6 per cent. of the value of exports in 1927-28 and for 5.3 per cent. in 1929-30, but the quantity fell from 76,000 tons to 74,000 tons. The present leases expire in 1940, and, unless there is then a sufficiency of mature trees in the forests, a policy of conservation

will be adopted.

Imports.—Over a sixth (in value) of the imports in 1929-30 were sugar, alcoholic liquors, vegetables, tea, fish, spices, biscuits, preserved meats, etc.—luxuries rather than necessaries. Cotton manufactures, iron and steel, kerosene, tobacco, vehicles, etc., are some other leading classes. During, or immediately after, the war, when supplies of many imported goods were cut off, seven factories were set up in Bangkok for the manufacture of cement, ice and aerated waters, soap, cigarettes, and leather. The D.O.T. Report for 1928 chronicles "the successful effort of a Bangkok cement factory to replace the imported by the local product" and "the continued survival of the local weaving and dyeing industry, which sprang into existence as a result of the high prices prevailing immediately after the war, for cotton textiles exported from abroad. . . . There are not wanting other signs that in certain lines Siam will endeavour to supplement by local manufacture articles which she has hitherto been content to import"; cinematograph films and matches, both subject to increased import duties, are specified.

Conclusions.—Siam, like the Federated Malay States, will have suffered few, if any, constitutional changes. Having successfully avoided electoral systems of government during the critical years following the war, and having profited by the sufferings of those countries on which such institutions were imposed by us, the Government of Siam will in 1950 be, as in 1932, a model to the rest of Asia. A small group of highly trained men, drawn for the most part from a single class, and educated in Europe, will remain at the head of affairs, directing a highly skilled bureaucracy drawn partly from Europe, such as Plato wished to see trained for the service of his ideal State. The population of Siam will have increased, as also its trade, both import and export, but the increase will be mainly with other Asiatic countries rather than with Europe.

Ceylon

Population.—Excluding military and shipping, the population of Ceylon was 2,760,000 in 1881, 3,571,000 in 1901, 4,499,000 in 1921, and 5,307,000 in 1931. The birth rate has been between 35 and 40 per thousand since 1911 (except in 1912), and from 1921 to 1927 tended to approximate to 40 per cent.; in 1929 and 1930 it fell towards 35. The death rate has fallen from 35 to 25 per thousand in 20 years. There is a considerable migration movement; in the five years there was an excess of 331,000 immigrants, but in 1929 and 1930 emigrants were in

excess by 46,000.

Agriculture.—Out of 3,263,000 acres cultivated about 1,000,000 acres are under coconuts, 800,000 under rice, 534,000 under rubber, and 457,000 under tea. Subsidiary to the cocoanut industry are desiccating mills for copra, oil mills, mat factories, fibre mills, etc. In 1929 exports of tea, rubber, and coconut products formed nearly 96 per cent. in the value of the exports of Ceylon. Exports of tea had increased from 205 million lbs. in 1924 to 251 million lbs. in 1929, falling to 243 million lbs. in 1930. For rubber the figures were 83 million lbs. in 1924, 181 million lbs. in 1929, and 171 million lbs. in 1930. For copra the exports were 88,500 tons in 1924, 102,100 tons in 1929, and 91,000 tons in 1930.

Trade.—Of the imports of merchandise in 1930, food, drink, and tobacco represented 47.0 per cent., raw materials 15.7 per cent., and manufactures 37.3 per cent.; for exports, food, etc., formed 69.6 per cent. and raw materials 29.5 per cent. The foodstuffs are mainly rice (505,000 tons in 1929), with some fish, wheat, flour, vegetables, sugar, and spirits. To this extent the island is not self-supporting. Mineral oil, cotton textiles, other textiles, coal, iron and steel, machinery, motorcars, and fertilizers are the most important of other imports. Imports of fertilizers increased from 104,000 tons in 1925 to 137,000 tons in 1927, and then decreased to 113,000 tons in 1931; they come mainly

from British India and secondly from the United Kingdom.

During the British occupation land development has proceeded rapidly, but fresh accessible land has in recent years become scarcer. About three-quarters of the island does not receive the monsoon and is a "dry zone"; its development depends on the discovery of some economic use of these large areas with their scanty and uncertain rainfall, as well as some means of protection for the labourers against the scourge of malaria that can be carried out at a less prohibitive cost than the methods so far devised.* The intermediate belt between the wet and dry zones has developed considerably in recent years. Labour comes largely from South India—the Tamils—and is non-indentured. Demand usually exceeds the supply; there is little social legislation and houring is poor. The cost of labour should, therefore, rise.

Conclusions.—The new Constitution seems unlikely to realize the optimism of the Parliamentary Commission which devised it, apparently on the model of the London County Council. The immediate effect is likely to be inimical to the investment of further capital by Europeans and a lowering of the standard of life. We may anticipate a tendency in the local Legislation to restrict immigration, to place heavy burdens on imported capital, and failure to realize the entire dependence of Ceylon upon trade with Great Britain. There is, too, always the danger of some insidious disease, which, as happened with coffee, may ravage the plantations and reduce the industry to a shadow of its former self.

The U.S.S.R.

Having thus, with our feet, I hope, firmly on the ground, dealt on the map of imagination with the Far East, we may turn in succession to the U.S.S.R., and to the Near and Middle East. The Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will in 1950 still, I apprehend, be in existence, but the legislative bond that will unite its component members will scarcely be more binding than the Statute of Westminster, and the moral ties will be far looser and will, in 1950, be suffering further dissolution due to the growth of "nationalistic" as contrasted with federal sentiments within the various States. After many setbacks and disappointments the third or fourth five-year plan will have come within measurable distance of accomplishment. The inhabitants of the U.S.S.R. will, in 1945 or so, be able to count upon approximately as ample a supply of food, warmth, light, and human pleasure as the inhabitants of, let us say, Germany in 1931. With relative prosperity will come discontent; the discipline that could be borne while primary needs were unsatisfied will have become intolerable in time of plenty. We know from the Bible that Jeshurun "waxed fat

^{*} Colonial Reports: Ceylon, 1929, p. 96.

and kicked." The phase conceals an important political truth; starvation and prosperity offer fertile ground for political unrest during the period of transition from one state to the other. By 1950 almost the whole output of a self-contained Russia will be devoted to internal needs: the philanthropic urge which in the years 1920-35 induced the rulers of Russia to devote such large sums of money towards spreading the gospel of Communism in foreign lands will have lost its force and missionary zeal. Communism will, indeed, be regarded as a very old-fashioned political system, inconsistent in its operation with human nature. 1950 will see the apostles of individual liberty, within the limits of a rather parochial nationalism, raising emphasis on the importance of the family. Increasing prosperity will have tended, in Russia as elsewhere, to encourage in some obscure way limitation of births: Russia, which till 1950 was rapidly increasing its population, will record a much lower birth rate: eugenics will be a favourite study: the grant of family allowances will be widely supported. The young married couple will have in the eyes of the State and the public something of the prestige and glamour which in 1932 is accorded them, not by the State or the law, but only by the illustrated papers. This will be the case also in Europe.

The political problems of the U.S.S.R., due to the increase of nationalism within the various Republics, will be acute. The Ukraine will have been the first to assert a measure of real independence; the Caucasian group of States, including the Armenian Republic (which in 1950 will be a source of anxiety to Turkey), second; the Trans-Caspian Republics third.

Soviet statesmen, who in 1920 were the first to give effect to the nationalistic ideals popularized by Woodrow Wilson, by constituting a series of associated republics on racial lines, will not, I imagine, suffer their empire to be thus disrupted without a struggle. But their efforts will be vain; "the importance of pure race," preached so eloquently before the war by Houston Chamberlain, will be the watchword of 1950. Ernest Renan's definition of a nation will be the ideal of every people.* The growing emphasis of leading scientists on racial eugenics, on the ability and the duty of men and women in the

* "A nation is a spiritual family, the product of past memories, past sacrifices, past glories, past sorrows and common regrets—of present desires to continue to live as one. What makes a nation is not a common tongue or membership of an ethnographical group, but the achievement of great things in the past, and the desire to achieve them in the future. The nation is a spiritual principle, with its roots deep in history."

national interest so to order their lives that the next generation may have healthy bodies and lead healthy lives, will be used to press the claims of an individual racial or regional group against others. A return to national culture and tradition in literature and art is already noticeable. Let me not be understood as commending this tendency, which in a realistic survey of world forces I think I see developing in the near future. It is only a stage—a dangerous stage indeed—on our road. It is in some senses a reversion to tribalism—but a large tribalism with a biological rather than a linguistic or purely geographical trend. It is already with us in these islands.

The Middle and Near East

Turkey has, according to the last census, a population of about 13½ millions,* and there is no evidence of any tendency to increase. The movement in favour of racial and economic self-sufficiency is nowhere more marked than in Turkey, and the tendency to repudiate debts incurred by the nation is sufficiently indicated by the last report of the Council of Foreign Bond Holders.†

The boundaries of Turkey will probably be substantially unchanged in 1950, but some rectification in the neighbourhood of Mount Ararat, restoring to the growing Soviet Republic of Armenia some part of the ancient homelands of the Armenian race—regions now almost completely desolate and untilled—is not impossible.

The process of Westernization, now so strongly marked in Turkey, will be in decline by 1950. It is not consistent with the growth of nationalism, which must demand eventually the outward expression of dress and of national institutions.

Commercial development in Turkey is unlikely to be noteworthy during the next eighteen years. The New Turkey has little to offer to New Asia. Indigenous mineral wealth is not on a scale likely to be susceptible of rapid development.

Turkey is primarily an agricultural country, yet agriculture has not been the Government's main consideration, as a glance at the budgets for the last few years will show. Owing to a series of bad crops production has declined year by year, and as a result a gradual decline in exports has naturally followed, thus increasing the adverse trade balance. Control of exchange and high tariffs have accentuated the economic crisis. The Government has a programme for the allo-

^{*} Turkey in Asia, 12,461,000; Turkey in Europe, 1,185,000.

[†] We must, however, be careful not to ascribe a peculiar measure of turpitude to the Turkish Government. Their attitude is closely paralleled by that of several other countries. The model country in this regard was once Russia, which, whilst the Crimean War was in progress, paid interest promptly and regularly upon Russian loans floated in Paris and London.

cation of important credits for agriculture and production in general, including the textile industry. "An effort is at last being made to start irrigation works—but the adoption of modern methods is also necessary. The farmer cannot, in most cases, afford to buy machinery, nor does he know how to use it. The use of phosphates might be of great value, but up to the present its uses have not been appreciated" (D.O.T. Report, 1930). Dried fruits, figs, hazel nuts, tobacco, opium, cotton, wool, and mohair are the chief agricultural products. Tobacco, fruit, wool and its products, opium, and cotton and its products contributed nearly three-quarters of Turkish exports in 1928. About one-sixth of the imports were foodstuffs, liquors, and confectionery.

Imports of Manufactures.—Cotton and woollen goods and other textiles and clothing accounted for over a third of the value of imports in 1928, but this trade is not likely to increase. At least 50 per cent. of the population are poor and they will buy the cheapest goods offered to them. The President of the Republic, attributing the depreciation of Turkish currency to the heavy imports of cotton and woollen textiles, has appealed to all sections of the community to follow his example and use only native cloth, and his lead has been followed by the majority of the Ministers and the Deputies. Soldiers, police, and other officials have to use only native cloth. Immunities from customs duties on machinery, structural material, and rolling stock, and from certain taxes are granted to factories in Turkey. maximum bonus of 10 per cent. of the value of the total annual output may be granted by the Government to factories in the country, and Government departments, municipalities and concessionary companies are obliged to purchase their requirements from a native factory, if such exists, even in cases where the local product is 10 per cent. more expensive than the corresponding article imported from abroad" (Report, 1928). A law of 1920 authorizes the Ministry of Commerce to spend, over a series of years, £T.18,000,000 in creating an iron and steel industry in Turkey, but no effective steps have yet been taken.

Syria

The state of Syria in 1950 is likely to be very different from that of 1932. The suspension of the Constitution of the Lebanese Republic in May, 1932,* will, I anticipate, prove to have been a landmark in

* The Times (Cairo Correspondent), May 10, 1932: "It is officially announced in Beirut that M. Henri Ponsot, the High Commissioner, has suspended the Constitution of the Lebanese Republic, and that the administration will be carried on for the present by President Debbas with the assistance of a Council of Directors nominated by him. The Cabinet and the Parliament have disappeared.

"The announcement claims that this decision has been taken in accordance with the wishes of the population. This is exceedingly likely, as the constitutional apparatus has proved over-costly for the resources of the miniature State,

and its expense has led to great discontent."

the political unification of Syria. The great network of motor roads made during the years 1920-40, the impetus to commerce given by the construction of oil-pipe lines from Iraq to the littoral, the considerable investments of capital in hydro-electric, irrigation, and other schemes, will have had by 1950 a profound effect upon the Syrian population. Religious differences will have been softened; the French will have acquired, painfully indeed, but with eventual success, the technique of government which they have mastered in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunis, which will remain in 1950, as in 1932, outstanding examples of the possibilities latent in a policy of assimilation when applied to races with a high order of natural intelligence, not separated from that of Europe by any impassable gulf. The true boundary between East and West is the western frontier of India.

The population of French Syria will not, I fear, be in all respects content with their lot; but they will be a unitary State, or at least discussing such a possibility, and will be emerging, not unprosperously, from a long tutelage. The Christian elements in the country will by 1950 be numerically superior to the Muslim elements: the leaders will be mainly Muslims, but commercial and agricultural interests rather than religious views will be the mainspring of current discussions, and Syrian Muslims will in 1950, even more than in 1932, exercise a predominant influence in the counsels of neighbouring States—Palestine and Iraq.

Palestine

Palestine, like Cyprus, will in 1950 still be under British control—though the "mandatory system" invented in 1919-20 will before that date have been abolished, with the consent of those principally concerned, as it will have been shown conclusively that its maintenance was inconsistent with the interests of the populations of mandated territories. Zionism will no longer be a pressing political issue: there will indeed be several flourishing Zionist colonies, self-supporting, but not recruited any longer from abroad and not financially supported by the Jewish world. The inhabitants of these colonies will have done much to raise the level of efficiency of the Arabs, who will have copied their methods wherever they have proved successful, and will have co-operated with them in marketing produce, and in other directions. Racial differences will not be obliterated, but regional and climatic influences will tend to soften sharp edges. In Palestine there will, by 1950, be no purely electoral representation, which is bound to

exacerbate racial differences. Advisory councils will have been formed, the representatives of various interests being nominated by the Government or by secondary systems; men so nominated will on the one hand be bound to prove their ability to lead those whom they represent and on the other to co-operate for the common good with each other and with the Government. Within these certi denique fines, quos ultra citrave nequit consistere rectum they will have learned to acquire a civic balance. The problem that will exercise them and the Syrians in 1950 will, I apprehend, be whether Palestine with Trans Jordan and Syria could not form together a single State. Syrians will claim that their country is so much richer, more populous, and more fertile than Palestine, that the latter could be admitted to partnership, if at all, only as a poor relation. Palestine will point to the Dead Sea Salts, which by 1950 should be an important source of revenue to the country and of employment to the inhabitants, and claim a larger share of power than her population* of less than a million (in 1950) would justify.

It is possible that by 1950 Palestine will have negotiated with Egypt and the Suez Canal Company an agreement for a railway line from Qantara on the Suez Canal to Port Fuad opposite Port Said, whence the produce of Palestine† can be shipped by direct steamer in small parcels to every port in the world, instead of via Haifa, and for the most part by transhipment. This will not involve the ruin of Haifa, still less of Jaffa, which will be increasingly prosperous, but the port works at Haifa will have proved costly and unremunerative, and it will be little used except for oil exports.

Arabia

The independent States of Arabia—including Nejd, Hijaz, and Yemen—will not differ greatly in political structure from that with which we are now familiar. "Augescunt aliæ gentes, aliæ minuuntur,"

† Exports in 1930 were valued at £1,896,000, of which oranges, £857,000; soap, £205,000; maize, £152,000; watermelons, £84,000; and wine, £31,000. Imports were valued at £6,985,000—cotton goods, £479,000; petroleum products,

£413,000; timber, £296,000; food, drink, and tobacco, £1,393,000.

^{*} The Census of 1922 recorded 757,000 persons, including 103,000 nomadic Bedouin. The Report of the British Government to the League of Nations for 1930 gives the estimated population as 843,000 in the middle of 1930. Jews increased from 47,000 in 1918, and 87,000 in January, 1923, to 162,000 in 1929; of the last number 130,000 were in towns and 32,000 in colonies.

wrote Lucretius. The star of some dynasties will have waned, and others will be waxing; there will have been no increase of population, and the people will be poorer than ever. The pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina will no longer be a popular institution even in India, and these towns will have shrunk in size, and with them Jeddah. The exports of Arabia will have diminished—the coffee of Mocha can scarcely compete with that of Kenya and Brazil, but the frankincense of Dhufar will still be in demand. Camels will not be commercially used extensively as beasts of burden; no fresh mineral resources will have been disclosed.

Yet Arabia proper will continue to breed, and on occasion to export to adjacent territories, the greatest of the world's products—men, who will exercise in the future as in the past an influence on affairs wholly disproportionate to their numbers.

Iraq

Turning now to Iraq, it is possible to forecast with some confidence that its future between now and 1950 will not be intimately linked with that of adjacent territories. Although Iraq, but for the waterway of the Shatt-al-Arab, is completely land-locked, and though the populations in the north have close affinities with those of Persia and of Turkey, and of Syria, and in the west with those of Arabia proper, it is safe to assume that in 1950, as today, Iraq will be a political entity with boundaries differing little from those with which we are now famliar and in receipt of a large sum by way of royalties on oil exported. It may well have decided to change its form of government at least twice during the years 1932-50. The growth of nationalism amongst the Arabs of Iraq will result in the emergence of a ruling class of a new type, and of a form of autonomy for the Kurds, for which the Iraqi Government is not yet ready, judging from the pertinacity with which (notwithstanding declarations at Geneva) the R.A.F. has been bombing the Kurdish population for the last ten years and in particular for the past six months. Devastated villages, slaughtered cattle, maimed men and women bear witness to the spread, in the words of a Special Correspondent to The Times, of "a uniform pattern of civilization." Parliamentary forms, which today lack vitality and life, may well become merely ornamental, but the essential organic structure of Iraq as a sovereign State will remain.

Persia

For Persia the years 1932-50 will be a critical period in her long history. The very steps taken by her during the previous decade to establish her complete independence of foreign influences will be clearly proven to have bound her more tightly than before to the commercial chariot of her northern neighbour. Her dealings with Soviet Russia will be as much as three-quarters of her total trade: * the conventions which have made this possible will be regarded as "unequal treaties"; they will be widely but vainly resented in Persia; the result will be an intensification of nationalistic feelings. No effort will be spared to make Persia as far as possible self-supporting: sugar beet factories, cotton and woollen mills, factories for the production of foot-gear and leather goods, matches, soap, and other commodities will be set up with the aid of large Government subventions, in the effort to circumvent the commercial conventions to which I have referred. In Persia, as elsewhere, not the volume of trade but the smallness of total import will be the index of success. By 1950 this policy will have reached its full growth and a movement towards freer trade may be making itself felt-but the way down to Avernus is easier than the upward path.

India

It remains to consider what India will be like in 1950. To make a prediction, however diffident, is exceedingly difficult. Many who may not have regarded my anticipations up to this point as wholly fantastic will, I fear, stigmatize this portion of my essay as, at best, unwise, at worst, as michievous. Yet twenty years is not very far ahead in the life of an individual. The institution of organized government is about 6,000 years old: a period of 20 years, or one three-hundredth part of its past existence, is equivalent to a period of less than three months of the life of an average man. It is reasonable to expect that a large proportion of those principally responsible for the conduct of Imperial affairs will still in 1950 be holding positions of trust, and at least two-thirds of the members of the present Parliament at Westminster will be alive. Nearly all those now at school and college will be engaged in bringing up young families, however exiguous, and the efflux of time will have demonstrated whether post-war idealisms were

^{*} According to Soviet figures, exports from U.S.S.R. to Persia totalled in 1931 32'4 million roubles, and imports into U.S.S.R. from Persia 46'4 million roubles.

any wiser than pre-war policies. Let us therefore not shrink from the intellectual effort involved in looking thus far into the future, for which, rather than the present, we are avowedly laying our plans.

Lord Lothian's farewell statement on leaving India after a visit lasting three months (*The Times*, May 11, 1932) read as follows:

"Franchise is the foundation for democratic self-government, and I hope our recommendations will be recognized by Indian opinion as laying a workable progressive foundation for real self-government in India. I am inclined to think that many people of experience of public life will be somewhat aghast at the magnitude of the practical task which we have set before the country. If, as I hope, the first elections under the new Constitution are held some time next year, it will be necessary before then to put thousands of candidates in the field, and for those candidates to educate and solicit the suffrage of tens of millions of electors who have never voted before. For those who are familiar with electioneering in England, the United States, France, Germany, and other countries, the work which the leaders of public opinion still have to do to create or develop political parties capable of dealing with this huge electorate is prodigious, and the time in which to do it is short. On its being properly done immense consequences hang, for under responsible government whoever wins a majority will form the Government. . . . The problems which confront this country during the next generation are colossal. But if we all pull together the constitutional problems which lie immediately ahead do not seem to me insoluble. . . . If only all classes in India, including those who are making sacrifices today for the sake of their own ideas of the road to self-government and reforms, will throw themselves into constructive work, electioneering, and winning majorities in the Legislatures, and if communal fears and antagonisms can be kept within bounds, I see no reason why India should not within a short time set going successfully a constitutional experiment on a vaster scale than has ever before been attempted in history."

Let us assume that this superb optimism (which has always characterized Lord Lothian's political utterances) is in this particular case justified by events, and that all current apprehensions to the opposite effect are proved to be wrong. Let us assume that throughout India the result of the elections in 1933 will show (as reported of the N.W. Frontier in *The Times* of May 10) that "the great majority of the electorate is composed of men of moderately conservative views who desire to give the reforms a fair trial, and to advance on constitutional lines to their ultimate goal." (Goals would perhaps be more accurate than goal.) Let us further assume that the net result of the elections "is a sweeping victory for the Conservatives over the Radicals, the success

of the landlord over the lawyer, and the definite vindication of the ancient Pathan feudal system," but that "the depth and power of the Redshirt organization . . . its strength and violence, have once more been fully proved . . . in areas where the maximum strength of British troops is concentrated."

Let us further agree with Dr. Rushbrook Williams (The Times, May 11) in making the following anticipations as to Indian States:

"The conception of entry into Federation through the door of a Confederation of the States has gained much ground, and is likely to gain more. The technical details connected with the entry of the States into Federation are now seen to be so complex that it is doubtful whether constitutional advance in British India can wait upon their complete elucidation. But thanks to the general wisdom of the Princes . . . the threatened breakaway from Federation has been averted; and despite the many difficulties involved and the many problems which arise for solution the participation of the Indian States in an All-India Constitution seems, so far as human foresight can avail, to be assured."

These are very daring postulates, and anyone who conducted the affairs of an Insurance Company, on the stability of which the welfare of millions of men and women depended, on such assumptions, would probably find himself first in the Bankruptcy Court and later in gaol. But we are not dealing with finance, but with politics, so let us make these assumptions and consider the position after, let us say, the third of these elections, say in 12 years' time.

The Indian States have declared their willingness to federate subject to the acceptance by the British Crown of the obligation to safeguard their position. It seems clear that within twelve years, on present plans, the Crown will be unable to give effect to such an undertaking, if made.

It further seems certain that the re-grouping of electorates postulated by almost all authorities, from Mr. Lionel Curtis onwards, not having been effected previous to the introduction of "responsible Government" it will not be possible thereafter, and that voting within provincial boundaries on communal, in other words on nationalistic or racial, lines, will be the invariable rule.

We know from Lord Eustace Percy's Report that the financial resources of the Federal Government will be modest: they are likely to prove precarious and insufficient, and its borrowing powers will be correspondingly restricted.

The Central or Federal Government will, as in Australia, but far sooner, find itself in difficulties with the subordinate legislatures, which

it will be unable to coerce: in this event by 1950 India will be governed not by one but by many governments; financial stringency at the centre will have compelled the reconstitution of the Indian Army by 1950 into its old components—the Bombay, Bengal, and Madras Armies, or their more numerous equivalents, and other "Imperial Services" will have followed suit. The Indian States will maintain larger forces than at present. But that an Indian Army or Armies under British officers will remain the central feature of Indian policy I do not doubt.

"Responsible" government on an electoral basis involves the right of self-determination, i.e., of secession, not merely from the British Empire, but from the Central and even from the Provincial Governments by law established. Under an electoral system this fissiparous tendency will proceed rapidly, and by 1950 it may be nearly complete. The units of Government will not be unlike those which we found in India at the end of the last century, but may be more numerous. Just as the Great War increased the number of independent States in Europe, so will the Constitution of 1932-33 increase them in India, and with far more reason. Every act of ours in India before the war was towards unitary and centralized government, but every change made since then has tended to encourage decentralization and tribalism, just as every successive act of European governments is tending in the same direction.

Indian export trade will diminish, and the balance of trade will barely suffice to pay interest on loans;* Indian import trade will be limited to goods of high value compared with their bulk-machinery, dyestuffs, and perhaps fertilizers, and, who can doubt, arms and ammunitions. The ancient feudal system will revive, as it has revived in the N.W. Frontier province, to the discomfiture of "the younger members of the intelligentsia" (The Times, May 10, 1932). Its revival will be accompanied, as I have suggested elsewhere, by the growth, as noticeable of recent years in every other Eastern State, of personal rule, by strong men, the product of hard times. The third election will, in most parts of India, be the last: the system, which Lord Lothian has himself condemned in a few well-chosen words, will be swept away by popular resentment. Men will look, not in vain, for the Word of Power-compared with which the babblings of Legislative Assemblies are as "the small dust of the balance" of the book of Isaiah. They will look for it, I fear, in vain from the representatives of Great

[•] In this connection see Sir Basil Blackett at East India Association, The Times, May 25, 1932.

Britain, but each race will hear it in their own tongue; taught by the proverbial wisdom of the ages, by the terrors of internecine strife and the miseries of acute scarcity, they will follow the leaders of the hour. Another Akbar or Sivaji may arise, or both, or even an Alexander from beyond the frontiers of India.

The picture that I have felt compelled to present to you has a dark background, but Empires cannot retrace their steps; the unilateral pledges of Ministers of State, though made under the gravest misapprehensions, and in anticipation of conditions not fulfilled, have with us the sanctity of a multilateral treaty. Vox missa nescit reverti.

True to our insular traditions, we have pledged ourselves, in each successive decade, more deeply and irrevocably, to a policy in which few statesmen, from Lord Morley (vide his Recollections) onward, have really believed. We have entrusted the Governorships of Ceylon and of the Indian Provinces, and the office of Viceroy and Governor-General, since Lord Curzon's day, to men who, with certain brilliant exceptions, had trained themselves for very different parts, and came to their heavy tasks unfortified by previous study and deeply imbued with the traditions of Westminster. Only once in the recent history of India has a successful Provincial Governor been allowed, as Viceroy, to profit by his experience in a more restricted field, and he was appointed five years too late.

The changes which I have anticipated in outline will not, I believe, be catastrophically sudden. The reversion to smaller units of Government will be slow and will not, as I have suggested, be confined to India. It will be accompanied by dark days throughout the world, but especially in India: it will involve the eclipse of the influence of the League of Nations outside Europe. The vast Empire of India, as "Al Carthill" wrote in that remarkably prophetic book *The Lost Dominion* in 1924, "must now continue with ever increasing momentum to follow the course on which it has been launched. Kings who abdicate may be wise or foolish, but there can be no question of the folly of a king who, having abdicated, seeks to resume the sceptre."

Honorius was compelled to withdraw the legions from Britain in A.D. 410: we are following his example with our administrative co-horts, but voluntarily. The first and greatest sufferers will, I fear, be sophisticated, educated Indians, in response to whose demands the great revolutionary schemes known as The Reforms were introduced. Though few of them realize it, they are today a part, not of India, but of the British Government of India, of the very system which is

disappearing. Governments in India to be stable must rest on the character and strength of rulers. A new generation of rulers must arise: these will not be drawn from existing Ministries or Legislative Councils.

It is now widely recognized, except in India, that expert aid is essential to success: we are on the way to recognize that the introduction of scientific method into public affairs is a necessary condition of any sort of national existence. It is no longer a question of educating the masses, but rather what the few can and must do to provide shelter, food, and the means of existence for the masses. The attitude of most political leaders today, whether in India or this country, indicates an inability or unwillingness to interpret the changes introduced to the world by the growth on the one hand of natural science and on the other of vast populations. We are facing the third decade of the twentieth century mumbling the shibboleths of the middle of the nineteenth.

I do not pretend to be a prophet; I know that political prognostication is a singularly unfruitful pursuit, and in any case, as Milton said, "Truth never comes into the world but, like a bastard, to the ignominy of him that brought her forth."

"Today," writes Rabindranath Tagore (Hibbert Lecture, 1930), "more than ever before in our history, the aid of spiritual power is needed . . . its sources will surely be discovered in the hidden depths of our being. Pioneers will come to take up this adventure and suffer and through suffering open out a path to that higher elevation of life in which lies our safety.

"The vastness of the race problem with which we are faced today will either compel us to train ourselves to moral fitness in the place of merely external efficiency or the complication arising out of it will fetter all our movements and drive us to our death."

Asiatic countries will not be for much longer a field for European investment, for they will have difficulty in paying interest on sums already invested. They will tend to import fewer commodities from Europe, and will in consequence export less, for in Asia fertile lands, not willing hands, are the principal source of wealth, and there are few lands easy to irrigate or to improve without large capital expenditure by strong governments. Africa and South America have in this respect a future greater than their past. Shipping in either direction through the Suez Canal will drop still lower than at present. Our commercial future lies in English-speaking countries, in a sane

and altruistic European policy, which involves comprehensive settlement with Soviet Russia (though the time is not yet ripe) and in Africa and in South America, in which last continent almost as much British capital is invested as in all Asia. But in India and in Asiatic countries a great field will remain open, and it may be greater in 1950 than today, for Englishmen of character, skill, and sympathy, working on lines perhaps very different from those with which we are familiar. The economic and scientific aspects of Asiatic problems have as yet scarcely been considered by Indian statesmen: the day will come when these aspects will of dire necessity assume paramount importance; when that happens the trained scientists of no country in the world will be as well able as ours to probe the secrets of mother earth and to apply the results to promote human happiness.

History is the record of conflict between individuals, tribes, nations, and races, and of successive crises, in which the passions of man provoke wrath that can be appeased only by what Aristotle termed the katharsis of strife. The man who, in such crises, gives himself wholly and disinterestedly to the service of his ideals need never be ashamed of himself.

The work to which we are called in Asiatic countries today is not merely to teach, to judge, or even to rule: the first essential is to understand. George Meredith (Letters ii. p. 621) wrote to an Indian man of letters: "Of Indian literature and thought we know much, and it is with reverence; of Indian character we know little." Our action in encouraging the application to India of a system of government wholly foreign to Indian literature, thought, and character, proves the truth of Meredith's words, but the poets, British and Indian, are always beforehand with the statesmen and historians. And this is true of Asiatic countries generally, and not only of India. Racial characteristics, if they are not indelible, show no signs at present of being obliterated: they are certainly deeper than religious differences. India is still to be compared not to England but to Europe; and "even Europe is less divided than India."*

Science must be our guide in all the arts of government, but we must never allow ourselves to forget that in Asia as elsewhere there are narrow limits to inter-racial and inter-national action. The emotions that are evoked are a part of human nature, a product of untold ages in the past and of environment not easily altered. These emo-

^{*} Edwyn Bevan, Indian Nationalism, p. 44.

tions are expressed by a national culture, which no race will willingly see submerged. We cannot, and should not wish to, make all men feel alike, which is what we mean when we say that two men think alike. War and civil strife are perhaps lesser evils than those that would follow from a static society.

If, as I hope, I am wrong, and that unity is coming in India, we may say with Simon de Montfort "'By the arm of St. George, they fight right shrewdly, but 'twas I that taught them.'" The long process might have been shortened had the course of history been different. From an historical point of view it is clear that the English settlement would have been more rapid, more beneficent, and more enduring if it had less of the spirit of Clive and more of the spirit of Christianity. It is not civilization, not an army, but a religion which makes an Empire.

The spectacle of our work in India is that of British power sustained by a Christian ideal. It is in reliance on that conviction alone that we can contemplate with calmness the dangers which surround the continued performance of our duty to the peoples of India.

The Chairman thanked Sir Arnold Wilson for his lecture, great in the breadth of its vision and in its interest. At the anniversary meeting of 1952 it would be recalled as an amazing forecast and survey.

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SOME MODERN ASPECTS OF THE CAPITULATIONS*

By H. E. GARLE

BEFORE reading the paper for this evening, may I preface it with a few remarks, to assist those who are not lawyers? I shall refer to Personal Law, to Private Law, Territorial Law, and International Law, and it is regarding these terms that perhaps a little explanation is desirable.

Lawyers will tell you that international law is not law at all, for law requires a lawgiver and a tribunal capable of enforcing it. That statement is true, and when speaking of international law I do so, not in the sense of droit des gens, but of that droit entre les gens of which d'Aguesseau speaks; that collection of usages which civilized States have agreed to observe in their dealings with one another.

International law is sometimes used to describe what are more properly laws made universally applicable by the consent of States as distinguished from nations, such as laws relating to copyright, trademarks, patents, extradition, and so on. These are really "laws of international application by consent."

Next, as you all know, there is a branch of international law, which arises because justice sometimes requires that effect should be given in the courts of law of one territory to the public authority of another territory. This branch is sometimes called International

another territory. This branch is sometimes called International Private Law, and sometimes "Conflict of Laws," and should be distinguished from personal law, which, if the historical view I take is correct, is of interest in connection with the Capitulations. I shall not

^{*} Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 19, 1932, Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., in the chair. In introducing the lecturer the Chairman said: Mr. Garle has had a varied legal experience in the Near and Middle East, extending back to the Daïra Sanieh liquidation in 1905, when he represented the Khedival family in conjunction with Monsieur Poincaré and the late Lord Oxford and Asquith. At the close of the war he assisted in the reorganization of the judicature in Palestine, and, after acting for some years as Special Commissioner for Turkish Reparations at Constantinople, was until recently the representative of the British Government on the Turkish Assessment Commission in Paris, of which he became President in 1925. He was fully qualified therefore to speak on a subject which affects all British traders and residents in the East.

offer you many light dishes this evening, but by way of hors d'œuvres I would ask you to think of the picture which most papers, whether professedly comic or otherwise, have at some time or other given to their readers. In this picture there is a hungry-looking individual of ebony hue dressed in the costume which the Welsh Harp object to, with an exceedingly pointed crown on his head to show that he is the King of the Cannibal Islands. He is surrounded by a court of equally dusky and hungry sunbathers, whilst in the foreground is a top-hatted and trussed missionary contemplating with horror the cauldron that a very jolly cook is getting ready for his reception. The picture is always the same, although the letterpress is sometimes different. I do not know whether the picture has yet appeared in the Law Times or Solicitors' Journal, but if they should put it in I would offer them as a caption the words "A Clash between Opposing Conceptions of Law," for I believe that no more convinced exponent of personal law could be found than the missionary, and that on the other hand the King of the Cannibal Islands is a firm believer in territorial sovereignty and complete administrative autonomy.

Personal law once existed in this country, and we all recollect the claim made in early days by the ecclesiastical authorities that every clericus should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the temporal courts. The matter was compromised in accordance with the best traditions of this country. The thorny and fundamental question of who was a clericus was settled in the year 1350 by the adoption of the definition that anybody was a clerk who could read verse one of the 51st Psalm. The Church accepted that definition and as a compromise agreed that the temporal courts should have jurisdiction over these learned people, but with the restriction that in cases where the offender was liable to the extreme penalty a secondary and more moderate punishment should be substituted.

One hundred and ninety-seven years later the wheel of controversy took another turn, and benefit of clergy was extended to Peers of the Realm, even to those Peers who were unable to read. Then the women took a hand, and feminism, after a struggle which lasted from 1622 to 1692, got benefit of clergy extended to them, whether they could read or not.

The exemption did not apply to the more atrocious crimes, and crimes came to be divided into clergyable and unclergyable, and the division was used to mitigate the severity of the criminal law until eventually it came to be the practice, when a law was intended really

to be punishable with death, to state that it was "without benefit of clergy."

Benefit of clergy was finally abolished in 1841, exactly 500 years after the first step was taken in the compromise to end the controversy. I have referred to it because it is an example of personal law in this country which lingered on into modern times.

There is one further explanation I may perhaps be permitted to make. The great empires of the world have always considered that the mutual transactions of Sovereigns as such is the true branch of jurisprudence which may be termed international, and treaties made between countries of equal status have always been distinguished from those made with countries of inferior importance or culture, whether real or imaginary. The test between civilized and uncivilized States has been the possession of a regular government sufficient to ensure to Europeans who settle amongst them safety of life and property.

Every country possessing such a government has prima facie the rank of a State, and I mention this because treaties made for the purpose of extraterritorial jurisdiction are sometimes thought to detract from the possession of equality and independence on the part of the country who agrees to them.

This is not the case. These treaties are based upon the assumption of equal status and are intended merely to take into account differences of judicial institutions, and there are instances today where provision has been made by the Great Mandatory Powers in countries detached from Turkey for the enjoyment by Moslems of certain extraterritorial privileges.

The Capitulations, by which are meant that body of concessions, treaties, customs, and law, which existed, and to some extent still exist, in the lands bordering on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, continue to exercise their influence upon international concerns. It is undeniable that on the one hand the protection they afforded greatly conduced to that flow of capital and trade which has proved much to the advantage of the lands in which the Capitulations prevailed, but, on the other hand, they may rightly be condemned as an intolerable servitude upon autonomy, and, if it is possible to point to advantages having followed upon their existence, it is equally easy to recite numberless examples in which they have been a hindrance to progress and an avenue for abuse. Moderate men have at all times been ready to admit the need

for the abolition of indefensible privileges, but they have desired to await proof of greater progress towards a more constructive phase of Eastern existence, and have perhaps felt that prudence was further enjoined by the common ancestry of the immunities of foreigners and the rights of minorities. The war has forced their abrogation upon the world, but, to modern eyes, their interest lies not only in a consideration of the material results consequent upon the abolition of the Capitulations, in those parts of the former Ottoman Empire in which they have been eliminated, or of what changes may become necessary where they are still operative, but in the contemplation of the forces that are at work behind events of recent years; for the Capitulations, like the rights of minorities, have their roots in personal as opposed to territorial law, and it was not until territorial conceptions of sovereignty developed in the Europe of the Renaissance that their importance came to be confined to the Ottoman Dominions. And if it be true that the East is becoming daily more conscious of Western territorial conceptions and political forms, so it is also the case that the West is gradually undergoing change in favour of a more international outlook. Early traders carried their laws about with them as well as their merchandise. Nowadays the League of Nations intervenes.

It may be that East is East and West is West, but whatever poets may sing to the contrary the two do meet in this commercial world. National independence notwithstanding, commerce, finance, the exigencies of transport, and considerations of strategy, will ever bring the two into intimate contact. Humanity will interest itself in the welfare of racial minorities, religion in its co-religionists. New methods of government will be put to the test, and it remains to be seen not merely how they will respond to the strain, and how far the old protection has become superfluous, but also how far modern appliances will prove a substitute.

For this it is necessary to go fairly minutely into the origins and history of the Capitulations, an inquiry which is not uninteresting, and, where they have been done away with, to see with what measures it has been possible to replace them.

The Capitulations, as has already been indicated, are an emanation of that personal, as opposed to territorial, law, which was once paramount in Western Europe, where traces of it may still be found in this country. Brown, who freely relies upon de Rausas, finds an explanation of these immunities in the needs of merchants trading in foreign

countries dating back to the thirteenth century B.C., and after referring to the permission given to the Phænicians who settled in Memphis from 1294-44 B.C. to have separate temples for worship, proceeds to cite the action of King Amasis in 579-526 B.C., who allowed certain Greek merchants who had established themselves at Naucratis to be judged by their own magistrates according to their own laws and customs, and speaks of the Treaty of A.D. 945 between the Varangians of Russia and the Emperor of Byzantium as the earliest documentary evidence of the granting of extraterritorial rights of foreigners.*

They were not in their origin something extraneous forced upon a country by outside pressure and incompatible with its institutions, but the natural application by foreign trading communities of their conception of the principle of personal law. The citizens of Italian Communes trading abroad carried with them their executive magistrates or "consuls," to exercise jurisdiction on shipboard or wherever they might settle. Extraterritorial jurisdiction was thus exercised in the thirteenth century over the permanent settlements of Pisan and Genoese merchants in Castile and Savoy, whilst Hanseatic merchants enjoyed extraterritorial rights in Scandinavian countries and the British Isles. In 1199 the Byzantine Empire granted Capitulations, "capitula," or "articles," to Venice, in which the principle was enlarged, jurisdiction being granted in cases where a Greek was the plaintiff and a Venetian the defendant, and in 1302 Edward I. of England devised a "Mixed Court" to meet conditions arising as between Hanseatic extraterritoriality and his own sovereignty.

Whilst, however, the idea of territorial sovereignty was growing in the West the decline of the Byzantine Empire, with the extension of trade to the Levant which followed the Crusades, witnessed an extension of the system of consular authority, the Genoese being granted jurisdiction in a suit in which a Greek was the defendant, and in the Crusading principalities consular jurisdiction developed into virtual territorial sovereignty. Nor with the growing power of Ottoman dominion was the East behind the West in asserting what were natural products of Islamic political ideas, and in 1391 we find that a Kadi was allowed to exercise jurisdiction over Ottoman residents in Constantinople, five years before the Ottoman conquest, and that, when the city was still a Venetian possession, there was an Ottoman consul possessing extraterritorial powers at Salonica.

^{*} Foreigners in Turkey: Their Judicial Status. P. M. Brown. Princeton University Press, 1914.

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Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Ottoman dominion extended from the Indian Ocean to the Adriatic, from Afghanistan to the Atlantic, and comprised within its boundaries a large part of modern Russia, and a new chapter opened in which Capitulations were granted to foreign communities within the Empire, in harmony with the personal rights granted to non-Moslem native communities. Both in their inception were voluntary, since neither at the time were in a position to bring any kind of pressure to bear, but the Italian republics which had taken the lead in the Levant trade fell into the background in the early part of the sixteenth century and were replaced by more formidable Western States able to treat with the paramount Oriental Power on equal terms; although by the time of the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks it had "become the almost universal custom to grant the foreigners extensive immunities of jurisdiction."*

If the Prophet Mohammed divided all mankind into "believers" and "infidels" "peoples of the Book"-i.e., Jews-Christians and others were distinguished from complete pagans, and religious toleration contrary to views that are sometimes expressed was a characteristic of Islam. This toleration was affirmed by Mohammed, the Conqueror, and in numerous iradés, up to and including the Hatti Houmayoun, non-Moslem native communities received at the hands of their conquerors extensive immunities of jurisdiction resembling in many respects those granted to foreigners. Both were excluded by their status from access to Moslem justice, which, administered as it was in the mosques, was not only inaccessible but totally unsuited to their needs, and could not in any degree be secularized so as to embrace them. There consequently grew up a system of jurisprudence which was totally non-Moslem, and was administered in spiritual councils presided over by the Patriarchs, Rabbis, and Vakils, which formed a branch of the Ottoman canon law, and was enforced by the Ottoman executive.

The Capitulations, therefore, in their more modern phase, as also the rights of non-Moslem native communities, were in fundamental principles based upon ancient privileges, personal law, and the origin and growth of Moslem law. France took the leading part in obtaining new Capitulations, as she also did in declaring the rights of Christian minorities to be under her protection. Both are a French achievement, but, from 1783, up to which time the other Western Powers were content to secure most-favoured-nation treatment, those Powers by a series

of treaties obtained a status assimilated to that of France. These treaties were for the most part unilateral, and at some stages one Power outstripped its rivals and became entitled to privileges additional to those enjoyed by its neighbours, but, generally speaking, they were brought into line, although, with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, each Power had in its dealings with that country often gone far beyond the text, explicit or implicit, of the Capitulations themselves.*

The Capitulations may, however, properly be considered as a single corpus of rights, and, on analysis, will be found first of all to confer sovereign rights in Ottoman territory, not merely over the nationals of the Power concerned, but often over the nationals of foreign Powers not enjoying capitulatory rights at all and even over Ottoman subjects themselves, particularly as regards special courts and legal formalities and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Next they extend certain extraterritorial privileges to subjects of the Capitulatory powers such as exemption from collective responsibility, inviolability of property, and of domicile, and the right to possess religious and secular buildings and institutions. The third head, into which capitulatory rights fall, is that of licences to trade, restrictions on Ottoman tariff autonomy, and control of shipping, cargoes, and goods in transit. Fourthly, individual foreign subjects enjoyed a certain freedom from personal taxation, security from requisition or forced sale of merchandise, confiscation or duties upon foreign currencies, and lastly, but not least, immunity from acquiring Ottoman citizenship, without which the Capitulations would, so far as individuals are concerned, have become a dead letter.

These are the Capitulations. They were in some cases bilateral, and, very rarely, reciprocal. Turkey denounced them en bloc on entering the war, but, with certain modifications and additions, they remain in full force in Egypt, and (except in Morocco), subject to special local arrangements or local use and wont, in other parts of North Africa, where, however, although important in practice, they have little legal validity.†

The Central Powers, like the Entente Powers, did indeed protest when Turkey denounced the Capitulations, but little more could be

^{*} G. Noradounghian "Recueil d'Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman, 1300-1902."

[†] For the Capitulations in the Barbary States as distinguished from the Byzantine Capitulations, see Lippmann, K., "Konsularjurisdiktion in Orient," pp. 72-74, and Rey, F., "Protection diplomatique et consulaire dans les echelles du Levant et de Barbarie," pp. 160-174.

done by the latter until victory was achieved, nor could Germany follow up her protest by any kind of pressure. She therefore accepted the abolition of the Capitulations, but followed it by negotiating a series of elaborate bilateral treaties, which virtually rehabilitated the old capitulatory system as far as she was concerned on a reciprocal basis, but when the war came to an end the Allies did not attempt to follow this diplomatic device, which, to-day, is, in fact, little better than a historical curiosity, although the Treaty of Sèvres, which was never ratified, contained far-reaching provisions. By a Convention, however, annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne, between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania, and Turkey, certain conditions of residence, business, and jurisdiction were obtained for foreigners generally, by which they were to be treated according to the Jus Gentium, with the right to hold personal and real property, and, subject to certain conventions which have since been negotiated, with the right to trade. Foreign companies which had been placed under a special law in November, 1914, were to be recognized, and, as regards their capacity, constitution, and legal rights, regard was to be had to the laws of their own country. Foreigners were, moreover, to be exempt from compulsory military service, or special taxation, and were admitted to the National Turkish courts, but as regards personal status or family law the rules of private international law were to be applicable. The authority of the consuls was saved only as regard civil status. The rights of minorities were safeguarded in the Treaty of Lausanne itself by provisions insuring protection of life and property, equal civil and political status, and freedom of conscience and religious exercises. In short, the complete abolition of all Capitulatory rights was recognized to the full.

The Grand National Assembly of Ankara had voted a fundamental law, in January, 1922, which was virtually a Constitution, based upon universal suffrage, without religious or race distinctions, and which also recognized the right of minorities to freedom and protection. Following upon the Treaty of Lausanne the Grand National Assembly in 1924 passed the Constitution declaring the Turkish Republic, and containing a declaration of rights which placed all the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of race or creed, on an equality before the law, with equal political, religious, and economic rights and freedom.

In 1926 three new codes of law were adopted. The Swiss civil code, which Mahommed Essad Bey, Minister of Justice, considers "the newest and most perfect and democratic that exists," the criminal code

of Italy, and the commercial code of Germany. In 1928 Islam was formally abolished as the religion of the Republic, and in 1929 a new penal code modelled upon German lines was put into force. The Constitution of April 20, 1924, contained absolute and far-reaching provisions regarding the independence of the judiciary, as well as for the establishment of a Supreme Court upon which extensive powers were conferred, designed to prevent any abuse of authority by the executive, and so far as pen and ink could make it so, the rights of non-Moslem native communities and of foreigners may be said to be safeguarded by the organic laws of Turkey, if not by treaty with the outside world.

As regards those parts of Turkey which were detached after the Treaty of Lausanne, the steps taken respecting the Capitulations as part of the war settlement were, with the exception of Egypt, all very much along the same lines. The immunities and privileges of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, were definitely abrogated in Palestine and Syria, an obligation being laid upon the Mandatory Powers for seeing that the judicial system established should safeguard the interests of foreigners as well as the jurisdiction regarding questions arising out of the religious beliefs of certain communities, such as laws of Wakfs and personal status. In particular, the Mandatory Powers agreed, that the control and administration of Wakfs should be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders. As Wakfs are private as well as public, the former being, in fact, rather akin to our English trusts with a remainder to pious uses, this stipulation is particularly noteworthy, as it is a recognition by the League of the right of Moslems to the enjoyment of privileges somewhat similar to those enjoyed by non-Moslem communities, when they were under the dominion of Islam.

In Iraq these matters were settled by Treaties between Great Britain and King Feisal and the application to that country of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations is subject to conditions whereby in matters relating to the personal status of foreigners, or in civil or criminal matters, where it was customary to apply the law of another country, such laws were to be applied in accordance with the rules of private international law. They were to be dealt with by the civil courts without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the religious courts, but, by the Judicial Agreement of March, 1931,* the consuls of Foreign States had certain rights of access to detained nationals, and no house or

premises might be entered, otherwise than by warrant, except when the police were pursuing a person caught in flagrante delicto. Subject to the Anglo-Iraq Treaties remaining in force the League considered that the Capitulations were not required, and it is presumed that the organic law, which will replace these Treaties, will be considered sufficient for the purpose, when Iraq is admitted a member of the League in September, 1932.

Egypt has been treated on an entirely different footing.

When the war broke out, instead of annexing the country without more ado, which would have swept away all extraterritorial and minority questions at a blow, Great Britain decided to proclaim a Protectorate. A body, which bore the title of the "Capitulations Committee," was set up to study the legislative and judicial reforms rendered possible or necessitated by the abolition of the Capitulations, but suspicions arose that its labours might result in proposals involving the Anglicisation of the judicature. This led to much opposition from the foreign bar, who considered that they had a vested interest in the existing systems, and no practical progress was made. The Milner proposals and the Declaration of 1922, which granted independence subject to four reserved points, was a step by which foreign rights were pooled in the hands of one Power, instead of fifteen, but the shackles of internationalism remained, and Egypt has forsaken all the precepts of the older school of reformers and is seeking to extend to the international courts the old consular jurisdiction in its anxiety to escape from British control. However immediately convenient from an administrative point of view, it is not easy to see how Egyptian national aspirations can be advanced by proposals which are their complete negation, and sooner or later Egypt will realize that, even in the Land of Paradox, it is impossible both to attack the Capitulations and at the same time to accept them as safeguards against interference in her internal affairs.

The official British view was last stated by Mr. Henderson in the covering note to the Draft Treaty of 1929 as follows:

*" His Britannic Majesty recognizes that the capitulatory régime now existing in Egypt is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and with the present state of Egypt.

"His Britannic Majesty accordingly undertakes to use all his influence with the Powers possessing capitulatory rights in Egypt to obtain, on conditions which will safeguard the legitimate in-

^{*} Egypt No. 1 (1929). Cmd. 3376, p. 11.

terests of foreigners, the transfer to the mixed tribunals of the jurisdiction of the existing consular courts, and the application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners."

This attitude is at present supported by many of the foreign communities in Egypt who are used to the Mixed codes, and porhaps even by the British community themselves, who, although very apprehensive of the intervention of the Mixed Courts in their own affairs, welcome the prolongation of foreign control as a refuge against what they regard as the dangers of modern British diplomacy, but it may well be questioned whether the proposals put forward at the last Treaty negotiations do more than postpone the question, for there are clear indications that Egypt would not accept the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Mixed Courts as a final solution of the problem. Test cases have been brought in recent days, having for their object the removal of certain classes of foreigners from their competence, and it is inevitable that, with each step taken by Egypt towards complete sovereignty, extraterritorial jurisdiction will suffer erosion.

From what has been said above it will be seen that it is only in the Turkish Republic that the effect of the abolition of the Capitulations can be estimated, for in those parts which have become detached they have either remained in force or have become, so to speak, merged in the sovereign rights of some at any rate of those Powers who formerly enjoyed them.

Until the end of 1922 Turco-Greek hostilities in Asia Minor, the revolt in Iraq, unrest in Armenia and Kurdistan combined with the famine in the Volga districts of Russia and the rising in Egypt, all of which forms such a dark page in the history of the Near and Middle East, caused a heavy cloud of commercial depression, but in the early part of 1923 the legislation of Ankara began to make itself felt. Customs duties were applied at a fivefold, and even a fifteenfold, rate, which goods shipped from Constantinople to other Ottoman ports were forced to pay twice over. Kestrictions were imposed on the discharge and shipment of cargoes, a particularly irritating exaction being the imposition of double duty on goods which owing to unforeseen circumstances had failed to be manifested, resulting in some cases in the goods being confiscated without appeal, whilst the abolition of the office of Director of Customs at Constantinople and the absorption of his staff by the Customs Administration in Ankara, with which there was little co-ordination, combined with the nationalization of port services and cabotage, brought trade to a standstill for a consider-

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able period. All boats, lighters, barges, and fishing boats were ordered to cease functioning, and as the Turks either did not possess salvage vessels, tugs, and dredgers, or if they did were very inexperienced in their use, shipping was exposed to such dangers that freights and insurance rose beyond all bounds, with a consequent increase in the cost of commodities. Foreign companies and business houses were subjected to innumerable regulations and restrictions. The use of the Turkish language, and the employment of a quota of Turkish nationals, were made compulsory, and such was the flow of departmental circulars, the arbitrary methods by which taxes were exacted, the lack of consideration shown to the taxpayer, and the want of training and experience of subordinate Treasury authorities, that any incentive on the part of the business community to develop or maintain activities was definitely checked. Operations on the Bourse were subject to interference; credit began to fail, and no merchant, commission agent, shopkeeper, or artisan knew from day to day where he stood. Most British fire insurance companies, together with some of the marine and life insurance companies and one or two banking institutions, decided to withdraw. A number of the more newly established British firms followed their example, and a further source of loss, particularly to British trade, was the closure of a number of Greek and Armenian firms of commission agents, the latter especially having formed a longexisting link with textile houses in Manchester and Bradford. The policy of the new Government was to develop the resources of the country to the utmost, but in its excess of nationalism, one might almost say of xenophobia, it failed to realize that it could not successfully replace those foreign elements which had conduced to success in the past by the inheritance of generations of experience. Nor did the Government show by any convincing acts that the West could render any financial assistance under reasonable conditions of security.

The picture is a black one, but can it be said that it, in itself, is the result of the abolition of the Capitulations? There was a large exodus of foreigners established in business locally, no doubt, to some extent, actuated by apprehensions resulting from the loss of their privileges and immunities, who, in spite of the new codes, were only too conscious how much depended upon the manner of their application by the Turkish courts. Life was made difficult and disagreeable, confidence was diminished, and innumerable difficulties arose, but it would be misleading to draw the inference from this that the Capitulations would have been any protection, nor is there any evidence, and,

this is the crucial test, of any complaints of maladministration of justice, and one is forced to conclude that the loss of foreign privilege and immunity did not in any direct manner contribute to the disorganization of commerce and dislocation of trade.

There may be those who will dissent from this conclusion, but they should bear in mind that the written law of the Capitulations and the established practice were widely divergent and that the working of the system had left the written basis far behind. Before the war the Turks were finding the Capitulations, under which they had been reduced to state of tutelage, increasingly irksome, and, even if they had not abolished them, it may be taken as certain that they would have confined them to the very letter. The pound of flesh, but no jot of blood, would have been cut from the breast of Turkish nationalism.

Nor except regarding certain fiscal impositions, which moreover were imposed equally on all inhabitants of Turkey, can a critical examination of the rights conferred by the Capitulations, in the light of what actually occurred, lead to any conclusion other than what in reality occurred in Turkey, and indeed throughout the East, was a manifestation of extreme nationalism against which no extraterritorial privileges and immunities would have been any protection at all. Rather the reverse, for they had become symbols of the personal law which was passing away in the East just as it had passed away in the West, and of which all Eastern countries were anxious to be rid as inimical to their awakening conceptions of territorial sovereignty.

But in the West the "national" system is not so permanent as we have been accustomed to think, and the territorial system is giving way to Government in larger groups. Long before the League of Nations was born or thought of, international conventions, as, for instance, regarding copyright, had paved the way to laws of international application by consent. Sanitary conventions, international labour conventions, had followed, and Disarmament, the Kellogg Pact, and the Bank of International Settlements and our recent experience of the importance of the distribution of gold in regard to world trade are further examples, which are leading us daily to become more international in our outlook and to seat more firmly in our hearts what was once only on our lips.

The League of Nations is a case in point and in addition, and apart altogether from its activities in the domain of peace, is a most useful instrument in the hands of diplomacy for providing forms and models which can be applied almost textually to international needs.

It will have been noticed how closely the Palestinian and Syrian Mandates resemble each other in many particulars. These forms were again found capable of easy use in the case of Iraq, and the application of the principles of Article 22 of the Covenant will tend to stereotype an international form of constitution in countries which are emerging from absolutism, tutelage, or revolution.

In this country, where our Constitution, like our laws, is to a large extent unwritten, we are hardly, perhaps, conscious of the difficulties with which other countries are sometimes confronted. We have been inclined to smile half-tolerantly at their attempts at constitution making and codification, but the pressing need that can be felt for them may be judged by the wide interest that is evinced nowadays in constitutional law and the fact that, counting only those countries which have come into existence within recent times owing to territorial changes, treaty creations, or radical political modifications, no less than sixteen have had to be fitted out with new Constitutions.* The truth, in fact, is it was just this lack of a satisfactory organic law within the Ottoman Empire which brought the Capitulations into being, and we have seen with what care the League of Nations has scrutinized the fundamental laws of those countries which it has decided to admit to the application of Article 22 of the Covenant. Where certain basic principles have been established, the League has considered that extraterritorial privileges or immunities are unnecessary, and these are the ends to which international effort should be directed.

But laws may be changed, and means must be found by which the loi suprême, the declaration des droits, of which Duguit speaks, should be made the particular care of international effort: "Au sommet la loi suprême, supérieure à toutes les autres, la declaration des droits. Audessous, les lois constitutionelles rigides qui leur sont subordonnées, mais qui sont supérieures aux lois ordinaires. Enfin ces dernières, qui ne peuvent édicter aucune disposition contraire aux lois constitutionelles ou à la declaration. Le systême constitue une puissante protection au profit de l'individu contre l'arbitraire législatif."†

How far this principle might be extended is an interesting speculation. In the early days of the Ottoman Empire, high officials were still technically the slaves of the Sultan, and any estate they left behind

^{*} Germany, Bavaria, Dantzig, Esthonia, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Lativia, Lithuania, Poland, Prussia, Roumania, Russia, Tcheco-Slovakia, Turkey, and Yugo-Slavia.

[†] Duguit, L., "Traité de Droit Constitutional," Vol. III., p. 641.

them was the Sultan's legal right. Anything which he might leave to their families was an act of grace. The principle came to be extended to wealthy persons of all classes, and was eventually applied to foreign merchants. Unlike we moderns who have become used to death duties upon modern scales, our ancestors were shocked and sought a refuge in a unilateral capitulation of 1675, which remained the basis of English privileges in Turkey until their recent abolition. Here we have the conception of personal law in its simplest form, which was submitted to willingly by the Sultan, but which in England would have been unthinkable even four hundred years ago. Yet modern treaties commonly contain provisions against discriminatory treatment, which are in effect limitations upon domestic sovereignty, supported by the whole authority of the League. In strict logic, what is to prevent minorities in countries in which there is no organic law to which to appeal from one day invoking international intervention for their protection against certain modern instances of political democracy? Mirkine Guetzevitch, in his recent book on the constitutions of modern Europe, propounds the theory that the very idea of a power capable of setting up a Constitution connotes constitutional superlaw. "L'idée même du pouvoir constituent, l'idée de la suprématie de la constitution aboutit à la superlegalité constitutionelle."*

This leads to the consideration of the doctrine of judicial control which has found favour in Northern America, where the courts, in each case, do not apply laws which are contrary to la superlegalité constitutionelle in the particular instance before them. The legislature may make laws, and they remain laws, but the courts simply do not apply them in particular instances in which they consider them unconstitutional.

A very heavy burden is thus thrown upon the judges, and it would seem that to Mirkine-Guetzevitch's conception of *superlegalité constitutionelle* must be added a judiciary of character, probity, experience, and, above all, of independence.

Whilst, therefore, the League has rightly insisted upon proper organic laws, it must, where there remains any risk of oppression by the executive, or of arbitrary discrimination by the legislature, be prepared to extend its intervention to the courts themselves. This does not apply to those countries in which they have granted a mandate, but it does apply to countries such as Turkey and Egypt, which have not yet been admitted to the League, and in a lesser degree in Iraq,

^{*} Mirkine-Guetzevitch, B., Les Constitutions de l'Europe Nouvelle.

where, if its admission is imminent, Great Britain is about to relinquish heavy responsibilities.

Here international effort has an undoubted duty cast upon it. Firstly to see that by a basic, paramount, and immutable declaration of rights, security of life, honour, property, and domicile, and freedom of religious or philosophical convictions and exercises are secured to every inhabitant without exception. Next, that there should be certain rigid constitutional laws governing the executive in the exercise of its functions, and, lastly, that a just and enlightened system of law should be provided, with a competent judiciary whose complete independence the League of Nations should be prepared to guarantee.

The CHAIRMAN asked Mr. Philby, just home from his great journey through the Arabian desert, to open the discussion.

Mr. Philby said he would like to go into the matter later, for he disagreed with the lecturer on several points. He felt the lecturer did not understand the hatred with which the Capitulations were regarded by Eastern countries, who felt their sovereign rights were infringed by them. He thought, too, that the lecturer had favoured the tax-gatherer unduly, and had considered the Capitulations in Turkey, and with regard to British nationals, to the exclusion of the many other countries concerned. The subject was many-sided and affected a large number of people—it needed an ample discussion.

Sir Telford Waugh: It is two years and a half since I left Turkey. Before the war it was for many years my job to deal with the application of the Capitulations to British subjects in Turkey. Since the Crimean War the Great Powers of Europe had succeeded in increasing largely their powers of control under the Capitulations. The gradual development of this control of Turkish jurisdiction by the foreign Embassies has been, described in a book, Sort de l'Empire Ottoman, written by a Dragoman of the Russian Embassy named Mandelstam. This control became more and more irksome to the Turks, and there were instances of abuse; fewer, I can honestly say, in English cases than in those of other foreign nationalities. The Turks came to detest the system, and negotiations for its modification were pending when the Great War came. The Turks took advantage of the war to proclaim the total abolition of the Capitulations.

When we went back to Turkey in 1918, my hope was that we might come to an arrangement fair to all parties, something on the lines of the Mixed Tribunals in Egypt, with representation at the Ministry of Finance to protect foreign subjects from unfair taxation. The Turks

would have accepted anything of this kind at that time. Instead of this, you know what happened; we put the Greeks into Smyrna and created the Turkish Nationalist movement. Perhaps the result will turn out to be for the best, with a strong homogeneous Turkish State. One point in which I think the lecturer was too hopeful was with regard to the safeguarding of minorities by the League of Nations. I am afraid this may prove illusory. Take an instance in Turkey itself: the Treaty of Lausanne provided that there should be no difference of treatment on the score of religion between any Turkish subjects; but the Turks put pressure on all business houses and banks to employ Moslems instead of Christians or Jews. A proposal was made to refer this breach of faith to the League, but the Powers came to the conclusion that any interference would only make things harder for the minorities and that it was best to leave it alone.

Mr. S. VESEY FITZGERARD thanked the Council for having given him the opportunity of hearing Mr. Garle and the preceding speakers, and asked indulgence as an academic student in the presence of so many distinguished experts. He believed that the contrast drawn by the lecturer between the popularity of the Mixed Courts in Egypt and the general condemnation of the Capitulations shed a light on the problem of the supersession of the Capitulatory régime in the mandated ex-Ottoman territories, a problem which was immediate in Iraq owing to the termination of that régime, and dormant-not dead-in Palestine and Trans-Jordan during the continuance of British control. The lecturer had stressed the paramount importance of an independent and able judiciary; the Mixed Courts had such a judiciary, but the general respect which they enjoyed was also based on the laws which they administered. In this respect the Egyptian Code of Obligations, based upon the Code Napoléon, might be contrasted with the Ottoman law covering, more or less, the same ground-viz., the Mejelle. The Mejelle, in spite of a widespread belief in its French origin (to which Sir Francis Humphrys in his evidence before the Permanent Mandates Commission on November 3, 1931, had lent accidental countenance), was pure Muhammadan law, and in parts a muddled and unintelligent statement of Muhammadan law. In particular, the disfavour with which it regarded forward contracts was a check on legitimate enterprise, and its narrow conception of responsibility and inadequate doctrine of damages favoured the bully and the powerful wrongdoer who could afford to act through others. There were serious objections also to its law of evidence. Nor was the system much improved by the method of indirect and unacknowledged supersession of the Mejelle practised by Ottoman rulers and unfortunately carried on (except recently in Cyprus) by ourselves, since the effect was to leave the actual law in uncertainty. The speaker urged that, in order to establish such a system of law as the League of Nations contemplated as a sine qua non for complete abolition of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Mejelle ought to be definitely repealed and an up-to-date Code enacted. Materials might be found in French or English law or perhaps in an eclectic study of various schools of Muhammadan law. He gave instances from several Moslem countries to show that a courageous handling of the question need not antagonize Moslem sentiment; more particularly since Turkish, the language of the Mejelle, was neither the language of Muhammadan law nor of the territories concerned.

Mr. FitzGerard also urged that the question raised in the League of Nations, whether the foreign element in the judiciary of Iraq should be purely British or of mixed nationality, affected the future development of the substantive law. All legal systems grew by absorbing ideas from other systems, and it would depend upon the constitution of the judiciary whether this stimulus was to be derived from Continental or English law.

Sir Nigel Davidson: On the general question of the Capitulations I find myself largely in agreement with Mr. Philby. I do not attach the same importance as the last speaker does to the fact that the law in Iraq and Palestine is based on the Mejelle, because the latter is to such a large extent overlaid by modern codes and enactments. For example, the criminal law, the commercial law, and the law of contract are all modern and based on up-to-date principles. But, in any case, I do not think the actual form of law in force will affect the position of the minorities one way or the other; they must depend on other safeguards than the letter of the law. In Egypt the hatred of the Capitulations is direced not so much at extraterritorial jurisdicion as to the fiscal limitations which they involve. Direct taxation cannot be imposed on foreigners except by consent; and consequently an income tax could not be enforced because it would place Egyptian traders and business men at a hopeless disadvantage with their foreign competitors. This is a serious handicap to Government finance and a genuine grievance. However suitable the Capitulations may have been under an absolute monarchy, they are not compatible with a state governed on modern or democratic principles.

The CHAIRMAN: It only remains now to discuss two other countries Persia and China.

Sir Percy Cox: I cannot claim to have made any close study of the questions which the lecturer has been dealing with, but I may say that I find myself in general agreement with the résumé of the existing position with which he brought his paper to a close.

I should like to say a word, however, in comment of the observations which we have just heard from Mr. Philby, who urges that "Capitulations" are quite out of date and states, from fresh personal experience, that they are regarded with intense dislike and resentment in the country where he has spent the last few years.

That may be—no doubt is—the light in which extraterritorial privileges are regarded today, but while recognizing that fact we should not forget the conditions which necessitated their existence in the not very distant past. As we all know, one of the marked sequels of the Great War was an intense development of the nationalistic spirit in all young countries, and we cannot be surprised if, in particular, the newly formed states of the Middle East have come to resent the continued operation of Capitulations and are determined to be rid of them. But, as I say, we must remember that if these safeguards have now served their purpose, time was when they were an absolute necessity for the protection and well-being of subjects of Western States residing and trading in Oriental countries. For example, well within the period of my own government service in the Persian Gulf sphere, and, I am sure, within the personal experience of the Chairman also, the mutilation of offenders and other such primitive forms of punishment were still in vogue, and but for the protection of the Capitulations the subjects of Western Powers would have been frequently in danger of grave oppression.

I agree that henceforward we must depend, for the safeguards hitherto provided by these Capitulations, on the civilizing influence of the League of Nations and the sense of international responsibility and self-respect engendered among its members; this, we hope, will encourage them to keep their administrations abreast of the times. In my experience, the sort of direction in which existing minority communities think that they may be likely to suffer, when there are no rights of extraterritoriality, is in the treatment of ordinary small cases in the provincial courts. They are inclined to fear that they will not even obtain justice. We can only hope that if such a fear is warranted it is

a phase which will gradually pass.

Mr. E. M. Gull: I have been extremely interested in Mr. Garle's paper and the discussion which has resulted from it, not least because of their bearing upon extraterritoriality in China. Extraterritoriality in China is one of the big outstanding questions in the Far East at the present time. To Nationalist China extraterritoriality is more than a little irritating. It is one of the things she wants to get rid of altogether. The difficulty is how to do this. I do not think that anybody who is familiar with the conditions out there would say that the time has come when extraterritoriality can be abolished. On the other hand, a good many people consider that the system could be modified. It has been suggested that one of the ways in which modification might take place would be through the institution of special courts, which would be Chinese courts applying Chinese law, but with the help of experienced foreign judges employed by China upon the recommendation of the League of Nations. Amongst objections to this course is the fact that there are still gaps in China's legal code. These gaps, however, are being filled up, and, in any case, that objection does not appear to be insuperable. Whether China would be willing to agree to this method of modification it is difficult to say, but there is good reason for thinking that she would. If alternative methods can be suggested so much the better. But this suggestion appears to be the most practicable. Some argue that the time has not come even for modifications of extraterritorial rights. If that argument could be tested solely by the advance which China has made in regard to judicial administration since the beginning of the century, it would be stronger than it actually is. It has, however, to be tested by other considerations, one of which is the strength of Chinese sentiment in the matter and the reaction of that sentiment upon Anglo-Chinese relations generally, not least commercial relations. It should be remembered that this question of extraterritoriality has been hanging fire ever since 1902.

Somehow or other it has got to be dealt with, or otherwise it will land us in trouble.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was much tempted to join in the discussion, but the hour was late and he would refrain. He would ask Mr. Garle to reply to the various points which had been raised in the discussion.

Mr. Garle: Mr. Philby has been absent from this country for some little while, and he certainly cannot have been here last January or he would not have wandered so far from probabilities as to have charged me with a partiality for tax collectors. I regret the charge, but recognize

that it would not have been made but for Mr. Philby having been lapped in the security of the Arabian Desert where he had nothing more dangerous to fear than a few marauding Arabs.

The criticisms I have heard in this interesting discussion are, shortly, that the Capitulations have been abused, that they are a restriction on fiscal autonomy, and that laws are not a sufficient protection per se for minorities.

As regards the first, I am sure we were all glad to hear from Sir Telford Waugh that there were fewer instances of abuse in English cases than in those of foreign nationalities. When we reflect upon the heterogeneous community which claims British protection in Turkey, this is high praise and speaks well for the influence of our national character on those who share our citizenship.

Sir Nigel Davidson referred to the impossibility of imposing an income tax in countries in which the Capitulations still prevail. I must say that complaints against institutions which preserve one's income from taxation leave me a little cold, and even from the point of view of the Government concerned one has to be sure that other sources have first been tapped. In Egypt, for example, there are no death duties imposed upon natives, although most foreigners pay them to the Treasuries of their own nations.

Sir Nigel Davidson and Mr. Vesey-FitzGerard both spoke of the Mejelle. Now, I have rather an affection for the Mejelle, as, when a judge, I was enabled to build up a very useful and fairly extensive equitable jurisdiction upon one of its articles dealing with the ownership of a hen that had swallowed somebody else's pearl. I applied this with great effect to some moneylenders who had refused to recognize any equity of redemption in some of their unfortunate mortgagors. The truth is that Koranic law enters far more into the daily life of the people than we are accustomed to in the case of Canon law generally. The laws of Islam are not purely religious. They do not gauge the effect of the actions of mankind by their effect only in the next world but also in this, and so many matters which we should consider purely temporal come within their purview. It is not always easy for a Moslem to assimilate modern codes of laws, often unsuited to his traditions and upbringing, and imposed upon him without much ceremony, from outside or above, as religious truths for which there is warrant in the Koran. It is true that for a Moslem, whether devout or not, all truths are religious truths, and the failure to realize this has led many students Lammadan law astray, but it does account for the lingering affection of both suitors and advocates for their imperfect Mejelle, in spite of there being other and, in our eyes, more perfect systems of law available to them.

My lecture deals with the Capitulations and not with extraterritoriality generally, although, as in China, similar problems are presented outside the Ottoman dominions. Steps are being taken to study the subject more closely, and I hope Mr. Gull will be able to give his very valuable assistance.

As regards minorities, the point I wanted to make was not that laws per se could protect them, but that whatever paper protection laws purported to give, that protection would be of no real value unless there were some safeguard that the laws themselves would be both immutable and properly administered. I tried to make this clear in the last part of my address and suggested that the League of Nations was the only safeguard on which minorities could rely in these days of international thought and international effort.

THE BURMA MILITARY POLICE ON THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER

By LT.-COLONEL A. LETHBRIDGE

[Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 25, 1932, Sir Harcourt Butler in the chair.]

HAVE chosen for the subject of my lecture the Burma Military Police of the North-East Frontier because there is no aspect of life Lon the frontier, or, for the matter of that, throughout Burma, in which the B.M.P. does not play its part. This is no idle boast. Since its birth in 1886, when Military Police began to replace Regulars for the pacification of Upper Burma, up to last year, when the force may be said to have come back to its own, Burma has been dependent upon the B.M.P. for the peace and security of its borders, for the safety of its officers scattered in lonely and isolated posts throughout the length and breadth of the land, and for the spread of civilization amongst the numerous tribes on its frontiers. They have paved the way for civil administration, for the traders, and for the traveller, and you can go anywhere from one end of the frontier to the other with a couple of orderlies and be safer than in Piccadilly. You will be welcome in every village and you can take your wife and children with you. The credit for this must be given to the Military Police.

If the British soldier is the greatest ambassador in Europe, then the military policeman is his equal on the N.E.F. Every frontier official has laid stress on the good relations existing between the Military Police and the people of the country, and when you think of the conditions under which they live, in posts with no amenities, and that offences against the inhabitants could be counted on the fingers of one hand, then I think you will agree that it is a record to be proud of. Unfortunately the force has always been an unpopular one in Burma proper owing to its being recruited chiefly in India, and its work is unknown, except to a handful of people, because up to the time of the rebellion its work was confined, in Burma proper, to the garrison battalions at Mandalay and Rangoon, whose work it is to assist the Civil Police in dealing with crime and escorts to treasure and prisoners and guard duties.

The W.A.F.F.S., the K.A.R., the Sudan Defence Force, the Piffers, etc., are famous, and justly so, but of the 12,000 men of the B.M.P. with its handful of British officers, even in Burma itself, little is known,

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although for its size and its efficiency it is without doubt the cheapest force in the world. Perhaps the name Military Police has had something to do with it and the fact that the greater part of the force is on the frontier. It would have needed courage perhaps to call ourselves the B.F.F.

Organization

There are six frontier battalions. Starting from the south-east: Southern Shan States, Northern Shan States, Bhamo, Myitkyina Eastern, Myitkyina Western, Chin Hills. A reserve battalion for the frontier at Pyawbee. The headquarters of each battalion is at the District Headquarters and is permanent. Each battalion has a number of outposts varying in strength and commanded by British or Indian officers. The B.O's are seconded from the Indian Army for four years as Assistant Commandants, and selected ones return for a second tour as Commandants.

The whole force is commanded by the Deputy Inspector-General of Military Police and he has one personal assistant as Staff Officer. The D.I.G. is under the Inspector-General of Police, who is the head of the Civil and Military Police.

The establishment of British officers up to the middle of 1931 was 9 Battalion Commandants and 26 Asssistant Commandants. No reserves for leave, sickness, columns, etc., so the force was always short of officers, and it is a remarkable achievement and the finest example of Indianization that 36 British officers have been able to train and administer a force equal to a division in strength, educate it, and maintain a very high standard of efficiency in all branches of training—musketry, signalling, mounted infantry, and pioneer work.

Education

The standard of education is the same as that for the Indian Army, and the difficulties are enormous in a force of this character, but when it has to be paid for by the battalion themselves it is remarkable if not equitable.

Duties

The duties of the force on the frontier are:

(a) Policing the frontier.(b) Repelling local raids.

(c) Providing escorts to civil officers.

(d) Furnishing columns for such work as the slave releasing in the Triangle and Hukawng valley and punitive columns.

(e) Intelligence.

I propose to deal with that section of the frontier which extends from Bhamo to the Chin Hills. No outstanding events have occurred on the frontier south of Bhamo in recent years with the exception of the rebellion, which is outside the scope of my lecture, but I may mention that it was the prompt and efficient work of the S.S.S. and N.S.S. battalions that smashed the rebellion in the Shan States.

I will take the Chinese frontier first.

The outstanding event of the past five years has been the penetration of the Triangle.

Mr. Barnard has already told you of this. The expedition caused some excitement in the Tengyueh, and the students formed a frontier association which put forward claims to the Triangle, and the Chinese authorities placed an embargo on the employment of Chinese mules in the Triangle and anywhere north of the settled boundary.

North of Sadon (Fort Harrison) the frontier has not been demarcated. We have taken the watershed as our frontier, and this line is respected by the tribes on both sides, but actually the Chinese have never agreed to this line and still look upon our occupation of Hpimaw as an act of brigandage. Some time in the near future we must come to a settlement, but the question is one for the Foreign Office.

For years the question of providing transport for rationing outposts, carrying mails, P.W.D. work, columns, etc., has been the bugbear of the N.E.F.

To be dependent on the Chinese for the mules to ration our posts was Gilbertian to say the least of it. The frontier battalions all had Government mules, but not sufficient, and several thousand mules from Tengureh came across every open season to do the work. The Shan States bred mules, but they were only used locally. When in 1929 we were forbidden to use Chinese mules for the Triangle expedition or for rationing our own posts north of Sadon, the position was acute. There has never been a better illustration of killing the goose which laid the golden eggs than the Chinese embargo. They also fined the mule contractors Rs.18,000 and taxed every mule crossing the border.

We asked the N.S.S. to supply the mules, and right well they responded. They got a five-year contract and it has cost the Chinese dear. The mule hire for the Triangle and Hukawng was several lakhs annually. I have no doubt that we will get eventually all our mules from the Shan States. Mule breeding has received a great impetus, and the muleteers of Yunnan are desirous of settling on our side of the frontier. The benefit to the Shan States and to our defence is

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incalculable, and one of our many frontier problems is now solved. I am sorry for the mule contractors who have been our standby for years and have never let us down.

We will in future be able to use Shan States mules as post mules, a great economy, as the cost of carrying paddy for Government mules to Htawgaw was Rs.20,000 a year.

Earthquakes

In the past four years very serious conditions have arisen in the Htawgaw area owing to earthquakes, and the whole district has been in perpetual motion. Dr. Chibber, of the Geological Survey, has written a most interesting report after two extensive visits to the area. The centre appears to be in the neighbourhood of the Lagwi Pass, south-east of the Htawgaw, where rumblings and boomings are perpetual. He has discovered extinct volcanoes in various parts of the district, and a "fault" in the limestone formation of these hills.

Commencing in 1927, shocks and tremors occurred with increasing violence, at one period there were shocks every fifteen minutes, and over a hundred have been recorded in a week. All sentries record and report on the time, direction, etc., of each shock. The result of these seismic disturbances has been to wipe out Htawgaw, the basis of our defence in this section of the frontier. Not a stone of the Htawgaw remains standing. It is a miracle how we escaped without loss of life. No sooner was one part wrecked than another part went. The heavy rainfall always causes landslides; the earthquake did the rest. Hpimaw has also suffered, but there were no pukha buildings there. I have personally been all over this area searching for a site to replace Htawgaw. The ridges are all knife-edge, and north of the Chipwi there is no ground capable of holding more than half a company, and that only with terracing.

The garrison, civil and military, of Htawgaw went through a most uncomfortable time, as can be imagined. Mr. Harris, of the Burma Frontier Service, with his wife and small child, arrived in Htawgaw to take over his duties, and the same night, after a violent shock, had to evacuate his house at two o'clock in the morning. He moved into a Kachin interpreter's house and continued to live in it for two years with his family with singular devotion to duty until evacuation was decided upon. It was, if I may say so, an example of that fine spirit which inspires the best type of Frontier officers. As for Mrs. Harris, I really don't know how she stood it. It must have needed great courage.

Now, if you clear away the jungle the rain washes away your hill-top, and if you terrace you get landslides. The only open country is in the neighbourhood of Punwa.

As this country is practically impassable in the rains except by the Government roads, we send up a column in the open season and withdraw it in the rains as a temporary measure, until we can build a new post. I cannot, of course, go into any details as to our future policy in regard to defence for this area. Suffice it to say that if and when funds are available we shall be able to profit by experience, our frontier outposts are bases from which columns can operate, and elaborate defences are unnecessary.

This brings us to the question of small posts rather than large ones. I have found the majority of civil officers prefer the former and all military officers the latter. For economy both in men and material and expenditure, training, health, and administration, the large post is undoubtedly the best. It can provide movable columns and put out temporary posts when necessary.

We have frequently in the last few years put out temporary posts on the Bhamo—Sadon section of the frontier to protect the mule convoys coming across from China, and they have been most useful in helping the Excise authorities in their endeavour to deal with the opium smuggling which is carried on all along the border. Rewards are good, and it tends to lessen the monotony of the life and keeps the men keen. Frequent patrols go out to all the passes and the main routes across the border. It is, of course, impossible to prevent the smuggling of opium in this tangled mass of hills and jungle, but the risk is becoming increasingly great.

Triangle

The next problem is the occupation or otherwise of the Triangle and Hukawng Valley. The Kachin Hills Regulations now apply to both areas, and occupation must be only a matter of time. To what extent it will be necessary depends upon the tribes themselves. We found the northern Triangle much more friendly than the south, where Chinese intrigue has made some headway. This year we have cut the numbers down to half in the Triangle and established a standing camp at the site selected for a post if and when we occupy the Triangle. The columns this year met with a very friendly reception everywhere.

In the Hukawng Valley only a small escort accompanied the civil officer to Maingkwan, the chiefs being called in to meet him.

These reductions were due to financial stringency, and drastic cuts were made involving the abandonment of the Naga Hills Expedition in the Upper Chindwin.

The Naga Hills

The problem of the Naga Hills is one of the most important frontier problems a separated Burma will have to face. Since 1925 we have sent an annual expedition to the Naga Hills to put a stop to human sacrifice and to prevent the bigger chiefs harassing the smaller ones and to show them that we can punish them if necessary.

What is to be the future of the Naga Hills and what is to be the boundary between Assam and Burma? The proposed boundary, the Patkoi Range, is not satisfactory to Assam. Burma at present does not administer any Nagas. Will she want to? If so, how is it to be done? It is impossible to do it from the Chin Hills or from the head-quarters of the Upper Chindwin at Mawlaik. It will mean a new district and new posts. In the present state of the finances of Burma it does not seem likely that she will be able to do more than keep a close watch upon events in this quarter. I am doubtful if the Naga will ever make a satisfactory soldier, though I may be wrong. The whole problem is a very interesting one and very little is ever heard about it.

Recruitment of Indigenous Races

The Military Police of the frontier battalions are chiefly recruited from the Punjab and from Nepal, plus several companies of Kachins and Chins locally enlisted by battalions. The recruitment of the Kachins is limited by the needs of the Burma Rifles. The Kachin is addicted to opium from an early age, disease is rife, and the proportion of recruits rejected is very large.

There is no doubt that the northern Triangle will produce excellent recruits, especially from the Nungs. The drawback is the distance from their homes. It is interesting to note that leave and furlough men cut across the Triangle instead of sticking to the Government road, and this should have an excellent effect, especially with the ladies, as a Kachin is a braw laddie going on leave in uniform. The Kachin is an excellent soldier, but they do not produce such excellent Military Police officers as the Chin. In the opinion of all the British officers I have met who have served with Kachins and Chins in the Military Police, the Chin is the best of the indigenous races, and very

440 THE BURMA MILITARY POLICE ON THE N.E. FRONTIER little, if any, inferior to the Gurkha. In actual jungle warfare there is

little difference between the Karen, Chin, Kachin, and Gurkha.

The Chin enlists freely; they make excellent N.C.O's and officers. They are not afraid of responsibility, and what is to my mind their greatest asset is that the Gurkha serves willingly under a Chin. They are brave, but not reckless, and dependable in a tight corner. There is no opium in their country. Their native liquor is exhilarating, but innocuous, and although they drink heavily in their villages it does not seem to impair their remarkable powers of endurance. In the Chin Hills the problem of the soldier is much to the fore. He gets educated, clean, well fed, and civilized, and the return to the dirt of his own home is not to his liking. They want their own villages and freedom from their tribal chiefs, but open their mouths too wide and demand to be free of all taxation.


I believe that in time the Chin Hills will be entirely policed by Chin levies and locally enlisted Gurkhas. The Subadar Major of the Chin Hills Battalion is a Chin.

We have been lucky to have had an administrator of the calibre of Colonel Burne in the Chin Hills. His name is one to conjure with from Manipur to Kanpetlet and is worth a hundred rifles to the Government.

I spent many years in the Chin Hills both as an A.C. and B.C., and to those of you who are fishermen, I know of no river so full of mahseer as the Boinu. The monsters of the Mali and N'mai are not to be had, but there are any number of fish up to 30 lbs. Unfortunately it is a hard trek of 90 miles across country from Haka. I paid my second visit in 1925 with my wife. She went at Colonel Burne's instigation, few white men and no white women had ever been there, and it was wonderful to see the astonishment of the villagers, and at times it was most embarrassing. I doubt that they will ever forget it and I know she never will, as it was far too severe a trek for any but the most hardened traveller to undertake.

One of my ambitions which will never be realized was to follow the Boinu down to Akyab where it reaches the sea as the Koladyne. It has not to my knowledge ever been done, and there is a chance for some enterprising officer to add to our knowledge and to get the fishing one dreams about. I have never seen such wonderful butterflies as on this trip, and also a great variety of orchids.

My first visit to the Boinu was with Mr. J. W. Wright, I.C.S., to get in touch with a shining light of a Mission School who to celebrate his



succession as chief of a village in unadministered territory (it is now all administered) raided one of our villages and took the heads of two boys and five girls as a reprisal for a raid ten years earlier. On this trip Wright was hearing cases in a village and the chief brought up a boy and a girl who wanted to be divorced for incompatibility of temper. On interrogation the chief said they had only lately been married and

SKETCH MAP OF THE PANWA AREA.

had quarrelled. Wright thereupon asked the chief if he had an empty house in the village, and the chief took us to an empty bamboo hut. We were at 8,000 feet and the wind whistled through it. Wright told the chief to put the couple in the hut for the night, to give them one blanket, and put a guard outside, and bring them up in the morning. Next morning they duly appeared and said they did not want a divorce. Perhaps if we could use similar methods in this country we should have fewer divorces.

On my second trip with my wife we halted at a village which had not seen a white man for seventeen years. The chief told me he suffered from pains after his food. I diagnosed indigestion and gave him six bisurated magnesia tablets to take with hot water after his next meal. Now, many of you know how appreciation of a good meal is expressed in the East. The old gentleman appeared after his evening meal and told me in picturesque language that the result of my medicine was like a thunderstorm in the hills.

One other incident on this trip was interesting though somewhat startling. We reached a village where we were to stay the night and found a dance in progress to celebrate the shooting of a leopard. The whole village was drunk with the exception of one man told off to keep sober to meet us. His ideas of sobriety were somewhat different from ours. What I may term the village palais de danse was directly in front of our rest hut. Here men, women, and children, in all stages of intoxication, were dancing and enjoying themselves. Old crones sat round the zu pots (zu is beer made from millet or rice), stirring the liquor and spitting into it at intervals. As we sat watching, a small black piedog came and sat down in front of my wife. Suddenly a drunken Chin dashed forward waving a dah, seized the dog by the hind legs, slashed off its head, threw the body at my wife's feet, and rushed off with the dripping head and stuck it on a pole. I gathered it was a sacrifice in honour of my wife, but it acted upon her as a most effective and instantaneous emeric.

The Chin is the only man of the inhabitants of Burma who saves his money. The chiefs invest their money in war loan. He is taking to business and applies for contracts; he can play the bagpipes, not one of his merits, and in fact has many of the characteristics of the Scotsman, and the women wear the kilt, often nothing else.

Burmanization is in the foreground of politics and I do not propose to discuss it, but it will be a great day for Burma when they look on their Kachins and Chins as we look on our Highland RegiTHE BURMA MILITARY POLICE ON THE N.E. FRONTIER 443 ments, with pride and affection, for the time will surely come when they will be the backbone of the defence of their frontiers.

Communications

In the Southern and Northern Shan States the motor-car and lorry are ousting animal transport, and there are excellent motor roads, which are being extended.

Elsewhere the lack of good roads is a severe handicap to the administration.

There is as yet no road from Bhamo and Myitkyina on the east of the Irrawaddy or from Mogaung on the west. A cart road motorable in the open season has been made at great expense from Myitkyina to Sumprabum, but on the east it is only possible to motor 32 miles to Seniku. This road, I hope, will be extended to Chipwi; it would bring our furthest posts within a few days of headquarters and would make the rationing and relief of posts a simple matter.

The frontier from Bhamo to Kambaiti Pass east of Sadon is crossed by innumerable tracks, and there is a frontier road from the Bhamo border to Sadon. North of this there is only one pass until you get to the Panwa. This tract of country is sparsely inhabited, and is most difficult. I do not think that anyone has ever attempted to explore it. The hills rise to 12,000 feet and there are no tracks fit for animals. From the Panwa to the Chimli, the most northern of the passes, within the administrative border there are from south to north the Lagwi, Hpare, Fengsuelieng, and Hpimaw Passes, all bad and difficult to negotiate and practically impassable in the rains, while the Hpimaw Pass is 11,000 feet and under snow for several months in the year. I have twice attempted to get to it at the end of March and failed. It is used a good deal from the end of April until the rains. The Chimli Pass is 14,000 feet and under snow for months. The Panwa is open all the year round, but the approaches to it are very difficult.

This is delightful open country; in the spring it is grand with rhododendrons, primulas, and numerous trees in blossom. The country is covered with bracken. Barking deer, sambhur, small game, including many varieties of pheasant, abound. Snipe in the bogs and cock in the ravines. The streams hold mahseer when the snow water has gone.

It would not be difficult to find an aerodrome site here. Flocks of sheep come over from Yunnan to graze, and it looks ideal for mule breeding.

It has always been an enigma to me why so few people in Burma ever spend their leave off the beaten track. In India, Kashmir and the Hills are swarming with officers on leave. The Shan States now attract motoring parties; but with the fishing, the scenery, the ease with which one can travel and the chance of getting into real hills and away from clubs, it is extraordinary how many people are content to spend all their time in Burma either in Rangoon or Maymyo.

From 1906 to 1930, except for short periods after the war, I was never in a station with fans or electric light or where ice was anything but an expensive luxury, so perhaps I am prejudiced, but it would be a very good thing if officers and selected N.C.O's of regiments in Burma were sent on a tour of the frontiers as part of their training.

Signalling

No description of the frontier would be complete without mention of the signallers of the B.M.P. From the Siam border to Kanpetlet there is a chain of signalling posts; some permanent, others sent out in the open season. They link their headquarters with the outposts, and it is possible to send a message from the S.S.S. to Fort Hertz.

Perched on top of some hills miles from civilization six or seven, or even fewer signallers, carry out day in and day out for months at a time their monotonous work. There are no long distance signallers in the Empire, and probably in the world, to compare with the signallers of the B.M.P. The army freely acknowledges that it cannot compete with them, as, of course, it does not get the same opportunities. Only an Oriental could stand the monotony without going mad. During the rebellion they established posts in the Pegu Yomahs and connected Pegu with Tharrawaddy. They have to cut their own roads through dense jungle, clear the site, and build their own posts.

In 1931 we trained 52 signallers in wireless at Pyawbwe.

One British officer and two British N.C.O's have in one year, out of ordinary visual signallers, taught and trained the only wireless group with Indian personnel. Halfway through their training they were taken away for the Pegu Yomahs. In Janua: y the N.S.S. and Bhamo wireless stations were established. We have short wave sets made in the workshops at Pyawbwe and have made our own pack equipment. In a short time, and funds being forthcoming, every frontier battalion will have wireless.

Just before I left Burma we were able to communicate with Aldershot and Hongkong and to take traffic between Aldershot and Hong-

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kong and Jubblepore. The pioneers of the force built the wireless school in a couple of months.

All signal posts, all posts on lines of communications, the whole of the reserve battalion lines at Pyawbwe, the stud farm were built by the Pioneers. Each battalion has 30 and they are invaluable. Many frontier posts are entirely built by the battalion pioneers.

Every battalion has mounted infantry.

Transport varies from elephants to motor-lorries, bullocks, coolies, boats, and, of course, mules.

The stud farm at Pyawbwe, thanks to the interest and support of Sir Harcourt Butler and of Sir Charles Innes, under Colonel Childers, is one of the most efficient shows in Burma and has already had a marked effect on the breeding of ponies throughout the province and for the mounted infantry. I have, I think, said enough, if not too much, about the work of the Military Police on the frontier, and I think that we could have taught the Israelites how to make bricks without straw, for the cost of the Force is about equal to that of four British regiments.

If I have blown the Military Police bugle rather loud and rather long, it is because with the advent of separation the Burma Military Police Force, as we know it, will cease to exist, and the Force will be incorporated in the future Burma Defence Force. Whatever form that Force may take, it will, I venture to think, have a firm foundation on which to build, and the rock on which that foundation will rest is that quality which permeates the whole Force and which might well be the motto for the Force—Self-reliance.

Captain Kingdon Ward said he knew little of the Burma Military Police, but he did know the North-East Frontier, and had been very interested in what the lecturer had said about the problems of defence which Burma would have to face if she voted, as she probably would vote, for separation from India. Burma's land frontier was 2,500 miles long, about the same as her sea frontier, but in all her history there was no record of a land invasion; it was from the sea she had been conquered. There had been abundant fighting in Burma, but it was between the three races who came into the country—the Burmans, the Shans, and the Talaings—for possession of the fertile Irrawaddy valley. Captain Kingdon Ward continued that he had always wondered why the policy of separation had not included Assam, for the natural frontier was to the west of Assam and not between Burma and Assam.

In the old days the North-East Frontier was impenetrable jungle,

but now motor roads are being cut through it and aeroplanes fly over the country and more and more intercourse will take place between Burma and Tibet as well as between Burma and China. It must also be recognized that, although since the British occupation of Burma, Burma has faced westwards, it is to the East, to China, that she turned before, and will turn again. Also, as sea trade with China declines, the overland routes will be more used and new routes opened. "I should, however, like to give you some idea of the great isolation of the Frontier. Last year, when I was collecting plants in the upper valleys of the Irrawaddy, I received a copy of the London Weekly Times, and from there I heard for the first time that there was a serious rebellion in Burma. So cut off are these frontier posts that not even a rumour had reached us or our porters.

"I should like to point out to Colonel Lethbridge that although he has great hopes of the 'Nungs, the Chins, and the Kachins' enlisting in the Frontier Defence Force of Burma, unless some protection is given in the unadministered areas on the Tibetan border there will presently be no Nungs to enlist; they will all have been killed off by the Tibetans who come over the border, murder these unfortunate people, carry off their wives and their cattle, and get away without any difficulty. The nearest Military Police post is five weeks' march away, and Government havers yearly as to whether they mean to afford proper protection for the unadministered areas or not; or even as to what territory they claim as being within our frontier.

"The border is undoubtedly full of good material. The Tibetans themselves would make excellent military police, but even they find it uncomfortable living in unadministered territory, as their own officials harass them. The result is that having driven out the tribesmen and taken their lands, they are at length forced to return to their own country, leaving the valleys they have abandoned desolate. The unfortunate inhabitants of the unadministered areas should know where they stand. If the country is to be under British rule, let us administer it properly and defend the inhabitants, otherwise let us leave it alone and say so clearly." (Applause.)

The Chairman, in conclusion, spoke of the work done by the lecturer, of the loneliness and hardships it entailed, and of its great usefulness. The North-East Frontier questions were not in the limelight, but were of great importance. The good wishes of the Society would go with the lecturer. (Applause.)

DISARMAMENT, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ASIA

By MAJOR-GENERAL W. L. O. TWISS, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.

[Paper given at a Members' Meeting on March 23, the Rt. Hon. LORD LLOYD in the Chair.]

Y LORD, LADIES, AND GENTLEMEN, When I was first asked, rather over two months ago, to give an address on "Disarmament in Asia," my first inclination was to refuse, for the very idea of Asia disarming seemed unworthy of serious consideration. However, I appreciated very fully the honour of addressing a meeting of your Society, and I considered that, after all, a close examination of the question might result in some modification of my preconceived idea of the utter absurdity of expecting Asia to disarm in the visible future. I will give you, briefly, the result of my investigations, together with my own views on the subject, and I hope you will not consider these views unduly influenced by the fact that I am a soldier. The title of this discussion has been changed slightly, as the original title was to be "Disarmament in Asia." This has, however, caused little alteration, as the problem in Asia is naturally inseparable from that of the rest of the world. All the great nations of the world have interests in Asia—e.g., Great Britain, France, and the U.S.A.—whilst Soviet Russia is a semi-Asiatic State.

In the last thirteen years a great deal has been said and written on disarmament, but I can find no record of the matter having been treated with special reference to Asia. From my point of view I am very sorry this is the case, as I should have been glad to borrow ideas from other people. However, I can sympathize with the silence of otherwise prolific writers on so difficult a subject, and also on the natural desire to await the result of disarmament in Europe before approaching the matter from the Asiatic point of view.

Disarmament

In order to explain my own views, and to assist you in forming your own conclusions, I should like to give you some idea of the present

strength of the armed forces of the various Powers, together with a brief review of their increase or decrease in recent years, and also to discuss the relations between these Powers, and some of the main political problems at issue. I would also remind you of the difficulty of defining the word "Disarmament." This is shown in Lord Cecil's Despatch of December 10, 1930, enclosing the Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference now being held at Geneva, and in the Draft Disarmament Convention itself. You should consider what may in these days be included in armaments: in addition to numbers of troops, ships, aeroplanes, guns, and tanks, they include terms of service-e.g., conscript armies with every citizen trained to war, and consequently huge reserves as opposed to voluntary service armies with small reserves-methods of communicationi.e., roads and railways, cables, telegraphs, and wireless; geographical position; means of transport, such as railway rolling stock and motor lorries; the progress of civil aviation and mercantile marine; the possession and development of material resources—e.g., foodstuffs, mineral products, factories, etc. All these factors influence the strength of the various Powers, and must be taken into account in considering the question of disarmament.

Japan

The two strongest Powers in Asia are Japan and Soviet Russia, and neither Power shows the least intention of reducing her armed strength, except as limited by the demands of national economy. It is true that the strength of the Japanese standing army has been slightly reduced, and is now only 17 divisions and some 230,000 men, but universal service prevails, and the entire manhood of the nation is liable to military service. The Japanese Navy is highly efficient and, in point of numbers, only behind our own and that of the U.S.A.; in strength of personnel they are indeed little short of us. Her air force ranks fourth in the world as regards numerical strength, and, although the Japanese are not naturally first-class mechanics, their air arm is well organized and of high value.

In the case of Japan, the limiting factor is that of finance, and this has prevented such increase in armaments as might otherwise have taken place. Although actual expenditure has decreased slightly in the last few years, the ratio of expenditure on armed forces to the total national budget shows an increase of 2 per cent. in the last two years.

Soviet Russia

As regards Soviet Russia, she has by far the largest standing army of any nation in the world at the present time, and shows no sign whatever of making any reduction; including a regular army of 29 divisions and a territorial army of 41 divisions, she has a total of 70 divisions and about 1,200,000 men under arms. Universal compulsory service prevails, and the number of men she could put in the field in case of war would be limited only by the amount of equipment available. Her navy is of no serious importance, except to the Baltic States, who are generally anxious to see a strong German navy to act as a buffer to Russia, but she is devoting great attention to her air force, which is very strong numerically, probably the second strongest in the world. Her expenditure on armaments shows a considerable increase as regards the actual money spent, but the drop in the value of her currency is a somewhat uncertain factor. It is not generally known that women are liable for military service in Russia, but I have been able to find no figures showing the extent to which this power has been utilized. No doubt they would be called up in large numbers on mobilization for employment in the non-combatant services and departments.

China

There are probably some 2,000,000 men under arms, but they are divided into many groups, and the great majority are apparently ready to transfer their allegiance at short notice—or to become bandits, if it suits them better. Actually the number of men under arms in China is far greater than that in any other country, but they can hardly be regarded as constituting a standing army. The Nanking Government aims at forming a peace army of 65 divisions, a total of some 800,000 men, but its control over the country is too weak to enable it to have any real power of enforcing reductions or disarmament, even if it wished to do so. Navy and air force may be regarded as practically negligible.

Indo-China. Siam

Neither French Indo-China nor Siam is of serious importance in considering the question of disarmament. In neither case is there any intention of seeking territorial additions, and the armaments in both

countries may be regarded as being of a defensive character. On the other hand, compulsory service prevails in both countries, and neither has taken any steps towards the reduction of armaments. Siam has an efficient and, for her size, comparatively large air force, numerically superior to that of our Indian Empire.

Nepal. Tibet

Nepal and Tibet need hardly be considered. The Nepalese Army is small but efficient, and the Gurkhas would not be slow to profit by our departure from India; should we ever be mad enough to hand over the country to Babu rule, they would have little difficulty in overrunning Bengal and a large part of the United Provinces.

India

Our army in India is about 200,000 strong, of whom some 60,000 are British and 140,000 Indians or Gurkhas. Alone among Asiatic countries, voluntary service obtains, with the result, of course, that trained reserves are very small. The extensive coast line of our Indian Empire is protected by the British Navy; there is no Indian Navy as yet. The strength of the air force in India is 8 squadrons, say, 180 machines, including reserves; civil aviation is practically non-existent, being confined to a few flying clubs.

On the N.W. Frontier of India, in the so-called independent country between India and Afghanistan, though within the Durand Line and nominally part of India, there are approximately 500,000 tribesmen, some under the control of rulers, but the great majority under no control whatever; they are unruly and turbulent and good fighters, about half armed with modern rifles. It goes without saying that they would never agree voluntarily to disarm.

Afghanistan

Beyond the N.W. Frontier is Afghanistan, a country whose military strength rests mainly upon her armed tribesmen. Although a system of compulsory service exists, her regular army is small (about 40,000 men) and of no serious military importance.

Persia

In Persia, compulsory military service was introduced in 1924, and has been maintained, in spite of strong opposition. The regular army

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numbers only some 42,000, but the Shah, Reza Khan, intends to bring it up to 100,000 if and when finances permit; it is of no great military value. A small Persian navy is now in process of formation, the personnel being trained in Italy.

Turkey

Lastly, Turkey has an army of real value, though without any arms, factories or arsenals capable of supplying her forces in time of war, except with rifles. Universal military service exists, and the standing army consists of 18 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions, and is about 150,000 strong. Navy and air force are both weak, and of no great value.

This is a short summary of the armed strength of the Asiatic Powers, and, in addition, I should like to point out that in no country except India has any real reduction of armaments been made. In India the net reduction since 1914 has been nearly 50,000 men, of whom 15,000 are British. It is, indeed, possible to say, without exaggeration, that in every country the strength of the armed forces has only been limited by finance and the necessity for economy. I would also like to emphasize the fact that, in every country except India, armies are recruited by compulsory military service, a cheap method that has the great advantage of producing large reserves of trained men.

I will now examine, very briefly, the relations between these Powers in order to arrive at some conclusion as to whether these are sufficiently good to afford any ground for the hope that they are likely to come to a mutual agreement for disarmament.

Japan is a Power whose territory is too small to hold her rapidly increasing population, which has already reached some 65 millions. Expansion is therefore essential, and she seeks this in Korea and Manchuria. Korea is already a Japanese province, and her occupation of Manchuria is now to all intents and purposes an accomplished fact; in fact, though not in name, the new State of Manchuria seems to be a vassal State of Japan. This policy of expansion must necessarily be distasteful to China, who regards Korea as within her legitimate sphere of influence and Manchuria as part of her own Empire, and to Russia, whose hope of expansion is thereby destroyed and whose communications with Vladivostock are seriously threatened.

Japan has, in fact, ceased to be a mere island State; she has become

a Continental Power with a long frontier marching with Russia and China, numerically two of the three strongest Powers in the world. It is most improbable that either of these Powers will ever acquiesce willingly in the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, although they are unable to oppose it effectively at the present time. It is therefore clear that Japan has incurred a serious addition to her commitments, especially as regards military and air forces.

Japan's relations with the U.S.A. have been more than once a cause for serious concern, and they have not improved of recent years. Personally I can see no vital reasons for conflict between these two Powers, but their relations show little or no improvement, and this fact will militate strongly against any reduction of Japanese armaments, especially as regards her naval strength.

I am convinced that, under present conditions, Japan will not agree to any appreciable reduction in armaments, if any at all, and that no attempt to induce her to do so would meet with the least success.

I now come to Soviet Russia, a Power which I cannot help regarding as the mad dog of the world. Her form of government is, fortunately, different from that of any other country; she has no friends, and she is in the midst of her celebrated Five-Year Plan, perhaps the biggest task which a nation has ever been set. From the political point of view alone, her rulers consider it essential for her to maintain her armed strength, so long as she is surrounded by States with a totally different form of government. But, apart from that, there is good reason to believe that the Bolshevik leaders contemplate, at some future date, the extension of the present frontiers of Russia. On the Western frontier much territory was lost as the result of the Great War, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and neither Communists nor National Russians are reconciled to these losses. The British Empire is the principal enemy of Soviet Russia, and, although it is difficult for the whale and elephant to meet, there is always the possibility of a clash through Afghanistan. The Soviet rulers, intent as they now are on the success of their Five-Year Plan, and doubtful of the peaceful intentions of their Western neighbours, have been unable to veto the recent Japanese advance in Manchuria—as no doubt the astute Japanese fully realized—but this does not mean permanent acquiescence. Lastly, Russia's gradual absorption of Mongolia, a province which the Chinese have always regarded as part of China, cannot fail to arouse suspicion and resentment among the Chinese.

It therefore seems clear that Soviet Russia will not carry out any

reduction of armaments, though she may—as recently at Geneva—pay lip service to the ideals of disarmament.

As regards China, the present Nanking Government would no doubt be ready to discuss the question of disarmament, but would be quite powerless to enforce any measures agreed upon; so that the attitude of China is merely of academic interest. On the other hand, should the Chinese succeed in establishing a really strong Government, it is quite conceivable that this Government would aim at the restoration of her frontiers in Manchuria and Mongolia, as also at the reconquest of Tibet. In any case, the internal condition of China is likely to necessitate the maintenance of strong armed forces for a long time to come.

French Indo-China and Siam would welcome a reduction in armaments, but could make no move in this direction whilst China is in her present condition; in any case their armaments are comparatively small, and constitute no menace to the peace of Asia.

The armed forces of Tibet and Nepal are small, and are mainly for the preservation of internal order, and there is no likelihood of their reduction. The rulers of Nepal keep a close watch on events in India, and, in the event of our policy leading to chaos and anarchy in that country, are anxious to have an army ready to enable them to get their share of the spoils.

Afghanistan lies between two great Empires, and has a mixed, turbulent, and unruly population, whose ruler sits upon a most insecure throne; this alone would prevent any reduction of such armaments as the national finances will permit. At the present time the stability of the situation depends on the strength and loyalty of the Afghan army, and there is not the slightest chance of Nadir Khan agreeing to any reduction; he would, indeed, increase his army if he had the money. Nor must we forget the idea and hope that exist in many Afghan minds that our rule in India may disappear one day, and that the Golden Road to Delhi—now barred for some 150 years—may once again be open. Should this be the case, there is little doubt that a fresh Afghan invasion would take place and that, with the assistance of the frontier tribes and the Punjabi Mohammedans, Northern India would become a Mussulman State.

In Persia there is no prospect whatever of any change; the Shah is complete master of the situation, and is determined to maintain as strong an army as possible, both to preserve internal order and to maintain his own position. Conterminous as Persia is with five other

Powers—Soviet Russia, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, and Turkey—it would be easy to plead that the present strength of the Persian Army is the minimum required for the defence of her frontiers.

In Arabia the tribes constitute Ibn Saud's army, but his hold over them is precarious, and he could not enforce disarmament even if he wanted to do so.

The Iraq Army is small, but is increasing; it is, however, still insufficient to maintain internal security without assistance from the R.A.F.

There can be no question of the reduction of the armed forces of Turkey as long as Mustapha Kemal remains in power; nor is there any prospect of any change if the government passed into other hands. The Turks regard Soviet Russia with natural and well-justified suspicion, whilst their experiences of foreign invasion are too recent to allow them to risk their repetition.

In this brief review I have left India to the last, partly because her position differs so much from that of any other Asiatic Power, but mainly because I wish to emphasize the absurdity and impossibility of India taking the lead in any attempt to persuade Asia to disarm. In order to further the cause of general disarmament, Great Britain has led the way at the cost of grave risks; it would be fatal to take such risks in India.

The responsibilities of our army in India are immense, including as they do the defence of a land frontier some 6,000 miles in length, and the maintenance of order in a country of 350 million inhabitants. Lest there should be any misconception regarding the strength of the forces in India, I should like to examine, very briefly, the duties they have to perform. The maintenance of internal security is no small matter in a country of the size of India, where distances are great and the communications difficult, where a large area is governed by Princes who may require assistance or whose action may necessitate intervention-e.g., Nabha and Kashmir-where the conduct of a seditious section of the people may lead to trouble and, most important of all, where the clashes between the different religions may cause riots and much bloodshed. During the course of my work on the staff, especially at Army Headquarters, and in command of my battalion, the Jullundur Brigade and the Lahore District (an area including the greater part of the Punjab), it has been my duty to examine the requirements of internal security, and I can assure you that the forces allotted to this rôle, which number about one-third of the army in

India, have been cut down to an absolute minimum. Another point is that, in view of the constant trouble between Hindus and Mohammedans—e.g., Bombay, Cawnpore and Kashmir—a large proportion of British troops (28 battalions out of 45) has to be included in the forces detailed for internal security duties.

From the Black Mountain, Kohistan and Chitral to Baluchistan, the whole N.W. frontier is lined by clan after clan, tribe after tribe, of brave, fanatical and well-armed tribesmen, numbering, as I have already mentioned, some half a million men. As may be imagined, a considerable body of troops is required to keep them under reasonable control, but I can assure you that the forces allotted to the maintenance of order along our N.W. frontier-which are termed Covering Troops -have been reduced to the utmost extent. It is a matter of the greatest regret that we have allowed this state of affairs to continue, that we did not take the opportunities offered to us on various occasions since 1893 of advancing to the Durand Line, at any rate South of the Kabul River; then it would have been comparatively easy: now the tribesmen are far better armed, and an advance up to our real frontier would involve great expenditure and many lives. At the same time, both from the military and political point of view, it would be the best solution, and would save a great deal of money in the end.

Lastly, I come to the field army, the force allotted to the defence of our frontier against external enemies. We have every desire to remain on good terms with Afghanistan, a country which we wish to be peaceful, settled, and prosperous. Her present ruler, Nadir Shah, has done his best to maintain friendly relations with us, and there is good reason to believe that he intends to adhere to this policy. At the same time, Afghanistan is an unstable country, and, in the event of Nadir Shah's death, the policy of a new ruler might be very different. We must not forget that, only thirteen years ago, Afghanistan declared war on us without serious cause or warning, whilst her invading army was at that time actually led by the present King.

And then, beyond Afghanistan, is that uncertain and disturbing element, Soviet Russia, a constant menace to the peace of the world, mainly owing to her perpetual intrigues and propaganda, but also because she possesses the largest army in the world and a powerful air force.

If you will forgive repetition, I should like to emphasize the difficulties and dangers of the military situation on the N.W. Frontier of India. First we have some half a million tribesmen, well armed and lawless, fond of loot, and fine fighters. Behind these the army of Afghanistan, armed with modern guns, machine-guns, and rifles, even possessing a few aeroplanes, to which must be added the powerful assistance that might be rendered by the Afghan tribesmen. In the background the great Russian Army, with strong forces in Russian Turkestan, and with two lines of railway running to the Northern frontier of Afghanistan.

In view of all these points it is, I think, clear that a field army of such strength as can be formed, say 4 divisions, after providing for the requirements of internal security and covering troops out of a total of some 200,000 men, must of necessity be dangerously small, and would, indeed, be wholly inadequate but for its high standard of

morale and general efficiency.

In this brief résumé I have not mentioned the N.E. Frontier of India. Actually the whole of this huge frontier, from the Malay coast via Siam, Burma, French Indo-China, Yunnan, Assam, Tibet, Bhutan, Nepal, and Kashmír to Chitral, may be said to be guarded by one division—hardly an extravagant number of troops for a frontier of over 4,000 miles, bordering on six foreign countries.

To sum up, my examination of the problem has convinced me that any attempt to introduce disarmament in Asia would at the present time be dangerous and utterly futile. All attempts to further the cause of world disarmament have so far failed, and, until more progress has been made in Europe, it is futile to expect any serious advance in Asia.

Will the Disarmament Conference now being held at Geneva result in any serious progress? I hope so, but have serious doubts, although all the delegates of the various countries are eloquent in their protestations of the desire of their respective nations for disarmament. We have the Turkish delegate stating that the policy of Turkey is "inspired by the ideal of universal love," but he refused even to consider the abandonment of universal compulsory military service. Then again Litvinoff, the Bolshevik representative, advocates total disarmament, the abolition of all armies, navies, and air forces—of course, with his tongue in his cheek, well knowing the absurdity of his proposal. I will not bore you by repeating to you the fable of the bear and his embrace, so well told by the Spanish delegate.

Just imagine India without an army, with her huge and varied population and with half a million warlike tribesmen on the N.W. Frontier—they would not disarm.

It seems to me that, before there can be any real prospect of disarmament, there must be more confidence among nations as to their neighbours' intentions, more general goodwill. It is most doubtful if such goodwill prevails in Europe; it certainly does not exist in Asia. In a letter recently addressed to his diocese, the Bishop of Exeter, the brother of Lord Robert Cecil, says, "Dark as the picture of Europe is, the picture of Asia is even darker," and he adds that, as the result of his study of recent history, it seems to him that the nations only wish peace if they can have their own way in everything, not otherwise.

Disarmament can only be possible if it is loyally and universally accepted by all the States concerned: if one State, especially if that State be a powerful one, refuses to disarm, general disarmament is out of the question. A leader in disarmament is required, and who will accept this rôle? The most important Powers, excepting India, are Japan, Soviet Russia, and China, and in all three cases there is not the slightest chance of their carrying out a satisfactory programme of disarmament, let alone take the lead. The other States—French Indo-China, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey—would certainly not take the lead, nor would they agree to any measure of disarmament that was not universally accepted. The armed tribesmen on the N.W. Frontier of India would certainly not agree to hand in their arms.

There is one more point. In many countries of Asia, unlike Europe, the problem of internal security is more one for the army than the police, and any disarmament cannot begin with a voluntary reduction of the army, but must commence with a forcible disarmament of the population. Persia has made considerable headway in this direction, but China, Arabia, and Afghanistan have not and cannot. Even in India our first task in any considerable measure of disarmament would be the forcible disarmament of the frontier tribes, and unless we were quite certain of Afghanistan, we should have to leave a large force in the area to prevent the smuggling of arms and to give the tribes protection against their Afghan neighbours, which they would be able to demand as a right.

I hope I have made it clear that our armed forces in India have been reduced to a minimum, and that it would be suicidal for us to attempt to give any further lead in an Asiatic disarmament programme, in which we should not be followed. Alone among the countries of Asia, India adheres to the maintenance of a small standing army, whilst every other country recruits its armed forces by means of universal compulsory service. There is not the slightest chance of

these countries agreeing to the abandonment of this system: apart from its cheapness, they all regard it as essential for their security and are convinced that it is of the greatest value for the training and development of the character and manhood of their nation.

I have therefore, unwillingly, come to the conclusion that disarmament in Asia is impossible at the present time, and that any attempt to introduce it, especially before any definite progress has been made at Geneva, would be utterly futile, and most dangerous to any Power that attempted to take the lead.

In conclusion, I should like to tell you a story which some of you may have heard, and which I regard as typical of most Asiatic countries. When the Afghan Delegates came to the present Disarmament Conference at Geneva, they did so in the hope that, as some other nations might disarm, they would be able to buy guns and rifles cheap.

This, in my opinion, gives the measure of the chances of "Disarmament in Asia."

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THE OUTLOOK IN AFGHANISTAN

By ABDUL QADIR KHAN

Paper given at a Members' Meeting on April 20, Sir Michael O'Dwyer in the Chair.

R. CHAIRMAN, MY LORDS, LADIES AND GENTLE-I confess to a sense of trepidation in agreeing to perform this difficult task. Afghanistan has always been an enigma to the people of the West. Its inaccessibility, its important position as a buffer State between Soviet Russia and India, the rapidity of its political metamorphoses, and, above all, the diversity of its population, who are constrained to choose between modernity and progress, medievalism and stagnation-all these factors contribute to the difficulties of my task. Much has been written from time to time about Afghan-British relations. But very little is known about the economic development of the country or about the post-war social reorganization which cost Amanullah his Crown, and which has tested the ability and tact of King Nadir for the last two and a half years. One cannot afford to dogmatize about a country which, by the very nature of its situation and the composition of its population, is prone to drift from one experiment to another, from Amanullah Khan to Bachai-Sakao, and from Bacha-i-Sakao to King Nadir. It will be clear that in my address I am only trying to assess tendencies, rather than expound philosophies, and to point out broad lines of future progress, rather than offer a detailed and comprehensive programme of political and economic reconstruction.

The Country and its People

The geographical configuration of Afghanistan is instrumental in making it a key State in Asiatic politics. Its strength or weakness is almost instantaneously felt in India. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the situation of Afghanistan has a decisive influence upon the political fate of India. At least, such has been the verdict of history. From the time of Alexander the Great to the present-day Imperialism of Soviet Russia, the history of Afghanistan more or less definitely

determined Indian, and incidentally British, foreign policies in the East. Hence it is necessary that a short description of the Afghan State and of its people should be offered here.

The Hindu Kush range of mountains is the natural eastern boundary of Afghanistan, and forms the dividing line between this State and India. To the south Baluchistan, to the west Persia, and to the north Russian Turkestan, limit the boundaries of Afghanistan. If you imagine a triangle, with its sides of almost equal length, but with a smaller base flanking the Persian border, lying on one of its sides, with the Pamir Plateau as its apex, with Herat as its north-western and Sibi as its south-western angles, you will have a picture of the geographical situation of Afghanistan. Perhaps you would much better appreciate it by a comparison with the position of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea.

Afghanistan has an area of a quarter of a million square miles, and is thus considerably larger than France. Its land surface is notorious for its bare hills and difficult mountain passes. Further, commissariat facilities are an unknown quantity in Afghanistan. The City of Kandahar stands 3,500 feet above sea level, Kabul 5,700, Ghazni 7,200, and Faizabad 10,600 feet above sea level. From these figures it will be seen what a strange contrast Afghanistan offers when one imagines the vast even stretches of Hindustan in juxtaposition. The extreme inaccessibility of the country is only equalled by its barrenness.

Afghanistan may be regarded as supplying a synthesis of Asiatic races. Ever since the Aryan migrations into India numerous races have swept over this gateway to the East. It is not the place here to enter into anthropological disquisitions, but this much may be said with confidence, that the present-day Afghan is Semitic in character and is the synthesis of groups of races as wide apart as the placid Aryan of India and the ferocious Tajik of the Oxus range.

This agglomeration of races, constrained to live in inaccessible mountain ranges and exposed to the vagaries of climate ranging between the extremes of heat and cold, has a profound influence on the political fortunes of Afghanistan. The Afghan is essentially a child of the mountains. Sturdy in appearance, vigorous in action, amazing in endurance—he is all that can be desired in proportion, symmetry and strength of human limbs. Whether Shia or Sunni, he is a Muslim to the core. Naturally enough, he represents all that is best and worst in Islam, which holds sway over the whole of Central Asia, from Jerusalem in the west to the interior of Mongoloid China. Hope-

lessly conservative in outlook, ignorant and extremely sensitive in religious belief, easily inflammable in passion, the Afghan is at once uncontrollable and precipitate in action.

It will thus be seen that the political fortunes of Afghanistan are noted for their unsteadiness. As the key State in Asia, it has to resist the forward policy of Russia, Imperial or Soviet it does not matter. With a population utterly impossible to control, it has to succumb to the vicissitudes of the kingly game of chess. Nurturing a stock of population possessing varying degrees of civilization, it has to find its level between medievalism and modernity. Small wonder that Afghanistan presents a series of problems both to the statesman and to the student of world affairs.

The Making of Modern Afghanistan

Time was when Afghanistan formed part of India, rather when India was an appendage to Afghanistan. Both these countries formed equally important parts of the Greek, Kanishkan, Indo-Bactrian, Ghazni, and Ghori empires. That the connection between these two countries was intimate is shown by the fact that the Sultanate of Delhi and the Mughal empire which superseded it later derived their strength and nourishment from Afghanistan. The invasions of Timur and Ahmad Shah Abdali were only incidents in the history of the everwidening gulf between India and Afghanistan and ultimately paved the way for the creation of an autonomous Afghan State. The reign of Ahmad Shah in the second half of the eighteenth century may be taken as the foundation of the modern Afghanistan.

From Ahmad Shah to Abdur Rahman, who flourished towards the close of the last century, is a long and chequered story, which need not be repeated here. But two cardinal points must be noticed. In the first place, the weakness of a succession of rapidly disappearing rulers of Afghanistan thoroughly undermined the prestige and influence of a country which once ruled India. As a corollary to this, Russian imperialism had its effects sorely felt in Central Asia, which is only an extension of the north and north-western frontiers of Afghanistan.

The first two Afghan wars, which were fought by Great Britain at great risk and expense, were fought only with a view to stem the tide of Imperial Russian expansion towards the Indian Ocean. The words of General Skobolev were by no means platitudes. The General declared, "The more powerful Russia becomes in Central

Asia, the weaker England becomes in India, and, consequently, the more amenable in Europe." Notwithstanding the fall of Czarist Russia, this declaration, strangely enough, stands to the present day even under the régime of a spuriously democratic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The traditional policy of Great Britain towards Afghanistan recognized the principle that judicious neighbourliness would alone serve the best interests of that country and India. There have been temporary triumphs in the advocacy of a "Scientific Frontier" and a "Forward Policy." The first two Afghan wars were undertaken by Great Britain with a view to translating those two slogans into practice. But the results attending these expeditions brought home to the Government of India and to the authorities in Whitehall the truth that a permanent enthronement of these catchwords in the official vocabulary of the War Office would not lead them anywhere.

Afghanistan prior to the accession of Abdur Rahman was weakened and disintegrated by court intrigues. The unqualified support lent by Great Britain to this ruler resulted in the creation of the modern Afghan State. Resolute, endowed with foresight, possessing an iron hand, Abdur Rahman rode rough-shod over the fortunes of Afghanistan with admirable results. During his régime the turbulent tribes of Afghanistan were brought under control; the economic resources of the country were, for the first time, systematically exploited; a cautious frontier policy both towards India and Russia has been adumbrated; in a word, a new national spirit has been instilled into the hearts of the Afghans.

All this Abdur Rahman achieved with the support of the British Government. But British foreign policy cannot be called one of a purely negative character. No doubt a vigilant watch was kept over the intrigues of foreign Governments, particularly of Russian courtesans at Kabul. A cautious, none the less vigorous, outlook was maintained by the British Foreign Office through the medium of the Government of India in order to bring pressure of various kinds to bear on the Amir and make him realize the futility of wild schemes and the necessity of friendship and alliance with Great Britain as against Russia. Abdur Rahman recognized these points, and it was through British support that he was able to consolidate Afghanistan by giving an iron government to a turbulent people and thus achieving the title Amir-el-Kabir, meaning "The Great Amir."

The Failure of Amanullah Khan

The death of Abdur Rahman once again let loose the centripetal forces which were kept under control by him under great difficulties. Once the stern hand of government was withdrawn, numerous openings for internecine quarrels and official brigandage were easily discovered. It was Amanullah Khan's emergence into power and office which saved the situation, though it was only for the comparatively short period of a decade. His coup-de-main ranks as one of the major military exploits of the present century. Maybe his royal blood helped to smooth the path of the victorous general.

The recognition of Amanullah Khan by the Western Powers as King is the cardinal point in the modernization of Afghanistan. The erstwhile Amir has now the status of His Majesty, and rightly so. Want of this recognition had always been a legitimate grievance of the characteristically proud Afghan. Amanullah Khan's treaties with Great Britain in 1921 and with Germany and France in 1926 are vested with tremendous importance. For the first time in the history of the country, His Afghan Majesty has now diplomatic representatives in the major capitals of the world, particularly in Europe. No doubt diplomatic and consular agencies tax the resources of an, as yet, economically undeveloped country. But they are only in keeping with the spirit and needs of modern times. Rapid means of communication, and particularly the future possibilities of aircraft warfare, demand from Afghanistan an alertness and ability to cope with contingencies which never existed before. Otherwise, the key position which the country holds in Asia will be in jeopardy. The significance of this point will be readily admitted when it is visualized that Moscow to Peshawar is but a journey of days as compared with months of the pre-war era. An efficient intelligence service as is supplied by Afghan military attachés at foreign capitals is but a necessary adjunct to stable government in Afghanistan.

Amanullah had the good fortune to have the devoted services of Ahmed Beg Tarzi (his father-in-law and Prime Minister) and of Muhammad Nadir Khan, the present Afghan King and the trusted general of Amanullah Khan. With his characteristic force of personality, Amanullah Khan set his hands to the difficult task of modernizing Afghanistan.

First and foremost amongst his schemes for the reorganization of his kingdom was a programme of democratization of the administration. The death-knell of medieval theocracy was tolled by the creation of a two-chambered parliament. A cabinet selected and presided over by the King completed the necessary machinery for the establishment of a rudimentary yet essentially sound system of democratic government. But the Mullahs were never destroyed root and branch. Instead, by defining their duties, and by providing for a well-regulated but restricted sphere of their actions, the Mullahs were allowed a recognizable latitude of religious and political initiative.

Next in the series of steps taken by Amanullah Khan to bring Afghanistan into line with the West, was the attention bestowed upon the education of his subjects. To a very large extent education was secularized, a miracle in the Orient, particularly of the Muslim zone. Towards the latter part of his career, Amanullah Khan veered round to a more and more advanced scheme of secularization. State schools were established both for boys and for girls. In the case of the latter, of course, a lot of opposition was encountered. But the zeal and doggedness of this modern reformer were able to cope with these difficulties for a time. The ex-Queen Souriya, who became well known in the West during her European tour, gave Amanullah Khan a helping hand worthy of a royal spouse.

Step by step Amanullah Khan proceeded with his gigantic task. Every department of State was thoroughly overhauled. Agriculture and mining were efficiently supervised by European experts. Scores of Afghan students were sent over to European Universities to bring back with them all that is best in Western civilization and scientific skill. Military missions were invited from Angora and Moscow to train Afghan forces in the methods of modern warfare. Considerable attention was bestowed upon Afghan aviation and means of land transport. Engineering exploits were legion, and undertaken with a view to developing the natural resources of the country and affording means of easy communication. Cities were laid out on modern sanitary linesthe Dilkusha Palace built by a French architect is an edifice of considerable beauty and magnificence. A healthy national Press grew up side by side with inspired journalism of the Parisian type, but giving sufficient scope for a robust public opinion even under a State censorship. Indeed, not one avenue for reform was left unexplored. Reorganization was the keynote of Amanullah Khan's policy.

The visit of Amanullah Khan to the West is a fateful episode in the history of Afghanistan which was enacted before our own eyes. His triumphal march from capital to capital now becomes but a sad achievement. The popularity of Amanullah Khan and his consort in the West was too dearly bought. To his great disillusionment, his prestige and influence in Afghanistan were found to be on a progressively declining plane. It was no difficult task for reactionary forces in an extremely conservative country to turn the tables while the monarch was making a protracted foreign tour. To a people who hate being driven by the nose and by royal decree, anything and everything in the reformist régime of Amanullah Khan supplied ample powder only awaiting a spark for explosion. Amanullah Khan's abolition of the purdah and the Queen's public example and the compulsory, maybe fantastic, sartorial changes were enough to gall and chill the blood of the self-righteous Afghan mountaineer. The curtailment of the prestige of the Mullahs and with it the diminution of their lucrative religious trades was yet another grievance which ought to be rectified once and for all. Indeed, Afghanistan could no longer tolerate an impetuous King, who, as the reactionary proclaimed, became at once a "Dunyadar, and foolishly heterodox." A religious war was the only way out. Din Din rang through the mountain vastnesses of Afghanistan.

The Crisis

The reactionary forces in Afghanistan found a ready means of gathering themselves to a focus. Hostile tribes, instigated by the fanatical Mullahs, who had everything to lose in the event of a perpetuation of Amanullah Khan's régime, swarmed round Kabul. Pillage, wanton destruction of property and lives of peaceful citizens were conducted on a large scale. The valiant efforts of Amanullah Khan to rally the progressive elements round his person proved of little avail. Even stern punishment meted out to the rebels failed in its objects. What was wanted for the overthrow of the King was leadership among the reactionaries. This found, the triumph of the Mullahs was assured.

Bacha-i-Sakao, as the name implies, was the son of a water-carrier. He thrived on brigandage and systematic looting of peaceful villages. He was an exile in the mountain vastnesses to the north of Afghanistan. Surrounded by a group of sturdy bandits, who would do anything for a consideration, he kept a vulturous vigil from the mountain tops. With an unerring eye, he noticed the right spot and the right time for his descent. The tribes which barred his way to Kabul were either subdued or bought over. Little by little he progressed towards the heart

of the country. Numerous engagements took place, and the Bacha's success seemed imminent.

All the while the British Legation at Kabul maintained a policy of strict neutrality. And rightly so. The treaty of 1921 was thus kept inviolate. When they found that there could no longer be any safety for foreign lives the evacuation of Kabul was ordered. This evacuation by air is one of the daring exploits of recent times. Sir Francis Humphry's tact and powers of organization can only be regarded as of the highest order.

The evacuation of the foreign legations, in fact, meant the downfall of Amanullah Khan. The short reign of the pious and gentle Inayatullah, elder brother of Amanullah, who was superseded by his more vigorous younger brother in the 1919 revolution, is of little value for our present purpose. With the evacuation of Amanullah Khan and the Royal Family, this time also by British service aeroplanes, to Peshawar, the screen lowered over the fate of the famous Durani line of sovereigns which ruled Afghanistan for wellnigh two centuries.

Bacha-i-Sakao was thus left with a clear field for his activities. True to Muslim traditions, he announced himself as the defender of the faith and assumed the imposing title Habibullah Ghazi (Beloved of God and Defender of the Faith). Habibullah's short régime meant the complete restoration of the power of the Mullahs and the medieval theocracy which hung round the neck of Afghanistan as a mill-stone, impeding even the slightest step towards progress. No one would be so hasty as to endorse every act of Amanullah Khan in his scheme for the modernization of Afghanistan. His precipitation was his undoing. But no one, again, will be stubborn enough in not recognizing his sincerity in endeavouring to bring about a reorganized Afghanistan. For ten years Amanullah Khan strove to serve Afghanistan with a zeal and ability befitting the reigns of even the best talented European monarchs. But Amanullah Khan was unable to see the significance of the saying "the inevitability of gradualness," and his whirlwind career had its price

Habibullah's short reign brought disaster upon Afghanistan. No doubt the autonomy of Afghanistan was left untouched. Indeed, the British were the first among the European nations to recognize his de facto rule. In this also Great Britain showed her willingness to preserve the integrity of a State, the stability of which is the guarantee against Russian aggression. But the incompetence of Habibullah was soon discovered. As the Eastern proverb goes, once a dog always a dog.

Habibullah's régime, as I have said above, meant a swing to the extreme limits of reactionarism in Afghanistan. His autocratic behaviour, the unfettered powers of the Mullahs, an empty treasury, the waywardness of mercenary soldiers who have no permanent bonds creating faith in the ruler, the economic ruin of the country and numerous other factors indicated that his rule could no longer be borne. Further, the country was surfeited with the violent acts of this barbarous chieftain. Indeed, a strong need was felt for a liberal-minded statesman who could guide the ship of State through the modern harassed times in Afghanistan.

But who was to be the leader of the moment? The exile Amanullah Khan's name had been freely canvassed. Even his extravagent promises for a return to the *status quo* existing before his reformist days could not have satisfied anybody in the country. The need was felt for one who is strong, yet liberal; steady yet progressive; wise, yet condescending. Muhammad Nadir Shah was the only man who could save the country.

King Nadir's Work

General Nadir Shah's return to Afghanistan from the south coast of France, where he was convalescing, was a great task. In undertaking this perilous adventure, Nadir was not actuated by any purely personal motives. To one who had served his country well for over a quarter of a century in various fields and with unflagging zeal, the hopeless incompetence and barbarism of Bacha-i-Sakao could not but be loathsome. The fact that Nadir was in indifferent health before he decided to rush to Kabul and deliver the country from economic and political ruin shows the purity of his motives.

I need not here describe the anxious days of 1930. Much blood was shed, and every inch of ground was dearly bought before the arg (or citadel) of Kabul fell into the hands of General Shah Wali Khan, brother of Nadir. The execution of Habibullah was only a prelude to the assumption of the Afghan throne by Nadir on October 16 last year. But the valiant General did not take recourse to this step before the tribal *Jirga* had decided to offer him the throne.

It is here necessary to assess the value of the support lent by the tribes to King Nadir. It will be recalled that the southern and eastern tribes, and even the Kohistanis of the north-east, who rose in revolt against Amanullah Khan and supported the Bacha, willingly paid their homage to the former General of the Afghan forces who was called

upon to rule the country. This is no mean achievement in a country like Afghanistan. It indicates the fact that the personal popularity of King Nadir is enthroned on a high pedestal. The entire nation is behind His Majesty, and this is the reason he was able to establish his position quickly and peacefully.

The first step in King Nadir's policy was the restoration of the Mullahs to their former prestige and privileges. It must be noted here that Nadir was in no way second to Amanullah Khan in his zeal for a progressive modernization of Afghanistan. But his is a zeal with a difference. He takes stock of the prevailing undercurrents of national life and sentiment, and also the capabilities of the people to assimilate sweeping changes. Hence the gradualness of his policy. If zest was the keynote of Amanullah's administration, caution is the pith of Nadir's policy.

King Nadir at once proceeded with the task of the restoration of Afghanistan to its normal conditions consistent with national safety. The two main reforms of Amanullah Khan which embittered the people—the suppression of the purdah and the secularization of the law—were forthwith rescinded. As a corollary to the restoration of the Mullahs to their former perquisites and privileges, Nadir established a tribunal of Ulemas at Kabul and charged this body with the interpretation and administration of the Shariat (the Koranic law). These two acts of Nadir were only curtain raisers, but effective curtain raisers to his policy of stabilization.

The next step in his régime of reconstruction of the country was one of defence. Shah Muhammad Khan, one of the King's brothers, was entrusted with the task of the reorganization of the army on modern lines. The five important Afghan military posts were strongly-guarded. A military detachment keeps vigilance at Faizabad facing the Russian Pamirski posts of the Valleys of Badakhshan. The concentration of Bolshevik troops near Termez in Russian Turkestan, on the Oxus, necessitated the strengthening of Takhtapul in Afghanistan, situated very near to Mazar-i-Sharif. Herat, the gateway to India, and commanding the highroad from Persia and Russian Turkestan, forms a well-guarded bulwark against the two Russian fortifications of Kushk and Merv. Turning to the North-West Frontier, Dakka flanking the Khyber and the posts facing Quetta in Baluchistan are always well guarded by Afghan contingents, as a guarantee against the guerilla warfare of the frontier tribes.

Incidentally, it may be noted here that the strength of the Afghan

forces on the eastern frontier is the basis of the immunity of India from Russian aggression. It is gratifying to note that King Nadir, by judiciously keeping aloof from Bolshevik overtures, is also helping to stem the Russian Communistic onslaught upon a spiritualistic and disturbed India.

The restoration of peace in the land and the maintenance of the status quo existing prior to the reformist days of Amanullah Khan gave King Nadir an opportunity of framing a new constitution. In announcing his policy, the King reaffirmed the treaties concluded by Amanullah Khan with European and other Powers. The government of the land was set up upon a scaffolding of constitutionalism. He elected his brother, Prince Mohamed Hasham Khan, as Prime Minister, who, in his turn, formed a cabinet composed mostly of ministers who had held office under Amanullah Khan. The Prime Minister and the Cabinet are responsible to the Grand National Assembly. Besides this permanent Assembly, there is a Loi Jirga (Grand Council) which meets every fourth year. The King presides over this Council in person. But the King's power is practically absolute and the present Government is almost a family affair, brothers of the sovereign holding the most important posts.

Recently the Government has laid down new rules and regulations of the Afghan Constitution. They declare Afghanistan to be completely independent in all its internal and external affairs. The City of Kabul will be the capital and the official Afghan flag will be black, red, and green in colour.

Islam is to be the religion of the country and the King is required to govern in accordance with the laws of Shariat (Islamic law) and the Fundamental Rules, and to regard the "Independence of the State" as his first and foremost duty.

The rights of Afghan subjects include individual freedom from interference, since no person may be detained or punished except under the orders of Shariat, or the laws of the State. Slavery is prohibited, forced labour is forbidden, and Afghan subjects will be free in all matters of trade, industry, and agriculture. The safety of personal property is guaranteed. The only property liable to confiscation is that of refugees from Afghanistan. Primary education will be compulsory, and schools will be under the supervision of the State. The publication of newspapers will be the right of the State and of Afghan subjects, but foreign newspapers which do not offend against the religion or policy of the State will be free to enter Aighanistan. De-

tailed rules are also framed for the constitution and procedure of the Majlis-i-Shora-Milli (Council of State). This Council will consist of elected representatives from the provinces and will sit in Kabul. The term of office is fixed at three years. Provision has been made to permit the King passing a special ordinance when the Council is not in session. Such ordinance, however, will be placed before the next session of the Council, and may be amended or rejected. All sessions will be open to the public and to the Press. All new laws will be drafted by the Ministers, and passed by the Council of State, before being signed by the King. The decisions of the Council of State must not clash with the Islamic Faith or with the accepted policy of the Government.

There will be a separate Chamber of Nobles (Majlis-i-Ayan) selected and appointed by the King. This Chamber will deal with matters referred to it by the Cabinet. Its recommendations will go to the Council of State, but it will also be required itself to examine and approve the decisions of the Council of State. In important cases in which the Council of State does not accept the recommendations of the Chamber of Nobles the point at issue may be referred to a select committee of not fewer than twenty members. Half the members of this committee will be selected from the Council of State and half from the Chamber of Nobles, and their recommendations will be referred to the full Council of State. Should the Council refuse to pass the recommendations of this joint committee the whole case may be referred to the King for final decision.

Nadir Shah has done much to reorganize the public services. Telephonic, telegraphic, and wireless connections, internally and with foreign countries, have been re-established, and the administration of the provinces under new governors has relieved the anxiety of peaceful citizens and traders. A successful appeal was made to the wealthy merchants to fill the Treasury, and the new Government's obstacles have been lessened by the revival of trade and a good harvest.

Land taxes, trade taxes, and Customs duties are the main source from which the revenue of Afghanistan is derived. The bulk of trade is with India, Russia, and Persia. Exports to the British territory through Peshawar and Quetta consist mainly of carpets, Afghan lamb skins—generally known as Persian lamb—dry fruit, and precious stones. Afghanistan sells to Russia most of her wool and carpets. The trade is conducted through Jews, Armenians, and Kabuli merchants. From Russia the imports are oil, petrol, sugar, and tea. The capital of

Afghan Turkestan—Mazar-i-Sharif—is the trade centre where Usbeks, Turkomans, and Persian merchants meet. The Russians enter the district by the Oxus River and have succeeded in capturing some of the trade which once was in the hands of Persian Jews and Shikarpuri Hindus. The people are endeavouring to make Afghan Turkestan a market for their manufactured cloths, petrol, and oil.

The Frontier Tribes

Side by side with Russian trade efforts in Afghanistan are the powerful Afghan traders who have been subsidized by the State during the past ten years. These traders have greatly increased, and the present Government is taking every step to further the development of this national trade. Caravans of camels and ponies loaded with carpets, skins, and dried fruits are again leaving regularly from Mazar on the way to Kabul through the snow-covered passes of the Hindu Kush.

Before I conclude, I would like to say a few words regarding the attitude of the present King towards the recent troubles on the North-West Frontier of India.

Naturally the rising on the North-West Frontier in 1929 and the subsequent agitation of the "Red Shirts" excited great interest among the tribes of Afghanistan. The Pathans of the independent territory are of the same stock as the population of Peshawar and the surrounding area, and on the other side have the closest racial and religious connections with the tribes in Afghan territory. King Nadir has, however, taken strong measures to discourage the Afghan tribes on the border from joining the adventures of Mohmand, Afridi, and other scattered clans of the mountains who have been skirmishing in British territory. He has successfully used his prestige among all these sister tribes, even out of his own land, and has urged them to settle their grievances against the British Government in a friendly spirit.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, My Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen,—I have so far attempted to deal with one of the most difficult subjects in international affairs. It is no exaggeration to say that Afghan politics are vested with tremendous importance. The material prosperity of a land a quarter of a million square miles in extent is important in itself. Likewise is the great issue of modernization, which means the Westernization of the people, at once ignorant and medieval in outlook. But

it is a happy sign that King Nadir is safely guiding Afghanistan through the extremely rough weather she has been facing since the fall of Amanullah. That this is a task of gigantic dimensions will be conceded by everyone in my audience. The aftermath of revolution and counter-revolution is no nurture-ground for ordered progress. When the characteristic turbulence of the Afghans remains unchanged, the achievement of the Nadir Shah's Government is nothing less than a miracle.

I am not trying to be a prophet and forecast future events which are to determine the fate of Afghanistan. But I can point with conviction to two important points which must determine future events. The first is: King Nadir, trained soldier and diplomat that he is, can be trusted with the task of the rehabilitation of Afghanistan. His foresight is sufficient to make him a tower of strength to the North-West Frontier of India, which is one of the most important assets to the British Empire. Afghan-British friendship is fraught with important results alike to the Empire and to the Moslem world. If British sympathy and alliance with Afghanistan can save this Muslim State from disintegration, it will not only guarantee the safety of the Khyber, but will also ensure the peaceful developments of the Muslim world. Great Britain has shown that her attitude is one of friendly neutrality, even during the dangerous period when Amanullah Khan was driven out by Bacha-i-Sakao, who in his turn was extirpated by King Nadir. There is every indication that this policy will be maintained.

The second point which I want to emphasize as determining the future of Afghanistan is the potentiality of Communist agitation and activity in Central Asia. It is not the place here for me to describe the Communist onslaught upon Central Asia. I will content myself with stating that Communist dictatorship of Borkhara and Samarkand is an established fact. The comparative contiguity of these two countries -i.e., Central Asia and Afghanistan-and propinquity of blood and other cultural affinities between the stocks of people inhabiting them are matters of great moment. The fact that Central Asia is brought under the thorough grip of a Communistic idealogy of life leads me to ask the question-Will this Communistic régime stop at the northern bank of the Oxus, or will it spread like wildfire among the Afghans, kinsmen of the people of Merv and Bhokhara? Humanly speaking, it is no difficult task for Communism to spread over Afghanistan, particularly with Bolshevik courtesans working in subterranean channels in the important cities all over the country. Asia is already in the

melting pot. If Communism can spread towards India, the future of Asia and of world peace will be in permanent jeopardy.

But there is one relieving feature in this threatening episode. King Nadir has the will and the power to resist Russian machinations. His Majesty knows at first hand all that is best in Western civilization. He also realizes the capabilities and limitations of the Afghans to assimilate foreign ideas. If the strong draught of Western ideas could only be hateful to the traditional-minded Afghan, the result of the dope of materialistic and anti-cultural Communist propaganda can only be disastrous. King Nadir is alive to this danger, and by judiciously disdaining Communistic activities he is preparing Aghanistan for a régime of progress tempered with caution. By a firm policy of friendship with Britain he is not only securing the autonomy of Afghanistan, but also ensuring the safety of India, and contributing towards the peace and happiness of Asia as a whole.

NOTES OF AN INFORMAL ADDRESS ON THE POLITICAL PROSPECT IN INDIA*

S you know, there is no problem in the world that is so complex or that ramifies in so many directions as the question of the political prospect in India. It is so vast that one is

bound to leave out things of the very first importance.

Most people know in outline the story of the events that led to the breaking of the Delhi Pact. By the courtesy of the Government of India, I went through the minutes of Mr. Gandhi's private talks with Mr. Emerson (who represented the Government of India). I may not use the minutes, but one can at any rate say that both parties showed up in an honourable light, as resolute to keep their part of the pact. Mr. Emerson particularly noted that he found Mr. Gandhi anxious to go beyond his obligations; he noted also that he often did not make the requests he (Mr. Emerson) expected him to make, because Mr. Gandhi was anxious not to claim more than the letter of the pact, strictly interpreted, allowed him.

I went also through the reports of the Provincial Governments. They showed with startling clearness that the temporary unification of India, which has been largely brought about by British rule, and has been very much intensified by the last thirty years of political unity—this temporary unity is ending. India is breaking up, just as the Roman Empire broke up into the nations of modern Europe. I will come back to the reports of the Provinces presently.

Mr. Gandhi in London (I had better state my own view) was not a success. I have sympathy with the outburst of a member of Parliament who said, "I would never go across the room to listen to Gandhi again." He moved in a mysterious way his blunders to perform, and he made two cardinal errors. One was that he played a lone hand,

* Short notes of an informal address given by Mr. Edward Thompson on Wednesday, May 11, 1932, Sir Jchn Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., in the chair.

In introducing the speaker, the Chairman said: Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Edward Thompson needs no introduction to people who take an interest in India. He was in India for some years as a rrissionary and teacher, joined up during the war and served for some time in Mesopotamia. He is a man who, as some of you know, has an original mind and the circumstances of his career have brought him in touch with angles of Indian life that some of us do not see, so that I think we may look forward to having an extremely interesting lecture.

aloof even from Indian Moderates of the proved ability, energy, and integrity of Sapru, Sastri, and Jayakar. His other mistake was that he underrated greatly the strength and tenacity of Doctor Ambedkar, the leader of the Untouchables. I think the most surprising event of the last few years, as Mr. Geoffrey Garratt pointed out to me, has been the emergence of the Untouchables. It has frightened the Hindus much more than the political emergence of the Moslems. They can deal with the Moslems by giving them their own provinces; but the Untouchables are everywhere.

While Mr. Gandhi was in England the Provincial Governments were pressing to be allowed to take action against Congress. There are really four bad regions in India: Bengal, the United Provinces, the North-West Frontier Province and the Gujerati-speaking parts of Bombay Presidency and Bombay City. In those four provinces the Provincial Governments were pressing to be allowed to take action against Congress; and, where all Provincial Governments were insistent, the most insistent was the Government of the N.W.F.P. But it put Government in a very difficult position, because, if they took action against the Red Shirt movement while they did not take action against Congress, they would provoke the Moslems to say, "You took action against a Moslem organization which is recent and so far has not done you much harm, whereas you allow a mainly Hindu organization, the Congress, to go on unproscribed." But on the other hand it was difficult to take action against Congress while their leader, Mr. Gandhi, was still in London as a delegate to the Conference. The N.W.F.P. said, "This thing is getting out of all control. We have let it go on far too long; the Red Shirt movement is definitely subversive and we must take action." But Government would be in a tactically bad position if it did take action!

However, one of Mr. Gandhi's most lovable qualities is his strong personal loyalty; and he had made it perfectly clear that if action was taken against Abdul Ghaffar Khan (familiarly known as A. G. K.), he would regard that as a casus belli, and consider that ipso facto the peace had been broken. So then Government were entitled to consider that if they took action against the Red Shirts, which the N.W.F.P. people said they must do—and they had had great provocation—then a state of war existed; and their hands were forced both by the Red Shirts and by the Congress in the U.P.

The reports of the Provincial Governments can be analyzed more

or less in this way: Madras had no serious complaint, at least it did not print any serious complaint. In the U.P., the Congress might claim that they were in a special position, as possessing intimate local knowledge and as being the poor man's friend and representative. But that does not alter the fact that they tried to push themselves in on every possible occasion, if not as a parallel governing body, at any rate as a powerful intermediate authority; from their point of view they cannot be blamed, they were striving for tactical advantage. An American who is very unfriendly to the British Government said to me, "I suppose that nobody could be more thoroughly in sympathy with the Congress cause than I am. But I think they did a downright mean thing in starting a no-rent movement in the U.P." The reason for that remark is, as you already know, that there is a great deal of acute economic misery in the U.P. As another American who works in Lahore said to me, "Whenever I cross the Jumna I feel that I have come out of a country of slaves into a country of free people." If you have 'a green revolution'-which up till now India has hitherto escaped-if ever there is an agrarian attempt at revolution, it will come in the U.P.

The Provincial Governments' reports contain to the most impartial mind a great deal of trivial matter that might be better omitted. For instance, Mr. Gandhi's own speeches, whenever they are reported, are unexceptionable, and I suppose are only put in for the sake of completeness. Further, though the Provincial Governments had an extraordinarily difficult job to do, many of the things they complained about were, I think, not really liable to much complaint. For instance, Government complained that some Congress speakers said, "Of course we have a truce; but it is only a truce and we must keep our powder dry." I suppose that the Congress might say that on the Government side too there were people who kept both their emotional attitudes and their powder reasonably dry. However, in the U.P. the Congress, in my opinion, did not keep the pact, while in Bengal they do not seem to me to have made any effort whatever to keep the pact. The reports of the Bengal Government abound in perfectly straightforward incitements to murder, in language recalling the Partition days. In the Gujerati-speaking portion of Bombay Presidency also there was no attempt to keep the pact; and in the N.W.F.P. there were the Red Shirts.

It is very doubtful if 'A.G.K.' understands what non-violence is.

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He has grasped one thing, that it calls for much patience, and, as he points out in his speeches, the whole history of Islam has been marked by patience and endurance; but apart from that fact I do not think that 'A.G.K.' understands what non-violence means. At any rate, the Red Shirts also did not keep the pact; and the breach came.

Mr. Gandhi himself when he landed in Bombay sent the Viceroy an extremely improper telegram. It was not quite as bad as it seemed to me. He said, "Am I to go on looking to you for guidance as to the advice I am to give to Congress?" I thought that was sarcasm, but it was not. When I went through Mr. Emerson's minutes it was quite clear that Mr. Gandhi had been coming steadily for guidance. Even so, the telegram was an improper one; and the Viceroy's reply was reasoned and courteous. But the note of mutual exasperation was set, and it proceeded until the whole correspondence was precipitated suddenly by a breakdown on both sides. Mr. Gandhi took up his old quarters in Yeravda gaol. The tragedy about the business is that, although he made that very bad mistake, Mr. Gandhi meant to cooperate. I could give my reasons for this belief: he did mean to co-operate, but he was locked up.

Both he and the Viceroy had very difficult constituencies behind them, and the Viceroy remembers Mr. Gandhi from pre-Mahatma days when he was a thorn in the side of the Bombay Government. It is fairly notorious that there is rooted disapproval in the memory; things are not as they were during the Consulship of Lord Irwin.

As for the N.W.F.P., I went through the speeches of 'A.G.K.' in the reports which Government courteously let me see. The main impression I got from the Government documents was that the people are hungry. The frontier hills are desolate. I do not see that the people can live without looting or a subvention such as they have at present. The situation is much as it was after the '45. A way out was found then partly by road-making, by emigration, and enlistment in the army.

The Red Shirt trouble is by no means over. For the first time since Islam came to these people they have got new ideas, and those new ideas are working. And the most subversive and the most influential of those new ideas is this: that they are very miserable and poor, that there is no self-respect in their position, and that outside their border there is a world which is infinitely more comfortable, very much better off, and free from outside interference.

I think what is happening in the N.W.F.P. is probably the most important thing in India today; the Constitutional experiment there is being watched right throughout Afghanistan and into Bokhara, and if it succeeds it will have tremendous repercussions. I suppose a really seditious person, addressing this audience, might say that two autocracies were making their last stand in the N.W.F.P.—the absolutism that rules in Afghanistan and the autocracy that you still have, and to a great extent necessarily have, in the militarized frontier region of India, a region so different from the other provinces of India. What is happening there is possibly the most important thing in India. The saddest thing from the point of view of an Englishman is that the Pathan, who used to be so friendly with us, is now unfortunately unfriendly. We have had a definite setback. The new N.W.F.P. Government have got a very hard job, and their success will not come by repressive methods used against the Red Shirt movement, but by what constructive methods they can find to get at the economic troubles that are distressing those people.

Mr. Thompson then spoke of Bengal, where also there was great poverty. The Province, he said, was not only in a profound depression, but slightly hysterical over some incidents which had been almost ignored in the British Press. In Bengal, further, there is a subversive movement among the young intellectuals. The youngest writers in Bengal (who have a great deal of influence) are all ultra-modernist. They know the modern literature of Europe pretty well; the English writers they admire are such authors as Wyndham Lewis, D. H. Lawrence, Eliot, Aldous Huxley, and the like. While in other parts of India people are writing books called The Mind's Harp, The Heart's Garland, or The Chaplet of Pearls, in Bengal they have finished not only with that kind of thing, but with the old poetry of mysticismpoetry about Radha and Krishna and the goddess Durga. They are keen on "realism" and have no bigoted objection to shocking the conservative sections of Indian society. A great deal of their work is filthy; but the important thing is, they are modern in outlook and manner. It is tragic that there is no sort of liaison between them and us: we have no suspicion that there is this extraordinarily up-to-date movement in Bengal breaking with the past so fast. They understand us well in many ways. If you meet them you find them attractive. They speak English without a suspicion of what is called the Babu accent; in fact, they have got the Oxford languor and the Oxford

accent in an exaggerated form. An understanding might have been built between us and them; but none exists.

When you come to the Gujerati-speaking parts of India, there is the closest possible connection and resemblance between them and Bengal. This is not accidental. It would be a good thing if a law could be passed forbidding for ten years translations from Bengali into Gujerati, for 90 per cent. of the books published in Gujerati are translations from Bengali. A knowledge of the history of Bengal and Gujerat will help one to understand a great deal of their unfriendly attitude today; one must remember also that in Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Patel, Gujerat has produced for the first time figures of importance on the all-India plane and all-India platform. If the British were really as wicked as Indians often suggest, and 'divided to rule,' there are two excellent opportunities; there is the beginning of a Mahratta-Gujerati quarrel and an allied quarrel between Ahmedabad and Bombay. The Mahrattas are a splendid people; I used to have a prejudice against them, but I do not think we are just to them; and I should like to quote what Mr. McMillan said to me: "The village people are the most reasonable in the world. They are as hard-headed as Scotsmen. You can explain anything to them, they will listen and take the trouble to get your point of view: they will not shut up their minds when anything involving religion is mentioned. They are a courageous people of spare physique, well knit and muscular, partly as the result of choice, partly as the result of stern natural conditions. Their women, to their great advantage, have been free of purdah. They are an excellent people, and I think sometimes that if the quarrel were simply between us and the Mahrattas we could settle it tomorrow, for the Mahrattas are at present a factor making for sobriety and for steadiness and their leaders are the soundest political leaders in India. I do not think people realize their importance in India today; for if I am right, and the unification of India has been temporary and is now breaking up (and it seems a great pity that a province like Madras should be held back from a big constitutional advance because of the backwardness of the people of India over a thousand miles away), the Mahrattas hold the balance of many problems in their hands.

A great many Englishmen in India feel that the central Government does not realize that it is the Provinces that matter now, and that they need to be increasingly cut loose from the centre. For

instance, if you look only at the centre you can be told that the Budget

is being balanced.

But they do not ask you to look at the provincial budgets! The economic condition of India is really bad. In the United Provinces Sir Malcolm Hailey told me he was convinced we should have to go every bit as far as we did in Ireland in the way of buying out Talukdars and Zamindars. A fact which it is hard to realize over here is that the bottom seems to have fallen out of the Indian revenue system. The peasant has had such remissions of his dues as he never had in the worst pre-war famine years. He is never going to pay full pre-war dues again.

I am quite sure myself that you will have to allow negotiations with the prisoners of the Government: sooner or later it is inevitable. People seem to think that we can keep them in prison for another year and a half, and then launch a Constitution and expect them to work it. What a magnificent asset you give a man if you allow him to go straight to the hustings with a certificate that he has come from prison! He would be bound to be elected as a 'patriot'; and, however excellent the Constitution that is worked out in the next eighteen months, to imagine it will be worked by people who come from prison and capture the elections simply to wreck the Constitution—to imagine that is folly.

Government is at present in a very strong position, thanks to several things. For example, over that murder of Stevens at Comilla, which was the meanest ever committed in India, it was generally admitted even by extremists that Government did not show any vindictiveness. Again, although Bengal at the time was hysterical over the Hijli and Chittagong episodes, even extremists admitted that the sentence on the woman who tried to shoot the Governor was amazingly lenient; and that was put down to the personal intervention of Sir Stanley Jackson. People still feel that Congress played the fool in a great many ways. They know a great deal of Congress activity was bluff, and that Government really had the game in their hands temporarily when they called that bluff, as they did call it. But, despite the strength of Government's present position, sooner or later negotiations will be inevitable. If there is anything in previous history, we shall probably negotiate when we are in a weak position, instead of now when we are in a strong position. Although there is no justification for flagrantly breaking the terms of an armistice, Congress was right in saying that the Delhi Pact was not a real peace but an armistice. And no treaty made with Gandhi alone, leaving out his belligerent lieutenants, is a peace that is going to be kept. Secondly, the emphasis of the Delhi Pact was not on principles but on details—how many ejected persons were to be reinstated, how many village officials given back their jobs, how many fines remitted. If you are to have a peace you must get down to principles; the Delhi Pact was only an armistice.

I agree with Conservatives that the Government of India has got to govern. But government is not simply locking people up. For example, one thing we have got to do is to settle the communal problem: we shall have to settle it ourselves sooner or later. While it was all right for the first Round-Table Conference to be mainly a series of debates and discussions, in the second Round-Table Conference our representatives ought to have remembered that after all, through no volition of the present generation, Britain is a partner to the Indian business. We should have taken a much more prominent part in the second Round-Table Conference than we did. We have had discussions going on half a dozen years. We shall have to settle the communal problem; and the longer we delay the harder it will be. There are a certain amount of data even now that show that the political settlement of the communal problem would not be quite as difficult as people imagine. Secondly, when I say we ought to govern more, of course the truth is that no democracy, or colourable imitation of a democracy, is able to manage India. You want somebody like Henry VIII. or Akbar. Not being either of these, the Government of India ought to behave as if it were: nothing has so raised its prestige of late as the passing of the Sarda Act and I do not think they would lose in prestige if that Act was enforced instead of disobeyed as, it is. It raised their prestige even to allow it to be passed.

Government should govern in other ways also. They have strong powers of bargaining with Native States in the fact that the States have such shocking administrative boundaries. Twenty years ago, we could have done much more by settling those boundaries. We have lost by waiting; and if we wait another ten years or so, we shall be able to do less than now. We ought to arrange the map of India, not in the way we are accustomed to, with endless Commissions and argument, but in a much more direct and overbearing fashion. Then as to Provincial Autonomy, Moderates oppose it strongly; but Govern-

ment ought to put as generous a measure as possible of provincial autonomy into practice as soon as it can, despite their opposition. Some of the provincial Moderate leaders are now open to argument and conviction, although they were not so at the last Round-Table Conference.

I do not know what we are to do about the economic depression. You remember that in the Crimean War the Tsar Nicholas said he attached great importance to the services of Generals January and February. I always have the feeling that we may be beaten in India by Generals Economic Trouble and Wrong Social Relations. I know that if you mention wrong social relations people think you are going to finish in a welter of sentimentalism. We must keep off that. But as for the economic problem, one reason why in the present trouble there has been so much less bitterness than last time is that Indians are thinking as they never did before about their social problem. One of the most important Indian leaders said to me, "We add a new France in population every three years." A great deal of their trouble is not due to princely extravagance, Governmental extravagance, or alien administration, but to social and religious customs which must be changed.

I am sure that either by remissions or by default the Land Revenue is going to drop badly. We are directly interested in this because the last Secretary of State in the House of Commons pledged the British taxpayer to be responsible for any debts that were incurred in India. It was in a quiet interchange of question and answer that the country did not notice, having much more important things to attend to at the time. I do not see how anything can prevent the debts of the Provincial Governments increasing steadily: something has got to be done about the economic situation.

Last of all, about social relations, a fair criticism is that our Government touches the life of India almost solely at one point, the administrative, where administration impinges on the lives of the people. That is almost the only place where we are in touch with the many-sided problem. We have magnificent assets in our hands but do not use them. I could give many illustrations, but must leave it. We have done extraordinarily well in many ways; but in other ways we have done fairly badly. We have done better in the essential things than any other nation would have done, but we are singularly in-

curious in intellectual matters. I gave an example just now of the amazingly modern movement in young Bengal, yet there is no channel by which these people can get in touch with us. You may say that apart from interest in big game hunting, we are interested in Indians chiefly when they make themselves politically a nuisance. You have to persuade them that we take them in on the ground floor, that there is such a thing as Imperial Citizenship. Of the Indian trouble 60 per cent. is economic and 30 per cent. wounded self-respect—only 10 per cent. comes under the head of political trouble.

Sir Albion Banerji: Sir John Thompson, ladies and gentlemen,—As the only Indian present at this meeting this afternoon I feel that a heavy responsibility rests on my shoulders in any attempt that I may make in contributing to the discussion after the very interesting address that Mr. Edward Thompson has just delivered to us. I am not exactly what might be called a representative Indian—in the sense that I do not represent any of the big political parties that have figured so largely in the recent discussions at the Round Table Conference. But I have had a certain amount of experience in the administration of India, especially in the Madras Presidency, in the Civil Service and in three of the most important States for a period of over thirty-six years, and I have given considerable thought to the very difficult problems facing us at the present moment. Personally I am inclined to agree with most of what Mr. Edward Thompson has told us as regards the details of the picture which he has put before us of the present position in India and the political prospect that lies before us. But I venture to say just one thing in regard to the Delhi Pact. Perhaps my views may be a little prejudiced, having been a member of Government at one time; but I think a great deal of importance has been attached to the Delhi Pact, and I do not know if, had there not been a Delhi Pact, we should have been in a worse position today than we are. The matters dealt with in the Delhi Pact were matters relating to internal administration. They had no bearing on politics, and if Mr. Gandhi himself framed a Government or Cabinet, or there was an All-Indian Federation with an Indian Prime Minister, all matters concerned in the Delhi Pact would have been dealt with by the Executive Government, the purely Indian Government, with satisfaction to themselves. At that moment a great deal of importance was attached to some of the questions brought into the Delhi Pact, but supposing Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi had not agreed, and Mr. Gandhi had not come to represent the Congress at the Second Round Table Conference, should we have been in any worse position than at the present moment? Immediately after the Round Table Conference closed and Mr. Gandhi went back we practically went back to the original position in a much more acute form.

Secondly, I agree that the present prospect in India is very gloomy indeed. We have attached too much importance to Federation, and thereby we are building, so to speak, the roof of the structure without paying attention to the foundations. I have got before me the latest report of the Federal Finance Committee. It was presented to Parliament only this month, and if you go through some of the figures as regards the financial position of the Federal Government that have been arrived at after a very careful investigation by the Committee, you will be

astounded. Most of the Provinces stand on the deficit side of the account, and the Central Federal Government, without making any provision for future contingencies as regards redistribution of revenue, or rearrangement as regards Customs Revenue in regard to certain Indian States' claims, and also as regards the contribution which these States pay to the Government of India-stands with a surplus of only four and a half crores of rupees. Can any sane person believe that a Federal structure could be established with any sound system of Federal finance when these figures, which are presented by an expert committee, are the data upon which a Federal constitution could be framed in India? But that is not all. The Provincial revenues will certainly have to contribute towards the Federal Government in very many ways. If the Central Government are to have any sense of responsibility, then there will have to be Indian ministers in the Cabinet representing every party and interest in India. The Cabinet must necessarily be a very large one, and the expenditure of the Federal Government, as far as I can judge, will be considerably larger than the expenditure of the present Government of India.

Now the second reason why I consider the prospect is very gloomy is that the communal problem at the present moment is more acute than it was two years ago. Every effort has been made by my countrymen on all sides to arrive at a settlement, but those who know the details of the Communal question can very well say without any exaggeration that amongst ourselves it would be impossible to settle it, and the British Government must take that question in hand. Supposing the British Government do settle it, it is not going to satisfy all parties, and in a Federal system there must be that necessary harmony to knit together all the different units in a vast continent like India; and unless there is a general consensus of opinion and agreement in regard to this communal question I fear that any Federal constitution we may set up will simply create additional reasons for serious communal differences likely to prove a great danger to the peace of India as a whole. Then there is the question about the Princes. The Princes may accept the principle of Federation, but, as Mr. Thompson has put it, the question of the State subjects has not been taken up at all. We have some knowledge of the recent troubles in Kashmir, and if the States' subjects do not feel that they have got the opportunity of exercising any influence over the States' administration, who knows but there may be serious trouble in the Indian States which will embarrass the British Government tremendously in regard to their treaty obligations to the Princes, the obligations they have undertaken by treaty to save them from aggression and also from internal disorder?

Along with the political prospect, the economic prospect has also to be taken into consideration, for on that depends the financial stability of any country, and no Government can be run without commerce and trade being carried on peacefully, and without life and property being adequately protected against wanton mischief and reckless disorder.

The general desire immediately to lay the foundation for the Federation, with responsibility at the centre, is chiefly due to the political ambition of a few amongst the different communities in India for power and place as Ministers. It is forgotten, however, that to satisfy all such ambition a very large Cabinet has to be formed in which every interest will be represented. This will involve very large expenditure at the Centre which the Federal system will be unable to meet.

The recent report furnishes additional proof that the different units of the Federation must come into being first and have a financial stability of their own. Till, therefore, the whole outlook can be changed to view things from a practical standpoint, the settlement of the Indian's political problem seems far distant.

But things have gone too far, and it may perhaps be difficult to re-trace these steps which have been taken without full cognisance of the implications and

difficulties of the Federation plan.

Mr. J. A. Spender: I really have no right to speak to an expert assembly, but I have paid two longish visits to India at intervals of a good many years. The first time I went I found a consensus of opinion that a visitor like myself, merely a journalist, had little right to express an opinion. I listened and I thought a little. I came back. I found India plunged into my own business of politics, and I took a little courage, formed certain opinions, and was bold enough to express them. As a politician of the old country, may I say what struck me looking upon India from the outside? I saw it committed to a large step in democracy, but apparently without any of the apparatus for making that step effective as we should understand it in our country. One instance I remember very much impressed itself upon me. I came away from the Delhi Assembly; I was there on one of the last days before it was dissolved. There were going to be General Elections about the month of October, and there were scattered all over India Indian politicians, spreading their gospel rightly and properly from their point of view. I asked what the British Government was going to do? It was April, and the elections were to be in October. I was told that the Viceroy might make one declaration, but otherwise there would be no official appearance on the part of the Government of India; which meant that here you had a Government standing aside from what is the nearest analogy to a General Election and the Opposition having full run. That seemed disappointing because, if you had those political contacts and a special corps of politically educated officials to go out at such times and establish contact with the Indian politicians (although it is not a thing to be expected from people whose main thoughts and time are spent on administration of the most responsible kind), I could not help thinking it would go a considerable way to meet the social question upon which the lecturer has enlarged to-day. If the political contacts are to do any good they must lead to social relations. As I saw them at Delhi, such contact was confined to the Assembly, not outside.

On the same occasion I had many opportunities of talking to Indians of all kinds about the political development and what was hoped for in the future, and I thought it most unfortunate that they had nothing in their heads but the English system of responsible ministry. To them responsible ministry was the only way of democracy, but obviously that is not the case. It is not so in the United States of America. If we tried to apply the principle of responsible government to a federal State like the United States it is reasonably certain that it would break down. It is even now breaking down in Germany, and I hear my German friends regret that they were led to adopt a British instead of an American model for their federal country. I suppose it is too late for us to go back now, but it is possible to have a democratic constitution without what is called a responsible Government—that is, a Government that goes out of office and comes into office according to a majority in the Assembly. In a vast country like India you cannot get the unities which are necessary for a party Government. You can have a democratic assembly which checks Government, but you cannot have in India, any more than you can in the United States of America, sufficient groundwork of opposing parties to make a foundation for responsible Government work.

I entirely agree with what Mr. Thompson has said, that we should boldly declare our own policy and go forward with the experiment in provincial autonomy. If we are constantly waiting for this party or the other party or something we call unity in politics—a thing we never get here and are unlikely to

get in the East—we are bound to lose ground in India.

One word about the economic situation; of course it is not a purely Indian problem. It is a problem of the whole world, and if we could only get our world Statesmen to grapple with the imminent and dangerous problems, especially the monetary problem, I think we should get a certain relief for India as for the rest of the world. But to regard it as a problem to be settled by each nation for itself would be terrible for a country like India. If we are all going to consider this as an internal problem to be met by raising revenues, new taxation, subsidizing this, that, and the other, and restricting international trade, the situation will get worse and worse. In this case I feel convinced that there is no local

settlement for India any more than for the rest of the world.

Sir HENRY LAWRENCE: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,-I have one small quarrel with Mr. Thompson in the course of the very large number of admirable points he has given us to think over-he has departed, I think, from his usual custom by being most astonishingly discreet. I certainly had hoped to have something more of Mr. Thompson's interviews and of the information he obtained from those interviews. But for once he has been very careful to tell us nothing that could do any harm if it went outside. I am sorry that he has ended so much on what he calls a note of depression. There are certain points in the present situation which are far better than we had any hope of seeing for a very long time. Take one point. Look back on the list of Secretaries of State for the last generation and I do not think you will find anyone who has had a historic sense before, and I feel sure too that it is very rare to find a man who understands percentages or the meaning of figures. Sir Samual Hoare made a speech in the House of Commons only ten days ago, and it was a very remarkable speech in various ways. One point he made was a point that is very seldom appreciated that the population of India is over 350,000,000, and in any population of 350,000,000 you must always expect to find a certain number of men, and sometimes women, who are dissatisfied with everything that is done by any authority. The number of people whom the Government have had to put away in detention for a short time—a short time up to now, but I hope it will continue till they cease to be dangerous—is 26,000. If you compare 26,000 with the total of 350,000,000 you will find that the number so put away is comparatively small. I had hoped Mr. Thompson would tell us his views on the remarkable publication that appeared last Saturday purporting to be the policy of the leader of the Opposition. Mr. Lansbury announced that he considered the Ordinances had failed, and that therefore it was necessary to release the Congress leaders. Well, at different times the Government of India have been blamed for the fact that they did not take measures against the leaders of the trouble, but took measures against the rank and file. Now, Mr. Lansbury's suggestion appears to me to be that once again the leaders should be released from all inconvenience, but the rank and file presumably should remain, as they like to phrase it, "rotting in prison." That is not the policy that I hope the present House of Commons will listen to with any favour. Another point in that political pronouncement was a definite stand against the introduction of provincial autonomy in advance of the Federal Government. I understand Sir Albion Banerji to say that he is in favour of the introduction of provincial autonomy, although there are certain sections of political opinion in India which have taken a different view. I believe that the Moslems have definitely stated that they wish to see provincial autonomy introduced in the first instance. But for some mysterious reason—perhaps Mr. Thompson, if he is indiscreet enough, will tell us why-the Indian National Congress and the Moderate Party have combined to oppose that. To my mind it is very important indeed that provincial autonomy should come first, in order that the world may

see how the new system of government will work in limited areas before there is any question of risking a breakdown of the machinery over such a tragically enormous area as the whole of India. I do not myself think that the outlook is anything like so gloomy as Mr. Thompson has stated. If we look back over the last hundred years we find that ever since Lord Macaulay started the education of Indian schools on the basis of English it has been anticipated that with the expansion of the Indian mind on English literature and English history, there was bound to come a time when they would demand English institutions; and, in fact, Lord Macaulay left it on record that if that day should ever come he would regard it as the proudest day in the history of England. That is the anticipation which has now come true. That has been foreseen for a hundred years. Step by step the British Government have laboured to educate the Indians in a sense of administrative capacity, and they have laboured not without fruit. When we see and hear so much nonsense talked and published in the papers we are apt to lese sight of the fact that there are hundreds of thousands of villages in which there are sensible villagers—I was very glad to hear Mr. Thompson's tribute to the Mahrattas, with whom I have had more to do than with most villagers in Indiaand those men are a very solid background for order and for the future prosperity of India, and if at times those people are led astray by persons who have succeeded in capturing their sentiment as Mr. Gandhi has-after a certain period of agitation they are very likely to return to much more sober methods of thought, and that, I believe, will be the result when they have had sufficient time for the bucolic mind to appreciate some of the extraordinary dangers that may otherwise come upon their villages. I believe that with time the people of India will settle down to the new situation, and that we are by no means destitute of sufficient statesmanship to carry this gigantic scheme to a successful conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN, in proposing a vote of thanks to the lecturer, said that he had had recent experience of how things were going in India, and felt that Mr. Thompson's views of the future were too gloomy. "The Ordinances, as worked, make little or no difference to the everyday life of the well-meaning citizen, and yet whole districts and provinces have been reduced to order by this means. Their object is to give a fair chance for the peaceful introduction of the reforms, not to stamp out the Congress. We wish to defeat the Congress as an unconstitutional body. When they are prepared to come in and work as a constitutional body as His Majesty's Government or His Majesty's Opposition, we should welcome them. The main preliminary to political advance is administrative security. The great danger two years ago was that a situation would arise in India which we should not be able to deal with by any administrative measures which public opinion would sanction. We have now public opinion behind us. Lord Willingdon's Ordinances have worked a change in India that few people who have not been there can realize, but let us not forget that the great work which has been done by Lord Willingdon since last December would not have been possible if it had not been for the nursing of public opinion by Lord Irwin and Lord Willingdon himself prior to that date. (Applause.) Whether Lord Irwin might safely have arrested Mr. Gandhi at the time of the declaration of independence at the Lahore Congress in 1929, or a few weeks later when he started his march to the sea, was an open question. If I had been in Lord Irwin's place I would have arrested him, but I am prepared to admit that the Government of India at the present moment is in a stronger position than it would have been if Mr. Gandhi had been arrested at that time." (Hear, hear.) The Government of India vis-a-vis public opinion in the West, in America, and in Europe was in

a stronger position to-day than it had ever been. Public opinion two years ago simply would not have allowed the Government of India, or, rather, the Government at home working through the Government of India, to take the steps Lord Willingdon has been allowed to take with general public approval during the last four or five months. If public opinion continued to support the Secretary of State and the Government of India in dealing administratively with these administrative problems, we should be able to carry through. We had before us four and a half years of the present Government. Mr. Thompson had said that he thought that in future the rural population would never pay their full revenue again. In northern India, at any rate, during recent years the old standards of assessments had been reduced, and Sir Malcolm Hailey had stated only a day or two ago that practically the whole of the land revenue and the rent that had been in arrears in the United Provinces had been got in. It was very much the same in the Delhi Province; Anti-Congress propagation in the villages was important. In Delhi some of the leading zemindars-many of them quite small landholders—had been trained to stand up against the Congress speakers and had become excellent publicity agents.

The vote of thanks to the lecturer was heartily accorded.

ANNIVERSARY MEETING

THE Anniversary Meeting of the Royal Central Asian Society was held at the Royal Society's Hall on Wednesday, June 8, at 4.15 p.m. Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, President of the Society, was in the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN called upon General Sir William Beynon to read the Report

for 1931.

General Sir William Beynon: Since the last Anniversary Meeting we have had a most interesting set of speakers and lecturers.

Sir John Simon and Mr. Whitley were our guests at the Annual Dinner.

Sir William Barton and Colonel C. E. Bruce spoke on the N.W.F. and its problems. Mr. Gull, Colonel Smallwood, and Mr. O. M. Green spoke of various aspects of China, Manchuria, and Shanghai. Mr. Findlay Andrew on the Moslems in North-West China. You may have seen that Mr. Findlay Andrew has been engaged on the delicate negotiations connected with Sir John Hope Simpson's efforts to relieve the flooded areas. It is his great knowledge of, and friendship with, the Moslems which is carrying him through.

The Persia Funds have given us a lecture from Mr. Talbot Rice on his excavations at Hira; M. Casenave and Colonel Lethbridge have spoken to us on Indo-China and Burma; Sir Nigel Davidson on 'Iraq; Commander Corbyn on the Armenian Nation; Miss Aidin on "Women's Education in Persia"; Captain Collins on Turkey; and Mr. Garle on the Capitulations, a subject of very special interest to all who trade and live in the East. Mr. Philby spoke a week ago on his explorations in the Empty Quarter, and Sir Arnold Wilson is to-day our special Anniversary Lecturer.

We have also had four special lantern lectures, two jointly with the Royal Asiatic Society, (1) Mrs. Weir on her journey to Lhasa, (2) Mr. Skrine, whose useful paper in the Journal has guided many of our members and others across Persia. Captain Morris and Colonel Crocker gave illustrated lectures, and Mr. Williamson explained the subjects of Captain Sherriff's beautiful slides and films of Chinese Turkestan.

The following talks have not been reported in the Journal: Maulana Shaukat Ali on the Moslem World; Mr. Cadell on the Second Round Table Conference; Mr. Peter Fleming on his journey home from Mukden; Mr. Graham on Social Relations in Siam; Mr. Reid on the working of the Constitutions in Ceylon.

Other members' meetings were addressed by Sir Henry Lawrence (interesting to read in connection with Lord Lothian's report), General Twiss on Disarmament in Asia, Abdul Qadir Khan on Afghanistan, and Mr. Korostovetz on the Problems of the Black Sea, all of which we hope to publish.

We hoped at the beginning of this year to increase our membership to 1,500, but owing to the financial crises I am sorry to say we have not done it. We have had no less than 100 resignations and 14 deaths, but on the other hand we have had 136 new members, leaving us eighty members short. The Council regret to report the following deaths:

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Mr. L. S. Brinton, Mr. F. W. Chardin, Mr. W. Forbes-Manson, Dr. Mahamohopadhya Haraprasad Sastri, Mr. F. D. Harford, General H. Hendley, Admiral Sir Richard Hyde, Colonel A. A. Smith, Mr. T. H. Stern, Colonel the Hon. M. G. Talbot, Sir Dorahji Tata, Admiral A. W. Waymouth.

The Honorary Treasurer then read the accounts, to be found at the end

of the Journal, which were adopted.

The Chairman: I should like to emphasize what the Honorary Treasurer has said about the need for more members; and there is one point I wish to remind you about, that is, that members who do not pay through bankers' orders should pay promptly.

We have had a very successful year; the lectures have been extraordinarily good and consequently very well attended, as Sir William Beynon has told us.

We are also very grateful to our reviewers, and to those who have helped us in the Journal. I think we ought to put in a special word of thanks to members who have been so very energetic in getting recruits for us, and I hope that they will not relax their efforts.

I am sure you will agree with me in deep regret at the loss of Sir Maurice Bunsen, who was our Chairman, and has been a member of the Council for many years.

With regard to the elections, I am glad to say Lord Lloyd has consented to be

Chairman for the next year. (Applause.)

Those Vice-Presidents retiring from the Council are Sir E. Denison Ross and Field-Marshal Viscount Plumer.

I must say how sorry we are to lose Sir Denison Ross and Lord Plumer. We have lost one Vice-President by the death of Sir Maurice de Bunsen.

The following have been nominated by the Council in their place: Admiral

Sir Herbert Richmond, Sir William Beynon, and Sir Harry Fox.

I know you would like to join me in thanking Sir William Beynon for all he has done for the Society during the time he has acted as Honorary Secretary. He has served for five and a half years, and has done great things. It has increased in every way, both in importance and in numbers since he took it on; he has been untiring in looking after the interests of the Society.

Sir Harry Fox has only been with us for a year, and for a large part of that time has been ill, but he, too, has been a splendid Honorary Secretary. (Applause.)

Sir Harcourt Butler has consented to act as Vice-Chairman.

Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes and Mr. E. M. Gull as Honorary Secretaries.

(The names were put to the vote and carried unanimously.)

Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., as a member of the Council.

Mr. E. H. Keeling, Mr. A. Rose, and Mr. Strickland retire from the Council and have been nominated for re-election.

The Chairman put the names to the vote and they were carried nem. con.

Sir Harry Fox spoke on behalf of himself and Sir William Beynon, thanking the Chairman for his kind words. He said how much he had enjoyed the work, and regretted that illness made it necessary for him to retire. It had given them great pleasure to work together and with the staff, and he felt sure that the membership would increase and so make any financial worry unnecessary. (Applause.)

REVIEWS

Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict. By Owen Lattimore. $8\frac{3}{4}$ " $\times 5\frac{3}{4}$ " Pp. xvi + 311. 4 maps. New York: Macmillan. 12s. 6d.

Mr. Owen Lattimore, after experience on the borders of China and Inner Mongolia, took a long journey through Chinese Turkestan, and then spent nine months of travel and residence in Manchuria with a fellowship from the Social Science Research Council of New York. He is therefore well fitted to present the real facts of the situation to Western readers. From his own experience and from his studies of Chinese authorities he reaches conclusions which are original and to some degree run counter to the popular view of Manchuria's future.

He plunges with a wealth of detail into the historical background of the "reservoir" of tribal invasions beyond the Great Wall, of early Chinese expansion, conquest and compromise, of the attempts to colonize the frontier with disbanded soldiery, and of the problems created by frontiersmen, opium-growers, and bandits. It is interesting to find that the Manchurian bandits are not purely destructive like their kindred in China. They found more villages than

any other outlaws in the world.

Mr. Lattimore treats the problem of Manchuria from the historical and racial rather than from the political standpoint. The solution lies in the outcome of the conflict between three different peoples and cultures, Chinese, Russian, and Japanese. Yet the crux of Manchurian affairs is now as in the past the relation of Manchuria to China. The policies of the "inward facing" frontiers of regionalism still take precedence in Nanking regions over those of the outer frontiers of China. The recent attempts at mass colonization have only been made possible by Western methods and assistance in the shape of new railroads. The resultant growth of wealth and power increases the pressure of Manchuria on China. For no matter how effective the political autonomy of the former may be, the latter remains the major focus of the life of the community.

Mass colonization has been developed as a forward policy of defence against Russian and Japanese aggression intermittently since 1880. A parallel to this can be found in British policy on the North-West frontier of India, where a forward movement of the frontier is maintained with a view to the better protection of the plains behind. When for a time Russia relaxed her pressure in order to gain orthodox diplomatic recognition, and when Japan momentarily adopted an attitude of conciliation in order to ease her relations with the Powers having interests in the Pacific, China mistook their attitudes for weakness. She forced first Russia and then Japan to take a firm stand. Her forward policy has come to a standstill.

There were grave defects in the Chinese method of colonizing Manchuria. Owing to a weak central Government no funds were available for the impartial development of distant lands by strict bureaucratic methods. Big interests had a priority of choice in taking up land, and recruited their tenants from Shantung peasants reduced to economic desperation by famine and overcrowding at home. Far from being hungry for land in Manchuria, the great mass of the colonists were in flight from the land in China. Their one object still is to make enough money with which to return home. There is an increasing tendency for them to leave the soil and migrate to the cities. This drift away from the land to the cities is as important a phenomenon as the recent colonization. There is no

dynamic urge within the Chinese driving them northwards to Manchuria, yet they are overwhelmingly in the lead as regards colonization. It is an induced reaction to foreign aggression, not an original pioneer movement. As a result of contact with the West, power in the North Pacific has become as important to China as to Russia and Japan.

On the other hand, Russia's eastward expansion is derived from forces within herself, which in the past have often overridden the considered policies of her Government. Mongolia and Central Asia are the main front of this advance, but Manchuria is the pivot upon which it turns, since it commands the Pacific outlet.

Control of the North Pacific is essential for the safety of Japan, and her industries are dependant upon the successful exploitation of the minerals in Manchuria. But the Japanese have reached a stage of development where settlement outside Japan no longer appeals to them. They go abroad as exploiters and entrepreneurs, not as settlers. Their peasants are drifting to the towns. Their unemployed, like our own, are unwilling to emigrate, and, if forced to do so, are failures. At best they may create another Korea or a new India; they can never colonize Manchuria.

At the same time Manchuria is the focus of conflict between three antipathetic styles of civilization: the old but still vigorous culture of China, the new but more powerful system of the West as sponsored by Japan, and the new but still incalculable force of Russia. Chinese civilization had no difficulty in conquering that of the Manchus, although it has never assimilated that of the Mongols or Koreans. The essential difference between it and Western civilization lies in the Chinese attitude towards responsibility and definition. The Chinese fix responsibility not in terms of who has done something, but of what has happened, when something has happened, responsibility must be assigned, with the result that there is an underlying tendency to prevent decisive things from happening and so diffuse responsibility. The type looked for in the Chinese colonist is not the man who goes out in search of loneliness with a desire to be free, but the man who adapts himself to the needs of a spreading society. In the words of Chuang Tzu, "The divine man trusts to the natural development of events. He does not strive to introduce the artificial into the domain of the natural." Definition is as far as possible avoided and when used is of secondary importance. All working processes are therefore carried out in a spirit of compromise between fact and theory. In the West any such compromise is felt to be a failure of the system; in the East it is the system.

In self-defence China is being forced to adopt Western methods and technique. She utilizes the formulæ, but disowns the cultural principles which underlie them. The result is the present stalemate of ruinous makeshifts. The hope of a rally depends on the "Chinese Renaissance" movement towards the rediscovery of the basic values of their culture. Hitherto Chinese schemes of reform have been merely proposals of maximum surrender on the part of China. She has still to apply Western criteria to her own values of thought and experience, as an essential preliminary to her digestion of Western principles. Until she has solved this problem she will be unable to resume the initiative in the exploitation and control of Manchuia. "Constructive foreign policy is the luxury of the nation who is strong enough to spare time from domestic China is still trying to use the weapons of the West to preserve herself from the West, in the hope that Western civilization is unsound and therefore doomed to failure. Japan has passed through that stage and emerged a nation which has integrated itself with the West; she carries on in the East the work of the West. The study of the Russian-Japanese War is an essential of

military history for modern soldiers. As the Chinese expand into Manchuria and Mongolia, they eliminate what they can, and absorb the rest, but the Japanese follow the Western procedure of administration from outside and above, with a tendency to "improve" and create "progress," the criteria for "progress" being Western. The result is a cultural hostility of increasing bitterness from both Chinese and Koreans towards Japan. This is increased in China by fear, arising from the fact that there is no traditional method of dealing with aggression from over the sea. A minor defeat in negotiation by Japan causes more baffled rancour throughout China and Manchuria than a major military defeat by Russia. There is a feeling that when Russia can be used at all, the method of the use is plain and the results calculable, but that any attempt to use Japan is profoundly dangerous. There is therefore a prevailing tendency for China to align herself with Russia against Japan. History is on the side of Russia's Pacific aspirations. This is the keynote of the whole book.

Japanese policy in Manchuria is controlled by the struggle between Western civilization and Chinese culture. Japanese rouse cultural hostility wherever they settle in the East. The Russians, on the other hand, have proved in Urianghai and Outer Mongolia an ability to rule by conversion and amalgamation superior even to the Chinese. In Manchuria her exiles have settled on and make a living out of the land, even turning with success to banditry. From the Pacific to the Pamirs, Russia has assumed from the Chinese point of view the historic Hun-Turk-Mongol-Manchu functions of the northern barbarian. But with this difference: she is overflowing with the pressure of ideas more powerful than the mere pressure of population. Her new social-economic ideas have proved their vigour and their capacity to spread in the East as a result of her talent for modernization without the corollary of subordination to the West. Chinese and Western civilizations are too rigid to adapt themselves to local conditions. Russia, while requiring certain articles of faith, can tolerate local patriotism of language and tradition. She does not merely establish an administrative order over the heads of subject peoples, nor does she depend on colonization, but she penetrates their indigenous life with great rapidity and thoroughness. Russia of all the countries of the world is the one of which it may be said that something new is bound to happen. Her movement to the East and the Pacific is the most important combined migration of people and culture in the modern world.

The future of Manchuria is not only a question of the superiority of a Chinese population over Russian, Japanese, or Korean efforts to plant colonies of settlers. There is the conflict between the Chinese, Russian, and Japanese-Western way of life. The underlying struggle is and will throughout the present century be caused by the conflicting migration of cultures and peoples and their mutual efforts to assert themselves. In such a struggle, generals and statesmen are the accidents of history; tradition, the way of life, the effort of race and region to assert themselves in the face of culture and nation are history itself.

The Social Science Research Council of New York are to be congratulated on having sponsored the production of such a valuable book.

England in Palestine. By Norman Bentwich. $8\frac{3}{4}'' \times 5\frac{1}{4}''$. Pp. viii + 358; map. London: Kegan Paul. 1932. 12s. 6d.

Amidst the mass of books and pamphlets on Palestine and Zionism that have been issued of recent years from all the presses of Europe and North America to say nothing of Asia—there are few that stand out as of more than ephemeral interest, but this book by Mr. Bentwich is one of the few. Its nearest relatives are the reports of the Mandatory Government to the League of Nations, but it would be unjust to the author to qualify his book as a kind of glorified "Report on the Administration of Palestine for the Years 1918-1931." The analogy arises rather from the fact that, as one of the principal officers of the Administration during that period, his point of view is much the same as that of the official reports, and he endeavours to maintain the same balance and impartiality between the opposing views and claims of Zionists and Pan-Arabs. Yet it would be equally wrong to regard it as an apologia for the Palestine Administration, although it does review dispassionately the activities of the British authorities and give due credit for the reforms carried out by them.

It is, in short, precisely what it claims to be—a plain narrative of the history of Palestine since the inception of British rule, a narrative which derives its peculiar value from several facts: that it is an organic whole, that it is related from within and not from without, and that it is from the pen of one who was himself in the closest touch with the events which he describes. If fault must be found with it, it will probably be found in the last of these considerations—namely, that it suffers from a certain official reticence and subordination of personal judgment on some points. In relating, for instance, the establishment of the Emir 'Abdallah in Transjordan, Mr. Bentwich dismisses the early diffi-

culties and abuses of his rule in a few guarded phrases:

"The Emir in the first years of his rule was not careful to limit his personal expenditure, and the controlling hand of the British Resident was lightly laid on his generous instincts. His Majesty's Government was called on to make grants of £E180,000 in the year 1922-23, etc. . . . The somewhat extravagant expenditure of the Emir in the early years and the enforcement of taxation with a certain inequality as between the tribes and the settled cultivators led to a rising against the Government in the summer of 1923. The rising was soon put down, and had the salutary effect of inducing stricter control over the financial administration."

Good and well so far as it goes—but is this really all that Mr. Bentwich would like to say? Is it even enough to enable the student of Palestinian affairs to appreciate the real state of affairs in Transjordan and its repercussions there and elsewhere? A similar delicacy or economy is observable in his exposition of the system of taxation and fiscal reforms, to all of which no more than a page and a half is given, despite its importance for the life of the country. The exigencies of space, however, are doubtless responsible to some extent for this compression, since even the most remarkable and unquestionable reforms are described often only in brief outline. The prison régime, which has won the admiration of neighbouring countries (besides having, as it appears, a direct interest for "a considerable percentage of the population"), receives but half a page, the successful campaign against malaria and the anopheles mosquito two sentences. But, on the whole, the second part of the book, which describes the executive and administrative machinery, is an excellent and informative summary, enlivened by judicious pen-portraits of past and serving officers of the Government.

The historical section, forming three-quarters of the book, is naturally concerned mainly (though by no means exclusively) with the development of Arab-Jewish relations. Mr. Bentwich, however, faithful to his title, excludes from his introductory chapter ("England and Palestine Before the Great War") any account of the early Jewish colonization. His exposition of the subsequent events will not prove wholly, palatable to the extreme protagonists on either side, but rarely departs from a calm objectivity, though the analysis, for example, of the

motives of opposition in England to the Zionist policy (p. 73) echoes rather surprisingly the accents of Colonel Wedgwood. Is it not possible that there were those who, while sympathizing whole-heartedly with the Zionist ideal, felt that the direction in which it was moving was disastrous, and perhaps others who resented the unscrupulous religious propaganda by which it was supported? That in various matters the methods both of the Palestine and of the Home Governments have been at fault is admitted by Mr. Bentwich; nevertheless, he takes heart of hope, and concludes the grim story of 1929 and 1930 with a vision of mutual understanding and co-operation in "a bi-national self-governing State."

Two points, finally, which he makes are worth noting. In one passage he enters a caveat against the multiplication of English officers. In another he deplores the importation of English legal terminology and precedent. Are not both of these features aspects of one and the same tendency, which under the labels of efficiency, reform, and the like, has been gradually altering in recent decades the character of European administration in Asia and Africa, and not altogether, one fears, for the greater happiness of their peoples? What is likely to be the result of the introduction of English law into a country with such divergent traditions and populated by peoples with such contradictory ideas? This is very much Mr. Bentwich's own ground, and one may express the hope that if his new duties at the Hebrew University will allow him the opportunity, he will sometime or another take up this question and treat it in the same thoroughgoing fashion as he has here treated the Palestinian problem in general.

H. A. R. GIBB.

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An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions: Proposals for the Initiation of Reform. By Sir Ernest Dowson, K.B.E., formerly Surveyor-General of Egypt and later Financial Adviser to the Egyptian Government. Iraqi Legation, 51, Queen's Gate Gardens, S.W. 7. 4s. 6d. net.

This exceedingly able report, by one of the greatest living authorities upon the subject with which it deals, is dated December, 1931, but is the outcome of investigations undertaken in 1930, some of the fruits of which have been embodied in provisional reports. It is illustrated by five excellent maps, and furnished with a number of valuable statistical tables. The total population of Iraq in 1930 is given as 2,824,000, a figure which corresponds very closely with the very rough census of 1919, which estimated the population, excluding Sulaimani, at 2,695,000. Sulaimani is credited in 1930 with 94,000, so that on this basis the total figure

in 1930 is almost exactly the same as for 1919.

The total area included within the frontiers of Iraq today is 453,500 square kilometres; that of Iraq in 1920, before great areas of the western desert were added to the burdens of the infant State, was about 300,000 square kilometres. Sir E. Dowson estimates the region of cultivable land within the rainfall zone at 41,000 square kilometres, and that within the irrigation zone at 51,000 square kilometres, representing 9 per cent. and 11 per cent. of the total surface of the country respectively. Only one-fifth to one-tenth of these zones is actually cultivated in any given year. The mean density of the highly mobile rural population per square kilometre in the cultivated region works out at nineteen in the rainfall and thirty-five in the irrigation zones, a very low proportion in each case.

Sir Ernest Dowson pays a well-deserved tribute to Mr. S. H. Longrigg, formerly Inspector-General of Revenue, whose "extremely able" note in May, 1926, gave fresh impetus to the consideration of reform, but not, unfortunately,

sufficient to produce results. "The failure to do anything appears to have been primarily due to lack of a competent executive service." He also refers with gratitude to "several papers, written in the days of the early administration by experienced officers of the Indian Government, outlining measures for settlement which, if steadily applied and developed, should by now have gone far to mitigate, if not to remove, the worst existing disabilities. Unfortunately, the promise of this preliminary work was interrupted and never took shape."

Among these papers, it is fair to mention, will be found a very complete scheme for a progressive cadastral survey of Iraq, covering a period of ten years, based upon accurate major triangulation, prepared for the Civil Administration by Colonel F. W. Pirrie of the Survey of India. Yet even this scheme, had it been pursued, might have been rendered abortive by the continual malicious

destruction of survey marks to which the report alludes.

Space does not permit of a summary of Sir Ernest Dowson's lucid and well-balanced survey of existing conditions of tenure, of the actual condition of the land, and of land revenue payments under varying assessments. In his "Recommendations," covering some 40 pages, he urges unified planning and direction, an increase and intensification of survey work on the scale of one ten-thousandth, and a comprehensive revision of the system of land registration.

Of air-photography, he remarks:

"The difficulties met with appear to have been occasioned by some failure by Government to ensure effective co-operation between the Survey Department and the air work. This should not prevent careful study of the advisability of again utilizing air photography under more carefully considered arrangements at least in less accessible areas. The exclusion of all but bold topo-cadastral boundaries should facilitate the use of air photographs in the original survey: but the simplicity of detail, the quality of contouring needed for irrigation purposes and the scale adopted may be expected to continue to make the use of the plane table economical, and of the level necessary, throughout the cultivated terrain. But recent advances in the use of air photographs have been great, and further advances should be carefully followed by the Survey Department, because of the great acceleration in the rate of survey which the utilization of air photography secures. But while air work can unquestionably be carried out best by a specialist organization, such work should be done as part and parcel of the national survey and not as an independent operation."

Of Land Settlement operations, to which Sir Ernest attaches great importance,

he writes:

"Every first-class Iraqi will be needed for some time ahead in the regular grades and for the regular work of Government. Settlement of rights is a temporary need apart from the current administration, and Government could not do better than entrust its conduct to some of the present Administrative Inspectors, who are being released from their current duties. It would be impossible to find anywhere a body of officers better fitted to discharge these onerous and responsible functions. They have served the Government of el 'Iraq devotedly for a number of years. They are familiar with the working of the various public services and have long been accustomed to collaborate with them. They have, for the most part, long since shown their knowledge of, and their interest in, the land problems with which they would be required to deal. They are familiar with the fundamental provisions of the current Ottoman Land Code, with post-war legislation affecting land, and with the customary practices of the country. They have already had considerable judicial experience as magistrates. They know the country and the language of the people. They know, and are known by, all

leading Iraqis. They understand and sympathize with the difficulties of landowners and cultivators, and they would spare no pains to help them."

This valuable State paper, more vital to the welfare of Iraq in the reviewer's opinion, than any Treaty or Convention, concludes with the following wise words:

"The establishment in practice throughout the country of a secure legal land tenure will not be brought about by a vote in the Legislative Chamber nor by any official actions alone. A considerable amount of preparatory work must precede any useful legislation: and such preparatory work must be well conceived and thorough if it is to yield satisfactory, economical, and assured results. For even the most appropriate legislation is only the national authority to proceed. Before such legislation can be implemented attention must be directed to providing the necessary working organization, to securing suitable officers, and to formulating investigatory and technical procedure which will both satisfy the practical requirements of the work and ensure the co-operation of the agricultural population. For success must be gauged by its ultimate effects, and it will be decisively determined in the open fields by the confidence felt by the general body of landholders and cultivators in the integrity and competence of the settlement staff, by the reasonableness and dispatch of the procedure adopted, and by the equity and stability of the findings." A. T. W.

England in the Near East. By H. U. Hoepli. $9\frac{1}{2}^{n} \times 6\frac{1}{2}^{n}$. Pp. xi+168. Germany: Palm u. Enke.

This book is the reprint of the thesis the author delivered at the University of Erlangen in Germany in order to obtain his doctorate. In spite of its having been delivered in Germany the author's name and the dedication to his uncle Commandator Hoepli, seem to indicate that he is of Italian rather than German origin.

The book starts with a brief historical survey from pre-Roman times up to the present and then treats the last twenty to twenty-five years in great detail.

The writer has studied his subject fully not only in Germany but also in England, France, and the United States; there is no evidence, internal or otherwise, that he has ever visited Iraq or the Near East; had he been able to do so the book would have been more valuable. He has taken great pains to document all his statements and there is an index at the end, also some maps in the text though they are not very good. Beyond the fact that the book can serve as a concise and well documented handbook to the subject, its main interest to English readers is that it embodies the intelligent continental opinion on the Iraq question, and is not one of those tendentious books so common on the Continent which, while purporting to be serious works, are mainly vehicles for throwing mud at Great Britain and are too often the work of so-called professors. The writer does his best to maintain an impartial tone throughout, though at the beginning there is a slight anti-British bias, but by the end "he that came to curse stays to bless."

Medieval India: Social and Economic Conditions. By A. Yusuf Ali, C.B.E., M.A., LL.M. 61" × 5". Pp. xii + 53. Oxford University Press. 1932.

This little book of 53 pages contains the substance of four lectures given in Urdu to the Hindustani Academy, Allahabad. The object which Mr. Yusuf Ali set before him was, we may conjecture, to stimulate the interest of young Indian historians in a field of scholarship which has hitherto been little explored but which

will well repay careful study. The field is the social and economic life of India in the Middle Ages. From his own wide reading Mr. Yusuf Ali gives some illustrations of the valuable lessons which may be learned from a patient examination of the material even now available. As his object is to point the way to others, to found a school of historical research, he devotes considerable space to indicating the authorities, or sources, of the social and economic history of India; these are very various, among them may be mentioned Prakrit dramas and romances, inscriptions upon stone and copper plates, the stories of Chinese and Arab travellers, the mural paintings of the Ajanta and Bagh caves, and the popular songs still current today, such as the Alha Kand in the U.P. This is the ore from which the social and economic history of India has to be smelted; some of it has already undergone a preliminary dressing—that is to say, it has been reduced to a common language by translation into English. To show how extensive is the material even now accessible in the English language Mr. Yusuf Ali wisely prefaces his lectures with a bibliography. But at the same time he insists that, though a start has been made, an enormous amount of work still remains to be done in the translation and publication of original documents, and it is in this field that historical research would be most immediately fruitful.

By contemplating her social and economic history from so many different angles, we obtain a composite photograph of India which is different from that which we get by studying her history in the familiar water-tight compartments—Hindu, Moslem, and British. History cannot be divided into separate compartments, for history is continuous; it is the story of growth and development, of the assimilation of new elements which have become integral parts of modern India. "If we realize," says Mr. Yusuf Ali, "that the conflicts were part of the cosmic process that was inevitable and a necessary element in our evolution, we shall cease to indulge in vain regrets. . . . Many of the things which we regret in the present had their roots in the past. But, on the other hand, many of the things for which we sigh were there on our soil and could be made to grow and flourish again, if we recognized them as constituent elements of our history and fostered them. The past was neither as gloomy nor as golden as some people imagine."

THEODORE MORISON.

Alexander the Great. By Ulrich Wilcken, translated by G. C. Richards, London: Chatto and Windus. 15s. net.

To the mind of the present reviewer this work presents itself as one of the best and perhaps most important historical works, written round an outstanding figure in the history of Asia, that has appeared since Durand's "Life of Nadir Shah." The author is a distinguished historian, and his conscience has prevented him from indulging, like some modern biographers, in vain speculation and ingenious word-pictures in order to give lightness and bulk to his work. He shows Alexander as a great general and a great statesman—a combination of qualities that is still indispensable to success in Asiatic States, and in the long run perhaps elsewhere. He describes his administrative genius, his financial policy, which led him to convert into currency the hoarded gold of the Achamenians and to establish a standard Imperial bimetallic currency throughout his dominions. Realizing that the Greeks alone could not attain world dominion, he sought by precept and example to encourage racial fusion between two noble races-Persian and Greek-as a basis for the worldwide federation of which he dreamed. His conquests brought East and West for the first time into close commercial relations, with effects on the Western world comparable with the discovery of the Americas two millenniums

later. His death, before the age of thirty-three, was one of the great tragedies of the world, for he inspired in his troops a passionate loyalty and affection, the record of which cannot be read even at this distance of time without emotion.

As stated above, the author is primarily a historian, and he is fortunate in his translator, whose rendering leaves nothing to be desired. Yet it is permissible to express regret that more attention has not been devoted to the geographical aspect of Alexander's vast conquests. The classic researches of Vincent, MacCrindle, Sir Percy Sykes, Sir Aurel Stein, to mention but a few, are ignored. Seldom is any attempt made in the text to give the modern equivalents of the places and rivers mentioned, or to relate them to recent discoveries, and the transliteration of modern Persian names is not consistent or satisfactory. In discussing the voyage of Nearchus up the Persian Gulf, Dr. Wilcken assumes that no communication by sea existed and that the very memory thereof was lost. Yet the fact that Nearchus engaged the services of a local pilot without difficulty at or near Jask suggests a contrary conclusion, and recent discoveries at Ur and elsewhere demonstrate that regular communication with India by sea, in one or more stages, was fully established in the second millennium B.C.

These, however, are minor blemishes in an historical work finely written and well translated, which brings home to us of the twentieth century the truth that a single outstanding personality can achieve success that is denied to efficient administrative machines, and that personal loyalties may transcend national patriotisms. Alexander is not forgotten in Asia, but he has had no successor. His achievements and his personality alike remain unique in history; this book enables us for the first time to see the greatest of Western heroes in the light of antiquity and of modern scholarship.

A. T. Wilson.

Baber: First of the Moguls. By Fernand Grenard, translated and adapted by Homer White and R. Glaenzer. 9" × 52". Pp. 253. Frontispiece. Illustrations. Butterworth.

This most readable and instructive historical survey by a writer of distinction tells once more the tale of the redoubtable Baber, whose romantic life has appealed to successive generations of mankind. As himself a traveller in Asiatic countries, and as a writer in sympathy with his subject, Mr. Grenard portrays the dramatic career of the conqueror of Hindustan, with keen insight into his character as well as into the motives which actuated him through the many years of adversity and vicissitude before he established himself on the throne at Kabul.

Now be it said that in the year 1494, when the story opens, there ruled in Central Asia four brothers of Turkish race, descendants and heirs of Timur (1336-1405) the Turki ruler, the seat of whose wide-flung empire was at Samarcand—the Sogdiana of the Ancients, the Transoxiana of the Arabs—the prosperity of which is ascribed by Gibbon to the industry of the victorious Arabs after their conquest of the province in A.D. 710, though he adds that the richness of the soil as well as the advantages of the climate having been always appreciated by the inhabitants, the lands bordering the river Oxus had been cultivated since the days of the Macedonian kings.

Three of these brothers, of whom the father of Baber was one, had married daughters of the Mogul, Yunus Khan, a descendant of Genghiz Khan (1162-1227), so that Baber had in his veins the blood of both races, kindred races in the sense of common ancestry, but long since distinct in feature, language, and culture.

The brothers ruled respectively at Samarcand and Bokhara; at Hissar, Kunduz, and Badakhshan; at Kabul and Ghaznee; and, lastly, Baber's father, in Ferghana.

While a distant cousin, equally a descendant of Timur, Sultan Hussain Baikara, alike famous as enlightened ruler and patron of the arts and sciences, was lord of Herat, where his reign (1470-1505) covered, according to Malleson, thirty-five years of unexampled prosperity. Born in 1483, Baber, as a boy of eleven, succeeded, as ruler of Ferghana, his father Omar Shiekh on the latter's sudden and accidental death at his capital of Akhsai in 1494.

His patrimony, it is true, was a poor one, but he enjoyed through life the prestige of royal descent on both sides, which went far to validate any claim he might make to the now scattered possessions of the House of Timur. None the less, in the main, as has been well said of him, character created his career.

Briefly, as regards the latter, it has been remarked by a recent travelled writer, that "in Asia troubles have a way of seething like the turmoil in a witch's kettle," as indeed was truly the case in Central Asia during the ten years from 1494 to 1504, when ceaseless strife reigned in the various small kingdoms which at the present

day constitute Russian and Afghan Turkestan.

By the end of the decade his uncles were dead, and their kingdoms, as well as his own, had passed by conquest into the possession of Shaibani Khan (known also as Shahi Beg), a descendant of Genghiz, whose territories, as lord of the Uzbegs, bordering the Jaxartes (Syrdarya) lay to the north of Tashkent and stretched across the steppes to the Caspian Sea, and whose rule, now on the death of Sultan Hussain Baikara in 1505, included Khorasan with the cities of Herat and Kandahar.

It was in 1501 that Baber's uncle, Ulugh Beg, King of Kabul, died, when his son, having failed to make good his succession to the throne, fled the kingdom.

The news of this event reaching Baber, he decided to cross the mountains into Afghanistan, with the result that in 1504 he succeeded in occupying Kabul, where the people willingly accepted him as their ruler in place of his late uncle. There for twenty years he maintained his position and made his home, while yet having ever in view the conquest of Hindustan, which, after several tentative expeditions into that land, he ultimately achieved in the year 1526.

It may be mentioned that in these latter years Baber was materially relieved from Uzbeg interference by the defeat and death of Shaibani Khan (Shahi Beg) at Merv in 1514, Uzbeg aggressive activities being henceforth kept in check by the Persian ruler Shah Ismail (1480-1524) and his son and successor Shah Tahmasp

(1524-1576).

In this way Baber enjoyed a certain immunity from the interference of powerful neighbours, who might otherwise have upset his plans and prevented him leaving Kabul to cross the Indus.

Victory over Sultan Ibrahim on the plain of Paniput in April, 1526, when his opponent was among the slain, gave him the object of his desires—Delhi.

Not for long, however, did the conqueror live to enjoy the fruits of victory,

death claiming him at Agra in December, 1530.

Now let us turn to the character of the man. Here the Emperor's own memoirs, written with such refreshing frankness, speak for themselves, and, incidentally, show us a powerfully built, active individual, who, we gather from the events of his life, must have been endowed with the qualities which ensure leadership to their possessor. Energetic and swift in action he yet exercised prudence in coming to a decision and forming plans.

Baber was withal a very human person, of a generous and cheerful disposition, taking fortune as it came, and making the best of life. His was a romantic career, in which the element of greatness remains even though it be conceded that the Emperor's renown be in part preserved by the fact that the Mogul rulers, his

successors at Delhi, maintained their position for so long in the land of their adoption. That they did this was due to the constructive ability of his grandson, the wise and broad-minded Akbar, who sought by just measures of government, and especially by the grant of religious freedom to all his subjects, to bring his various States into a common bond of union.

Mr. Grenard's map in the book, to which no scale is, however, attached, though a clear and artistically drawn sketch covering the ground of the letterpress, may be deemed by some readers to be hardly sufficiently comprehensive for so important a narrative, but, owing to the considerable cost of map production, it has to be recognized that it is not always possible nowadays for maps to be worthy of the context they illustrate.

The student reader is the sufferer directly—the author indirectly. Perhaps a time will come when libraries will issue maps as they now do books.

E. St.C. P.

A Tower of Skulls. By Gerald Reitlinger. 332 pp. 25 plates in half-tone. Index. Map. Duckworth, 1932. 18s.

To a lover of the Middle East Mr. Reitlinger's itinerary could hardly be better chosen, for he not only visits the most interesting parts of Persia, but also succeeds in coming home by way of Turkish Armenia, a region which has remained practically unknown since the outbreak of the war. And for one who cares for such sidelights of travel as scenery, archæology, mediæval, and ancient history, or the more up-to-date of the people met by the way; for one who is anxious to see from close quarters the curious anomalies of a mingling of East and West, of the time-honoured and of the newest of the new; or for one who sees the romance of those curious days of war and revolution and who can reconstruct, as Mr. Reitlinger does, a whole picture of them from the rusting vestiges of railway stock and disused guns, the region traversed provides the best possible material.

The archæological dissertations are in most cases interesting; the tale of events is lively; entertaining stories and descriptions are interspersed with more serious matter in very even balance. Yet for some reason the first half of the book makes poor reading. Whether it is that the country was seen through spectacles unpleasantly clouded, whether it is that the author has failed somehow in his interpretation, the fact remains that the reader benefits little from the account of the Persian journey.

From Tabriz onwards the narrative improves and the reader can not only find entertainment, but also a quantity of interesting information as to the state of the highlands of Armenia and Kurdistan today and as to events there during the last fifteen years. It is a region that has been very little visited by Europeans, being a closed military zone. The penalties of penetrating such a zone are recorded by Mr. Reitlinger with admirable good humour. One admires his pertinacity in the face of events which must have seemed at the time wellnigh insupportable.

A few very definite faults spring at once to the eye. Of these perhaps the most irritating is the obstinate regularity with which names are spelt either wrongly or in the most unfamiliar and inappropriate manner. To mention but a few: "tup" for the well-known Turkish word "top" (cannon), "chindi" for "shimdi," "shiftieh" for "chiftieh," "Erzuroum" for "Erzeroum" (the title of Curzon's book is misspelt), "Keir Porter" for "Ker Porter," "Il Khaini" for "Il Khan." The use of foreign words and phrases, too, is decidedly overdone, especially in the first half of the book.

On more general lines, however, the content of the book is good and well

selected, though its display is often marred by the fact that the author suffers from a very modern complaint, that of attempting to be bright without ceasing and on every occasion, and in his efforts to avoid that dull monotony characteristic of many a travel book of the last century he only falls a victim to boredom of another type. He spoils much good material and some good writing by a repeated introduction of quippy comparisons which, alas, as often fall flat as they succeed. One feels, through the first part of the book in any case, that the author is ashamed of admitting that he admires or likes any particular thing or any particular style; he has constantly to protect himself from the jibes of a possible scoffer by means of a defensive armour of raillery, and in so doing he only lays himself open to criticism from other—and, one hopes, more worthy—adversaries. Yet he is courageous enough during his "escorted journey" in Turkey, and he can laugh at himself and his predicament right heartily. It is hence the more regrettable that he hides his courage under a bushel in regard to matters of a more permanent character.

The plates seem well selected, and the map, a necessity too often omitted in travel books, enables the reader to follow the journey with ease and accuracy.

A Tour in the Mysore State (Melkote to Gersoppa). By Constance E. Parsons. 7½" x 5". Pp. 227. Illustrated. Oxford University Press. 5s. net. Miss Parsons has now added to her Mysore City and Seringapatam a third guidebook, describing things seen on a tour in the western districts of Mysore, ending up with the loftiest large waterfalls in the world, the Gersappa Falls. Besides providing a great deal of historical and practical information for the traveller, the book contains descriptions which, helped out by some good photographs, give the armchair reader a fairly good account of the tract of country and its contents. Although the fate of India was never decided in this region, its old towns and sites carry us far back into Indian history; and the author describes it appropriately as a land saturated in legends, where diabolical cruelty met greathearted courage, and where men left examples of utter devotion to the faith they held and a passionate quest for the ultimate good. The show place of the region is undoubtedly the twelfth-century temple of Shiva, the best known among the many temples of the Hoysala dynasty, at Halebid, their capital. This polygonal star-shaped temple has its walls covered, as with a mantle, with the most delicately executed carvings of animals, men, and gods. A string of little elephants is surmounted by strings of little leogriffs, horsemen, heroes, birds, and beasts heraldic, and so on, and above them all the deities of the pantheon. This is only one of a number of temples and bastis at various places which are described with their respective histories and legends. Miss Parsons' other subjects include a god's diamond crown on which none but the ministering priest can look with safety, suicide on the death of one's sovereign, so performed that one's severed head rises instantly on the released bough of a tree, coffee estates, and the vernacular and scientific names of the more arresting trees of village and forest. The figures of Chandragupta (turned a Jain ascetic), Ramanuja, Tippu Sultan, and Colonel Wellesley pass in turn across her stage. The amount of appropriate information which she has collected with great trouble is most praiseworthy. A few criticisms must be made. The author gives the impression, so to speak, of not being many lessons ahead of her pupils. From what musty authority is her statement derived that "Jainism was an offshoot of Buddhism"? The otherwise very satisfactory account of the statue at Sravana Belgola, 58 feet high, of the princely ascetic Gomta, with tendrils of creepers climbing up his legs and

arms as he stands lost in contemplation, gives no hint of the fact that there are at least two similar, though smaller, statues of Gomta, one of which the reviewer has seen, in the courtyards of other Jain temples of the South. Does not the somewhat Mongolian cast of countenance of these colossi, by the way, suggest some very ancient prototype, in wood or stone, carried from the homeland of Mahavira in the north of India? Some explanation of the term "Sri Vaishnava"—as distinguished from plain "Vaishnava"—would have been of assistance to barbarians from more northerly parts of India such as the reviewer. Some readers might also have appreciated a few lines as to the place of Hoysala art in the development of Indian architecture, materials for which are available in the works of Mr. H. Cousens and M. Grousset. On the other hand, there are full and welcome particulars supplied regarding Gomta, Ramanuja, and the succession of Hoysala kings. The book as a whole is an excellent guide; and it is to be hoped that Miss Parsons will continue the series.

A. F. K.

The Indian Peasant Uprooted. By M. Read. With a Foreword by the Rt. Hon. J. H. Whitley. 7½" × 5". Pp. xiv + 256. Illustrations. Longmans. 6s.

The report of a Royal Commission, if tolerably well written (as it usually is), contains matter of absorbing interest to a minority, and is read by them from beginning to end. The average man, on the other hand, requires solid food to be peptonized before consumption, otherwise he leaves it untouched. A description in simple terms, therefore, of the general conditions which the Whitley Commission found to prevail among Indian labourers, and of the remedies which they offer to the Government and the public, has a definite value in bringing knowledge to many who would have remained uninstructed. Miss Read has enlivened her account by introducing a number of imaginary individuals and exhibiting their discomfort and resentment at filthy housing, ill-ventilated workshops, insecurity of employment, and oppression by foremen and others who intervene between them and their employers. Certain of the facts brought to light-for instance, the mortgaging of child labour to carpet factories in discharge of debtcall for immediate action, which the Indian Governments will certainly take. Others—overcrowding, payment of a wage insufficient to support life on a minimum scale of health, the improvement of the quality of labour by education of the adults and their children-are problems with which only a long-range policy can deal, and the enumeration of Factories Acts and other measures in the final chapter of the book shows that Government, while reluctant to go far in advance of public opinion, has recognized the necessity for a progressive amelioration of the labourer's position. Employers in India, as elsewhere, range from the stupidly obstructive to the far-seeing and even the venturesome. If, in fact, an unfavourable comment may be made on Miss Read's critical method, it will be directed towards her tendency to paint the dark rather than the light features of the picture. Her book is somewhat sentimental and "written up"; occasionally it is unfair. It is, for instance, unfair to represent the senior railway officers or the managers and owners of mills as "Sahibs" (ordinarily a term applied to Europeans); a certain number of the former, as Miss Read's figures reveal, and a great majority of the latter (a point which she does not mention) are Indians. Similarly it is misleading to speak (p. 84) of "the ladder of advancement in the higher grades of (Railway) labour" as barred to the Indian, when she has just recorded (p. 82) that one-third of the subordinates drawing Rs.250 and more are Indians. These lapses are, however, occasional, and the treatment of such important ques-

tions as women and children, welfare work and recruitment, housing and education, is reasonable, and indicates the need for a steady pressure by the public (in England and in India) on the Government, and by Government on employers, for the removal of abuses and the stabilization of a more efficient labour-force by ensuring an adequate wage and comfortable surroundings. To the economic consequences of expenditure on such objects, Miss Read does not refer; the point, though far from negligible, lay outside the scope of her book. A well-paid and contented labourer is more efficient; but in the transitional period, while efficiency is being bred, the industry may become insolvent. The road of advance lies in the midway between two dangers, and grave though one may be, Miss Read does well to emphasize the seriousness of the other. Low-paid labour is inefficient, unorganized labour is discontented, and ignorant labour is politically unsafe.

C. F. S.

Indian Courts and Characters. By Sir Thomas Strangman. Pp. 213. Illustrations. Heinemann. 8s. 6d.

Some fifteen years ago a distinguished medical practitioner of Bombay, himself a Hindu, expatiating on the civic greatness and social amenities of the city, ascribed its good fortune to the friendliness of its four component communities, all of approximately equal wealth and importance—Europeans, Hindus, Muslims, and Parsis. The truth of this remark is amply borne out by Sir Thomas Strangman's recollections of twenty-five years in Bombay. Sir Thomas, landing in 1896, briefless but determined, worked his way to the top, and in his course met and appreciated the best in a society composed of varied elements, but by no means lacking in distinction. With Inverarity at the Bar, and Sir Lawrence Jenkins on the Bench, the legal lights of Bombay shone second to none in India; while a sequence of Governors, such as Lord Sydenham, Lord Willingdon, and Lord Lloyd, falls to the lot of few Presidencies or Provinces. The Aga Khan and the Jam Sahib figure prominently in these reminiscences of good fellowship in work and sport. The author mercifully points no moral, but one is left with an impression of able and energetic men—and women—striving for the welfare of the whole community.

Side by side with this ordered progress, and crossing its path from time to time, moves the lurking figure of the irreconcilable nationalist, personified in Tilak, and assuming an infinity of disguises. Appearing now as a constitutionalist for the benefit of England and the Continent of Europe, now as a seceder from the British Empire to win sympathy from America and Ireland, now, to deceive even the elect, assuming the likeness of Christ Himself, the extremist, with his followers, dupes or stalking-horses, pursues his relentless course of opposition to the alien Government. As Advocate-General Sir Thomas Strangman was brought into contact with many of this fraternity. His experiences are full of interest, the description of M. K. Gandhi's trial in 1922 being particularly in-

structive.

Sir Thomas has something to say of Delhi and the Royal visit of 1911-12. But as becomes a citizen of no mean city, he is at his best when writing of Bombay. He does not shrink from criticism, and his dispassionate account of the Back Bay projects strikes one as no less fair than illuminating. Though surprised at the present estrangement between Europeans and Indians in Bombay he is no pessimist. As in the past, he considers, so in the future there is every reason for good understanding in the working of a connection of such benefit to both. A distinguished Parsi in a recent article in *The Times* arrives at the same conclusion, and the course of events since this book was published goes far to justify this reasoned optimism.

The book is in no sense history, but the historian in years to come will turn to its pages with gratitude for the light it throws on social and political life in Bombay during a stirring quarter of a century.

A. M. S.

The Indian Horizon. By Maharajadhiraja Bahadur of Burdwan, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., I.O.M., with a foreword by the Most Hon. the Marquess of Zetland, P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E. 9\frac{2}{3}" \times 5\frac{1}{2}". Pp. 106. London: Ernest Benn. 3s. 6d. In this book the author has placed before us a clear, concise, and yet complete view of the problem which is confronting British statesmen and the whole of India today. The Maharaja speaks with knowledge, great experience, and in a very frank manner. In doing so he has conferred a service upon us, and incidentally contributed one more addition to our English literature. We have been used to eloquence from the cultured classes in India—witness the speeches made from time to time by many eminent Indians—but in the matter of writing pure English, this little book excels, and the author may be congratulated on the

high standard of writing to which he has attained.

It is not perhaps generally known, and in any case not often realized, that the great Indian Empire covers an area nearly fifteen times that of the British Isles, with a population seven times that of England and Scotland. There are included peoples of many different races and different religions, who have been in fierce conflict in the past, and, as the Maharaja says now, "the Hindus and Moslems have only been kept in check during the past hundred years by the great British power." "The tragic Mother India" has had a long and troubled history, conquerors have desired her, prophets have proselytized her, but her history has grown less tragic since the rise of the British Raj in India. Since their administration, for the first time, at any rate for a thousand years, India has enjoyed peace and prosperity, with security to life and property, relief from those terrible wars and famines which formerly wasted the country, and her population has greatly increased.

Strange as it may appear, many people, both in England and India, who are gravely anxious because of the present unrest and disorder, are under the impression that it was Mr. Montagu who, in 1919-20, was responsible for what is known as the Reforms and the Indianization of the Services, but, as the Maharaja points out, Lord Elphinstone wrote in 1819:

"If we can manage our native army, and keep out the Russians, I see nothing to threaten the safety of our Empire—until the natives become enlightened under our tuition, and a separation becomes desirable to both parties."

And further, that Sir Thomas Munro, in 1824, said:

"We should look upon India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall, in some future age, have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular Government for themselves, and conduct and preserve it."

And also the Marquess of Zetland in his foreword refers to the famous minute which Lord Macaulay penned in 1835. This minute, together with other of Lord Macaulay's views expressed on many occasions, showed clearly that he accepted Lord Elphinstone's and Sir Thomas Munro's opinions.

The Maharaja tells us that fifty years later it was Mr. A. O. Hume, a retired

member of the Indian Civil Service, who founded the Indian National Congress, the fundamental principles of which were laid down as follows:

"Firstly, the fusion into one national whole of all the different and discordant elements that constitute the population of India; secondly, the gradual regeneration, along all lines—mental, moral, social, and political—of the nation thus evolved; and thirdly, the consolidation of union between England and India by securing the modification of such of the conditions as may be unjust or injurious to the latter country."

It is therefore quite clear that almost from the very outset clear-sighted statesmen and others were able to foresee the future developments. It is probable that they may have pictured to themselves a much smoother journey, and it is greatly to be regretted that the progress towards their goal has not been under more pleasant conditions and more rapid; but, after all, no immense change can be accomplished in the affairs of a great country without difficulties arising such as those we have experienced. Certain it is that our statesmen between 1819 and 1835, or Mr. Hume fifty years later, never anticipated the lawlessness which has occurred. For this lawlessness we must blame our respective Governments.

As regards the Indian National Congress, something much better might have been expected, because, when we realize the fundamental principles upon which it was started, it would seem that the Congress never ought to have been allowed to reach its present state. The Maharaja calls attention to this. He says:

"In 1885, when the Indian National Congress was brought into being, it was friendly to the British, tolerating them as benevolent despots. . . In 1920 . . . Mr. Gandhi . . . captured the Congress and introduced the slogan of independence with the cult of hate against the British as the goal of this political body. Further, in 1930-1931 there was put forward the claim of Purana Swaraj, or complete independence, which practically rules out the British connection."

The tremendous contrast between the spirit in which the National Congress was started, therefore, and that of its condition today, is obvious, and although the Maharaja pays respect to Gandhi's sincerity, he clearly shows how his policy, with its mottoes of civil disobedience and non-co-operation, has done great harm to India, and put back the clock in the progress of her self-government.

The book contains seven chapters, entitled:

I. "The Growth of the Indian Constitution." II. "The States and the Indian Aristocracy." III. "Hindu and Moslem." IV. "The Minority Problem Today." V. "Political Grouping in India." VI. "The Spirit of India." VII. "India as a British Dominion."

In the third chapter His Highness quotes from a book, entitled "The Indian Moslems" (London, 1928), written by an Indian Mohammedan:

"Why did the Moslems first come into India? Because it was visibly a disunited country, a congeries of quarrelling principalities with no bond of union, no sense of common interest between them; in no sense a . . . united state. . . . It was the Mogul emperors who first broke this rule by gathering up all the regions of the peninsula under their sway—an example in which they are followed by their British successors. The talk of a united India, apart from these two supremacies, is but a figment of the imagination."

And he also quotes from Sir Harcourt Butler's "Modern India":

"And, finally, Moslems can never forget that they have been a ruling race for many centuries in India before the British came and established their

rule over the sub-continent. In their hearts they believe that with help from Afghanistan, the frontier tribes and the virile Moslems of the northwest and in Central India they could, if the controlling hand of British rule were removed, conquer India."

In this same quotation the Maharaja gives us some indication of the terrible gulf which exists between the Moslem and the Hindu, and says:

"A third party like the British must be near to keep the Hindus and Mohammedans from flying at each other's throats until the majority community can see, admit, and of its own freewill and common sense realize that the minority community must go on existing as a homogeneous unit with its peculiarities as a part and parcel of the Indian nation; and also, until the minority can so trust the majority as to go on building that Indian nation, and considering themselves Indians first and Mohammedans afterwards."

But can a minority community exist without a common meeting ground? The failure to solve the minorities problem was very plainly exhibited by the Round-Table Conference and Mr. Gandhi's complete obstruction. The platitudinous good wishes uttered after his regrets were doubtless delivered with the full knowledge that no conclusion regarding the minorities problem could be reached in conjunction with his political propaganda.

The difficulty in regard to the Hindu and Moslem question is stupendous,

but it is only one of many equally difficult problems.

The Maharaja makes very little reference to the Sankey Federal scheme, which is discussed and referred to much more fully in a little book entitled "The Round-Table Conference and After," by D. Madahava Rao, the chief correspondent of the Morning Post in India, but he enters very fully into the scheme of a Federal India, more especially in relation to its application to the Native States. He presents the case for the ruling Princes with considerable literary force and logic, and does not fail to point out the dangers and quicksands by which the vessel of democratic government, should it ever be launched, will be beset. He enlarges upon other difficulties, and quotes from Sir Robert Holland's summarizing of the objections raised by the Maharaja of Patiala:

"That it would be well-nigh impossible to devise a federal scheme which would embrace the vast number of States and provinces existing in India, and that if such a scheme were devised it would be unworkable and doomed to failure; that there is at present no trace of the existence of a federal spirit throughout India. Without it no federal scheme could succeed. There is no political or cultural affinity between the States and the Provinces."

Reference is made to the depressed classes, and especially to those who are now called Anglo-Indians, who were formerly known as Eurasians, and His Highness speaks of these last with a well-considered and benevolent expression of kindness. A very clear and informative note is struck by his reference to the outstanding difference between the trend of thought and the mode of life of the Indian in the East and the English democracy in the West. He says:

"Granting the fact that the spread of English, as the language of the ruling race, has been remarkable, in view of the total literacy in India, let us take two tests. In spite of the fact that, say, 175 males out of every 10,000 of the population can read and write English, how many of them have adopted the Western modes of living and Western social customs? . . Let us suppose that out of the 175 males in every 10,000, 100 have adopted the English mode of dress, and can speak English. Let it not be imagined that

these 100 use only spoons and forks and have their meals at a table, as the people of the West. Perhaps ten or fifteen out of the 175 men referred to may, from a mistaken idea of respectability," etc.

And he mentions that even the most Westernized and the most advanced Indians still adopt Eastern fashions by preference, remarking:

"But even today Indians do not possess dancing halls or cabarets, much less night clubs (thank God!) like the cities of Europe and those of America."

Indeed, he emphasizes this point by a personal reference:

"The remainder not only don their national costume but prefer to have their meals in Indian fashion, and in most cases squatting on the floor and using their hands, for even the most Westernized and the most advanced Indians (among whom I might perhaps include my own family and myself) prefer Indian food and the Indian mode of eating when they have the opportunity."

We cannot fail to agree with him very completely when he says:

"Having given to Indians a taste of Western democracy and the ideals of liberty and equality as understood in the West, the British must stand by the Indians and teach them to attain the goal which we all desire—namely, the progressive realization of responsible self-government. On the other hand, if Indian statesmen, Indian rulers, and Indian politicians are sincere they must sink differences and must not allow the cult of hatred to spoil the great programme that is in front of them; they must give to the world at large a horizon of India bright and cheerful, and must bring to their work goodwill and co-operation. Further, they must look upon the continuance of the British connection for the good of India herself as inevitable, upon British officers as their friends and British merchants as co-partners in a national programme of prosperity."

And he supports this view by quoting from a speech made by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru at the Imperial Conference of 1923, who said:

"I am fighting the cause of my country, and the premiers of the various Dominions, who have in their day fought the cause of their country, will not object if I fight the cause of mine. But I do fight, let me tell you frankly, as a subject of King George, and I fight for a place in his household, and I will not be content with a place in his stables."

And pays a tribute to Great Britain when he says:

"We know from past experience that whereas Great Britain may, when occasion demands, be ruthless to her enemies, she can also be generous—generous to a fault perhaps. It is such generous magnanimity that has turned a hostile country into a prosperous Union of South Africa—one of the greatest achievements of the present century."

The British rule in India has provided the whole world with an example of high-minded endeavour which has no previous parallel in history, and tribute is here paid to the continuous attempts to educate and endow with judicial and political vision "the Indian," and thereby render him worthy to take his place as an equal member of the British Commonwealth of nations, but the result has disappointed the idealists, and the Maharaja emphasizes that India must still look to the British Government to provide her with those conditions necessary to bring her people to their hoped-for ideal.

As we progress with the book, we see the blind gradually drawn up, displaying

the whole picture. A great country, with enormous potentialities, requiring only a spirit of tolerance, with abundance of goodwill, a determination to sink all disputes and jealousies, and for all to work together with a will to form a strong and law-abiding community. A family can only remain united if there is some outstanding interest common to all, and the same principle applies to a State, and the great outstanding interest is the accomplishment of a united India, with a strong Government.

And, finally, His Highness makes a most arresting suggestion:

"I cannot help wondering whether, in the long run, she (India) achieves Dominion status or not, she would not really be happier, with a member of the British Royal family as Viceroy, with a Constitution largely Indianized, and with her citizens enjoying equal rights in every part of the British Empire."

Many times and in divers countries the British rule of India has been subjected to fierce criticism, but no one can deny that the result has provided an everlasting monument to the uprightness and justice of British rule.

The Maharaja of Burdwan concludes with a question: "Can England afford to lose India or can India do without England?"

The whole book provides the answer.

ALEXANDER L. HOWARD.

The India Round Table Conference and After. By D. Madahava Rao, Chief Correspondent of the Morning Post in India. With an Introduction by Edward Marjoribanks, M.O. 7½" × 5". Pp. 94. Heath, Cranton.

History teaches us that great nationalities have only become established after the people and their characters have been disciplined by long and grievous trials.

A little while ago a film entitled "The Birth of a Nation" was shown in London, which depicted the events of the American Civil War. The title was not descriptive of the pictures, because the birth of the great American nation occurred much earlier, and the war between the North and the South was the outcome of the burning question of slavery, an event which might more fitly be described as one of those unfortunate maladies from which young nations as well as young people suffer. The American nation was formed by the welding together of several different peoples, professing different religions, and coming from many different countries. Great Britain herself was not always the same well-ordered country which she has been now for many hundreds of years. Daniel Defoe, some 200 to 250 years ago, was put into prison mainly for publicly describing in verse what he considered was the origin of the "true-born Englishman." Among the lurid terms which he used, he described the "true-born Englishman" as derived from "the most scoundrel race that ever lived . . . who ransacked Kingdoms and dispeopled Towns," etc. While there were some underlying truths in his description, the terms were, of course, exaggerated, and although at first sight this reference to America and Great Britain might seem to have little connection with the existing state of India, or Mr. Rao's contribution entitled "The Round Table Conference and After," if we consider, we shall see that although the case of India presents far more complicated problems there is still a similarity between the cases.

At the time when the British first established themselves in India the formation of an Indian nation was, without question, a complete impossibility. Notwithstanding the wonderful progressive advance which has been made in all directions, it must be clear that the conditions are still very unfavourable. It may be that the surgeons and nurses who have attended the patient have not handled the

case well: it may be that the patient has not entirely responded to the efforts made for her prosperity, but it does not necessarily follow that if and when the youth be born he may not prove strong in after-life. We may wonder what sort of a youth we shall see, but we must not be impatient or attempt to unduly hasten the time of his arrival.

Mr. Rao strikes out vigorously and in an unsparing manner at everyone, from very highly placed officials downwards, nor does he spare his own countrymen, and it is as well that it should be so. A young enthusiastic Indian may be forgiven for being impatient, and forget that we are confronted today with a worldwide confusion, a more difficult situation than any living man has before experienced, or has ever been recorded in all history. It is not surprising that mistakes should have been, and still will be made in the handling of Indian affairs, in the attempt to weld together all these warring elements, when at the same moment we are confronted with other profound difficulties at home, throughout the Empire, and all over the world.

Mr. Rao recognizes the natural aptitude of the Indian character for argument and dispute, for conversation rather than for action: he quotes from Omar

Khayyam:

"Myself when young did eagerly frequent Doctor and Saint, and heard great argument About it, and about: but evermore Came out by the same door as in I went."

And he further says:

"Only when Indians once again realize the necessity and respect for ordered Government will it be possible for them to assume to advantage new responsi-

bilities and privileges."

But those who are tending the patient and attempting to make the best arrangements for the birth would do well to remember that violent disorders are harmful. A soldier of experience in India said to me a little while since, "You cannot rule India with files, commissions, and committees: you must get amongst the people and find out their difficulties and handle them, and, above all, govern them."

The public, of course, have read much about the Round Table Conference, but few have any inside knowledge either of the manner in which it was summoned or the results attained. Mr. Rao shows us that the foundations upon which it

was established were weak. He says:

"For the successful termination of the India Round Table Conference, therefore, a three-party agreement on every problem at the Conference was necessary.
Indeed, a three-party agreement was the foundation on which the scheme of the
Round Table Conference had to rest. But those who knew the Indian temperament and the age-long disputes between Indian communities and sections could
easily predict that the Conference scheme would always lack that foundation.
This belief was shared by the delegates from British India, where there were
fundamental differences and acute conflicts between the Hindus, the Moslems,
and other Minority Communities like the Sikhs, the Depressed Classes and the
Anglo-Indians."

And again:

"Although the Indian delegates were informally assisted by the British Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for India in the Socialist Cabinet, once again the Indian delegates could not compose their differences and consent to a settlement. By that failure the Indian delegates not only disgraced themselves, but grievously disappointed the Socialist Cabinet and Lord Irwin, who had laid great

store by the Round Table Conference scheme. The novel method of solving the Indian problem by settlement through negotiation had failed."

Mr. Rao especially places the heaviest responsibility for this failure upon

Gandhi individually. He says:

"A dispassionate examination of the efforts made in London by the Indian delegates during September and December, 1931, to settle these disputes clearly shows that, more than any single person, Gandhi was responsible for the breakdown of the communal and minorities settlement. His whole attitude in this matter was one of recurring inconsistency. He changed his ground from day to day, and like a clever tactician explained away his own inconsistency in a series of interviews of a propagandist type, which flooded the Indian and the American press. In these interviews Gandhi sought to appear as the staunchest friend of the Moslems and other Indian minorities. Perhaps with the Indian crowd this camouflage succeeded, and it is the more essential, in fairness to all concerned, that the facts be stated."

To those who have been privileged to travel throughout India during the last twelve years, it must have been clear that Gandhi's mottoes of "non co-operation" and "civil disobedience" have had a terribly serious effect upon the people, and that the movement ought not to have been allowed so much liberty, or the Indian Congress to become such a highly dangerous institution. In all probability the outstanding quality which has enabled the British people to carry out their great work of benevolent colonization all over the world has been the natural inherent tolerance, which is perhaps the greatest quality we possess, and the peoples of India must learn and cultivate the same spirit.

Until such time as there is healing in all the divided camps, until the fierceness between the Hindu and the Moslem may be subdued, the child, if born,

cannot be raised strong and healthy.

Mr. Edward Marjoribanks, unfortunately gone from us in the flower of his youth, has summed up the whole of the book in his introduction. Mr. Marjori-

banks, referring to Mr. Rao's work, writes in this foreword:

"He (Mr. Rao) says in effect: 'Oh ye of little faith in yourselves! Your doubts concerning your right to be in India are not justified. Your justification is and has always been the work you can do for India. Your fears are not justified. You yourselves have made Gandhi a dangerous man and Congress a dangerous institution. You can unmake them. There is urgent work for you to do in India now, as in the past, but you waste precious time when you should be doing real work, in framing impractical schemes not only rejected by the Princes but by all sensible opinion in British India. It is unthinkable that you can force such an unpractical and unpopular scheme as Lord Sankey's plan for Federation for India . . . '"

And he goes on later to say:

"The Sahibs have set out on a perilous voyage. We are already in mountainous seas. The horizon is dark and menacing. We are told that we cannot turn about, and we have not yet decided on an ultimate destination or even a port of call. We weave legends as we go about a harbour named 'Dominion Status'; but there is no such place."

The key-note of Mr. Rao's work may be summed up as follows: The British have spent freely of their blood and treasure, they have created order out of chaos, prevented wholesale bloodshed, given to India prosperity and security to life and property, established one of the finest railway systems the world has ever seen, and built up a colossal commercial life. They have raised a large section of the people, both men and women, to a higher standard of life and culture,

and they cannot and must not betray such a trust until it is abundantly clear that a strong and united India is fit to take upon itself the responsibility of becoming an Indian nation.

Mr. Marjoribanks concludes his well-framed introduction by the following words:

"Meanwhile a young Englishman salutes in friendship a young Indian, and in wishing him well hopes especially that the book will be widely read and appreciated both here and in India."

And in this last wish, expressed by "a young Englishman," there are many old Englishmen of long experience of India and the world in general who heartily concur.

ALEXANDER L. HOWARD.

The Capital Question of China. By Lionel Curtis.

The author's object in writing this book is, as he explains in the preface, to show that China presents a problem of major importance in the world in general and this country in particular, and to bring into being, through the development of an informed public opinion, a consistent British policy, the absence of which is a conspicuous feature of the present Far Eastern situation.

The book is the outcome of the intensive study by a mind specially fitted, both by long experience of high Imperial statesmanship and by recent close contact with many of the leading figures on the Far Eastern stage, to give a balanced view of the complicated problems involved. It therefore deserves the serious attention not only of those who have a special interest in the Far East, but of that wider public which it is Mr. Curtis' aim to reach.

The book is divided into two parts; the first an historical review of the foreign relations of China and Japan; the second the author's own comments and views upon recent British policy, with suggestions as to the steps necessary to improve it, and in conclusion of the means whereby he considers the regeneration of China

could be brought about.

The first, or historical, section has the merit of presenting within readable compass a subject on which the majority of available works are of such length as to deter the ordinary reader. The first nineteen chapters, tracing the story from pre-Tartar times through the first contacts with Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch to the general opening of the country to foreign trade, the Treaties and the foundation of the Treaty Port system in the nineteenth century; and so through the Taiping rebellion, the Boxer rising, the collapse of the Manchu dynasty and the early revolutionary period to the turning points of the Washington Treaty and 1925, form an admirably concise statement. The fundamental contrast, which lies at the root of the whole China problem, between the traditional Chinese and Western political conceptions—the former based on collective, and the latter on individual responsibility-is clearly brought out. To the Chinese official refusal to come into direct contact with foreigners, in striking contrast to the Japanese who, after the admittance of the American Consul Townshend Harris in 1857 and, still more, after the Imperial restoration of 1867, actively sought contact with officials and traders from all the world, the author traces the subsequent failure of the Chinese to adapt themselves to the situation forced upon them after the collapse of the Manchu dynasty. They may, it is true, have owed that situation largely to Foreign influence, for it is at least arguable that another virile dynasty might have succeeded the Manchus if the Foreign Powers had not lent support to the suppression of the Taiping rebellion, or that the Government machine would not have broken down had they not, in reprisal for the Boxer

rising, interfered with the established system of recruiting officials; but the situation was none the less inevitable sooner or later in the development of the modern world, and the responsibility for the failure to meet it must rest with the Chinese themselves. The peculiarly Chinese custom of unanimous consent, upon which the author rightly lays stress, goes far to explain the paralysis of executive civilian

government under anything like modern democratic conditions.

The concluding chapters of the first part of the book, which bring the story down to the present day, do not maintain the high standard set by the beginning, and appear to have been hurriedly written. In treating the history of the past seven years too much emphasis is laid on the details of internecine wars between comparatively unimportant military leaders, which might well have been passed over in a few lines, and too little on the interesting and highly significant political system which, largely under Russian influence, has emerged from the chaos. The struggles of the infant Nanking Government to establish itself, in face of constant troubles from within and with little support from without, form an episode which might with advantage be treated in wider perspective. The emergence of this, the first Chinese attempt at government on modern Western lines, probably forms a critical turning-point in Chinese history.

It is to be hoped that, in the reprints which will doubtless appear, Mr. Curtis

will revise these chapters.

In the second section of the book the author gives it as his opinion, with which few who have any experience of China will disagree, that internal anarchy and the absence of the rule of law are at the root of all problems, both domestic and foreign; that the policy of the Foreign Powers, especially Great Britain, must bear a large share of responsibility for this condition; and that a radical change in British policy can do more than almost anything else to restore order and to bring about that regeneration, for which all who have the interests of China and the world at heart must work. He holds that the idea of trade as the sole motive of our policy is fundamentally wrong, and will only end by destroying the very trade which it seeks; that the interest of China herself is also our own true interest; and that nothing contrary to the welfare of China can in the long run benefit itself or anybody else. "We shall fail in all our dealings with China until we recognize that our own interests are misconceived wherever they seem to conflict with hers." He roundly condemns our present policy of "yielding to Chinese demands for Treaty revision; but yielding as slowly as we can," as unconstructive and not in the true interests of China herself; he considers that the existing safeguards of extraterritoriality must be retained until a government is established, which can maintain internal order, and until the Chinese have learned the principle that Treaties and Agreements are meant to be literally carried out and are something more than an ideal standard which the parties concerned should try to approximate.

With this as his text he proceeds to outline the practical steps, which he thinks should be taken to develop our policy and reach the goal at which he is aiming. He urges that the greatest contribution Great Britain can make to the problem is to give China the benefit of her long experience of constitutional government, and to send her as British representative a man of acknowledged standing who would, by his influence and advice, support her leaders in their task of establishing the rule of law. He takes as examples the work of such great ambassadors as D'Abernon in Germany, Dwight Morrow in Mexico, and Cromer and Milner in Egypt and South Africa, and argues effectively for the appointment of a man of this calibre as High Commissioner, with power to co-ordinate the policies of our Chinese Colonies of Hong Kong and Malaya in so far as they

affect China. He emphasizes the bad effects of the British Minister's isolation in Peking, out of touch both with the Government to which he is accredited and with the British trading community, whose almost permanent opposition to the policy laid down by the British Government is one of the major disturbing factors in the situation. He shows how, for lack of that guidance which the British representative might have given them, serious mistakes have been made both by the Chinese Government and by the leaders of the British community; and he destroys in convincing fashion the common arguments against moving the British Legation to Nanking.

With the appointment of such a representative the author urges the importance of publishing his despatches for the guidance of public opinion both in this country and in China; he cites the effect Milner's and Cromer's despatches had upon public opinion at the end of last century and points to the abandonment of the practice of laying such papers before Parliament as in large measure responsible for the absence of a defined British policy, because of the lack of effective

criticism of the Foreign Office bureaucracy.

Considerable attention is devoted to an exposure of the scandal of the Boxer Indemnity settlement, which should be more widely known and which is the result of allowing the carrying out of policy to fall into the hands of permanent officials unchecked. A plea is also made for an improvement in the recruitment and status of British consular officials in China, which will receive hearty endorsement from all who have lived in the country; the peculiarly political, as distinct from commercial, nature of the Consul's functions is perhaps scarcely brought out

Mr. Curtis wisely makes little reference to the situation in Manchuria, where the rôle of prophet is likely to be particularly unfruitful and where British policy is less directly concerned than in China proper. He clearly considers, however, the Japanese "forward policy" to be misconceived in her own interests, and points to the special contribution which Japan can make, if she will only subdue that deep-rooted fear of a strong China which has guided her policy in recent

years.

The book closes with a forceful plea by Mr. Patrick Young for the co-operation J. S. S. of the League of Nations.

Selections from the Works of Su Tung-p'o (A.D. 1036-1101). Translated into English with Introduction, Notes, and Commentaries by Cyril Drumond LeGros Clark, secretary for Chinese Affairs, Sarawak; and wood engravings by Averil Salmond LeGros Clark. The foreword by Edward Chalmers Werner, H.B.M., Consul, Foochow (retired). Jonathan Cape. LI 1s.

The French have kept, in their speech, the old differentiation between the words version and traduction. A version, according to the article "Traduction" in the "Encyclopédie," denotes a literal rendering of a text, a rendering in which beauty of style is in no wise considered, desired, or required. A traduction is, however, expected to be a literary product, exact, of course, but in the spirit rather than the letter of the original.

This differentiation is hardly recognized in English-or in German for the matter of that-which is a pity. Works undertaken from entirely different points of view are all dubbed "translations," and are judged by the same standards. The whole issue is thereby confused. Works on the art of translation are apt to confine themselves to the æsthetics involved, and ignore the wider question as to whether or not the letter of an author's meaning has been brought over into the foreign language.

In Selections from the Works of Su Tung-p'o, Mr. LeGros Clark has made a traduction—I use the word in the French sense—and it is, therefore, as a traduction, not a version, that the book should be judged. And very lovely it is. The style is smooth and rhythmic, and the spirit of Su Tung-p'o is finely interpreted.

The Introduction is devoted to a study of the author and his works; a biography of the man; and a sketch of the historical and cultural background of the time. Then follow the "Selections," eighteen pieces in all, most of which have already appeared in Latin, English, French, or German, but which in their new dress are none the less welcome for that. The volume is brought to a close by forty pages of invaluable "Notes and Commentaries."

Su Shih, or, as he is popularly known, Su of the Eastern Embankment—tung-p'o—earned this name during his period of office in Hangchow when he constructed a famous embankment in the West Lake. He was the son of a famous writer, and the works of his brother are also admired by the Chinese. He was the friend, too, of many famous literati, and lived in an atmosphere of poetry and literary inspiration. He became an official as a matter of course, but maxims of Government do not concern him greatly. His joy, his absorption, and his preoccupation were the study of Nature and the philosophy inspired by this study. In his writings on Nature he reveals himself a poet of power and delicacy and a philosopher imbued with Taoist ideals.

Mr. LeGros Clark has confined himself to the fu or prose poems of the master, and, indeed, Su Shih is especially renowned for his fu, that form of literary expression which somewhat resembles the polyphonic prose of French writers, and of the late Amy Lowell. In Chinese it is a delightful and characteristic form, and one used to perfection by the author. Not only does his poetry inspire and his philosophy intrigue the reader, his humour is also a delight.

Turning over the leaves of Mr. LeGros Clark's book I long to quote, now here now there, but I realize that each selection forms a complete whole, and that I should but do violence to an entity. The book must be read to be appreciated, and he is dull of mind indeed who is not moved by the "Pavilion of Flying Cranes," "Medlar and Chrysanthemum," "Autumn Sun," or "The Pavilion to Glad Rain." In the Preface we are promised, in the near future, a complete edition of Sun Tung-p'o's prose poetry, and it is to be hoped that this promise will be kept. It would be an invaluable addition to the works on Chinese literature available in English.

The wood engravings of Mrs. LeGros Clark are extremely interesting. They are, however, more in the style of Han than that of Sung, and would better illustrate a volume dealing with that factual period than one which gives the whimsical and abstract thought of the Sung.

I cannot close without a word in regard to the exquisite little dedication; it reads:

To the spirit of the New China this book is dedicated in the sure belief that her future greatness lies in the knowledge and emulation of her ancient and immortal arts.

Ah! must this be but a pious hope?

FLORENCE AYSCOUGH.

Researches in Manichæism. By A. V. Williams Jackson, Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages in Columbia University, New York, U.S.A. 1932. 20s.

This profound, abstruse, and valuable work by a master hand prompts the reader to reflect upon other topics than those with which it deals. The bibliography of leading authorities on the subject includes the works of several German scholars (two of whom-Müller and le Coq-died in 1930), a Dane. several Englishmen, half a dozen Parsees, a few French writers, and Saint Augustine, but all alike would probably recognize the learned author as their doyen. This book is dedicated to a Syrian, the late Dr. Abraham Yohannan. lecturer in Oriental Languages in Columbia University, and contains acknowledgments among others to his successor, Dr. Charles J, Ogden, to a Professor in the Jewish Institute of Religion of New York, and to two scholars with Russian names. How many of us realize that in a field so remote as this from "material" interests, the United States of America has expert philologists prepared, for insignificant salaries, to enlarge the bounds of knowledge? Dr. Jackson, indeed, commences his preface with the remark that besides carrying on his regular duties at Columbia University in connection with the classes in Sanskrit and Iranian, he "never let pass a single day, not even a Sunday or a holiday, without working on something relating to Manichæism."

The importance of the subject arises, of course, from the fact that Manichæism, which arose in the Persian Empire in the third century A.D., was once a rival both of Zoroastrianism and of Christianity, and new interest has been aroused by the recent discovery in Central Asia of fragmentary documents relating to the sect founded by Mani, a Persian by blood, born in Babylonia, then a province of Persia.

The author shows how the religious teachings of Mani spread eastwards even to China, and westwards into Sicily and Northern Africa, where it was absorbed into other heresies, rather than extinguished.

"The blood of the martyrs" is not always "the seed of the Church": Manichæism was extirpated by persecution, but had a profound effect upon current thought for nearly a thousand years. As a faith it no longer exists, but it was a veritable religion, and exercised an influence upon a countless company of devoted followers, inspired by the ideals and high principles of its founder, whom they accounted divine, and the example of whose martyrdom they aspired to follow.

A. T. Wilson.

The Land of Timur: Recollections of Russian Turkestan. By A. Polovstoff, with Illustrations by B. Litvinoff and a map. $9'' \times 5\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. xi + 206. Methuen and Co., Ltd. 10s. 6d.

This is a book of reminiscence. We are taken back into days of long ago, when a Tsar was on the throne of Russia, and Lenin and Communism were undreamed of. Beyond this generalization, it is difficult to place a date for our author's experience within a quinquennium, for everything is of the vaguest from a chronological point of view. However, he tells us that his visit to the Pamirs on the Bokharan border coincided with that of Lord Kitchener to the Indian frontier on an "inspection of frontier outposts," and therefore he must have been at that particular spot somewhere between 1902 and 1909. Again, there is nothing to show, in the sixteen chapters of which the book is composed, what the author was doing in Central Asia and why he seemed so interested in the country bordering on Afghanistan, India, and Persia. He tells us, though not in

so many words, that he was not an officer, and as he certainly was not what in India would be called a "box-wallah," the reader is left with the only possible alternative and concludes he must have been an intelligence officer in the Civil Service, and, indeed, on the publisher's paper cover we read that the author "was in pre-war days diplomatic adviser to the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan."

Of the book itself there is really little to be said. It is, as its author states, a collection of "unpretending sketches," pleasantly written and in wonderfully idiomatic English which makes one quite forget that the author is a Russian. He is fortunate, too, in his collaborator, M. B. Litvinoff, whose illustrations are

those of a real artist.

Our author is enthusiastic about the country and the scenes he describes, as well he may be. No visitor to Central Asia can ever forget the charm of that fascinating land and its picturesque inhabitants, who, before the arrival of motors and the multiplicity of railway lines, lived very much as their ancestors must have lived in the time of Timur. Of the treasures of Bokhara and Samarcand practically nothing is added to our knowledge, and the whole book suffers rather from want of any subjectivity-it would have been so much more interesting if we heard more of individuals and the life of the diplomatic adviser, with his views on things in general, especially political, during his tenure of his diplomatic post, and less of archæology and scenery.

The chapter on "The Pamirs" is perhaps the best in the book. We are told what a "pamir" really means; the reason for the plural; the artificiality of the "buffer state" arrangement there; its tendency to breed trouble rather than prevent it; the incredible barrenness of these high tablelands; the impossibility of Russian soldiers staying there for more than a year; the lack of communication and the scarcity of food and fuel for man and beast; the strange capriciousness of mountain sickness; the magnificent awe-inspiring scenery (he becomes poetic when he refers to the "frozen fireworks of the glaciers"); the dizzy dangers of negotiating "ovrings"; and finally his subtle manœuvre to kidnap a boy of Yazgoolem in order that he might get an interpreter to teach him not only the language of the little State, but also its customs and its folk-lore.

In the chapter on Mazanderan, where our author seems to have settled for some weeks, we leave Russian Central Asia for Persia and learn something of the intense bigotry to be found in this little known, almost impenetrable, corner of the earth. The author came near losing his life in attempting to photograph the great Shiah procession in commemoration of the death of Hassan and Hussein,

called Shakhsay-Wakhsay.

As the reader puts the book down he cannot help wondering what effect the political upheaval has had on these Central Asian peoples, whose whole past is in such violent contrast to all that Bolshevism stands for. If others have written their views after studying the result of this gigantic experiment, our author is discreetly silent on the subject. He admits, however, that he was the first to bring a motor into Central Asia and that the natives christened it "Sheitan-arba"railways first and then motors! As in India so in Central Asia the internal combustion engine is shattering the static East, and making it easier for the spread of all sorts of strange doctrines. The railways began the work, motors and aeroplanes will finish it, but M. Polovstoff "left the country before it was invaded by the motor-car."

One word in conclusion. It is a pleasure to find that place-names in the map coincide with those in the text. This is far from being always the case.

nak jiban per malantik bermakan Kabut India di Patra

Hunted Through Central Asia. By P. S. Nazaroff. $8\frac{1}{4}$ " $\times 5\frac{1}{4}$ ". Pp. xi + 333. Map and illustrations. Blackwood. 7s. 6d.

The author of this book was a Russian geologist and engineer, who was seized and imprisoned by the Bolshevists at Tashkent in 1918 and, as is the case with most of their prisoners, was condemned to death. He escaped this fate owing to the brief re-occupation of the town by the "Whites" and regained his freedom; here he narrates in a very entertaining way his adventures and final arrival in Chinese territory. Mr. Nazaroff shows himself to be a brave and humane man as well as a talented, observant, and resourceful one.

His account is temperate and restrained, and it describes the misery and cruelty which Bolshevism brought on the smiling face of Turkestan, and on its innocent and simple folk. It describes, too, the muddle, stupidity, and wastefulness of these Communists. The futility, mismanagement, and confusion of all that Bolshevism has produced, and which apparently are all that it can produce, are manifest enough to any unbiassed observer, and here we have the sober and first-hand narrative of Mr. Nazaroff to corroborate an oft-told tale.

When the Bolshevists retook Tashkent, which they did with ease, looting and murder were unchecked, 5,000 harmless people were stripped naked and shot, and the rest of the inhabitants of the city aided the invaders or stood aloof.

Apparently Mr. Nazaroff managed by changing his name and by some judicious bribery to obtain a set of papers, and eventually he even secured a post under the Soviet who were pursuing him as Nazaroff and paying him as Novikoff.

During his wanderings the author spent much time with the Sarts and well describes life amongst these people, justly observing (page 79) "the domestic life of the Central Asian people is little known to Europeans."

It is significant how he differentiates Russians from Europeans—e.g., "Not Europeans only but even Russians" (page 79), and again we read "In Russia and in Europe" (page 206). The truth is that Russians regard themselves as distinct from Europeans, and it is a pity that few in the West realize that they do so.

The author's remarks on the Russian peasant are extremely to the point. He rightly says (page 238) that the fable of the gentle, good-natured Russian peasant must go, together with the illusion of the Great Bloodless Russian Revolution—already presumably gone—and he wonders (page 165) how the formerly patriotic and religious Russian people have forgotten all they used to respect and how they bow down to all they used to despise. Did Lenin use a cudgel to drive the Russian people into Communism as Peter the Great used a stick to drive them into European culture and civilization? On page 215 he asks, "What is this immense Russian people that a handful of ruffians with a thick stick can do what they want with?" He observés (page 242) that "Lenin never converted the Russian mujiks to socialism; he only allowed them to indulge their instincts for plunder, their hatred of civilization, and their love for destruction."

There are many references to the senseless and indiscriminate murders and massacres committed by the Reds (pages 209, 236, 237), and also to the wanton and criminal destruction of the resources of the country (pages 30, 182, 216).

There is a graphic account of the Turkestan bugs (page 105), of nomads' way of dealing with vermin (page 243), of the gruesome episode of the president's nose (page 181), and there are numerous other references to amusing or interesting incidents.

It is a pity that the Turki words have been so barbarously turned into English, and the pages of the book are disfigured by abominations such as kurdjum (page 91), khop djaksi (page 228), djigii (page 272), and others.

To the Briton, perhaps, it is a little strange that Mr. Nazaroff, enterprising,

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accomplished, brave, and patriotic, made no attempt to get into touch with the anti-Bolshevist forces; or to organize locally any party against the heralds of revolt; but initiative is a rare flower in Russia. The average Russian is ready to answer a call, and to follow a leader, but to sound the trumpet himself, to rouse, to organize, to energize, are gifts but rarely found in a land where individuality is replaced by originality, and eccentricity by character. The book gives a good idea of the reckless muddling on both sides, amongst the Whites as amongst the Reds, and of that fatalistic inertia which has enabled Bolshevism, with its Semitic leaven, to triumph and decency to be overthrown. Mr. Nazaroff may be congratulated on a really interesting book, which shows him to be a man of wide culture, competent, and liberal-minded.

Bolshevism in Perspective. By J. de V. Loder. $8\frac{1}{4}$ " $\times 5\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. 251. Allen and Unwin. 125. 6d.

(Reviewed by Sir Albion Banerji, C.S.I., C.I.E.)

So many books have been recently published on Russia, each presenting a picture impossible to reconcile with that of any other, that it is pleasant to find a reasonable and unprejudiced writer whose motive is not to bolster up extravagant claims or condemn wholesale everything connected with the Bolshevik Régime in Russia.

Mr. J. de V. Loder sets himself an ambitious task in his book, *Bolshevism in Perspective* (George Allen and Unwin). His work combines a history of Russia from Alexander I. to the present day, a series of traveller's impressions of the different regions under the Soviet rule, a description of the present political organization in Russia, and finally an attempt to place in its proper perspective the

great Bolshevik experiment.

In his first three objectives he undoubtedly succeeds. His history of the exceedingly difficult and involved politics of the Revolution, though it necessarily omits much, is one of the fairest and clearest I have yet read. Throughout he emphasizes the enormous power wielded by the small Communist minority, which knew its own mind, over the bewildered, apathetic masses, and against the division and uncertainty of the rival parties. The power of the Jews, so often quoted as the dominant factor in Bolshevik politics, he shows to have been a product of the early days of the Revolution, when oppression of the Jews was represented as part of the Czarist Régime. He holds that now Jewish influence has declined. About this, however, opinions may differ.

The progress of Bolshevism itself he divides into three stages. The violent seizure of private property on the outbreak of the Revolution is followed in 1920 by the system of "War Communism," with the forcible mobilization of labour and the abolition of money, brought about through the collapse of the currency. The hostile attitude of the peasants and the famine only mitigated by foreign aid forced the second stage, Lenin's new Economic Policy. This makes considerable concessions to private trading and by stabilizing the currency opens the way to relations with foreign countries. Under this system the country makes considerable economic recovery, but the peasant is brought no nearer to accepting Communism. Finally in 1928 comes the third stage, the Five Year Plan, which means the establishment of State Capitalism. Mr. Loder concurs with the general view of foreign observers that the Five Year Plan, in spite of many muddles and failures, has on the whole succeeded sufficiently to make an enormous difference to the wealth of Russia, but at a tremendous cost in effort and sacrifice to the Russian people.

In his travels in Russia he found, as I myself experienced, that the foreigner receives every facility to travel in safety, order being as well maintained here as in any country in Europe. The State assists the traveller through its Tourist Agency, Intourist, an organization which promises the stranger every comfort he could ask, but whose promises are not always justified by its performance. It does not interfere with the freedom of the foreigner to go anywhere he likes, but hotels on the routes of which it approves are apt to be better stocked with food

and generally more comfortable.

In evaluating finally the position of the Russian experiment it is obvious that Mr. Loder is fundamentally opposed to the system and regards its success as a menace to Europe. To a certain extent, therefore, his estimate is diametrically opposed to that of a Bolshevik, since he counts as unfortunate those tendencies of Soviet social services, education, and the like, in so far as they strengthen the system. But this fundamental hostility is frankly expressed, and there is no sign of any attempt to fit facts to it. He admits that in many ways the workers are better off than ever under the Old Régime, and that the dictatorial methods of the Soviet are less onerous to a nation accustomed to autocracy. He considers the Soviet as probably the most suitable government for Russia at present, and

thinks it more likely to be modified than to collapse.

There is just one important point on which I should like to join issue with Mr. Loder. On the question of the Communist Dictatorship (page 167) he says, "Were the Soviet System worked as a free system, were freedom of speech and opinion and organization permitted, were elections allowed to express the feelings of the voters, were the congresses of Soviets places of frank discussion . . . it is possible that these institutions might constitute the form of democratic government most suited to Russian conditions." Here it seems to me that Mr. Loder has completely misread the Russian position. The Russians, as he points out elsewhere, never have had any experience of free institutions. Even the intellectuals have only the vaguest idea of what is meant by such freedom. Every Government in Russia has ruled by force, and the Soviet, like its predecessors, will only survive so long as it continues to rule with an iron hand. The prospect of transforming that vast, half-Asiatic country, with its extraordinary mixtures of language and races, its difficult communications, and its population apathetic and irresponsible by turns, into an orthodox, coherent and freedom-loving democracy, is a wilder dream than any the Bolsheviks have fashioned.

Rätsel der Gobi. By Sven Hedin. 91" x 61". Pp. ix + 335. Map. Illustrations. Leipzig: Brockhaus. 1931.

This is a sequel to the author's previous book, Auf grosser Fahrt, the English translation of which, under the title Across the Gobi Desert, was published last year, and was reviewed in the last issue of the JOURNAL. The book begins with an interesting summary of exploration in Central Asia from the earliest recorded journeys 2,000 years ago, up to the present time. In detailing the books written during the last ten years about Sinkiang and the Gobi, the author remarks that "the English writers have as a rule the common characteristic of omitting mention of all other explorers than their own countrymen"-a taunt that can hardly be justified.

The story begins with Sven Hedin's return to Sinkiang after the interval spent in Sweden in the summer of 1928. The expedition had lost their best friend through the murder of the Governor-General Yang Tseng-Hsin. His successor Chen was suspicious of the objects of the party, and his obstructiveness led Sven

Hedin to make the devious and costly journey, by the new Russian "Turk-Sib" railway, the Trans-Siberian, Chinese Eastern, and Manchurian railways, to

Peking, where he arrived in January, 1929.

Although cordially welcomed by many sympathizers, among them a remarkable character, the Mongolian Princess Palta de Torgut, Sven Hedin failed to overcome the Governor-General's obstruction, and proceeded next to Nanking, where he was received by Marshal Chang Kai Shek and others. On returning to Peking, where he met Colonel Bailey, he was taken ill, and his medical adviser took so serious a view of his state as to prescribe a journey to Chicago for an operation by Dr. Harvey Cushing, a famous specialist on spinal complaints. The voyage was made accordingly, but on arrival it was found that an operation was unnecessary. The journey, however, was not unprofitable, for besides making a friend of Dr. Cushing, Sven Hedin met the Swedish magnate Vincent Bendix, of Chicago, South Bend, and New York, who substantially financed the expedition. From America Hedin returned to Stockholm, and with health restored planned to return to Urumchi via Orenburg and Tashkent, but fresh difficulties arose owing to the Governor-General's opposition, and again the journey had to be made to Peking by the Trans-Siberian railway in October, 1929. Here, again, unexpected good fortune came to the aid of the expedition in the person of Professor Roy Chapman Andrews, the American explorer. Having been obliged to abandon at the eleventh hour a projected journey in Mongolia, he handed over to Sven Hedin for a mere song his equipment and camel transport.

The main party of the expedition was at this time at Belimiao on the eastern edge of the Gobi under Bergmann, preparing for a fresh start across the desert, and a valuable addition was made to the party in the person of Dr. Bohlin, who was an expert in investigating the traces of prehistoric man. While their party struck westwards in the direction of Sinkiang, Sven Hedin with another party, under the guidance of a Swedish missionary named Ericson, made a journey in Ford cars through north-eastern Mongolia, examining Lama temples and visiting Swedish missionary outposts. One of the objects was the acquisition of a typical Lama temple with the idea of transporting it complete to the West to give Christian countries an idea of Lama temple construction and worship. A very beautiful temple is described, "Boro-tologain" ("The Temple of the Greyhead"), but "this beautiful sanctuary was not to be bought." As winten was setting in they arrived at Kalgan, and made the headquarters of the expedition at the house of Larson, the organizer of the camel transport, who had spent the greater part of his life in Mongolia. From this centre communication was maintained as was possible with the parties in the Gobi until after Christmas when Sven Hedin left

for Peking.

Three vividly written chapters are devoted to the adventures of the small party that was left in charge of the meteorological station on the Edsin Gol in November, 1927; the German Dr. Zimmermann, the young Swede Söderbom, and their Chinese colleague Ma. The story tells of the hostility of the Kansu officials who ordered them to leave the country; the imprisonment at Suchow of the two who went to try and come to an understanding with the officials; their appeal to Feng Yu Hsiang and consequent release and return to Edsin Gol. Then the tragic story of Ma's madness, gradually developing in the remote camp alone with Zimmermann, until in the end he became a raving lunatic, murdering his servant and killing himself; the commission of enquiry from Suchow before which the two Europeans had to clear themselves of suspicion, and finally their departure from the ill-fated spot for Peking amid demonstrations of friendship from the Torgut tribesmen. In commenting upon the loneliness of research in these remote

places, the Author has another hit at the English and their ways with the remark: "I am more lonely on a Sunday in London than with a pair of Asiatics in the midst of the Takla Makan desert." Young Söderbom's story is told in detail under the heading "Adventures of a Swede in Marco Polo's Tracks." When imprisoned at Suchow he suffered brutal treatment as if he were a common criminal. When released and on the return to Edsin Gol he joined a party of Kansu soldiery sent to punish a gang of brigands, was accepted as their leader, and conducted the pursuit with great enterprise and success.

The remaining chapters of the book give extracts from the diaries of various members of the expedition describing their operations in their several spheres. The activities of Dr. Erik Norin, the chief geographer and geologist, were much hampered by the hostility of the Sinkiang officials, but he effected useful exploration in the Kuruk Tag range and about Bagrash Kol Lake in Sinkiang during 1928-1929, and in the Turfan depression, 300 metres below sea level, during the

autumn of 1929.

Dr. Ambolt was also in Turfan in the spring of 1929, and on his return to Urumchi he tells of the visit of the English Colonel Schomberg, writes in very appreciative terms of him, and of the assistance given by him in various ways. He describes him as "a famous and efficient member of the Indian Secret Service." The Chinese affirmed that "he aimed at creating for England another Afghanistan in Sinkiang"—whatever that may mean!

Bergmann in co-operation with Dr. Bohlin and others was occupied with archæological research, and was most successful in the eastern part of the Gobi desert. His numerous finds await expert examination and study before any in-

teresting deductions can be made from them.

Meteorological observation was one of the main objects of the expedition, and this department of the work was the one that was most hampered by Chinese suspicions. Hydrogen cylinders were taken for cannon, and their import into Sinkiang forbidden; balloons sent up to test the air currents at high altitudes were regarded as part of a system of secret signalling.

Although the book records no very striking new discoveries, it is an interesting record of work carried on with patient determination in the face of great discouragements, and severe hardships from the climate—great heat in

summer and intense cold in winter.

There are numerous and excellent photographic illustrations. There are two maps, the same as those accompanying Across the Gobi Desert, one a general map on a scale of 1:12,000,000; the other on a scale of 1:3,000,000, to illustrate the explorations in Sinkiang.

J. K. T.

Jehol. By Sven Hedin. $9\frac{1}{4}" \times 6\frac{1}{4}"$ Pp. 211. Illustrations. Leipzig: Brockhaus. This book is the account of a trip made by Sven Hedin and two companions to Jehol in order to avoid the rains in Peking. His other object was to obtain measurements and exact drawings of the temple in the Povala at Jehol in order that it should be exactly reproduced at the coming Chicago exhibition.

Jehol has already been fully described, and has long been the seat of a Belgian mission, at which Sven Hedin stayed, so the main interest lies in the photographs, which are excellent. There is only one small map, and no plans of the temples, buildings, etc. The text is poor, and owing to the lack of plans it is none too easy to follow the descriptions of the temples. A certain amount of the book has already appeared as articles in the German illustrated press, and the matter is padded out with a description of Lord Macartnev's embassy and a somewhat

inaccurate account of the Dowager Empress's connection with the place. It is a work of little interest to the serious student, and can be described as popular, the author no doubt wishing to turn his very pleasant holiday into money; but it is not the sort of book one is used to associate with Sven Hedin, but rather with the rich American tourist.

People of the Book. By Major A. J. Pott, D.C.M. Pp. xxiii + 261. 11 illus trations and 3 maps. The Foreword is by General Sir R. W. Wingate, Bart. Blackwood.

Of the ten stories included in this volume, three were previously published in Blackwood's Magazine, four in the National Review, and one in the Quarterly Review.

The volume makes a very suitable memorial to a gallant officer, the whole book is inspired with a human sympathy, a simplicity and directness of character that cannot fail to appeal to the reader as the literary expression of a personality both sensitive and strong.

It is a memorial, however, to more than the man. For the Egyptian army of those days is no more. The days are passed when it mattered not so much what was done as how it was done, when the conduct of affairs depended primarily on the patience, good humour, and sympathy of the individual British officer or official rather than the efficiency or precision of regulations.

It would be easy, reading between the lines, to observe implications of policy calculated to cause consternation. The forcible recruitment of prisoners of war, administration by official cattle raiding, the flogging of women are instances of the type of behaviour the author seems to have accepted quite simply and naturally as in the order of things.

But the stories show with equal clarity how these problems were dealt with: instead of being ignored or repressed, they were used and reformed—a hint to the doctrinaires not without its appositeness.

It is characteristic of the author and his colleagues that the volume should be called the *People of the Book*, although more than half the stories concern not Mohammedans but the pagan negroids of the Southern Sudan. It represents a theory deeply but unconsciously engrained in the minds of all ranks in the Egyptian army that Islam is the right, proper, and natural religion for all natives of Africa.

Men of action, however, commonly make poor philosophers, and they are wiser to leave to others to dissect the moralities; they can stand by their results.

Major Pott's book will delight the few who know the Sudan well and can recognize the old yarns. It will please the many who do not know the Sudan by its sincerity and graphic simplicity, and it gives a picture of the Sudan quite sufficiently accurate for the needs of Everyman, and it is a fitting memorial of a period of prosperity and progress such as the Sudan never knew before and may never see again.

The only blot on the book is the transliteration of Arabic words, which is so bad as that it must be assumed to be deliberate. That does not make it excusable.

C. A. W.

The Himalayan Journal. Vol. IV. April, 1932.

The Himalayan Club are to be congratulated on the fourth volume of their annual journal, which has just been issued. It is an excellent number, and fully

maintains the high standard of the preceding volumes. For this sustained success the Club must be indebted in no small measure to the indefatigable enthusiasm of the honorary editor, Major Kenneth Mason, who, with his extensive practical and technical experience of the Himalayas, spares no effort in collecting interesting material and in providing authoritative references, comments and maps to make that material of real research value.

It is again a pleasing feature of the journal to see such a number of really informative articles by younger members—a most healthy sign for the future of

this young alpine club.

Of particular interest to members of the R.C.A.S. will be one of those instructive papers which that eminent Central Asian authority, Sir Aurel Stein, too rarely

finds time to give us.

In this article he describes, with scholarly references to the records of ancient geographers and travellers, and with many illuminating conclusions from his own personal observations, the various tracks past the Pamirs which, in ancient times, carried a very considerable traffic between the advanced civilizations of China in the east and the Hellenized portions of Asia, beyond the middle Oxus in the west. Further, he explains the economic and political importance which attached to these lines of communication in those days.

Apart from retracing the old silk road of the Alai Valley, Sir Aurel describes, with many interesting details, the lesser known tracks along the upper tributaries of the Oxus, to the Taghdunbash Pamirs and Tarim basin, and here again he is

able to discuss ancient records with a personal knowledge of the ground.

He refers only briefly to that remarkable exploit of the Chinese General, Kao Hsien-Chih, who in A.D. 747 led a force of 10,000 men from Kashgar across the bleak and inhospitable Pamirs, and, in the face of Tibetan opposition, forced a way over the very formidable glacier-covered pass of the Tarkot, c. 15,400 ft., down into Gilgit. Few who have read Sir Aurel's detailed account of this expedition in the Geographical Journal of February, 1932, will disagree with him that it fully equalled any such achievement known to European military history.

Humbler students of Central Asian affairs at least regret that this veteran explorer and eminent scholar cannot spare more time for the instruction which his

papers always provide.

Amongst many other articles of interest in the journal will be found a brief but graphic account of the Bavarian attempt on Kanchenjunga, in 1931. As the editor remarks: "The extreme modesty of the account hides an amazing achievement."

There is also a short account of the first ascent of Kamet, a discussion on the value of oxygen in high altitudes, accounts of private tours and expeditions, and a lively—and rather disquieting—study of edible bugs and slugs, which, we are told, find favour in the menu of some of the more primitive inhabitants of the Himalaya region.

The journal contains some beautiful photographs, and of outstanding merit are the two well-produced panoramas of the Chong Kumdan glacier blocking the

Shyok Valley.

Altogether the journal is a fine record of a year of solid achievement, of which

any mountain club could take legitimate pride.

The club will be much gratified, and his many friends no less pleased to hear of the recent selection of the honorary editor to be the first occupant of the new Chair of Geography at Oxford University, a sphere in which his well-known organizing abilities will find ample scope.

A Letter from India. By Edward Thompson. 71" × 5". Pp. 162. Faber and Faber. 5s.

On the flap of these letters from India the author is described as "a sensitive and experienced observer of India conditions," who foretells "what is likely to happen in the near future" and—"incidentally"—gives "fresh information of extraordinary interest about General Dyer's action at Amritsar." The "advertisement" further states that "A Letter from India contains articles contributed to The Times and Manchester Guardian, etc." The Author's Preface, however, explains that the only contribution to The Times was the paper on fauna.

Whatever else Mr. Thompson may be or may have been, for the purpose of this review, he has to be considered as a pure and simple (and "sensitive") peripatetic journalist, without any reference to or need to read his Poetry, Drama, Belles-Lettres, or History. On the back flap of the jacket of this composite letter from India are (for the reviewer) helpful extracts from reviews on *The Reconstruction of India* by the same author. The Times says that "even in the smallest details Mr. Thompson is extraordinarily impartial," while The Times Literary Supplement affirms that "he is eminently fair and fascinatingly suggestive." While throughout this book of "letters" the writer would appear to be cease-lessly striving for recognition as a superlatively impartial person, his style and views are provocative to an extent which would be intolerable except in "specials" contributed to the Manchester Guardian.

Mr. Thompson has many of the qualities and characteristics required of the modern improving journalist. He produces rabbits out of bureaucratic hats and lions out of Congress internés, and endeavours to make people in this country—and notably in U.S.A.—aware that "The Indian Governments are not wicked, as many suppose, but "—according to Mr. Thompson—" there is a good deal of evidence that they are sometimes half-witted." In almost alternate pages and sentences Mr. Thompson furnishes the necessary "evidence." Although seeking to be cynically pro-British, it is at least satisfactory that this observer is himself without doubt one of "the already considerable company of Englishmen who take (Indian) friendliness for granted and accept it without reservation of racial nervousness." While it may be difficult to deny some justification for some of the hard things Mr. Thompson has to say about Calcutta European commercial careerists, there is surely another school of thought now arising (perhaps as a result of defeatism) who in their "egocentricism" outdo Mr. Thompson himself.

Mr. Thompson also has some straight talk about Gandhiji, but is tolerant enough to counterbalance the adverse poise with some meed of praise. "It is perhaps true," says Mr. Thompson, "that Mr. Gandhi is still the main defence against a bloody outbreak, but the last few years have seen him growing egocentric, increasingly tolerant of lapses from the incredibly lofty ideas associated with his name. He is not the man he was."

Mr. Thompson makes ambitious statements. He claims to have "thousands of friends in every part of India" and "with humility" remembers "their fairness and their kindness and their abounding belief in my people." Apart from his provocative style, we have some unwarranted calumnies; for instance, dealing with the British officer (in India) Mr. Thompson thinks it is "a miracle that the Indian Army has remained loyal, a miracle second only to the loyalty of the police," and then proceeds to amplify his libel as follows: "The British officer in nine cases out of ten recognizes no sort of comradeship with any Englishman outside his clan. If by accident you run up against him and by some fluke he suddenly sees that you also are human he is the finest-mannered person on this planet. But unless this accident and this fluke happen he has "no use" for you,

as every P. and O boat that plies between England and India proves afresh. Since he does not accept his own fellow-countryman, naturally he does not accept his Indian fellow-citizen; naturally he is incapable of even beginning to think there may be an opinion or a judgment other than that obtaining in military circles. There is such a thing as intellectual inbreeding."

And then, and then, came Spring—for a page further on we have this threadbare penitence: "Why don't we take Indian friendship for granted? It is there, waiting for us. I remember a famous Indian telling me, twenty years ago, that on the few occasions when he had met officers of our Army he had lost his resentment against their presence in his country. 'I know it's wrong. But they

attract me more than your civilians do."

"What Happened at Jalianwalabagh," for all its verisimilitude and after-dinner intimacy with Messrs. Irving and Puckle, Sir Abdul Qadir, Mr. Schuyler (another American—what is the significance?); for all Mr. Thompson's representation that "General Dyer's action saved the Punjab from a revolt with all its attendant horrors"; with all his excuses for Dyer, one cannot help feeling that, underlying all this, is a smug and bitter motive. The answer to this sensational and shameful bid for journalistic notoriety is that a British Court of Justice found differently, and completely vindicated General Dyer from the attacks of the insidious for all time.

Is the explanation for various references and quotations from and of Americans, that these articles were "syndicated" or intended for consumption in the U.S.A.?

There is another unpardonable calumny, a cheap untruth at that, at the foot of page 127, which completely discounts what is otherwise a sympathetic and valuable contribution in the interests of a community whose cause and case appears likely to go by default—for many of the reasons Mr. Thompson adduces. The story about the child who "played as an equal with the Civil Servant's child until a visitor took it upon himself to ask why 'this dirty little Eurasian' was mingling in the society of the nobly born" is palpably false.

The general impression left is that Mr. Thompson grudgingly gives Sir Samuel Hoare and the policy of the present Government a seventy-five per cent. blessing. The twenty-five per cent. withheld may be no more than literary technique, plus

an endeavour to show a properly sensitive impartiality.

Letters II., III., and IV. are the best of the bunch, and give a distinctly clear view of anti- and post-Irwin-Gandhi pact days, are cogent in argument, and carry weight with facts. "K."

Himalaya, Karakorum, and Eastern Turkestan. By Filippo de Filippi, K.C.I.E., Ph.D. 11" × 8\frac{3}" Pp. 42. Illustrations, map. Dehra Dun. 1922. This book is an account of an expedition conducted by Dr. Filippo de Filippi across India, Baltistan, Ladakh, and Russian Turkestan between August, 1913, and December, 1914. It was first published in Italy in 1923, and the author expresses the hope, in his Preface, that the results achieved by the expedition will justify the re-issue of the book in English after so long an interval. I think the author need entertain no fears on this point, for we have here an admirably compiled record of travel and exploration, in which the lucid prose of the narrative is assisted by numerous photographs and some excellent maps.

The object of the expedition was scientific research and exploration in a region rarely visited by Europeans, where the scientific data hitherto supplied were scanty and sometimes inaccurate. The book is therefore written with a serious object,

in that it is the description of the fulfilment of a scientific purpose, and as such it will make a greater appeal to those equipped with knowledge properly to understand and appreciate the importance of the knowledge gained and results achieved. But the normal reader who hopes for a book of travel and adventure will not be disappointed. He need not apprehend a mass of complex detail. Those who require that sort of thing may refer to other volumes published by Dr. de Filippi where the scientific results are compiled and exhaustively treated. Here information is imparted in an interesting manner and the path to instruction about the remote yet fascinating region with which the book deals is suitably graded and has been cleared of obstacles. Those who have travelled in search of sport or adventure in Baltistan, Ladakh, or Turkestan and have gazed with awe and admiration on the snow-capped giants of the Himalayas, or the formidable rampart of the Karakorum, will turn these pages with the pleasure with which one greets an old friend.

Dr. de Filippi skips lightly over the initial stages of his expedition: the preparation and organization in Italy, which must have required a great deal of care, knowledge, and forethought; the voyage to India and thence to Srinagar, the Capital of Kashmir. From Srinagar the members of the expedition followed a route which in its initial stage only is familiar to many; that up the lovely Sind Valley, the beauty and fertility of which form a bad introduction for the traveller who has to face the bleak and inhospitable wilderness beyond. The expedition crossed the Zoji pass, and so changed from the garden of Kashmir proper to the aridity of the "roof of the world." The party spent three and a

half months of the first winter at Skardu in Baltistan.

For the normal traveller a winter spent in Skardu would be a terribly dull proceeding, but Dr. de Filippi and his companions had neither time nor inclination for ennui. Every member of the expedition was busy with the special branch of scientific research which he had adopted. We read that "gravimetric observations alternated with geodetic operations; astronomical calculations of latitude and longitude; reception and recording of wireless time-signals transmitted from Lahore, etc."

Dr. de Filippi found time to trace the history of Baltistan and the Baltis, and he gives an interesting account of the religious and social customs of the inhabitants. Like other travellers, he is impressed by the general gloom and furtiveness of the Baltis, and there is a graphic description of the religious hysteria displayed during the celebration of the Mohurrum in Skardu.

Towards the end of February, 1914, the expedition moved forward from Baltistan to Ladakh, and so entered "a strange new world; a Lamaist Country."

So far as physical features are concerned, there is nothing to warn the traveller from Baltistan to Ladakh of the change which awaits him. He crosses no obvious boundary, but once in Ladakh he is indeed in a new world. Ladakh, though politically united to the State of Kashmir, is, by virtue of its social and religious customs, a part of Tibet. And so the traveller suddenly finds himself among Monasteries, Chortens, Mané Walls, Prayer Wheels, and Buddhas. The cheerful friendliness of the pig-tailed Ladakhis contrasts pleasantly with the reserve of the Mahomedans of Baltistan. The Ladakhi women, with their characteristic dress, greet the traveller with cheerful smiles and a friendly salutation of "Ju-ju," and are ready to dance before him; a strange contrast to the veiled women of a country where Islam rules. The contrast is vividly and variously illustrated, and it is based on the fundamental difference in the religions of the two tracts; for there is an enormous difference between the austere monotheism of Islam and the complicated religious system of Tibet, a Buddhistic polytheism, complicated by the

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introduction of Hindu Tantrisim, and so debased into Lamaism. The reader will find an admirable description of Ladakh, and the author's word pictures of the scenery, people and social and religious customs will enable him to form a very good idea of that strange and fascinating land.

Dr. de Filippi pays a cordial tribute to the assistance he received from the Government of India, and he relates how the campaign of exploration, undertaken in the spring of 1914, was assisted by a party sent by the Indian Trigonometrical Survey, consisting of Major (now Colonel) Henry Wood, R.E., Mr. Alfred Spranger, and the Indian Surveyors, Jamna Prasad and Shib Lal.

After spending two months in Leh, the capital of Ladakh, the expedition journeved to the high-lying Depsang plateau, crossing the great Ladakh range via the Chang-la, which is 18,370 feet above sea level, and travelling up the wild and Dr. de Filippi draws a comparison barren valley of the Shyok river. between the two caravan routes to the Karakorum through the Nubra and Shyok Valleys, which is unfavourable to the latter, and it is interesting and gratifying to note that his conclusions coincide with those recorded by the writer in an official report written some four years later. The utter barrenness of the Shyok Valley, and the difficulty of obtaining even pasture and firewood, is graphically described; while the poignant description of the sufferings of transport animals on this route is an unpleasant reminder to anyone who has visited this There is a vivid and interesting account of the Depsang plateau, a cup-shaped plain about 310 square miles in extent, with an average height of about 18,000 feet, almost surrounded by a chain of mountains, which includes some giant peaks. And so we come to what appears to have been the toughest task the expedition had to face, the exploration of the Rimu glacier, and surrounding country in the Eastern Karakorum, where Dr. de Filippi and his stouthearted colleagues were literally " off the map." The very considerable difficulties, and not inconsiderable dangers of this bitterly cold and desolate region were overcome by pluck, patience, and perseverance, with the result that the Italian explorers, ably assisted by their British colleagues, found it possible to correct the hitherto inaccurate map of the Rimu glacier and surrounding country, thereby confirming the Rimu as the source of the Yarkand River, as well as the Shyok.

It was on their return to the Depsang plateau, after their tour of exploration, in practically unknown country, that the members of the expedition received their first intimation of the outbreak of the Great War. And surely the stunning news of this catastrophe can hardly have been received by anyone in stranger surroundings! Some of the Italian members of the expedition, Commander Alessio, Lieutenant Antilli, and Dr. Alessandri, who were officers of the Italian Army, Navy, and Reserve, felt that they ought to return to their own country at once. Major Wood, who had instructions from the Survey Office to carry on with the expedition, agreed to take Alessio's place as second-in-command, and so the diminished party were able to carry out their project.

Leaving the Depsang plateau, the party crossed the Karakorum Pass, a comparatively easy undertaking by comparison with their former exertions, although this pass is 18,300 feet above sea-level, and so descended to Eastern Turkestan, the extreme western province of the Chinese Empire, and were received with suspicious courtesy by Chinese bureaucrats. Dr. de Filippi is as happy as usual in his account of the historical vicissitudes which Eastern Turkestan has undergone, and his description of the cities of Yarkand and Kashgar. At Kashgar the party disintegrated, for most of the subordinate staff had to return. From Kashgar Dr. de Filippi and his remaining companions embarked on the last stage of their journey towards home; through Russian Turkestan to Tashkent and then on

via Odessa, Roumania, and Austria. One can sympathize with the feverish impatience which consumed these travellers to return to their homeland after so long and arduous a journey, more especially since events of startling and world-wide importance were transpiring in the European theatre. The exigencies of war compelled the temporary abandonment of much scientific equipment at Tashkent, and it was a curious irony that after having transported this heavy and delicate paraphernalia over the most difficult and inaccessible country, the party should have been obliged to relinquish it as soon as they returned to contact with a railway system. However, one is glad to learn that the scientific equipment was returned in perfect condition by the Soviet Government in 1925.

In Roumania, Major Wood and Mr. Spranger parted from their Italian colleagues, who continued their journey to Italy, arriving there in December, 1914,

after more than sixteen months of absence.

In the last chapter of his book Dr. de Filippi gives a synopsis of the results achieved by the expedition under his command. Frankly, I do not feel competent to deal with these, and I think the normal reader will be able only vaguely to apprehend their importance. As I have said before, the expedition had a scientific object, which appears to have been attained. But the book, nevertheless, should appeal to any reader, not only as a record of pluck and endurance, but by reason of Dr. de Filippi's admirable and picturesque account of strange peoples and places.

D. M. Field.

Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus Entitled "Chronicle."
By Leontios Makhairas. Edited, with a Translation and Notes by R. M.
Dawkins. Two volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Milford.
50s. net.

If F. W. Hasluck, to whose memory this book is dedicated, and whose untimely death in 1920 was so heavy a loss to those interested in the less-frequented paths of near Eastern history and folklore, had survived to see its publication, how greatly he would have rejoiced at a piece of scholarship so much after his own heart. For Professor Dawkins has now given us not only an admirable edition, but a very readable English translation, of the most vivid and human chronicle of the most romantic epoch in the history of the Latin East. Makhairas has been edited before, first by Constantine Sathas, who printed the chronicle in 1873, and again in 1881, when Sathas collaborated with Edouard Miller in a second edition accompanied by a French translation. Indeed, French scholars have hitherto made the history of mediæval Cyprus particularly their own, as witness the monumental works of De Mas Latrie, Rey, Delaville Le Roulx, Enlart and others in the publications of the unfortunately now defunct Société de l'Orient Latin and elsewhere, a circumstance which is not unnatural seeing that the civilization which blossomed so freely on the rich Levantine soil of Cyprus in the three hundred years during which that island was ruled by the Kings and Queens of the House of Lusignan was essentially French. The dynasty was French, and its leading statesmen and men of letters bore such names as Guillaume de Machaut, Philippe de Novare and Philippe de Mézières. Nevertheless, Cyprus has been under British rule since 1878 and an integral portion of the British Empire since 1914; and it is well that a first-rate piece of research dealing with the most brilliant period in the annals of this British colony should come from the hands of an English scholar.

The three centuries during which it was ruled by the dynasty of Lusignan were without doubt the most notable epoch in the varied history of Cyprus,

despite the prominence of the island in classical times. In every aspect of mediæval civilization the little kingdom played a distinguished part; its remarkable achievements in every domain of human activity invested it with an importance among the nations of Europe wholly out of proportion to its small size and population. Its constitution was the model of that of the mediæval feudal state; its laws, as embodied in the Assizes of Jerusalem, were a pattern of mediæval jurisprudence. In the Abbey of Bella Paise, in the Cathedrals of Nicosia and Famagusta, in the Castles of St. Hilarion, Buffavento, and Kantara, it could boast rarely beautiful examples of western mediæval architecture; in its King Peter I. it possessed the greatest knight-errant the world has seen, in his Order of the Sword the most perfect expression of chivalrous ideals. The prevailing ambition of the Lusignan Kings being the reconquest of their nominal kingdom of Jerusalem, Peter I. twice went the round of the Courts of Europe to collect men and money for this purpose, and under him the Lusignan kingdom attained the height of its reputation. The ten years of the King's reign-1359 to 1360—were filled with a variety of picturesque and often tragic incidents, to which the Middle Ages afford no parallel. Vowed from the days before his accession, when he was still Count of Tripoli, to a perpetual crusade against the Saracens, he commemorated his vow in his Order of the Sword, whose motto was "Pour loyauté maintenir." With all his kingly qualities, however, Peter was not a model husband, and it was unfortunate for him that his wife, Eleanor of Aragon, was a vindictive woman, whose jealousy was not disarmed by Peter's romantic practice of putting her nightdress in his bed every night that he spent away from her. Eleanor, who exercised the regency during her husband's absences, took these opportunities to wreak her vengeance on the King's mistresses; and Peter, embittered by disappointments both political and domestic, became in the end a cruel and capricious tyrant. With his assassination in 1369 and the accession of his young son, Peter II., the kingdom of Cyprus began to go downhill, for a dispute between the Consuls of Venice and Genoa at the young King's coronation led to the Genoese occupation of the island's principal port of Famagusta, which endured for ninety-one years. Although Makhairas brings his chronicle down to the death of King John II. and the accession of his daughter Charlotte in 1458, by far the greater part of his work is concerned with the reigns of the two Peters; those of James I., Janus, and John II. are dealt with more summarily. Makhairas was probably born about the year 1380, that is to say, in the lifetime of Peter II., who died in 1382; and what information he did not acquire at first hand he probably obtained from relatives and from one Demetrios Daniel, the Secretary of Queen Eleanor. He has done for his native Cyprus what Froissart did for the countries of Western Europe; and Professor Dawkins has made a signal addition to mediæval studies by producing not only a collation of the two texts, the Venice manuscript and that of the Bodleian, but in providing for the first time an English translation of this graphic, picturesque, at times naïve, but always intensely interesting, narrative.

It was a strange world, that of Cyprus under its Poitevin dynasty, with the foreign and Catholic ruling class of Frankish sovereigns and nobles superimposed upon the Greek-speaking Orthodox masses of the population. Until the establishment of the Lusignan dynasty, Cyprus was of course wholly Orthodox, but in 1260 Pope Alexander IV. issued the famous, or better, infamous, Bulla Cypria, whereby the Latin Archbishop was made the supreme ecclesiastical chief of Latins and Orthodox alike, the Orthodox Archbishopric of Cyprus was degraded into a mere Bishopric of Solea, the three other Orthodox Bishops were compelled to abandon the headquarters of their Sees to the Latin Bishops and relegated to

three villages, and all tithes were made over to the Latin clergy. The Orthodox Bishops were reduced to the position of dependents of the corresponding Latin Bishops, and at their installation were obliged to take the oath of obedience to them and to the Holy See. Nevertheless, the relations between ruling Frankish Latins and ruled Greek-speaking Orthodox were not as bad as might be supposed from the above facts; and Makhairas, although a Greek-speaking Cypriote and a member of the Orthodox faith, was a fervent admirer of the Lusignan Kings despite their foreign blood, religion, and language. Although he could sympathize with his fellow-Orthodox against occasional Frankish oppression, he had the aristocrat's sympathy with the feudal system of the Lusignan régime. He had a high idea of the sanctity of kingship; and, while recognizing the faults of his beloved Peter I., had no sympathy for the knights who rebelled against him. He was a Cypriote Greek gentleman of feudal and monarchical instincts, who was able to preserve an impartial judgment between the indigenous population of his native island and its imported ruling caste; it was for the Genoese, who by their greed and bad faith ultimately brought the Cypriote kingdom to disaster, that he reserved the full force of his disapproval.

Volume I. of Professor Dawkins's work is mainly taken up with the text and the translation, which are conveniently printed on opposite pages. Volume II. contains a general introduction; a bibliographical note; an invaluable glossary, good indexes, and a genealogy; some 200 pages of general notes; and ten interesting pages on the language in which the "Chronicle" is written, that strange mediæval Cypriote dialect so full of Frankish proper names and legal and social terms. The following lines, chosen at random, will give an idea of this amazing jargon, with which it is safe to say that few scholars other than the Bywater and Sotheby Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek at Oxford could have coped so successfully:

so successfully:

'Ακομή ἔδωκέν του καὶ τὸ κουτοσταυλικιν τῆς Κύπρου' Καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου του ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ Τζακὲς τὸ κοντοσταυλικιν τῶν 'Ιεροσολύμων' Καὶ τοῦ σἰρ Τουμᾶς τε 'Ιμπελήν, Κόρης τοῦ 'Αρσεφίον, σινεσκάρδος τοὺ ρηγάτου. Καὶ τοὺ σἰρ Ραμοῦν Παπήν πουντουλλιέρην του ρηγάτου τῆς Κύπρου. Καὶ τοὺ σἰρ Ποργάτου τῆς Κύπρου. Καὶ τοὺ σἰρ Πιὲρ Μαλοζέλη τζαμπερλάνον τῆς Κύπρου. 'Ο ποῖος ρὲ Πιὲρ ἀρμάτην μίαν ὀμόρφην κόρην ἀπό τὴν Καταλονίαν καὶ ἐκράζαν την Λιενόραν τ' 'Αρραλούν.

Professor Dawkins has been fortunate in his material, as witness the following characteristic quotation, dealing with the last day in the life of Peter I.:

"We must return again to the king. When he had finished his business, he sat down to eat his supper very much vexed, on Tuesday the sixteenth of January, 1369 after Christ, the eve of St. Anthony. And they saw that the king was so angry that he had made himself sick; and there were many knights with him. The king was fasting for the eve of St. Anthony, (and he sat down at the table). And following after many dishes, they served him with asparagus; (and they asked him if it was his pleasure that this should be brought to table. And he said: 'Bring it.') And his squire looked for oil to put on the asparagus; and they had forgotten to buy it, and the shops were shut because it was late. And the king was waiting for them to set it before him. When he saw that they did not bring it, he said: 'In the name of God, serve up this asparagus.' And the squire said to him: 'Sir, they have no oil, and the grocers' shops are shut; and they forgot to bring it in time, and they beg for pardon.' The king grew vexed, for he was full of wrath and in a high passion, and said: 'The steward of my court has served me thus out of obstinacy.' And he sends off at once and throws him

into prison, and he threatened that in the morning he would cut off his head. . . .

And on Wednesday the seventeenth of January, 1369 after Christ, very early all the knights in company with the prince and his brother came to the king's lodging; (and it was the time of Ave Maria at dawn). And they dismounted at the pavement and went up the stairs and went to the loggia with all those who had been at the prison. Then the prince knocks gently at the door. Of the ushers it was the day of Gilet de Cornalie; he opened, and when the king's brothers went in, they all went in together. The king heard the stir and got up from the bed and says: 'Who are these who have come?' The Lady Echive de Scandelion his mistress, who was sleeping with him, said to him: 'Who can it be but your brothers?' And the lady covered herself with her coat and went out into the loggia and down into the betweenroom, where saddles for tournaments were stored: and they shut the trapdoor. When the prince saw that the Lady Echive, who was at the king's side, had gone away, he went into the king's room, and greeted the king: and the constable did not go in, nor did the prince wish to go in, but the knights, who had another plan in their minds, forced him to go in. Then he says to the king: 'Sir, a good day to you.' And the king said to him 'Good day to you, my good brother.' And the prince said to him: 'We worked all last night and have written down our opinion, and we have brought it to you for you to see.' The king was naked in his shirt and wanted to dress, and he was ashamed to dress before his brother, and he says to him: 'My princely brother, go outside for a little for me to dress, and I will look at what you have written.' The prince went out. Then the Lord of Arsuf pushed in, holding in his hand a dagger like a little sword, as was usual at this time, and by him was Sir Henry de Giblet. And when the prince had gone out, the king put on his clothes to dress himself; and he had put on one sleeve (of his coat) and had turned his head to put on the other, when he sees the knights in his room: and he says to them: 'Faithless traitors, what are you doing at this hour in my room, attacking me?' And there were there, Sir Philip d'Ibelin, the Lord of Arsuf, and Sir Henry de Giblet and Sir John de Gaurelle; these three went in at once and drew their swords and gave him each one of them three or four wounds: and the king cried out: ⁹Help, mercy, (for the love of Godl') And immediately Sir John Gorap, the steward of the court, pushed his way in, and found him in a faint: and he draws his sword and cut off his head, saying: 'You wished to-day to cut off my head, and I will cut off yours, and your threat shall fall upon your own self.'

And thus the knights came in one after the other, and they all laid their

swords (upon him) because of their oath."

The extract quoted above is typical of this authentic, human, spirited piece of history; and if, as has been said, Professor Dawkins is to be congratulated on the choice of his material, he is equally to be congratulated on the masterly fashion in which he has handled it.

H. C. L.

The English in India. By Sir John A. R. Marriott. 9" x 6". Pp. 322. Map. Clarendon Press. 12s. 6d.

The purpose of this book, as may be gathered from the Preface and the Prologue, is to set out the Indian problem—a constitution for a continent—in its historical perspective, and to examine the proposals made for its solution, a solution devolving on the Parliament and electorate of the United Kingdom.

Admirable purpose, and worthy performance, if only it had not been done before and if the time when it can be repeated with any profit was not rapidly REVIEWS 533

passing, if not actually past. "In India no one can build on vacant ground," remarks Sir John Simon, with his usual aptness, and indeed the incomparable work of the Commission over which he presided dominates to exclusion the site where the present author would fain build. Moreover, India's new constitution. once a respectable problem, is in imminent danger of becoming like the heavy lorry or the itinerant musician, a nuisance only to be dealt with by Act of Parliament.

With no desire to under-rate the interest and importance of the author's Indian researches, one could wish that the historical background to his conclusions and suggestions were not so deep, and the perspective so distant. From the "Genesis of the Problem" (chapter ii.) we move through the ages, wondering what we may expect in the way of Revelations at the end of it all. Was no shorter cut possible in the demonstration that the dominant factor in the history of Modern India "might have been a Russian, a Turk, or French or Prussian," and was, in fact, "an Englishman"? From Sir John Marriott one would have welcomed far fuller discussion regarding constitutions in the Dominions, in North and South America, in Germany and France, than the few short paragraphs vouchsafed to us. As it is, the line of historical communications is too long and too vulnerable. The author, it is true, presents his account with a cautionary E. and O.E. But it is frankly disconcerting to be told that Government's "rent" was collected "by native officials known as zemindars, who received a commission on the amount collected." Emphatically a thing one would have wished to express differently.

The real value of this work—and the value is very real indeed—lies in the author's knowledge of what may be called the English side of Indian history, of Indian questions as dealt with by English statesmen and men of affairs. The chapter on education, for instance, is an excellent summary of the movements in England which led to the extension of popular education in India, of the results which have followed from the momentous decisions taken nearly a century ago and of the present disastrous position in regard to this problem of problems. Again, in the description of the Afghan crises, our relations with Russia, and the defence of the Frontier, Palmerston, Disraeli and Lord Grey stand out clearer than the viceroys and political officers who carried out the policy laid down by these distinguished statesmen. The account of Wellesley's period of office has a freshness and vigour which it owes to an outlook not confined to India alone but envisaging the whole line of Imperial policy.

There is undoubtedly an opening for a history of Indian affairs as viewed by the English politician and the English elector, and of the treatment which Indian questions have received in the past and are now receiving at the hands of these arbiters. If Sir John Marriott has stimulated interest in this aspect of the Indian

problem his book has not been written in vain.

A. L. S.

THE ROYAL CENTRAL ASIAN SOCIETY, 77, GROSVENOR STREET, W. 1. INCOME AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1931.

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Audited and found correct,
G. C. STEPHENSON.

NOTICES

WE have been asked to give notice of the following:

At the Imperial Institute, S.W., from June 17 to July 16. Week-days, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.; Sundays, 2.30 to 6 p.m.

"VANISHING INDIA," an Exhibition of Paintings, by HUBERT

STOWITTS.

Three Lantern Lectures in aid of the British School of Egyptian Archæology, on "THE SOJOURN OF ISRAEL IN EGYPT," by DR. A. S. YAHUDA, at the University College, Gower Street. JULY 18, 25, and 28. Tickets for the course, 5s.; single 2s. The chair on July 18 will be taken by F.-M. Viscount Allenby, on July 25 by Dean Inge, and on July 28 by Dr. Leonard Woolley.

GERTRUDE BELL MEMORIAL SCHOOL OF ARCHÆOLOGY

The subscribers to the Fund for establishing a British School of Archæology in Iraq, as a memorial to Gertrude Bell, who died in Baghdad on July 12, 1926, have now appointed a Council on which the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Durham, London, the British Museum, British Academy, Royal Geographical Society, Royal Asiatic Society, Royal Central Asian Society, Society of Antiquaries, and other Societies are represented. The President is Sir Percy Cox (late High Commissioner for 'Iraq), the Chairman of the Executive Committee is Sir Edgar Bonham Carter, Mr. E. H. Keeling is Honorary Secretary, and Brigadier-General Sir Osborne Mance Honorary Treasurer. The funds raised up to the present total nearly £9,000. In addition, the income from sums of £6,000 and £4,000 bequeathed by Gertrude Bell and by her father, Sir Hugh Bell, to the British Museum on trust will, it is hoped, be payable to the School. The disposal of the income is under consideration. The office of the School is temporarily at 20, Wilton Street, S.W. I.

RECENT WORKS OF LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR GEORGE MACMUNN, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.

Afghanistan from Darius to Amanullah. Illustrated. (Bell and Sons.) 20s.
The Indian Mutiny in Perspective. Illustrated. (G. Bell and Sons.) 12s. 6d.
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Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society

VOL. XIX.

OCTOBER, 1932

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
M. N. KENNEDY.

NOTICES

Тне	Hon.	Secretaries	will	be	at	77,	Grosv	enor	Street	on	Wedn	esdays
at 12	.30 p.r	n.										

Members are asked to notify the office of any change of address.

Contributors and speakers are alone responsible for their statements in the Journal.



AMERICAN FAR EASTERN POLICY*

By HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR+

Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions, Chicago University.

TATEMENTS made during the past few months by Secretary of State Stimson regarding the attitude of the Hoover administration towards changes in Manchuria render the subject for discussion this evening more timely than might otherwise be the case for an English audience. In so far as possible I shall restrict my comments to the policy of the United States alone; inasmuch, however, as the policy and actions of the British Government have since the first third of the nineteenth century been of predominant importance, frequent reference to these must be made.

It has been said that the United States has no Far Eastern policy. This statement is quite incorrect. It has also been said that the United States has a policy but no programme. This statement is at least half erroneous. The United States within a generation of its inception began to formulate two outstanding regional policies—namely, those pertaining to the Far East and to the Americas. As to the programmes, or methods, for acting upon these policies, they have perforce changed with changing conditions in the areas to which the policies apply

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on September 21; in the absence of Lord Lloyd, the Chair was taken by Mr. Lionel Curtis.

In introducing Professor MacNair, the Chairman said: "Ladies and gentlemen, I have to-night the very pleasant duty of introducing to you the lecturer, Professor MacNair, Professor of Far Eastern History and Institutions at the University of Chicago, who has combined with this post the services to the State University of Shanghai. It was a very few years ago that I began to realize the nature of my own ignorance on China. I went to Sir John Pratt and asked him to advise me as to what books to begin to read. He strongly advised me to get Professor MacNair's Readings on Chinese History. In certain respects, he said, it was a work of genius, a view which I shared after having taken his advice. I only wish that more books were written on the same lines as this one, where the writer suppresses himself and shows what contemporaries think. It is with great regret to-night that I hear that great numbers of this book were lost in the conflagration at Shanghai. It is with very great pleasure that I introduce to you the lecturer."

† In the preparation of this paper I wish to acknowledge the use of materials, especially in Dr. Tyler Dennett's Americans in Eastern Asia, and in Morse-MacNair's Far Eastern International Relations. H. F. M.

and with Presidential administrations. Broadly speaking, however, the policies themselves have changed little for more than a century. Particularly is this true with respect to the Far East.

It is worth noting that Great Britain, more than any other Power, was intimately and closely connected with the origin and application of both policies. In general, it was to the advantage of England as well as to the United States that both the policies should be carried out. Which is not to say, nevertheless, that the two Powers have always seen eye to eye as regards details; this would be too much to expect in a world inhabited by men. Even angels, however, if we are to accept Milton's cosmogony, do not always agree.

Stated in the simplest and clearest terms, the policy of the United States in the Far East is one of demanding for its nationals most-favoured-nation treatment. In other words, the object of the United States has always been, and continues to the present day to be, to oppose monopolistic, exclusive, special, and preferential treatment for the nations of any country; this includes, of course, American nationals, for, as in the case of England, the United States has sought and seeks no special rights or privileges for its own citizens. In carrying out this basic policy the government of the United States has opposed, and, I think it is correct to say, it still opposes, the development of special or peculiar relations between any Far Eastern state and another state, whether of East or West, which would place such state in a position, vis-à-vis the Eastern state, of unique influence.

Two important corollaries of this basic policy are to be noted: First, that of striving by all peaceful means to aid in the maintenance of the independence of the states of the Far East and the strengthening of them so that they may be able to maintain their position as sovereign states; secondly, in dealing with these states to hold them responsible to the duties and obligations of sovereign states, inclusive of the protection and fair treatment of aliens within their borders, the protection of the properties of such aliens, and the granting of equal opportunity to these aliens irrespective of their origin. It is clear that a deviation from any of the principles mentioned would be contrary to the basic principle of most-favoured-nation treatment.

Before entering into a discussion of various incidents and conditions bearing upon the subject under consideration, it may be worth while analyzing certain factors involved in a comprehension of American policy and of criticisms levelled at it. Of basic significance is the factor of geography: that the United States is a non-European

state is of almost as great importance with reference to the Far East as is the case in its relations with the countries of Latin America. Not only is this true in a geographical sense; for many years after 1783 it applied to social and, to a degree, economic conditions as well. Although its white inhabitants were European in origin and institutions, the facts of their separation from the homes of their ancestors and their life on a vast and undeveloped continent served to inculcate in them an attitude different from that of their relatives across the Atlantic. If not entirely lacking in social and class distinctions the citizens of the newly united states were comparatively little affected by the ancient social distinctions based on the earlier feudal organization of Europe. Imbued by the political and social theories of the eighteenth century, they were, perhaps, less inclined to act upon an assumption of social and racial superiority in their contacts with Asiatics than were many of the Europeans. That they had but recently succeeded in gaining their independence of one European power with the aid of another such power, and that they had had but comparatively little relationship with other Asiatic lands-especially Indiawhen they began their trade with China, contributed also to a certain readiness on their part to attempt to enter into relations with the Chinese on a basis of actual equality—an attempt not always crowned wih success but for the most part persevered in to the present day.

There were in the United States no privileged and monopolistic trading organizations such as the East India Company; this was peculiarly advantageous to the Americans—as long as the monopoly of the East India Company lasted. They enjoyed a relatively free field with small responsibility. In addition, the neutrality of the United States during most of the period of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars aided the early American traders to a very considerable extent. Within a few years they enjoyed a trade with the Chinese second only to that enjoyed by the English-and all without interference or aid from the government at Washington. The American traders and their government had good reason to be satisfied on the whole with the situation that prevailed at Canton from 1784 to the arrival of Lord Napier in 1834. In spite of occasional causes for dissatisfaction it was a happy and successful half century during which the Americans, on account of their fortunate position, enjoyed advantages similar to those of the East India Company, and far superior to that of other English traders, without the responsibility of the Company.

With respect to the situation thus referred to, the government of

the United States has at times been accused of playing the rôle of Saul at the martyrdom of St. Stephen; or, to state it more bluntly, Americans and their government have at times been criticized for failing to cooperate with a government engaged in the coercion of an Eastern government in an effort to obtain new privileges or to enforce the carrying into effect of rights earlier conceded by such a government, but of insisting upon enjoying such rights or privileges after they have been obtained. Those who have worked all day in the vineyard naturally—whether justifiably or not—resent full payment to eleventh-hour labourers. Such criticism has been levelled at the United States particularly with respect to China; there could be no justification for it in the cases of Japan and Korea. In its application to China, however, such criticism is worthy of careful analysis which may serve to explain, and possibly justify in no small measure, the policy of the United States and the actions of the American nationals.

In the first place, it is to be remembered that for more than a century after the appearance of American traders in China in 1784, the American government was not vitally interested in the Far East as it may be said to have been during the past generation. The reason for this is simple: the thirteen original states had a considerable share of a vast continent to subdue and develop; it was not necessary to seek abroad for new worlds to conquer. Moreover, the American people, until well toward the close of the nineteenth century, were overwhelmingly agricultural in their pursuits. The English, first to feel the effects of the Industrial Revolution, found it impossible to pursue a policy like that of the United States. They needed sources of raw materials and markets in which to dispose of finished products. Not until the dawn of the present century did the Americans feel the need of searching for markets abroad for their manufactured goods or of sources of raw materials. It is accordingly easily understood why the governments of England and the United States should have pursued their respective policies. England perforce took the lead in the "opening up" of China. The United States could afford to lag behind and to refuse to co-operate with other powers in what is nowadays sometimes called a "positive policy." The American merchants as a whole and their governments were willing to maintain the status quo-to let sleeping dogs lie. When, however, some other power or powers determined upon a vigorous policy for the improvement of relations with China and succeeded in obtaining additional rights or privileges for their nationals, the American government could scarcely be expected to remain silent concerning equal rights and privileges for its nationals. From a strictly moral or ethical viewpoint, this aspect of American policy may by some be criticized; from any other point of view it must be conceded that there was no alternative to the policy followed by the United States. However satisfied Americans and the government at Washington might in general be with the situation in China at a given time, they could not afford to permit others to enjoy rights or privileges which did not accrue to themselves.

When the troubles connected with the outbreak of the first Anglo-Chinese War (please note that I consider it historically inaccurate to describe Great Britain's nineteenth-century struggles with China as "Opium Wars") were coming to a head, and it became evident that the status quo at Canton was to be upset, the American merchants at that port memorialized their government for aid. While watching the situation in China during the years 1839-1842 with deep interest and considerable suspicion, the American government was almost as slow to act as had been the English Government in the period following the death of Lord Napier. It did, however, order Commodore Kearny, who was commanding the American East India squadron, to proceed to China to observe developments. Six weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, but before the Commodore was aware of its having been signed, Kearny despatched a letter to the Manchu High Commissioner, Kiying, requesting that citizens of his country should "be placed upon the same footing as the merchants of the nation most favoured." Kiying readily agreed, and on September 20 of the following year, 1843, the Consular Agent of the United States at Canton informed the Secretary of State in Washington that Americans would enjoy a position identical with that of British merchants. It is distinctly worthy of comment that not only did the American government and its representatives in China meet with no opposition in their desire to obtain for their nationals most-favourednation treatment, but that on January 20, 1841, in his directions to Captain Charles Elliot, Lord Palmerston had clearly announced that his government did not have for its object the seeking of exclusive privileges for the English. In this position the Chinese cordially concurred in 1842 and 1843.

By the time that the Washington government had decided to negotiate a treaty with China, the Americans at Canton, finding their position under the new régime quite satisfactory, were inclined to

oppose such action. The American government had wisely decided, however, that a treaty was desirable, and accordingly Mr. Caleb Cushing arrived for this purpose in February of 1844. Mr. Cushing's chief object was to "secure the entry of American ships and cargoes into these ports [i.e., Canton and the four newly opened ports] on terms as favourable as those which are enjoyed by English merchants." He entered into negotiations with High Commissioner Kiving. Mr. Cushing declared the principles which he desired to have embodied in a treaty to be as follows: (1) "The United States is to treat with China on the basis of cordial friendship and firm peace." (2) "We do not desire any portion of the territory of China, nor any terms and conditions whatever which shall be otherwise than just and honourable to China as well as to the United States." (3) The American government desired reciprocity in commerce and wished to "procure to the citizens of the United States a free and secure commerce in the ports opened to the nations of the West." (4) Mr. Cushing suggested provisions differing from, and in addition to, those contained in the British treaties of 1842 and 1843, which should place the United States in its relations with China in as favourable a situation as that of England without necessitating the cession to the United States of a territorial equivalent to Hongkong. (5) In conclusion Mr. Cushing "inserted a multitude of provisions in the interest and for the benefit of China."

The first Chinese-American treaty, known generally as the Treaty of Wanghia, was signed on July 3, 1844. In connection with it I wish to direct your attention to the following aspects. First, the offer of friendship to China. Second, the early determination of the United States not to seek cessions of Chinese territory; but, third, the desire for an equivalent which would ensure a most-favoured-nation position to American nationals. Fourth, the United States indicated clearly its expectation that China should as a sovereign state assume the duties of a sovereign state; it was China, without the aid of the United States, on whom devolved full responsibility for carrying out the terms of the treaty. Because of the failure of Chinese officials to protect American nationals at Canton Mr. Cushing himself required the principles of extraterritoriality to be applied to Americans accused of crime. Fifth, in the American treaty we find the beginnings in the modern period of an interest on the part of American nationals in the culture and civilization of China: the treaty contained permission for aliens to obtain books in the Chinese language and to employ teachers of the language. This cultural interest was missionary.

The desire of the United States to see the nations of the Far East strengthen their position by adopting modern means of warfare so that they might protect themselves from aggression, is to be observed in Mr. Cushing's offer to the Manchu High Commissioner of books on military and naval tactics and of models of guns which, he informed Kiying, he thought might be of value. A possible key to an understanding of the difference in the developments in China and Japan in the nineteenth century is to be found in the refusal by Kiying to accept the gifts, whereas Japan in both the sixteenth and the nineteenth century eagerly availed herself of all such offers. I may remark in conclusion that it was the Treaty of Wanghia and not the Treaty of Nanking which was the key treaty until 1858. The French and Norwegian-Swedish treaties which were shortly signed were based upon the American treaty.

Nine years after the signing of the Treaty of Wanghia a further opportunity was presented to an American official in China to act upon the principle of attempting to maintain the unity of China. The year 1853 was almost undoubtedly the most critical in the international relations of China down to 1898. With the rise of the Taipings and their movement northward, and then eastward to Nanking, it appeared to the American Commissioner, Mr. Humphrey Marshall, who resided at Shanghai, that there was a double danger to American interests. He was fearful that Great Britain might assume a protectorate over the Taiping rebels and obtain from the Taiping Wang certain exclusive rights. He also feared that, should recognition be granted to the Taipings, the Chinese Empire would gradually break into a group of weak and warring states which might easily be conquered by the powers of Europe. He remarked, "China is like a lamb before the shearers, as easy a conquest as were the provinces of India. Whenever the avarice or the ambition of Russia or Great Britain shall tempt them to make the prizes, the fate of Asia will be sealed, and the future Chinese relations with the United States may be considered as closed for ages, unless now the United States shall foil the untoward result by adopting a sound policy." And he concluded, "It is my opinion that the highest interests of the United States are involved in sustaining China-maintaining order here, and gradually engrafting on this wornout stock the healthy principles which give life and health to government, rather than to see China become the theatre of widespread anarchy, and ultimately the prey of European ambition."

Whether Marshall's suspicions of the European powers were justi-

fied or not I am unprepared to state; from the cordiality with which the British Consul worked in the following year with his successor, Mr. Commissioner McLane, in bringing about the institution of the great Imperial Maritime Customs, it may be doubted whether his suspicions of Great Britain at least had any real foundation. I mention it here for two reasons. First because it so clearly pictures the attitude of American officials and their policy towards China which had been outlined more than a decade earlier; and secondly because the confusion of the Taiping period is in many ways so similar to that which has prevailed in recent years, and perhaps throws light on the contemporary attitude of Mr. Secretary of State Stimson with reference to Manchuria. A few years before this, in December, 1848, the American Consul in Shanghai, Mr. John Griswold, by raising the American flag over his official residence had likewise protested against the development in that port of what he termed the "principle of exclusive privilege and exclusive rights," making it clear to the Chinese authorities that, unless what has developed into the International Settlement of Shanghai were to be in reality international, each of the nations would become seekers of separate concessions. Disregarding protests from both Chinese and British authorities, Mr. Griswold maintained his attitude and the result was the development of Shanghai as an International Settlement with only one additional so-called concession-namely, the French-which is in reality a settlement and not a concession.

In the year following Mr. Marshall's outline of his policy, his successor, Mr. McLane, assumed an attitude illustrative of the basic policy of his country. This was in connection with the new Land Regulations for Shanghai of 1854. By the first Regulations of 1845 "native inhabitants" (Chinese) had been prohibited from selling or renting land or domiciles to other Chinese, and foreigners had been prevented from "building houses for renting to or for the use of Chinese." It was mainly the attitude of Mr. McLane, who envisioned the growth of a great international city, such as Shanghai had grown to be, which was responsible for the omission from the Regulations of 1854 of the restrictions of 1845.

Contemporaneously with the developments just mentioned in China the American government was taking the lead in the opening up of Japan. As Great Britain had led the way in China so the United States, having a few years previously opened a door for itself on the Pacific coast of the American continent, was now to lead in the

development of treaty relations with Japan. Two officials are primarily responsible for the negotiation of these treaties-namely, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry and Minister Townsend Harris. For a moment it appeared that the policy, which I have previously described as being that of the United States in the Far East, might give way to a policy similar to that of the European powers of the day. A series of incidents had occurred in connection with American relations with Japan which had caused a degree of irritation on the part of American nationals and officials. When Commodore Perry was sent to Japan his objects were three in number: First, to secure protection for the persons and property of Americans shipwrecked on the then inhospitable coasts of Japan; second, to obtain the opening of one or two ports for trade; third, to gain the right to buy supplies, coal in particular. The Commodore was to inform the officials with whom he might come into touch that the American "president desires to live in peace and friendship with the emperor," but that "no friendship can long exist between them unless Japan should change her policy and cease to act towards the people of the United States as if they were her enemies." If friendly discussion should prove insufficient Perry was to "change his tone, and to inform them in the most unequivocal terms that it is the determination of this government to insist that hereafter all citizens or vessels of the United States that may be wrecked on their coasts or driven by stress of weather into their harbours shall, so long as they are compelled to remain there, be treated with humanity; and that if any acts of cruelty should hereafter be practised upon the citizens of this country, whether by the government or by the inhabitants of Japan, they will be severely chastized." In the instructions to Perry are to be observed two interesting facts: First, that the American government in dealing with Japan was profiting by its experience in dealing with China; second, that the American government was following a policy of holding the sovereign state of Japan responsible for the duties of a sovereign state.

Japan was at this time in a period of confusion owing to the existence of a double form of government which was at rivalry with itself. I refer, of course, to the existence of a shadowy Imperial Government in Kyoto and an actual government, that of the Shogun, at Yedo (Tokyo). The latter was weakening to its fall. Of the internal situation in Japan Perry had no real conception, nor did Townsend Harris for some time after his arrival a few years later. The statesmanship of the Japanese officials of the Shogunate and the basic friendliness of

the American Commodore rendered it possible for them to agree upon a treaty, which laid the foundations of equalitarian relationship between the two countries. To quote, however, from Mr. Tyler Dennett:* "The policy of Commodore Perry was much broader and far more aggressive than is indicated in the terms of the treaty. The Perry expedition, viewed as a whole, marks something new in policy when compared with that of Caleb Cushing at Macao. Cushing had devoted himself exclusively to the protection of American mercantile interests in China; Perry felt that he was laying the foundation for an American commercial empire in Asia and on the Pacific. Indeed, Perry appears to have been the first American in official position to view not merely the commercial, but also the political, problems of Asia and the Pacific as a unity." Two points only connected with the Treaty of Kanagawa of 1854 need comment. First, that this treaty included the mostfavoured-nation clause; second, that no provision for extraterritorial rights for foreigners in Japan was made such as Mr. Cushing had included ten years earlier at Wanghia. For the inclusion of the mostfavoured-nation clause and for the omission of provision for extraterritoriality, Dr. S. Wells Williams, first Interpreter to the Mission, was responsible.

As indicated above, had the negotiations for the next treaty between Japan and the United States been conducted by Perry, it may be surmised that a bold and even aggressive policy might have been acted upon. Happily, however, the first American official to be stationed in Japan was Mr. Townsend Harris, whose policy—for it was fully as much Harris's policy as it was that of the government at Washington—was a pacific one. Harris arrived in Japan as Consul-General for the United States in the summer of 1856, and remained without instructions from Washington for a year and a half. Although received without cordiality by the Japanese, he persevered in a tactful and friendly manner. His object was to negotiate a commercial treaty which should be much broader in scope than the introductory Treaty of Kanagawa. His first step was the signing of a Convention in June, 1857. Among the provisions of this document was one providing for extraterritorial rights for Americans residing in Japan; this he was convinced was necessary, although he personally disapproved of extraterritoriality.† In acting upon the equalitarian ideas of both Great

* Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 270.

[†] The principle of extraterritoriality in Japan is to be traced to the charter granted to the English Captain Saris by Tokugawa Ieyasu in 1613.

Britain and the United States he politely but positively refused to perform the prostration (kotow) in the presence of the Shogun, and the Japanese, more tactful than the Chinese, waived the requirement. In negotiating for his great commercial treaty Harris pointed out to the Japanese the advantage of signing a treaty with himself, unattended, as he was, by a military and naval force, and argued that such a treaty negotiated under these conditions would serve as a valuable precedent for the negotiations of later agreements with the powers of Europe. Acting also upon the policy of his government to strengthen the states of the Far East so that they might maintain their independence, Harris offered the aid of the United States in the strengthening of the defences of Japan, and also offered the mediatorial offices of his government in case of trouble between Japan and a European power. The fair and friendly policy of Harris has always been recognized with gratitude by the Japanese people and their government. In the successful carrying out of the policy just outlined by Harris is to be found one of the explanations for the development of Japan along happier lines than are to be observed in the case of China.

As years passed and Japan more and more clearly manifested ability to assume the duties, as well as to demand the rights, of a sovereign state, the government of the United States aided Japan in throwing off the restrictions imposed upon her by the United States and the governments of Europe. The first Convention signed by Japan upon a basis of full equality with a Western power was the Postal Convention signed at Washington in the year 1873. This was much criticized by the European diplomats at Tokyo. During the following six years the government at Washington narrowed the application of extraterritoriality by ordering its nationals to obey the laws of Japan, and by holding that extraterritoriality meant for Americans merely that in the case of their being arrested for contravening Japanese law they should be tried and punished according to American law. The other powers in Japan and in China with this exception held that their nationals were subject only to those laws which had been approved by them. In July, 1878, the United States signed with Japan a treaty by which the former recognized the exclusive right of the latter to regulate her tariff and coasting trade. Acting upon the well-defined policy of most-favoured-nation treatment, however, the United States required that this treaty should go into effect only when similar treaties had been signed by other powers. The refusal of the European powers

to sign such treaties prevented the treaty of 1878 from coming into operation; nevertheless, America's policy had been made additionally clear. Between 1865 and 1882 the United States and the powers of Europe in general acted upon a co-operative policy under the leadership of Sir Harry Parkes. This policy was gradually broken down in the manner just indicated. For a variety of reasons the policy of Great Britain gradually changed following the transfer of Sir Harry Parkes to Peking in 1882. In December of the following year President Arthur in his annual message to Congress gave official encouragement to Japan "to assimilate the terms and duration of [her] treaties to those of other civilized states." It was left to Great Britain, however, to sign the master treaty of July 16, 1894, with Japan. Following the path which the United States herself had blazed, the latter in November of the same year signed a treaty similar to that signed by England with the exception that the American treaty demanded no tariff concessions and was to remain in force for fifteen years.

In the case of Korea the American policy was to prove less successful than in the cases of either Japan or China, since, as everyone knows, Korea by a combination of its own weakness and the aggressions of Japan and the European powers was finally to lose its independence and to be annexed to the Japanese Empire. [Attempts on the part of the Western powers in the sixties and seventies of the nineteenth century to enter into friendly relations with Korea failed. In 1876 Japan succeeded in signing a treaty with Korea in which, in defiance of China's claim to be the suzerain power, Japan recognized Korea as an "independent state" which enjoyed the "same sovereign rights" as those enjoyed by Japan.] The American Commodore, Robert W. Shufeldt, anxious to play a rôle similar to that which Commodore Perry had acted in Japan, arrived in Korea in 1880. With the aid of Li Hung-Chang, who was determined to block Japan in Korea, Shufeldt succeeded in 1882 in signing a treaty with Korea, which was to prove ultimately a misfortune to that country. For this, however, the United States government can scarcely be held responsible: the rivalries of China, Japan, and the European powers and the weakness and corruption of the Korean government were quite beyond the control of Washington. The Shufeldt Treaty of 1882 contained a good-offices clause, the significance of which was not understood by the Koreans, who apparently felt that they were safely under the protection of the American government. All that this clause meant was that, at the request of Korea, the United States would approach by

diplomatic methods any government which might be troubling Korea, and would attempt to obtain an agreement; good offices can only be used, however, when acceptable to both contending parties. Moreover, Korea in February and August of 1904 signed agreements with Japan which completely nullified the good-offices clause of the Shufeldt Treaty of 1882 and made it impossible for President Roosevelt to give aid to the Korean Emperor when the latter requested it. In a note to Secretary of State John Hay, dated January 28, 1905, President Roosevelt succinctly stated the situation when he observed: "We cannot possibly interfere for the Koreans against Japan. They could not strike one blow in their own defence." It may be surmised that in carrying out their contemporary policy in Manchuria, the Japanese rulers, civil and military, have in mind the above statement by President Roosevelt.

Returning now to China, which has always constituted the pièce de résistance of the Far East, we may in conclusion sketch hastily America's policy there during the past generation. Following upon the defeat of China by Japan in the years 1894 and 1895, there occurred what Westerners had generally called "the scramble for concessions," or, as a Chinese writer terms it, "the era of unashamed theft." France, Russia, and Germany carried out a policy with respect to China which was far from pleasing to Great Britain, but which the latter in selfdefence felt compelled to follow. It was the common belief throughout the world that the Chinese melon was now to be sliced and consumed. Japan, Great Britain, and the United States-not to mention China-were each opposed to the disappearance of China. What Commissioners Marshall and McLane had feared during the days of the Taipings seemed now about to occur-namely, the breaking up and the swallowing of China by the powers of Europe. As ever, the United States was in equal degrees opposed to seizing Chinese territory herself and to having others seize it. This serious state of affairs in China synchronized with America's need for foreign markets and with her transformation, as a result of the war with Spain, into an Asiatic power. The decision of the McKinley administration to annex the Philippine Islands can be comprehended only in the light of what was taking place in China. It appeared to President McKinley to be possible to restore a balance of power in the Far East without injuring either the Chinese or the Filipinos, which latter were considered by all others than themselves to be unprepared to administer and maintain an independent government. The President denied having had "any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition" of the Islands, but in discussing the problem on September 16, 1898, he referred to the whole Far Eastern situation, and, for the first time in an American official document, he referred to the Open Door doctrine, which term had earlier been used in Mr. Austen Chamberlain's Birmingham speech of May 13. "It is just," said President McKinley, "to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the 'open door' for ourselves, we are ready to afford the 'open door' to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less upon large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges."

With respect to China itself the McKinley administration took direct action in an attempt to preserve the American position. During the ambassadorship of John Hay in England, from the spring of 1897 to September, 1898, conversations regarding the China situation had taken place between him and the British Foreign Secretary. There is no doubt that the action taken by Mr. Hay as Secretary of State had the approval of the British Government. It is not Secretary Hay, however, but his friend and adviser, Mr. W. W. Rockhill, who was later to become Minister to China, and who had long been a student of affairs Far Eastern, who was mainly responsible for the enunciation of the Open Door doctrine. Specific recommendations made by him in a memorandum to Mr. Secretary Hay on August 28, 1899, were embodied by the latter in his circular note to England, Germany, and Russia on September 6, and later to the governments of Japan, Italy, and France. In these notes the American ambassadors to these powers were requested to obtain from each a "a formal assurance that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence—

"1. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China.

"2. That only the Chinese government should collect duty and according to the Chinese treaty tariff.

"3. That no preferential harbour dues or railway charges should benefit its own subjects."

It is clear that while the doctrine of the Open Door constituted a new programme, it did not constitute a new policy. It was, in reality, a reassertion of the most-favoured-nation principle, which has constituted the keynote of American Far Eastern policy since the end of the

eighteenth century. It must, I think, be equally clear that the Open Door policy, while undeniably beneficent in its results for China, was not basically or primarily an altruistic policy. It has been a happy coincidence that the policy of the United States in the Far East has coincided with the best interests of the Eastern nations. As stated early in this paper the geographical and economic position of the United States is responsible for this fact. I trust I shall not be considered unpatriotic if I remark that I do not think the policy of the United States in the Far East is primarily based upon a superior morality of the American people. For a number of years about the middle of the nineteenth century the United States had followed a policy of co-operation with the powers in China. By the end of this century, however, this policy had completely passed away. The United States was isolated—perhaps not too splendidly—and found it necessary to attempt to resurrect to a degree the former policy of co-operation. In following this policy, however, the American government has been at times embarrassed, and perhaps is at the present day, by an innate distaste for, and an inability to offer, a quid pro quo. It is difficult to trade if one is unable or unwilling to give an exchange. The way of the idealist is difficult in a naughty world.

One or two additional aspects of the Hay-Rockhill Open Door policy are worthy of mention. In the first place it is interesting to observe that Hay's notes were issued without consultation with the government of China. Not until the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 did China ever officially recognize this doctrine. It is also noteworthy that the existence of "spheres of interest" in China was formally recognized in the notes, although the term was placed in quotation marks. Most important of all, however, was the omission of any reference to the maintenance of the territorial and administrative integrity of China which is now generally considered as being the basic principle of the Open Door. It was not until July 3 of the following year-1900-during the Boxer Revolt, that Secretary Hay again circularized the envoys of the powers represented in China announcing America's resolve to obtain for China permanent peace and security and the preservation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China and the protection of treaty rights. To this the powers officially agreed.

The Open Door doctrine did not and never has resulted in safeguarding the position of either China or the United States as securely as is perhaps generally supposed. Time after time during the past quarter of a century the doctrine has received lip service, but one may be pardoned for suspecting the state of affairs when it becomes necessary to sign so many agreements concerning it. It did not, for example, prevent the policy of "grab" at Tientsin in 1900 and 1901. Against the claims to gain concessions or to extend existing ones on the part of Russia, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Great Britain, the American envoy to Peking fruitlessly protested.

On November 30, 1908, Baron Takahira, the Japanese Ambassador to Washington, succeeded in an axchange of notes with the United States regarding the situation in the Pacific and China. There are certain peculiarities in the Root-Takahira notes which are worthy of attention; in the first place they were negotiated with such haste that they were ready to be signed and were signed on the day of the arrival in Washington of a Chinese Mission under the leadership of Tang Shao-yi; the omission of the qualifier "territorial" to the phrase "integrity of China," and the use of the term "existing status quo," which term is not defined and appears to refer to the Pacific Ocean rather than to China. These notes made it evident that the Roosevelt administration had been converted, for the time at least, to the giving of a free hand to Japan in Manchuria as it was doing in Korea. The policy of Japan in Manchuria made it appear necessary to Mr. Philander C. Knox, Secretary of State in President Taft's cabinet, to outline alternative plans for the "complete commercial neutralization of Manchuria," which was in line with the policy of the Open Door. For a variety of reasons Secretary Knox's plans were a complete failure -except that it was made more clear than ever that the interpretation of the Open Door by Russia and Japan was very different from that of the United States, that China was yet the pawn of the powers, and that it is extremely difficult to pursue a policy of even practical idealism without readiness to use armed force.

In what may be euphemistically described as the Republican period in China, the United States has continued to follow its basic policy. The idealism and altruism of President Wilson were manifested by him only twelve days after his inauguration in 1913. On March 16 he announced that his administration would not support American nationals as members of the Sextuple Group of bankers; the reason stated was that the conditions of a proposed loan of from £40,000,000 to £60,000,000 to China over a period of years appeared to threaten the administrative independence of China. President Wilson's action did not prevent the floating of a "reorganization loan" of £25,000,000

sterling by the Five-Power Group in the following May. In July, 1918, the Wilson administration took the first steps for the organization of a second consortium, which had for its purpose to "strengthen China and fit her for a more active part in the war against the Central European powers." However helpful such a consortium might have been to China, it has proved a complete failure; it did serve, nevertheless, to make clear America's underlying and age-old policy respecting that country. It also served to make clearer Japan's policies with respect to Manchuria and Mongolia, in which regions Japan during the negotiations claimed to have "special interests" which, in general, neither Great Britain nor the United States agreed to recognize. The international situation with respect to armaments and with respect to the Far East rendered desirable the convening of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922.

During the "confusion of Europe" of 1914-1918 Japan seized the opportunity on the night of January 18, 1915, to present directly to President Yuan Shih-kai the Twenty-One Demands. Had these been accepted by China and acted upon in their entirety, China would have become, to all intents and purposes, a Japanese protectorate. Fortunately, perhaps, for the rest of the world, not all of the demands were implemented. All that concerns us here is the attitude of the United States at this time. On March 13 a memorandum of the Department of State was presented to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington containing a review of American policy in the Far East and a reference to the Root-Takahira notes; this document made clear the fact that American policy remained unchanged, that American treaty rights must be respected, and that the United States objected to the granting of special privileges in China to any nation or its nationals. Nevertheless, the American government did recognize, with reference to Shantung, South Manchuria, and East Mongolia, that "territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts." On May 11 the American government notified that it could not "recognize any agreement or undertaking . . . impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy." The American Minister pointed out that any rights of residence in Manchuria conferred upon Japanese would, by the most-favoured-nation clause, accrue to the nationals of all the treaty powers—a statement which was confirmed by his government on May 15.

During the confusion brought about in China over the question of China's entering the Great War, the American government took action which considerably irritated the government of Tokyo. A note was sent to Peking expressing the hope that tranquillity might be restored and stating that: "In the maintenance by China of one central, united, and alone responsible government, the United States is deeply interested, and now expresses the very sincere hope that China . . . will work for the re-establishment of a co-ordinate government and the assumption of that place among the powers of the world to which China is so justly entitled. . . ." This note was interpreted by Tokyo as constituting interference in Chinese affairs without previous consultation with Tokyo.

In the following November an interchange of notes took place between Secretary of State Robert Lansing and Viscount Ishii, Special Ambassador to the United States. In the Lansing-Ishii agreement were contained reiterations of devotion to the "so-called 'open door,' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China." It was again announced that both nations were opposed to the acquisition by any government of "any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China, or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China." There was nothing new in this statement, but of considerable significance was the formal incorporation in the preface of the principle conceded by Secretary of State Bryan in his note to Tokyo of March 13, 1915: "The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part of which her possessions are contiguous."

her possessions are contiguous."

In the negotiations preceding the signing of the Lansing-Ishii notes, Viscount Ishii had tried to have the term "special influence" substituted for "special interests." While the United States was prepared to recognize the existence of special economic interest of Japan in China, which, it was held, in no way infringed the doctrine of the Open Door and which was based upon the idea of "territorial propinquity," Secretary Lansing would not agree to the substitution of "special influence" for that of "special interests," which, in the light of history, connoted political and not merely economic interests. Whatever Secretary Lansing may have felt as to the real significance of his

exchange of notes with Viscount Ishii, there can be no doubt that the position of Japan in Manchuria and in Shantung was strengthened. It is also worthy of note that these negotiations had been carried out secretly, and that China was in no wise consulted. These notes remained in force until their abrogation as a result of the Washington Conference.

Concerning the struggle at the Paris Peace Conference between China and Japan, it is not necessary to make any comment other than to say that President Wilson fought valiantly to maintain the century-old policy of his country in the Far East, and to prevent the exploitation of Asia for the primary benefit of the West, and to maintain the economic and political integrity of the Eastern nations.

Prior to the convening of the representatives of the Nine Powers having interests in Eastern Asia, a situation had arisen in the Russian Far East which resulted in another declaration of its policy by Washington. The policy and actions of the Japanese in and with respect to Russian Eastern Asia were such as to result in the despatch of a note to Tokyo on May 31, 1921. In this is contained a declaration similar in tone to those made during the past few months by the present Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson. The American government declared that it could "neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation or control (by Japan), and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia." Without necessarily attributing Japan's decision to withdraw from the Siberian mainland to the policy thus enunciated, it may be remarked that the Japanese did withdraw their troops from the mainland at the end of October, 1922.

At the Washington Conference the policy of the United States with respect to the Far East was made yet more clear by the enunciation by Mr. Secretary of State Root of what came to be known as the Root Principles as follows:

"It is the firm intention of the powers attending this conference:

"1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

"2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

"3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing

and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

"4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges, which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states."

Shortly prior to the adoption by the Committee of the Whole on specific and Far Eastern questions, the question had been raised as to the meaning of the term "China." As a result, Admiral Baron Kato, of the Japanese delegation, admitted that Manchuria constituted a part of China. Among the proofs of the Washington Conference may be mentioned the Four-Power Pacific Treaty and the Nine-Power Tariff Treaty. By the former Great Britain, France, Japan, and the United States agreed to respect each other's positions in the Pacific, to settle by special conference any disputes which might arise between them, and to confer together and jointly determine upon the best means of settling any dispute which might arise between a party to the treaty and an outside nation. In the general Nine-Power Treaty, signed on February 6, 1922, China for the first time became a party to the Open Door, and the powers—other than China—bound themselves to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, and they bound themselves not to foster, nor permit their respective nationals to seek, any position which might "frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity" in China.

The practical goodwill of the United States towards China was shown further on July 25, 1928, when the American Minister, Mr. MacMurray, signed with a representative of the Nanking government the Sino-American Tariff Treaty at a moment of strain in the relations between China and Japan over this particular question. It is of special interest to note that this treaty was signed on the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese-American Treaty of Washington which dealt with a similar subject. It is of interest further to note that while the treaty signed half a century before had irritated the British and German diplomats in Tokyo, it was the Japanese who were now angered at the action of the United States.

In an attempt to foster the spread of her Pacific policy, which had long been manifested with respect to the Far East, the United States signed at Paris in August, 1928, the international treaty for the Renunciation of War, commonly known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact,

which went into effect on July 24, 1929. Interestingly enough, the first test of the new treaty came in Manchuria. As a result of the Sino-Russian imbroglio in Northern Manchuria, both the American Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Briand, reminded China and Russia, respectively, of the new war renunciation. A second invocation of the Pact took place in the following November. Neither invocation can be said to have resulted in unqualified success—a fact which may be of some importance when the developments in Manchuria during the past year are considered.

It is yet too early for the student of history to comment upon the details of contemporary American policy with respect to the Far East. It is safe to say, however, that there has been no basic change in this policy during the past twelve months. In conclusion I may be permitted, I hope, to quote from an article which I wrote on this subject a little more than a year ago: "The policy of the United States of encouraging the maintenance of the independence of the nations of Eastern Asia, helping them to strengthen their position, and of demanding from them all opportunities for American nationals enjoyed in them by other foreign nationals, has worked with a high degree of success in Japan, Siam, and China. In the case of Korea, the fundamental policy of the United States was sacrificed with the independence of that country by the development of conditions over which Americans had no control and for which they were but indirectly responsible.

"The American government has been faced in the East by three possibilities—to wit, co-operation with the powers, or withdrawal from the scene altogether, or development of its own policy with readiness ultimately to defend or carry out this policy by resort to diplomacy and force. During recent years it has in general chosen co-operation. It took the lead in organizing the new international consortium in China; also in demanding a settlement of the Linchang affair, as a result of which it participated in the discussion of a plan for policing Chinese railways. It participated also in the prevention by the powers of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's proposed seizure of the customs funds at Canton, and in the Taku ultimatum. Finally, it joined with the governments of Great Britain and of France, Italy, and Japan in the sending of identical notes after the Nanking outrage of March 24, 1927. But by refusing to join with the powers in the use of force in the interior for the backing of these demands it prevented co-operative action. By in-

dependently negotiating the tariff treaty with China in 1928, and granting recognition to the Nanking government, it set a precedent which other powers followed. It is evident, therefore, that the choice between co-operation and independent action was based on the exigencies of the occasion.

"For being at once too active and not active enough, the American government has been criticized at home and abroad. If American business interests have inclined to coolness as regards sympathy for certain of China's nationalist aspirations, and have tended to demand and support drastic action to force China to meet her international obligations, considerable numbers of American missionaries have contributed to the development of a national spirit in China and have aided the movement for rights recovery in every legitimate way. Of the great powers whom the Chinese nationalists and their Russian advisers denounced as 'imperialistic' in the years 1925-1927, America alone has no territories which have been conquered or leased from China, and enjoys no spheres of interest or influence. Extraterritoriality, however, the United States still enjoys in company with several other states—a sufficient answer, when considered in the light of a consistent demand for most-favoured-nation treatment of her nationals. to the charge sometimes made that American policy is mainly based on altruism and sentiment. The notable differences between American policy in the East and those of the other powers have been based primarily on the fact that American interest and policy have generally been consonant with those of Eastern nations, while those of Europe -and, in later times, Japan-have not.

"The rôle played in China by the American government has not generally been an easy one. The divergencies of aim between the United States and the other powers have made it desirable that the United States should receive the support of the nations of the East to the extent at least that they should set whole-heartedly to work to save themselves and not depend mainly on outside aid. In the cases of Japan and Siam, such action was forthcoming to vindicate the American policy. In Korea it was not; and in China from 1842 to 1928 there was comparatively little self-aid on the part of the Chinese to warrant the belief that she would follow the road trod by Japan and Siam rather than that taken by Korea. For many years, before and after 1900, all that saved China was the inability of the powers—other than the United States—to agree upon a division of the spoils; that, and the steady hold of the American government, at times

cordially supported by Great Britain, to its policy of territorial and administrative integrity for China."

Perhaps the contemporary attitude of the United States towards China may best be summed up in the words of the recent Secretary of State, Kellogg, to Minister C. T. Wong in a communication despatched immediately prior to the signing of the tariff treaty of 1928: "The goodwill of the United States toward China is proverbial, and the American government and people welcome every advance made by the Chinese in the direction of unity, peace, and progress. We do not believe in interference in their internal affairs. We ask of them only that which we look for from every nation with which we maintain friendly intercourse—specifically, proper and adequate protection of American citizens, their property and their lawful rights, and, in general, treatment in no way discriminatory as compared with the treatment accorded to the interest of a national of any other country." I think if this statement of Secretary Kellogg's is at all carefully considered, it will not take a very astute person to surmise what is the present-day policy of the United States in the Far East. There is nothing occult or mysterious about it; it is, in short, as it almost always has been, crystal-clear.

Mr. MAYERS: The lecturer has compressed into his paper such an enormous amount of information that my difficulty in opening discussion is to choose a peg on which to hang a few reflections. His closing words still ring in my ears: there is nothing mysterious in American policy in the Far East.

I think we can all agree with that statement. There is a tendency to think that her policy has enabled America to derive great advantages from early British efforts to open the door of China to foreign trade, without contributing much support in the struggle we had to get that door opened. There is, I think, justification for that view, but historical circumstances have to be taken into consideration. My own contact with American Far Eastern policy has been that of an observer, in China only, where for many years I had the privilege of knowing well one of the great American figures who, as Mr. MacNair has said, played an important part in the development of this policy during the tenure of his office, Mr. W. W. Rockhill. I found in talking with him that diplomats on occasion are by no means reluctant to express their personal views quite strongly. I remember his advice that if one

wished to understand American policy in the Far East, one should first acquaint oneself with the atmosphere in which that policy had germinated.

It is a most remarkable fact, when the New Nation was born in 1783, that actually in the very next year a ship, aptly called the *Empress of China*, came out of New York harbour and anchored at Canton. The world was inhospitable towards the New Nation. One of their earliest diplomatic activities was to find a way into the trade of the Baltic and other closed waters in Europe. Their merchant enterprise was responsible for getting into the China trade, and their reception when the first ship reached China was good. They did not come with the aggressive spirit which undoubtedly influenced Europeans coming to China, and while the colonial possessions of European countries in Asia were closed to their ships, they found it possible to gain entrance at Canton. The accounts of those times show that the great enterprise of American shipowners drove vessel after vessel to the Canton river. In 1788 the *Alliance* set out from Philadelphia and sailed to Canton without dropping anchor and without charts.

All the circumstances of the relations between America and Great Britain have to be weighed when one considers the atmosphere in which American Far Eastern policy was born—in a time of great strain between our two countries. After the war of 1812 the next two or three decades of American activity in Canton produced better relationships, and when the treaty period came our relationships—Britain's and America's—were good, but our point of view regarding China was still far different.

An examination of State Department papers shows that the basic orientation of American policy, which was gradually becoming coherent, rested upon the lines of friendship, conciliation, and forbearance towards China. The Chinese welcomed the Americans as a nation apart from the aggressive British and French, and I think there is considerable romance in the way in which the early American negotiators presented their case to the Chinese on these three principles—friendship, conciliation, and forbearance. As the treaty period opened there was a gradual rapprochement between the British and American communities in China, but the basic principle of American policy was never disturbed. While other nations took an acquisitive attitude in their dealings with China, the Americans forbore.

The great impetus to American activity in the Pacific was, of course, due to the discovery of gold in California, which came at the time

when the political slogan of "manifest destiny" was current. In the forties of the last century everything westwards was included in the "manifest destiny" of America. With the discovery of gold we come to that extraordinary period of activity in American history when steamships came round the Horn, which brought up the question of obtaining coaling stations in the Pacific. America was then stretching out her thoughts to be able to develop a great steamship traffic across the Pacific. It was therefore indispensable to her to preserve the attitude that whatever anyone else achieved in China should be open to American enterprise as well.

In 1842 Commodore Kearny, as we have been told by Mr. MacNair, extracted from the Chinese a most-favoured-nation treatment before the American government had negotiated a treaty with China at all. Thus, throughout all their dealings, they kept to that basic principle that whatever anyone else achieved in China should be shared by American enterprise.

In more recent years one has seen variations, but always based upon the same principle. There was the independent activity of that romantic figure Anson Burlinghame, the American Minister in the sixties, who gained such confidence with the Chinese that they made him their own ambassador, and he negotiated in Washington a treaty allowing Chinese immigration into America. This chapter of history, as you doubtless know, ended rather disastrously for America. Chinese labourers flooded Western America, and America had to come to an agreement with China by which the treaty regulations allowing the immigration of labourers into America were cancelled.

At the present time we have this dreadful juncture in Far Eastern affairs before us, and I think all of us would like to know more than anything else what, in the estimation of a student of American diplomacy, is the answer to the following question—What is there that America can do to maintain in its integrity its own policy which has been so persistent all these years? Is there anything she can do? One thing, I should think, is excluded, and that is the application of force. Her principle has been to profit by advantages gained by others, and if she gained an advantage, not to keep it to herself—the principle of equal opportunity, which now appears to be endangered in a large part of the territory of China.

COLONEL SMALLWOOD: I should like to put three questions: first, in relation to the Philippine Islands. I suppose that America's greatest Far Eastern problem at the present moment is the ruling of these

islands. I have been told that the question of the Philippine independence rested entirely with the sugar interests of America, and that most of the agitation for independence is due to sugar interests in America. I should like to hear the lecturer's ideas on this subject.

Then, America's policy with regard to Russian influence in Mongolia, for although we hear much of their policy in Manchuria, we

hear nothing of any policy in Mongolia.

Russia pushed into Outer Mongolia, and at present she is entirely supreme there. The government is made up of men working entirely under Russia, the coins are Russian, postage stamps are Russian—in fact, the whole government is under Russian influence. We hear a good deal about Japan's influence in Manchuria, but I have been told that the government there is by no means inclined to do exactly as Japan wishes her to do. Though the present government is said to owe its present position to Japan, Manchuria is producing an independence which Japan may find embarrassing.

Personally, I am more interested in the future of American policy. We must look ahead. I think that our lecturer has told us that one of the main objects of her policy is protecting the lives and property of her nationals. We all feel that particular point at this moment, as we have two of our nationals in danger of their lives. I should like to know what would be the attitude of America if two of her people were in the same position as ours. I personally can barely sit down under the fact that two British people are being ill-treated, and there seems no possible means of dealing with it. My suggestion is that the £35,000 asked for should be handed over to the bandits and deducted from the next repayment of the Boxer indemnity to China. America could not do this, as her repayments of Boxer indemnity have already been made, but I should like to know what her action would be.

Mr. Gull said that there was one point in the history of the open door which had always puzzled him and which the lecturer had omitted from his extremely interesting survey. That survey had certainly shown the consistency of American policy in relation to the open door. Nevertheless, at the time of the Sino-Japanese War, when Great Britain sought to obtain the co-operation of the United States in a diplomatic intervention on the basis of securing Korean independence, the reply which the British Government got from the American government was that American interests were unaffected by the events which were taking place. The actual wording of this reply as recorded in American state papers was:

"The deplorable war between Japan and China endangers no policy of the United States in Asia."

Could the lecturer throw any light upon the considerations which led the United States to take that view?

Looking back with the wisdom which succeeds events, one could see what a very different course history might have pursued had the United States agreed to the intervention proposed by Great Britain.

Mr. Gull added that, while the lecturer had indicated quite clearly that the doctrine of the open door was by no means an American invention, he had not, he thought, sufficiently emphasized its British origin.

A later questioner pointed out that now in her dealings with the Far East the United States was a creditor nation. Her position had therefore altered.

In his reply the Lecturer said: May I again call attention to the question under discussion—namely, "American Far Eastern Policy."

I thoroughly agree with the attitude taken by the second and third speakers; it would be extremely interesting to know what the future is going to be; no one would be more pleased—or otherwise—than myself. I am, however, a student of history and not a prophet. That applies also to my failure to deal with the Manchurian case, because it is a contemporary and also a future problem. I apologize for not having dealt more in detail with the credit due to England in the doctrine of the open door, but I would submit that lack of time prevented me, as I was dealing with American policy and could therefore deal but little with other countries.

With regard to the Philippine Islands, the matter as far as I can see is purely a financial one. The wisdom or lack of it in connection with the question of giving independence I cannot say.

I think that the Mongolian question is quite a simple one to answer. It does not follow for an instant that because the United States does not say anything about the Russian control of Outer Mongolia, she does not, therefore, have any interest in it. In the case of Russia, you have in the eyes of the United States an outlaw nation, with which they can have no official dealings. The Japan government, on the other hand, is a member of the League of Nations; she signed the Treaties of Washington, 1921-22, and also the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

The next question we come to is the failure to participate in any intervention at the time of the Japanese war. I think that the key to this can be found in the cool relations which had developed in the few

years after 1868, which resulted in the flooding of America with Chinese coolies. For a number of years the relations, while certainly not officially unfriendly, were certainly not cordial. Japan was looked upon for many years as a foster-child of the United States.

The Chairman: I am sure you all share my admiration for the clear and concise manner in which Professor MacNair has put the history of the relations between his country and the Far East. He showed us very clearly what the policy of the United States has been, and left us a pretty good idea of what it is likely to be in the future. I have the pleasure to express our great gratitude for the lecture he has given us to-night.

A vote of thanks was passed to the Chairman.

RUB' AL KHALI*

By H. ST.J. B. PHILBY

An account of a journey through the Great South Desert of Arabia under the auspices and patronage of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and Najd and its Dependencies.



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T is indeed a great pleasure for me to find myself once more confronting an audience of this Society which, since I last addressed it, now many years ago, has been honoured by the grant of a royal title in recognition not only of the important work it has accomplished since its birth, but of its right to rank with the other great societies styled royal, of which our country may be justly proud for the leadership and encouragement they provide in every sphere of honourable adventure.

I have recently, as some of you know, returned from Arabia, where,

* Lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on May 31, the Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd in the Chair.

during the past two years, and thanks to the kindly assistance and encouragement of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and Najd, I have enjoyed rather exceptional opportunities of indulging my favourite hobby of exploration. I have, naturally, come back with a good deal to talk about, but I see from the cards issued by your Secretary that I am expected this afternoon to address you on the text: "Across the Rub' al Khali to Ubar." Now I am in no way responsible for the wording, much less for the spelling, of the cards issued to you; but I will content myself with deprecating the deplorable fact that a Society like this should so tamely follow the fashion set some years ago by Colonel Lawrence of spelling Arabic words just anyhow. My friend Mr. Thomas seems unaccountably to have fallen a prey to the same facile snare; and he at any rate ought to have known better, in view of the years we spent together in an Arabian atmosphere. I must not labour the point, and I am aware that Arabs, like other people, have many different ways of pronouncing the same word; but for all practical purposes and for obvious reasons the spelling of words has become standardized, and incorrect spelling is commonly regarded as the mark of slovenly, perhaps I should say artistic, minds! To return to the point, I know of no authority earlier than 1931 for the spelling UBAR, while the form WABAR was known to and used by the Arab geographers many centuries ago. And after all, who can have a better claim to know how the word is spelt than myself, for I have actually been there? I have seen it suggested that Ubar and Wabar may not be in fact one and the same place, but there is surely little solid comfort to be gained from such a reflection; and I would suggest as a much more exciting alternative, the possibility of challenging my claim to have discovered the site of Wabar. Such a possibility may some day encourage somebody to attempt another Rub' al Khali expedition, and that would be all to the good. But I, for one, have done for ever with the search for the mysterious city in the southern sands of Arabia, which has been my goal for the last fourteen years. My Arab companions had no doubt whatever that the ruins in which they burrowed in vain for treasure were the ruins of that city; and I am satisfied that I have traced the Arab legend about it to its source. I might almost go a step further, subject to the ultimate verdict of our geological and other experts on the material I have brought back from those parts, but before doing so I propose to conduct you to the scene of my recent wanderings.

Before leaving Hufuf on January 7 of this year for a journey which

was to take ninety days and which resulted in my third crossing of the Arabian peninsula between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea by way of the Rub' al Khali desert, I had three main objectives in view. In the first place I wanted to investigate what Major Cheesman in 1923 called the "problem" of Magainama. My second objective was to discover and examine Wabar itself. And, thirdly, I wished to attempt the crossing of the waterless desert south of Jabrin and east of Sulaivil. Otherwise my object was generally to see as much of the Great South Desert as possible and to go as far south as might prove feasible. Mr. Thomas last year had struck across this desert from south to north on his great journey, in the course of which he had found and placed on the map for the first time an unexpectedly large series of wells, which are indeed the outstanding feature of the vast desert pasturelands which the Arabs call Al Rimal, or The Sands. As far as I can gather from his accounts, he was told that there were no wells to westward of his line, and that at any rate was my understanding of the position when I planned to keep well to the westward of his route as I went southward. In fact, I found myself marching from well to well on a line averaging about twenty to forty miles westward of his course, which I actually touched at two points-namely, Faraja and Shanna. It would seem therefore that Mr. Thomas's guide from the Murra tribe was deterred by the presence of other and potentially hostile elements in Mr. Thomas's party from revealing the secret of the more westerly wells, which are for the most part known only to the Murra tribesmen. That was fortunate for me, as it left me some mapping to do to complete the picture of the desert drawn so fully and with so much detail by Mr. Thomas, whose map, I may add, proved to be a most precious possession.

When we left Jabrin on January 21 en route for Maqainama our party consisted of nineteen Arabs, mainly drawn from the Murra, Manasir, and 'Ajman tribes, thirty-two camels of the very best 'Umaniya breed, and a Saluqi hound, which was presented to us at Jabrin by an Arab of the Murra tribe, who arrived at that point simultaneously with ourselves from beyond Shanna in the south. He had come up with his camels and his family, consisting of his wife and two naked children, to take advantage of the richer pastures reported to have resulted from the recent rains in the northern part of the Hasa province, where at this time practically the whole of the Murra tribe had congregated. I had indeed seen a good deal of them during my journey from Riyadh to Hufuf and in the Jafura desert

between Hufuf and Jabrin; but this single belated family proved to be the last human beings we were to see until we arrived at Sulaiyil fifty-three days later. The man had indeed told us that the rumour of our expedition had preceded us and that, at the time of his starting on his long northward trek, all the pasturing tribes of the south had been busy packing up and moving far back to the shelter of the southern mountains. He prophesied that we should find the whole desert empty, and I surely cannot give you a better idea of the awe and respect inspired by the very name of Ibn Sa'ud than by saying that he was perfectly right. What is more, wherever we went it was our regular practice to leave our identity marks upon the sand and particularly in the neighbourhood of the wells we visited. After all, any Arab of the sands would know a good deal about us by simply inspecting our tracks. He could tell the number of our men and camels. He could see that we had a dog with us, and he would know that we had a good deal of baggage, including tents. He could even see that we were dawdling instead of hurrying, as is usual in such circumstances. But then he would possibly be puzzled as to the character of the people behaving so curiously in the desert. The King's mark on the sands would fill the blank in his knowledge of us, and he would keep away lest the King's men might be out to collect taxes or to make themselves unpleasant in other ways. It must not be supposed that a mere matter of nineteen men was a serious menace to the southern tribes, who are perfectly capable of putting 200 or 300 men into the field at the shortest notice; but they knew Ibn Sa'ud and his cousin, Ibn Jiluwi, the Governor of the Hasa, well enough to know that a larger force would pay them a visit in due course if they were unkind to a small body of comparatively innocuous tourists.

It took us three days of easy marching over rather dull desert country of alternating sand and steppe to reach Maqainama, which lies some seventy miles southward of Jabrin on a strip of gravel country which just divides the steppe desert of the Summan from the real sands of the tract known as Al Rimal. Major Cheesman had suggested a possible identification of this spot with Magan, the capital of an ancient kingdom which some thousands of years ago was in commercial relations with the Sumerians of Mesopotamia. I naturally hoped to find something exciting in the way of ancient relics of man in such a spot, and I did indeed find a bronze arrow-head, but that was all except the well itself, which proved to be no less than 171 feet in depth—a remarkable piece of work which is clearly not to be

attributed to the modern Badawin of these parts. The tracks leading westward towards Laila and eastward towards the deep well of Bir Fadhil suggested to me that we were here on an ancient trade route between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea markets of Mecca, Madain Salih, and Petra. And it is at any rate a somewhat curious coincidence that at the Persian Gulf end of such a route there is actually a locality called Majann, which the modern Arabs pronounce Mayann or Magann, and where, according to my companions, ancient ruins are still to be found. There is, however, no reason to suppose that Magainama was at any time more than it is now, a desert well in typical desert country of limestone superimposed on sandstones, which cannot by any stretch of the imagination be suspected of being the source of the little fragment of granite which Major Cheesman found near Jabrin and on which he built a very charming little legend. In point of fact, such fragments of granite and other igneous rocks may be found all over the Arabian desert right down to the very shores of the Persian Gulf, whither they have clearly been carried by the rivers which flowed across these parts in very ancient times and possibly even before the appearance of the human race on our planet. The "problem" of Maqainama may therefore, perhaps, be regarded as disposed of or non-existent, though the deep well and the well-marked caravan route I found here, to say nothing of the bronze arrow-head, encouraged me to believe that Wabar, the next item on our programme, would be found on another caravan track connecting the frankincense country of Mr. Thomas's Arabia Felix in the south with this obviously important east-west route across the peninsula.

You have at various times heard a great deal about the very high development of the art of tracking among the Arabs of these vast sandy tracts, and I will not enlarge on that subject; but it was something new to me on the evening before our departure from Maqainama to find a highly developed sense of smell added to the list of desert accomplishments. We had been summoned to dinner that evening as usual, and I noticed as we sat round the common dish that my companions all held their rifles in their left hands and were fully equipped with cartridge-belts and other accessories. On asking the reason for such an unusual phenomenon, I was told that our chief guide, a man of the Murra tribe, had about sunset smelt the smoke of a camp-fire somewhere in the neighbourhood. I have very little doubt that he had done so, and many weeks later we heard that a small raiding party from Najran had indeed about this time carried away the livestock of

the man we had said good-bye to at Jabrin. It was possibly their fire that our guide had smelt on this occasion, though the night passed without alarm, as the party in question was doubtless too small to venture on molesting our superior numbers. On another occasion later on I was asked for the temporary loan of my lamp, on the ground that my companions, while sitting round the camp-fire, had all distinctly heard a low whistling note which they naturally took to be the signal of an enemy scout. The lamp was wanted to cast round for tracks of such enemy, but our trackers found no trace of them. It must have been the voice of a Jinn, said one of the party, and everybody believed that that was a reasonable explanation of the phenomenon.

From Maqainama we struck due east for three days to Bir Fadhil, a group of four deep wells of about 125 feet in the midst of lofty dunes of piled-up sand. The intervening country was mostly sand with long narrow tongues of gravel protruding into it from the steppe country of the north. To prevent such wells going out of commission the Arabs using them make a practice of covering over their mouths after use with skins and rafters over which they spread a thick layer of sand. The next comers can thus easily and rapidly open up the wells if water is required, and it is only when a rapidly moving hostile raiding party strikes such wells and leaves them open that the blowing sand fills up the shaft and thus makes the clearing of them a lengthy operation. At Bir Fadhil we found that part of the covering had collapsed and thus let in a good deal of sand, so one of our party had to climb down the narrow shaft to clear it before we could draw water.

During the next three days we only marched thirty-five miles in a southward direction, but these days were full of interest. Our objective was the wells of Numaila and Tuwairifa, both about 125 feet deep and both reckoned as "dead," as they have not been in use these ten years or more. All this country had indeed been becoming more and more bare and desolate, with game scarce and very little sign of other life with the exception of occasional ravens, of which we duly collected two adults and a nestful of exceedingly ugly youngsters, who ultimately defied our well-meant attempts to keep them alive. The drought has been upon this area for many years, and the grazing Arabs had not apparently visited it for a long time. In addition to the "dead" wells I have referred to we found two others apparently unknown to the Arabs of today, to which we gave the names of Bir Maqran and Bir Makassar respectively. The first of these names resulted from a discovery of first-rate importance, for as we were traversing a long and

fairly wide strip of gravel plain wedged into the sands, we came upon a great deposit of freshwater shells, in association with which we found numerous beautifully made flint implements of ancient man. There can be no reasonable doubt that we had chanced upon the site of an ancient lake or river-bed, and I have tentatively connected up this spot with the great system of western wadis in the Aflaj district, of which Wadi Maqran, which I crossed fourteen years ago on my way down to Wadi Dawasir, would seem to be the most important. That is merely a suggestion, but at any rate there was at some time in the past a sheet of permanent fresh water in these parts, which were equally certainly frequented by man, presumably in search of such game as might come down to the water to drink. The experts of the British Museum are now engaged in trying to determine the age of these shells, and thus, indirectly, of the sportsmen whose weapons we found among them. The weapons are, I am told, of Neolithic and Bronze Age types, but we cannot yet say when such types of implements were evolved in Arabia; but it is surely a fair assumption that there was a river or lake in this locality when those weapons were in use among its inhabitants. When we can determine approximately the date on which water ceased to flow in these parts we shall know something of the antiquity of man in the Arabian desert. For the moment I naturally regarded these interesting finds of shells and flints as valuable clues to the riddle of Wabar, and yet another clue was provided by Tuwairifa, where we found the deeply scored tracks of an old caravan route in a patch of gravel round the buried wells. Odd flint implements were found here and there at frequent intervals, and indeed everything seemed to indicate that we were really on the point of discovering the mysterious city of the sands which, according to my guides, lay eastward of us at a distance of only about two days' journey.

The actual distance proved to be about fifty miles, and we reached the spot towards the evening of the second day. In the vast dreary wilderness of low rolling bare sand-billows nothing seemed less likely than that we were on the point of entering the portals of a great city of the past which, according to the legend, had been destroyed by fire from heaven owing to the riotous luxury of the court of the king of this country, named 'Ad ibn Kin'ad. Fourteen years before I had heard the story from my companions on the way down to Wadi Dawasir, when we skirted the northern edge of the Rub' al Khali. They had told me of the ruins in the sand and of a mysterious block of iron as large as a camel, and I had noted the spots suggested by their

information tentatively on the map. I now found myself standing on one of those spots, almost to the inch, but the ruins and the block of iron had apparently come together in the interval; and both, so to speak, lay before me. You may imagine my excitement as I walked up to the top of a low sand-dune to get a good general view of the ruined palaces and castles of Wabar. I had resolutely persuaded myself that at the very best we should possibly find the remains of such broken-down forts as are still to be seen at Jabrin. But what I did see from that hill-top simply took my breath away, and I scarcely knew whether to laugh or weep. The whole thing flashed through my brain in that painful second as I realized that for fourteen years I had followed a will-o'-the-wisp through the Arabian desert. I looked down not on the ruins of a city but into the open mouth of what I took to be a volcano with twin craters side by side surrounded by low walls of what looked like outpoured slag and lava. And that was the Wabar of which I had heard and dreamed so much all these many years. My companions were in no wise disturbed by the sceptical views to which I gave expression, and were soon busy digging for treasure, for on the way down I had entertained them with a little embroidery of the original legend. The ninety ladies of King 'Ad, I had told them, had, as a matter of fact, not perished in the conflagration, but had been stowed away in a cellar of the palace, where with any luck we should still find them alive and as beautiful as ever. We were nineteen and they were ninety, so there would be nearly five apiece if only we could find the key to the cellar.

Our camels were by now in need of water, and I decided to go down with them to the well of Ibrahima, leaving two-thirds of our party to continue the search for the treasure and the ladies, to say nothing of the block of iron big as a camel. On the way down and about ten miles from Wabar we touched Mr. Thomas's route at the buried well of Faraja; and on our return to camp those who had stayed behind had regretfully to confess that they had had no luck, though they had found masses of polished jet-black pellets which they took to be fire-blackened pearls and also a small lump of iron. The latter was so little like a camel in stature that they had not thought it worth while to pick it up, but I lost no time in adding it to my collection of curios from Wabar. It was, in fact, a fragment of a meteorite, and provided the necessary clue to the real character of the craters to which I have referred. These are not volcanic, but meteoritic craters, and one might be tempted to think that perhaps the Arab

legend of the destruction of Wabar by fire from heaven was, after all, based on the account of an eye-witness, except that, as Dr. Spencer of the British Museum has pointed out, there would probably be very little left of any eye-witness of such an interesting event. It may well be that a much larger fragment of the same meteorite lies somewhere in this neighbourhood buried in the sand, but I fancy that the piece I have brought home is in fact the block of iron so often spoken about by the Badawin with suitable and typical exaggerations.

In any case, I felt that we had duly completed the part of our programme relating to Wabar. We seemed to have discovered the origin of its strange legend and also the block of iron, or a sufficient part of it, to leave no doubt about its nature. It was all something of an anticlimax for everybody except the Mineral Department of the British Museum. We had now been just a month in the desert, and some of my companions were getting rather tired of our wanderings, so it was rather drearily and wearily that on February 6 we resumed our march southward. For nearly a month we had been keeping the fast of Ramdhan, and, as you may imagine, the daily ordeal of nothing to eat and nothing to drink from an hour before sunrise to sunset was becoming a little monotonous. The country had become utterly desolate and lifeless, and I must not attempt to linger over our marches of the next fortnight during which we covered about 200 miles to Shanna, where we again touched Mr. Thomas's route at the point from which he began his northward dash last year. On the way we had visited a considerable group of wells of such briny water as to suggest that the gypseous rock in which they are situated may have formed part of an ancient sea-floor now covered over by the sands. I am indeed inclined to think that the whole of the tract known as Al Rimal and Al Khiran (the salt wells), together with the great northern depressions of Jabrin and the Jiban, formed a great bay of the sea possibly at the time of the Eocene uplift, which raised the present mountainous tracts of Southern Arabia above the level of the ocean. If that is so, I should think that at that period the deep-well tract of Magainama, Bir Fadhil, etc., represented the coastline, which would seem to have curved round southward to include Shanna, which is a well of comparatively sweet water at a depth of 55 feet. At any rate, Shanna and a series of five wells to west of it all seem to lie in a well-marked valley-bed whose floor is exposed for considerable stretches, in which I found small lots of freshwater shells, while at about twenty miles west of Shanna I came upon a very large deposit of shells like

those we had found 200 miles to the north. I have suggested that this valley-bottom represents the lower reaches of the great Wadi Dawasir channel, and, personally, I have very little doubt that this is so. In that case I would seem to have struck the two ancient rivers of Maqran

and Dawasir at points very near their original mouths.

From Shanna I wanted to proceed south or south-west, while my companions had a strong preference for retracing our steps homeward, though they were not altogether averse to going south-east towards Dhufar, where we should be able to replenish our stock of provisions, which we had been using up at the rate of about two days' rations each day, while I only now discovered that our supply of dates had been freely dished out to the camels to make up for bad pastures. Against my plan there was the obvious argument that we had no one in our party who knew the way to the southern wells or who could safely introduce us to the southern tribes. To cut short a long story of argument and altercation, we ultimately decided to attempt the crossing of the waterless desert to Sulaivil from here, and on February 22 all was ready for a start. The pastures round Shanna had been comparatively abundant, and our camels, much refreshed by a good feed, came in for a final drink, while we ourselves sat down to a substantial meal of rice cooked in butter, to prepare ourselves for a long diet of nothing but dates, as we would not be able to afford any water for cooking rice during the crossing, which would take us, as we reckoned, nearly a fortnight. We should certainly have sent our heavy baggage back by the water route through Al Rimal, and I think my companions were guilty of bad desert-craft in deciding that we should make the attempt on the waterless crossing with all our tents and other heavy paraphernalia. I fancy they had up their sleeves the idea of abandoning the attempt before we had got too far and of striking back to the nearest water if our experiences proved too unpleasant. And for the moment most of them were quite pleased at the thought that they might get some oryx shooting and thus some meat for the pot to compensate them for their trouble. At any rate, they all seemed to be quite cheerful at the prospect before them, and I began to think that our venture might after all prove to be a good deal simpler than it seemed. Nevertheless it must be remembered to their credit that the side-to-side crossing of this great stretch of waterless desert had, according to our guides, never been attempted before by human beings, much less by a party with full camping equipment and heavy baggage. It would seem that the Badawin who have occasion

to pay unfriendly visits to their neighbours across the desert generally skirt round the edges of it, keeping sufficiently near the wells on its boundary to call at them if there should be need. Similarly, grazing or hunting parties on all sides of the desert penetrate some four or five days' journey into its depths in favourable seasons, living on camel's milk and returning to their water-bases when their camels require a drink. In such circumstances the people of the desert and its fringes seldom, if ever, have any practical object to serve by a direct crossing, and my guides declared that they had never heard of its being done.

And so we started, nineteen men, thirty camels (for we had slain one for food and abandoned another at Wabar when it went lame), and a dog. The first day's march was a light one, as I made a detour with a small party to visit all the wells westward of Shanna while the main body went straight to the appointed rendezvous. During the next two days we found fair pastures, and the camels got on very nicely, while many members of the party went off from time to time on the trail of oryx, whose tracks we came across quite frequently. They invariably returned with nothing to show for their trouble, and they were, of course, subjecting their camels to a good deal of unnecessary exertion. However, all seemed to be well enough on the third night, when we extracted two foxes from the same burrow near our camp. Each night about 1 or 2 a.m. our practice was to send on the baggage animals to give them the advantage of marching during the cool hours, while the rest of us followed at dawn. On the fourth day we found ourselves in absolutely bare and pastureless country as we skirted the lofty sand-dune tract called Qa'amiyat, and the camels, marching all day under the blazing sun with heavy loads and nothing to eat, began to wilt, while my companions began to whisper uncomfortably about turning back. The fifth day brought matters to a climax. Never have I seen such deadly country. It was not like the vast flat gravel tracts of typical Arabian steppe where one expects nothing better, but a pleasant, undulating landscape of sand-ridges and valleys where one might reasonably expect to look upon fresh pastures from any ridge as one laboriously climbed to its summit. Yet everything we looked upon was dead, struck down by the unrelieved drought of twenty years, during which no drop of rain had been known in these parts. Not a green thing of any sort did we see that day, and the sweet piping of the desert lark, twice heard but not seen, seemed to be a mockery. One small desert warbler and a single raven were

the only living things in that scene of desolation, and the actual climax came when we topped a ridge about midday and saw ahead of us our own tents pitched for the first time since our leaving Shanna in the midst of the bare wilderness. We knew instinctively what that portended, but I scarcely expected to find several of the baggagecamels sheltering in the tents against the sun. They had simply collapsed under the strain of marching without any food, and we knew that nothing but a dose of water could restore their power of movement. It was a ghastly state of affairs. We were 120 miles from the nearest water, and it was obvious that the baggage animals would have to go back. They would, however, require a drink before attempting such a march, and the problem was whether a small party, lightly equipped, might, with reasonable prospects of success, attempt the remaining 240 miles of the waterless desert with our water supply so seriously reduced. On that issue we argued and wrangled the rest of that day while the precious moments passed. In the end I had to accept defeat. Much precious water was poured out to the camels most in need, while the others were given a short drink through the nose, a process which is supposed to cool their brains while economizing water. And finally the men, famished by their five days on a short ration of dates, insisted on the cooking of a great meal of rice, of which, hungry as I was, I refused to partake. At midnight the orgy was over and the baggage animals were got off while my party slept till dawn, when we also began the retreat, knowing that we had barely sufficient water left to get us back to the well of Naifa. It was a dreary business, but I must pass rapidly over the details of the next four days. Each day we had to halt for a few hours to let the animals rest during the hot afternoon, while the more weary of them were brought in under canvas as before. Two of our carnels during this period actually gave birth prematurely to calves, which were at once slaughtered and eaten by us after a perfunctory roasting on the ashes of our fire; and the strain on the animals may be judged from the fact that those two camels never gave us a drop of milk. The meat of their calves was, however, a welcome addition to our diet, and I must confess that it made me feel a very different man after what had been nothing but a starvation diet, while I had so far not tasted a drop of water since leaving Hufuf nearly two months before. I had contented myself with tea and camel's milk, but now my supply of tea was running out and I had to economize by using the same tea-leaves over and over again for several brews.

On the morning of the fourth day we had exhausted our last drop of water at 5 a.m., while we did not arrive at Naifa till nearly 11 p.m., after a long day's march under a gruelling sun. My first thought was for water, and I don't think I have ever enjoyed a cold drink more than that bowl of Naifa stuff they brought me. It was as strong a solution of Epsom salts as one can well imagine, but I was not at the moment thinking of the consequences. The spell was broken, and next day I had my first bath for nearly two months-a fact which reminds me that Mr. Thomas in one of his lectures last year seems to have painted a rather alarming picture of Wahhabi cleanliness. As you know, the religion of Islam, like other religions, prescribes cleanliness as a virtue; but, in desert countries where water is scarce, the use of sand is permitted in lieu of water for all ceremonial ablutions. That rule is prevalent everywhere in Wahhabi country, not only among the Badawin, but in Court circles and generally in the best society. It is a very simple rule. If the nearest water is so far away that it would be unreasonable for the men to expect their womenfolk to go and fetch it, sand may be used; while a "reasonable" distance, according to the best authorities, works out to about two or three miles. In actual practice while travelling one uses sand as a matter of course unless one is actually encamped at a well.

On arrival at Naifa our future was dismally dark and uncertain. I scarcely thought that my companions would face another attempt on the desert. Our camels were much reduced in vitality by two long months of hard marching under exceedingly unfavourable pasture conditions. Our date supply was nearly exhausted, and we were all so weak with hunger that we had to kill one of our camels to replenish our larder. That, to be sure, put fresh life into us; but it was the clerk of the weather who actually decided our plans. On March 2 I was actually woken by drops of rain; and during the next few days, while our camels were out grazing to recuperate from their recent trying experiences, the storm-clouds gathered about us with thunder and lightning and occasional light showers, which made the Badawin as happy as sandboys. A Scotch mist descended on the sand-dunes of Arabia, and the whirlwind carried black clouds of sand in a wild stampede along the crests of the ridges around us, while occasional hurricanes swept down into our hollow to uproot our tents. It was here that some weeks earlier we had heard the singing sands, but the cold and rain had damped their musical ardour. Meanwhile our preparations for another attempt on the waterless desert went on apace.

On March 5, at sunset, we started, our desert party being reduced to eleven men, fifteen camels, and, of course, the dog, while with us we carried twenty-four skins of Epsom salts and our share of the wind-dried raw flesh of the slaughtered camel, which was to be our sole sustenance, besides what remained of the dates. We could afford no water for cooking, so the rice was sent with the baggage party, which marched the same day by easy stages along the well route to Riyadh.

I calculated that we had about 350 miles to reckon with, while the weather forecast seemed to be favourable enough. At any rate, we had made a start, and now we had to hurry all we knew. For the first three days all went well, with clouds to shield us from the sun and occasional rain to refresh us and the camels, while the fourth day remained cool enough, though the storm had passed away. During this period, marching hard all day with scarcely a halt and for a few hours each day before dawn, we traversed the tracts known as Bani Zainan and Hawaya, covering about 120 miles, which brought us level roughly with the point from which we had retreated so ignominiously ten days before. So far we had not been unduly extended, and we had found moderate pastures. The fifth day was rather grim. The sun came out in all its glory into an unclouded sky; the pastures failed suddenly, and disappointment awaited us as we topped each ridge, hoping to find signs of fresh herbage. We marched forty miles that day, passing from the dreary sands of Shuwaikila on to a vast flat stretch of gravel called Sahma, lying between sand-ridges. Apart from a few insects, there was not a vestige of animal life to be seen during the next few days; even the raven had given up all hope, and everywhere we found horns and skeletons of the oryx and the white Rim gazelle, where they had laid down to die on the barren sands. On the sixth day we had to call a halt at noon to give our camels a rest, and it was pitiable to see their ugly pessimistic faces as they stood or sat round us without making the slightest attempt to prospect for forage. There was only one cheering aspect of the situation in which we found ourselves at that moment. We were just about in the very middle of the desert with water in practically every direction at a uniform distance of about 200 miles. There was no point in turning back, and there was never any question of that, though we wrangled and quarrelled as hungry and thirsty and tired people are prone to do.

And so we went on. That night we gave four of the most weary camels a drink to keep them going, while the rest were from time to

time watered through the nose during the next few days. Our water supply held out admirably, with the result that I was able to bring back a barrel of Naifa water for analysis at home. The sixth day was critical but decisive. Early that morning we looked out from the last ridge of Bani Ma'aridh on to what appeared to be an immense ocean. It was the gravel plain of Abu Bahr. Our guide had never been here, and we plunged into it, looking optimistically for the sand-dunes which would mark our approach to possible pastures. For more than fifty miles we marched that day, and the sun went down with never a sign of the welcoming sands ahead. One can scarcely imagine a more perfect speed track or an aerodrome more capable of accommodating all the air-fleets of the world; but in all that flat smooth expanse of light gravel there was not a drop of water, not a dry blade of grass, and not a stick for fuel. Tealess and coffeeless we marched on, and never have I seen Arabs drive camels as they drove that day; never have I seen camels on the borderland of starvation march as those camels marched; and for the first time in my Arabian experience it was I that clamoured for a halt from sheer fatigue. That was about 9.30 p.m., after we had been marching since 2 a.m. with scarcely a halt. The Arabs had no earthly hope of reaching pasture, but they did hope to come to dead bushes, which would give us fuel and therefore coffee. That was the uppermost thought in their minds, but what I really needed was sleep, for I at any rate could not sleep on camel-back as most of my companions could do for long periods at a stretch.

Next morning, after only five minutes of marching, we came to fuel and sat down to an orgy of coffee, while the camels looked on bored and disconsolate. When we came to some possible fodder, as dry as hay, they were too thirsty to eat, but we were now very nearly at the end of our tribulations. Once more the storm-clouds worked up from the west and we had drops of rain, while that evening, the eighth of our march, we camped within sight of the dark hills of Tuwaiq. That was practically the end, though we had to march fifty miles on the ninth day. The scene had, however, changed. Everywhere we saw the bushes that marked the lines of drainage descending from the western uplands; at last our carnels found greenstuff to eat; and the beasts and birds, which we had missed for nearly 300 miles, began to reappear. The sands had ended, and we marched over gravel and steppe to camp for the last night in a charming coppice of trees and bushes in the bed of Wadi Dawasir. The thing was done, and it was a bevy of women gathering sticks for the home fires that actually

welcomed us back to civilization, the first human beings we had looked upon since we had said good-bye to the little Marri family at Jabrin nearly two months before. We had seen for ourselves that the Rub' al Khali was indeed an empty quarter, and some weeks later we were back home at Mecca just in time for the pilgrimage, which we performed on the camels which had carried us so well and so far. My companions were disappointed of the fortunes which they had hoped to make out of the black pearls of Wabar, but they had not done so badly with an average of about £8 apiece as the result of three months of hard labour—just about enough to buy a wife, but not quite enough to buy a good camel. For such is life in Arabia Felix.

Sir Percy Cox: My Lord Chairman, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen-I am very grateful for the privilege of saying a few words on this occasion, a most important one in the history of the Royal Central Asian Society. I have had for many years the very strongest personal reasons for being interested in the Great Arabian Desert and its crossing. At the end of the last century—thirty-three odd years ago now-I was British representative at Muscat, and during the five years I spent there I did what travelling I could as a Government official. On one of these occasions I travelled from Abu Thabi on the Persian Gulf and southward along the edge of the desert to the neighbourhood of Adam and thence back to Muscat. At that time the problem of the crossing of the Great Desert was specifically under the limelight, in connection with a certain vogue for amateur ballooning which then prevailed in England. One of the chief among the amateur balloonists was the Rev. John Bacon, who was a great enthusiast and set himself to tackle seriously the problem of the crossing. His idea and belief was that if he could be helped to find a starting-ground somewhere on the shores of the Red Sea he could balloon across Arabia. The enquiries which he had made gave him good reason to believe that there was a constant easterly wind blowing from the Red Sea coast across the Great Sands which would carry his balloon over to the Persian Gulf, where he could count on being seen and rescued by one of our gunboats stationed in those waters. Unfortunately, before his project could mature he died of some malady quite unconnected with his ballooning activities. I left Muscat soon afterwards on promotion and the subject passed out of my lively attention, but I have never since ceased to be keenly interested in the exploration of this region. And now I feel very proud that within a year of each other two friends and comrades of mine should have thus shared the unveiling of the secrets of the sands; and, further, that each of them should have travelled under the auspices respectively of two Arab potentates, King Ibn Sa'ud and the Sultan of Muscat, by whose friendship I am also honoured. As I say, I feel very proud that such have been the circumstances of the crossing.

Now to turn for a moment to the actual journeys of the two explorers. It is really extraordinary that they should have been accomplished within such a short distance of each other, in time, and that they should have been concerned with two quite different portions of the Great Desert. It is, of course, only natural, in the case of journeys in completely untravelled and uncharted regions, that differences of opinion, or of information gathered, should be found to exist between successive explorers in regard to particular points; and such differences can only be set at rest by specific research or further exploration. Two instances of the kind I might, I think, mention here.

Firstly, Mr. Philby clearly feels that, so far as he is concerned, he has solved beyond all doubt the question of the identity and position of the supposed buried city of Wabar (as he spells it). Mr. Bertram Thomas, on the other hand, tells us that the locality to which his companions pointed as containing the ruins of Ubar (as he spells it) was, in latitude, quite 150 miles south of the point where Mr. Philby found his crater or meteor-pit. As to the question of the spelling, I agree with Mr. Philby—i.e., in thinking that they must be merely two different renderings of the same name. I suggest that what needs to be done now is that some keen student should investigate the history of the name or names on the record, find out if possible the earliest reference to the place among the ancient native historians and trace it back to its source, and thus enable us, perhaps, to get to the bottom of the problem.

Mr. Thomas, I feel sure, will not be satisfied until this is done.

The other point to which I referred is this; I notice that on Mr. Philby's slide-map one part of the desert is called Rimal and another Ruba'-al-Khali. He apparently considers that they are quite distinct portions of the Great Desert; while Mr. Thomas tells us that the expression Ruba'-al-Khali was not current at all where he was travelling and was never used by his Arab companions. Well, I think this is

quite understandable. In just the same way people living in London, or not far off, would speak of having been to Kensington, or Hampstead, or Hammersmith, whereas people living a long distance away would not know their London well enough to differentiate. To them it would be all just London. In the case of the Arabian Desert the tribesmen who traverse it or graze into it would have different names for various sections of it, and would never think of it or speak of it as a whole; while to the dweller at a distance or the intelligent public in general it would be all Ruba'-al-Khali, and to them the names of its various subdivisions would be unknown. My experience was that outside the immediate neighbourhood of the desert, at any rate north and east, the expression Ruba'-al-Khali was generally known and commonly used for the whole desert.

Mr. Philby has done a splendid piece of work. That portion of his route westwards from Shanna, thence back to Naifa, in straits for water, and then, after all, the second and successful dash across the waterless tract to safety at Sulaiyil, was a wonderful effort. You must have realized, I feel sure, from what we have heard just now that but for that most providential spell of wet weather on his leaving Naifa he would probably never have got across the waterless belt at all.

There is still a blank corner remaining on the map which I hope we may soon see explored by Mr. Philby or some other enthusiast. I mean the western edge of the desert from Sulaiyil due southwards, past Najran, and on to the south-western corner and limit of the Ruba'-al-Khali. Mr. Philby, as you have just heard, declares that he personally has finished for ever with the Great Sands, but I cannot quite take him seriously nor help hoping that he will some day find an opportunity to take this remaining piece of country in hand.

In conclusion, may I once again offer him most hearty congratula-

The CHAIRMAN congratulated Mr. Philby on his remarkable

achievement and joined Sir Percy Cox in hoping he would one day take up his explorations in Arabia and would fill in that still unmapped corner in the Rub' al Khali.

AN THE THE STATE OF SELECTION

THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE ARMENIAN NATION*

By COMMANDER F. C. CORBYN, R.N.

F we are fully to understand and to appreciate the significances of the present position of the Armenian nation it is, I think, necessary to turn back the pages of history to the year 1914, when the question of reforms in Turkish Armenia, which had long been one of the outstanding problems of international diplomacy, seemed to be on the point of settlement. Under a plan dated February 8, 1914, approved by the European Powers and accepted by Turkey, the Armenian vilayets were divided into two sectors—the first comprised the vilayets of Sivas, Trebizond, and Erzerum; the second, Kharput, Diarbekir, Bitlis, and Van. These sectors were to be placed under the control of European inspectors. Hoff, a Norwegian, and Westanenk, a Dutchman, were actually appointed, but owing to the outbreak of the Great War they never took up their posts.

The story of what happened to the Armenians during and immediately subsequent to the Great War can best be told through the medium of official documents and Parliamentary records. From such of these records as are available I will endeavour to state

The Case for Armenia

"I. In the autumn of 1914 the Turks sent emissaries to the National Congress of the Ottoman Armenians then sitting in Erzerum and made them offers of autonomy if they would actively assist Turkey

* Paper read to the Royal Central Asian Society on April 13, 1932, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Arnold Wilson, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN (Sir Arnold Wilson), in introducing the lecturer, said: Very few words are necessary to introduce to you Commander Corbyn, who is about to lecture to us on "The Present Position of the Armenian Nation," a problem that has been on the conscience of Europe for the past thirty years at least and has its roots in ancient history. It is of great interest to-day because the Armenian nation, in spite of many vicissitudes, on which the lecturer does not propose to dwell to-day, remains a nation and is being re-established, not, indeed, in its ancient homelands, but in a portion of them, within the boundaries of Soviet Russia and on the very borders of Turkey. It is an exceedingly interesting situation and one of which we have perhaps heard too little during the past few years. With this brief introduction I will ask Commander Corbyn to commence his address.

in the War. The Armenians replied that they would do their duty individually as Ottoman subjects, but that as a nation they could not

work for the cause of Turkey and her Allies.

2. On account, in part, of this courageous refusal the Ottoman Armenians were systematically murdered by the Turkish Government in 1915. Two-thirds of the population were exterminated by the most cold-blooded and fiendish methods—more than 700,000 people, men, women and children alike.

3. From the beginning of the War that half of the Armenian nation which was under the sovereignty of Russia organized volunteer forces, and, under their heroic leader, Andranik, bore the brunt of

some of the heaviest fighting in the Caucasian campaigns.

4. After the breakdown of the Russian Army at the end of 1917 these Armenian forces took over the Caucasian front, and for five months delayed the advance of the Turks, thus rendering an important service to the British Army in Mesopotamia."


(Extract from letter from Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Viscount Bryce, 3rd October, 1918.)

1. We also recall that the Russian Armenians turned a deaf ear to the blandishments of Tatar and other leaders to join them in a rising against Russia at the outbreak of the War, gave some 200,000 volunteers and conscripts to the Russian Army, and after the defeat of Enver's invasion in the winter of 1914-15 were acclaimed by all the leading organs of the Russian Press as the saviours of the Caucasus.

In effect, during the later stages of the War, the Armenians were fighting as much to bar the enemy's way to India as our own Armies in Mesopotamia and Syria. Moreover, by cutting off from the Germans at a critical period the supply of oil from Baku, they rendered an inestimable service to the Allied cause, as is admitted by General Ludendorff in his book of War Memoirs.

2. As a result of negotiations in 1916 between the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Armenian National Delegation, France undertook after the victory of the Allies to give autonomy to Cilicia under French protection. The Armenian National Delegation, upon this condition, co-operated in raising a force of Armenian volunteers, called originally the "Légion d'Orient" and later the "Légion arménienne." Under French officers, this regiment took part in the Palestine campaign, and by its valour and endurance earned tributes from the commander of the French contingent and from Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief, who wrote of them in these terms:

- "I am proud to have Armenians under my command. They fought brilliantly and played a leading part in the victory."
- 3. After the termination of hostilities, the Allied authorities invited, and in some cases required, Armenian refugees from Egypt, Palestine,



and Syria to settle in Cilicia; and upwards of 200,000, not doubting that the pledge of autonomy under French protection would be fulfilled, responded.

4. Both during the War and since the Armistice, statesmen of the

Allied and Associated Powers gave repeated pledges to secure the liberation and independence of the Armenian nation.

In his Mansion House speech on 9th November, 1916, Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, promised "an era of liberation and redemption for that ancient people."

Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech to the Trades Union Congress on 5th January, 1918, said:

"Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. . . . It would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred."

On 8th January, 1918, President Wilson issued his famous Fourteen Points, the twelfth of which read:

"The Turkish portions of the present Turkish Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."

On 23rd July, 1918, M. Clemenceau wrote:

"The Government of the Republic, like that of the United Kingdom, has not ceased to include the Armenian nation among the peoples whose fate the Allies count on determining according to the supreme laws of humanity and justice."

On 3rd October, 1918, the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the British Government's "determination that wrongs such as Armenia has suffered shall be brought to an end and their recurrence made impossible."

In the House of Lords on 13th November, 1918, the Earl of Crawford (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster) said:

"I gladly take this opportunity of assuring him (Lord Bryce) that His Majesty's Government are fully alive to the gravity of the national and humanitarian interests involved, and are determined to spare no efforts to secure full satisfaction for the rightful claims of the Armenians."

In the House of Commons, on 18th November, 1918, the Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said:

"As far as I am concerned—and I believe in this matter I am speaking for the Government—I should be deeply disappointed

if any shred or shadow of Turkish government were left in Armenia."

In reply to Damad Ferid Pasha, in June, 1919, the Council of the principal Allied and Associated Powers said:

"It cannot admit that among the qualities of the Turkish people is to be counted capacity to rule over alien races. The experiment has been tried too long and too often for there to be the least doubt as to its result."

In the House of Lords, on 11th March, 1920, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said:

"It is true that the French are anxious, not unnaturally, to limit their engagements in that part of Turkey (Cilicia); but let it be remembered that they have entered into definite obligations to protect the Armenians there, and that obligation I am certain they have not the slightest intention of evading; and I think we may hope that this which is our main object—namely, the security of those minorities in that part of the world—in future will be undertaken by them."

Later in the same speech he said:

"The principles upon which we are acting are these. We want to create an Armenia in those parts where there is a distinct predominance of the Armenian population, where we can provide them with a defensible frontier, where they will have the possibilities of economic development and an access to the sea."

Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons, on 29th April, 1920, after the San Remo Conference, said:

"The French are to exercise guardianship over the minority in Cilicia. I believe there are considerable forces in that Province and there is a struggle going on which I hope will, in the end, achieve the result of securing efficient protection for these poor threatened people. But I assure my hon. friends that we cannot dissociate ourselves from the responsibility that is cast upon us by our pledges in respect of the Armenians. If the United States of America feel that they cannot take direct responsibility, we shall have to reconsider the whole position, and will undoubtedly take our share in the matter of helping the Armenian community to equip themselves for their very difficult and perilous task."

The reply of the Supreme Council to the Turkish Delegates' observations on the draft of the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by M. Millerand and dated 16th July, 1920, contained the following passage:

"Not only has the Turkish Government failed to protect its subjects of other races from pillage, outrage, and murder, but there

is abundant evidence that it has been responsible for directing and organizing savagery against people to whom it owed protection. . . . It would neither be just nor would it conduce to lasting peace in the Near and Middle East that large masses of non-Turkish nationality should be forced to remain under Turkish rule."

- 5. During 1920 the Government of the Armenian Republic of Erivan, acting on the advice of the British Chief Commissioner in Transcaucasia, declined an invitation to negotiate separately with the Turks, and likewise refused to accept the terms offered to it by Soviet Russia.
- 6. On 10th August, 1920, Armenia was admitted as a signatory to the Treaty of Sèvres. The decision of Mr. Wilson upon the boundaries of Armenia—a question left to his arbitration by the Treaty—was announced on 22nd November, 1920. Under this award, which was never put into execution, Armenia would have acquired rather more than half of the Turkish vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Furthermore, Article 206 of the Treaty of Sèvres provided that certain portions of the Armistice of 30th October, 1918, should remain in force "so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the present Treaty"; among the portions specified were the following:

"Article 7.—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

Article 10.—Allied occupations of the Taurus tunnel system. Article 24.—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them."

Also, on 10th August, 1920, Britain, France, and Italy signed a Tripartite Agreement respecting Anatolia. Articles 8 and 9 of this Agreement read as follows:

"Article 8.—The French and Italian Governments will withdraw their troops from the respective areas where their special interests are recognized when the Contracting Powers are agreed in considering that the said Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Sèvres) is being executed and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of Christian minorities have been put into force and their execution effectively guaranteed.

Article 9.—Each of the Contracting Powers whose special interests are recognized in any area in Turkish territory shall accept therewith the responsibility for supervising the execution of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey with regard to the protection of minorities in such area."

7. In the autumn of 1920, the Armenian Republic of Erivan was overwhelmed by the forces of the Nationalist Turks, who annexed about one-third of its territory. The remaining portion, seeing no prospect of assistance from the Western Powers, adopted a Soviet form of government under compulsion, and has in consequence enjoyed immunity from further Turkish aggression. During 1922 the three Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia established a Transcaucasian Federation. In December, 1922, this Federation was formally incorporated in the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

8. In March, 1921, a Conference of the Allied Powers and Turkey was held in London. The proposals for a settlement included the following paragraph:

"In regard to Armenia, the present stipulations might be adapted on condition of Turkey recognizing the rights of Turkish Armenians to a national home on the eastern frontiers of Turkey in Asia, and agreeing to accept the decision of a Commission appointed by the Council of the League of Nations to examine on the spot the question of the territory equitably to be transferred for this purpose to Armenia."

Turkey and Greece did not accept the Allies' terms, and the Conference proved abortive.

9. France took the opportunity of embarking upon separate negotiations with the representatives of the Angora Government who were present at the London Conference. These negotiations did not come to fruition till the autumn, when M. Franklin-Bouillon, on 20th October, 1921, obtained the signature of the Angora Government, to a Treaty of Peace, by which not only that part of Cilicia which, under the Treaty of Sèvres, was to remain Turkish (subject to the protection of the Christian population), but also the remainder of Cilicia and a part of Northern Syria—i.e., mandated territories—were to be handed back to the Turks. In spite of British protests, France evacuated these territories, and the Armenian and other non-Turkish inhabitants, to the number of about 150,000, besides many important Turks who had supported the French régime, fled en masse to Syria, Cyprus, Egypt, and other parts of the Near East.

10. In the meantime, the question of Armenia had come before the Second Assembly of the League of Nations (September, 1921), which adopted the following resolution:

"Seeing that the First Assembly on November 18th, 1920, entrusted the Council with the duty of safeguarding the future of

Armenia;

And that the Council on February 25th, 1921, while holding that the situation in Asia Minor made action for the time being impossible, entrusted the Secretary-General with the duty of watching developments in Armenian affairs with a view to procuring subsequent decisions by the Council;

And that in the meantime the Supreme Council in the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, proposed to make provision for a National

Home for the Armenians;

Seeing, further, the probable imminence of a Peace Treaty

between Turkey and the Allied Powers at no distant date;

The Assembly urges the Council to press upon the Supreme Council of the Allies the necessity of making provisions in this Treaty for safeguarding the future of Armenia, and in particular of providing the Armenians with a National Home entirely independent of Turkish rule."

11. In March, 1922, the three Allied Foreign Ministers met at Paris to attempt once again to work out a basis for the settlement of the Near East. They reached a considerable measure of agreement, and their decisions upon the Armenian question were announced in the following form:

"The case of the Armenians has called for special consideration by reason both of the undertakings entered into by the Allied Powers in the course of the War and of the cruel sufferings of that people. Accordingly the aid of the League of Nations is sought over and above the protection accorded by the minority provisions to which reference has already been made, in order to obtain for the Armenians the satisfaction of their traditional aspirations for a national home."

12. The Third Assembly of the League of Nations again considered the question of Armenia, and on the 22nd September, 1922, adopted the following resolution:

"The Assembly notes with gratitude the action taken by the Council with respect to Armenia, and recommends that, in the negotiations for a peace with Turkey, the necessity of providing a national home for the Armenians should not be overlooked, and requests the Council to take all steps which it may think useful to secure this result."

13. In November, 1922, a Conference of the Allied Powers, Greece, and Turkey assembled at Lausanne to discuss terms of peace. Lord Curzon, on behalf of the Allies, brought forward a proposal for the creation of a national home for the Armenians.

In the course of a speech on 12th December, 1922, he said:

"One of the objects which the Allies set before themselves when they were involved in war was the protection and, where possible, the liberation of the Christian minorities existing in large numbers in Asia Minor. Particularly was this the case with regard to Armenia, the pledges about which have been often repeated and are well known. Indeed, these pledges may be said to have dated from the Berlin Treaty nearly half a century ago. . . .

I pass to the Armenians. Their case is deserving of special consideration, not merely because of the cruel sufferings which they have endured for generations, and which have excited the sympathy and horror of the civilized world, but because of the special pledges which have been made with regard to their future.

In the old Russian province of Erivan, now a Soviet Republic, exists a so-called Armenian State numbering, I am told, about 1½ million persons, but already so crowded with refugees of every description that it cannot admit a larger population.

For the rest, the Armenian population of Kars and Ardahan, of Van, Bitlis and Erzerum, has pretty well disappeared. When the French evacuated Cilicia, the Armenian population of that province followed panic-stricken in their wake, and is now strewn in the towns of Alexandretta, Aleppo, Beirut and the Syrian border. There only remain, I believe, about 130,000 Armenians in Turkish Asiatic territory out of a population which once numbered over 3 millions. Hundreds of thousands of them are scattered about as refugees in the Caucasus, Russia, Persia, and adjacent countries. . . .

At this stage I must allude to the well-known demand which has been put forward both by the Armenians and their friends in all parts of the world for the creation of an Armenian national home. It is not unnatural that a people with so strong an individuality, so remarkable, if tragic, a history, and so pronounced a national spirit should aspire to a habitation of their own. If it be replied that they already possess it in the Erivan Republic, the answer must be returned that that area is already poverty-stricken and over-stocked."

On the following day, in reply to Ismet Pasha, the chief Turkish delegate, Lord Curzon said:

"Ismet Pasha had then referred to the Armenians, whom he depicted as a people who were quite happy and contented under Turkish rule, for whom the Turkish Government had the most fraternal feelings, whose sufferings had only been brought on them either by their own folly or by the machinations of their neighbours. Did this picture agree with the facts? If such happy relations had always existed between these two peoples, how was

it that the 3,000,000 Armenians formerly in Asia Minor had been reduced to 130,000? Had they killed themselves, or had they voluntarily run away? By what pressure had this reduction been accomplished? When the French troops recently left Cilicia, why had 60,000 to 80,000 of these happy, contented people fled after them to live in misery elsewhere, leaving their homes and families behind? Why were hundreds of thousands of Armenians now fugitives in every country in the world, when all they had to do was to return to the cordial embraces of the Turkish Government? Why was this Armenian question one of the great scandals of the world? . . . The eyes of the world were on Armenia and on Turkey, and the world would not be content that these wretched people should be left without any protection at the mercy of whatever the Turkish Government might be pleased to do."

The question was referred to a Sub-Commission under the presidency of Signor Montagna. On 9th January, 1923, when the Report of this Sub-Commission was considered, Lord Curzon said:

"As regards the Armenians, I need only say a few words, as the question has been argued with great ability by M. Montagna in his statement. He showed that the suggestion of a national home implied no intention to attack the sovereignty of Turkey, to create an *imperium in imperio* or a State within a State, or to

set up an autonomous régime.

I am somewhat surprised at the Turkish objections to our proposals, for it was the Turks themselves who recently proposed, in connection with the Ægean Islands, the setting up of a special autonomous régime which did not infringe the sovereignty of Turkey. But M. Montagna did not even go so far as that; he only proposed that either in the south, near the Syrian border, as suggested by Sir Horace Rumbold, or somewhere else, a place should be set apart, under Turkish rule and with a Turkish Governor-General, where the Armenians could congregate for the purpose of maintaining their race, language, and culture. The Turkish delegation refused the proposal even in this innocent form and Ismet Pasha apparently repeated that refusal just now."

In consequence of the Turkish refusal the Allies abandoned the proposal. Thus the draft treaty presented to the Turks at the conclusion of the Lausanne Conference makes no mention of an Armenian National Home, and merely provides certain illusory measures for the protection of minorities in Turkey.

[Note.—The French evacuation of Cilicia did not take place before, as the result of a successful attack by Mustapha Kemal Pasha on the French troops, 30,000 of those Armenians from Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq who had been induced to settle there, were massacred.]

On 26th September, 1924, a memorial was presented to the British Prime Minister under the heading:

"Proposal of a Grant for the Final Liquidation of Armenian Questions arising out of the War"

This memorial opened with the following statement:

"The British Government was invited, by a letter from the Secretary-General to the League of Nations, dated 24th March, 1924, to sup-

port the work of assistance to the Armenian people.

We desire to state the reasons why, in our opinion, a substantial contribution should be made to the scheme, approved by the Council of the League of Nations (September, 1923) for the settlement in the Caucasus of the remnants of the Ottoman Armenians, now finding temporary shelter in Greece, the Balkans, etc.

(1) Because the Armenians were encouraged by promises of freedom to support the Allied cause during the War, and suffered for this

cause so tragically.

(2) Because during the War and since the Armistice, statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers have given repeated pledges to secure the liberation and independence of the Armenian nation.

(3) Because in part Great Britain is responsible for the final dispersion of the Ottoman Armenians after the Sack of Smyrna in 1922.

The Greek War against Turkey, which led to the final destruction and expulsion of the Christian minorities in Asia Minor, was initiated and protracted under the direct encouragement of the British Government.

(4) Because the sum of £5,000,000 (Turkish gold) deposited by the Turkish Government in Berlin, 1916, and taken over by the Allies after the Armistice, was in large part (perhaps wholly) Armenian

money.

After the enforced deportation of the Armenians in 1915, their bank accounts, both current and deposit, were transferred by order to the State Treasury at Constantinople. This fact enabled the Turks to send 5 million sterling to the Reichsbank, Berlin, in exchange for a new issue of notes.

(5) Because the present conditions of the refugees are unstable and

demoralizing; and constitute a reproach to the Western Powers.

The remnants of the Ottoman Armenians are now dispersed throughout the Near and Middle East—without homes, without means, without the prospect of settlement. Over 115,000 refugees are finding temporary shelter in Greece. About 25,000 are in Bulgaria. Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, etc., harbour a large number also.

Dispersed in all directions, they beg to be installed at the earliest opportunity on a territory where they may work and earn their living, without being a charge on public charity; they ask not to be treated as outcasts, and they wish to have a civil status that will enable them

to attend to their business.

The Greek delegate at the Council Meeting at Geneva stated (12th June, 1924) that the Greek Government desired the immediate evacuation of the Armenian refugees from Greece, owing to the lack of room and of money to support them, and offered assistance in transport up to £60,000.

On one thing the Turks are absolutely bent: they are determined to exclude all Christians. Thus, since these people cannot return to Turkey, it is necessary to install them upon other appropriate territories, as well as to regulate their legal status. Where shall they be

placed?

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

We recognize, with deep regret, that it is impossible now to fulfil our pledges to the Armenians; for these pledges involved political and territorial re-arrangements now beyond our power to achieve. But there is open to us another method of expressing our sense of responsibility and of relieving the desperate plight of the scattered remnants of the Turkish Armenians.

The most appropriate territory for their settlement would be surely in Russian Armenia. Facilities are offered by the local Government. In September, 1923, the Council of the League of Nations approved a scheme for the land settlement of 50,000 Armenian refugees in the little Republic of (Soviet) Armenia in the Russian Caucasus. The

Armenian leaders in Europe approve this plan.

The Council passed a Resolution that an appeal should be made to its members to give financial support to this constructive scheme, and the Council would be prepared to give assistance through its technical organizations. This Resolution was circulated to the fifty-four States Members of the League with an invitation for assistance as stated above.

The Scheme of Settlement in Russian Armenia

The plans and estimates of this enterprise are thus already prepared,

and call for an expenditure of about one million pounds.

The States Members of the League of Nations have been invited to subscribe themselves and also to facilitate the formation of National Committees which, with the help of the Press in each country and through the medium of philanthropic institutions and large financial and industrial establishments, would organize public subscriptions.

Thus in France the Government, after opening the subscription list with a substantial sum, aided the formation of a National Committee under the Presidency of Monsieur de Selves, Chairman of the Senate Commission of Foreign Affairs. In Italy a similar Committee has been formed with the consent of Signor Mussolini, under the Presidency of Senator Luzzatti, former Prime Minister. In Belgium also a National Committee has been formed with Governmental authorization. In Great Britain H.M. Government has nominated the Armenian (Lord Mayor's) Fund, but has made no contribution. Well-to-do Armenians in England have already given or promised about £14,000.

It is in our opinion the duty of Great Britain to give substantial

support to this Scheme.

We desire to express our view that, as some compensation for unfulfilled pledges is morally due to the Armenians, the British Government should forthwith make an important grant.

Lastly, be it noted that this Scheme:

(1) Has no political implications; (2) Is intended to be a final liquidation of Allied responsibility for the Armenians.

(Signed) (Rt. Hon.) H. H. Asquith.
(Rt. Hon.) Stanley Baldwin."

Addenda to memorial presented to the Prime Minister on 26th September, 1924:

"I. The Scheme of Settlement in Russian Armenia is now, once again, under discussion at the League of Nations Assembly (Commission V.). We learn that many of the Armenian refugees earnestly desire to proceed there, while some prefer to settle in Greece or elsewhere. In any case, provision must be made for them if these destitute folk are to be enabled to survive and to make a fresh start. In our opinion 'Re-settlement' Funds should be available for any area approved by the League.

2. Re the £5,000,000 Turkish gold, this sum, by a Convention between the Allies, dated 23rd November, 1923, will shortly be distributed among Allied nationals having claims in Turkey. The Armenians as a community are not permitted to claim compensation for their losses out of this sum. But our responsibility cannot be forgotten; and a Government grant, to be placed in the hands of the officially authorized 'Armenian (Lord Mayor's) Fund,' seems to us

the best way of fulfilling it."

[Notes.—(a) This Memorial and Addenda is here presented without any alteration or addition. The detailed explanation given under the headings setting forth the first three reasons for the course recommended to the Prime Minister, has purposely been left out, as this evidence had already emerged under the heading, "The Case for Armenia." With regard to the £5,000,000 Turkish gold, admitted to be in large part (perhaps wholly) Armenian money, I have, from Armenian sources, the information that in 1930 approximately £200,000 remained. A number of young Armenians domiciled in Canada, greatly daring and by virtue of their British citizenship, put in a claim for the whole of this sum. They eventually received between them £5,000. That is all of this Armenian money Armenia's Allies in the Great War have seen fit to hand back to her nationals.

(b) It is only fair to point out that the responsibility regarding the initiation and protraction of the Greek War against Turkey was shared

by the Governments of France and the United States. Further that the re-arming of Turkey which led to the adoption of this policy was the work of Russia, France, and Italy.

(c) Successive British Governments have failed to take any step, whatsoever, to implement the proposals put forward under the signatures of these eminent statesmen, though they continued to hold out from year to year vain hopes of a substantial grant or loan. In 1928 these hopes were finally dashed to the ground.]

The Refugee Problem

The first League of Nations Proposal, the "Nansen Scheme," was primarily to settle in Erivan 10,000 Armenian refugees from Greece, and 5,000 from Constantinople. These latter were the last remnant of the Armenian population in that city who were too poor to effect their escape.

Dr. Nansen, who had been appointed High Commissioner for Refugees, proposed that the League should raise a loan among the Member States of one million sterling to cover the expense of settling these 15,000 on land within the Armenian Republic to be drained and irrigated by their labour. Experts who were sent to enquire on the spot into the practicability of the scheme reported favourably upon it. The Armenian Government, the Government of the Federation of Transcaucasia and Soviet Russia were successively prepared to guarantee the loan, whose service would have been covered by contributions from the settlers after the establishment of the colony.

The security was not considered by the financial committee of the League sufficient to ensure the successful flotation of a loan in the open market and the League members were not prepared to give the national guarantees that would have ensured its success.

So Dr. Nansen's proposal was referred back to him to raise the money through other sources if he were able. In view of the fact that promises of only an insignificant fraction of the total sum required were forthcoming, the whole scheme had to be abandoned.

The Armenians, however, whose outstanding characteristic is stubborn determination of purpose, have never ceased to regard the Nansen Scheme as their ultimate goal. The energies and resources of such important societies as the Armenian General Benevolent Union, whose headquarters are in Paris, while available to render first aid to the refugees in Syria at times of crisis, have been bent towards restoring their dispersed fellow-countrymen to what is all that remains of their Homeland. M. Pachalian, their representative, reminded the delegates at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission attached to the High Commission for Refugees which I attended at Geneva in September, 1930, that the Armenian Committees had in the year 1927-28 moved 7,000 refugees from Greece to Erivan, and further that a small city (Nubaropolis) was being prepared in the Caucasus, to which they hoped to move a further 5,000 in 1931. This information was called forth by a plea put forward by the Greek representative that Greece, who had already spent £250,000 on the Armenian refugees, might be relieved of the presence of and further financial responsibility for the 30,000 who could not be absorbed into the population of that country.

Extract from Massis, October, 1931 (an organ of Armenian

interests, published in London):

"SIX THOUSAND REFUGEES GOING HOME

We are delighted to announce that all arrangements have been made for the immediate transfer of 6,000 refugees to the Homeland. The refugees are being listed in Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, and France to start from Greek and Bulgarian ports for Batum, in Georgia, on their way to Armenia, on transport boats most generously supplied by the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, without any charge. Another 4,000 of our people will be transferred early next Spring, let us hope this time from Syria. This vital decision was taken by the Armenian Government last July. Pr. Sahak Ter Gabrielian, the Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars, announced then, in Erivan, that the Government, in co-operation with the Soviet-Union, had decided to admit into the country a certain number of immigrants within the next few months for permanent settlement in the Homeland. 'The economic growth of Armenia on the one side,' explained Pr. Ter Gabrielian, 'and grave and intolerable situation of Armenian workers in the capitalistic countries on the other, necessitates the progressive immigration of a large number of refugees.' Productive and skilled workers would be preferred, besides all those who chose to merge themselves into the political entity of the country and to accept and practise the prevailing methods of public production in industry. Those skilled workers who are willing to place their knowledge and experience at the service of Socialist construction will be accepted with particular pleasure. The Commissariat of Agriculture and the Stateplanning Commission had been asked to define the number of immigrants who could be settled for good, both in agriculture and indus-

With the settlement plan in his possession, the Prime Minister of Armenia started for Europe to examine the details of immigration on the spot. Pr. Ter Gabrielian has been studying the problem in Paris

in co-operation with the A.G.B.U., the H.O.K., and other organized bodies. He has met Pr. C. S. Gulbenkian, the President of the Armenian Benevolent Union, and representatives of several charitable and patriotic Societies. In a conference of Provincial Unions (Hairenaktsakans) held towards the end of August, a resolution was adopted to call upon all Armenian workers in diaspora (exile) to avail themselves of the opportunity offered and not to take any notice of other proposals which induced them to go to other countries. The H.O.K. branches in Athens, Salonika, and elsewhere, have been instructed to prepare lists of immigrants.

In an interview granted to our Press, Pr. Sahak Ter Gabrielian has stated that measures have been taken to transfer 6,000 people immediately, and another 4,000 people in a few months. Housing accommodation and employment will be provided to the immigrants, who will be settled mainly round Erivan, in Ani-Pemza, and in the neighbourhood of Artik (Leninakan).

"We need workers of every kind, skilled or unskilled," said Ter Gabrielian, "we want at once 17,000 workers for carrying out our immediate plans. We must have working hands, and naturally we thought of those Armenian people who were in distress and condemned to unemployment in diaspora. We now can provide them accommodation and work. The Government of Armenia, in conjunction with the Federal authorities in Tiflis and Moscow, have provided a fund of two million roubles, a sum which will cover the settlement expenses of 2,000 families, each consisting of five souls on the average. But the charitable and patriotic unions abroad should provide the expénses of transfer. Refugees will be taken from Greece, Bulgaria, Syria, and the interior provinces of Turkey. Those in France who desire to return will not be excluded." The Prime Minister concluded by holding out the hope that the process of immigration will extend over a number of years, inasmuch as the economic conditions in the Homeland permitted their settlement and absorption.

It is necessary for a true understanding of the situation to realize that what I might describe as the patriotic Armenian point of view regards the settlements in Syria or elsewhere as temporary expedients. The feeling is that Armenian national dignity and racial self-respect require that within their own means they should make efforts to transfer these minorities gradually, but energetically, to the Republic of Armenia, and so confer on them "the blessings of security and honourable citizenship."

The following statement was issued in March, 1932, by the Nansen International Office for Refugees, League of Nations:

"Transfer of Armenian Refugees to Erivan

Thanks to the active co-operation of the Greek Government, which provided, at its own expense, boats for their transport from Greece and Batoum; of the League of Red Cross Societies and the Greek Red Cross, which supplied clothing and medical assistance, of which the refugees were sadly in need; of the Armenian refugee organizations and the Armenian (Lord Mayor's) Fund, which contributed generously towards the cost of feeding during the voyage undertaken by the Nansen Office, about 3,250 Armenian refugees from Greece have already been transferred to Erivan, the second convoy of 1,250 refugees having disembarked at Batoum on February 29th.

The transfers of these refugees have been effected at the request of, and in close co-operation with, the responsible Armenian refugee organizations, who have satisfied themselves that it is in the best interests of the refugees to settle in Erivan and that they have registered for the transfer of their own free will. Reports received from the representatives of the Armenian refugee organizations in Erivan state that the first group of 2,000 refugees were provided on their arrival with housing accommodation and employment by the Armenian Government, many of them being occupied on the irrigated lands of the Sardarabad Plain contemplated by Dr. Nansen's Erivan Settlement Scheme. The Armenian Government has agreed to receive, in the near future, and settle at its own expense, a further 3,750 Armenian refugees who are at present destitute in Bulgaria and Greece."

The Syrian Settlement Scheme

We have already been apprised of the breakdown of Dr. Nansen's original plans. In the meantime the refugees in Syria to the number of about 100,000, most of them gathered in camps at Aleppo, Alexandretta and Beirut, were in desperate circumstances. The unsettled conditions in Syria caused trade to be very slack and the openings for refugee labour and small trading became progressively less. In the winter of 1925-26 conditions were bad. The prospect for the winter of 1926-27 was worse.

When the Nansen proposal was referred back, influence was brought to bear upon the League Assembly to do something for these unfortunates. The Assembly, therefore, invited the International Labour Office to take the necessary steps to better the condition of the refugees by settlement on the land.

The International Labour Office accordingly set up a mixed committee with two British members.

The first meeting of this committee had before it a proposal to start by settling fifty peasant families from the Aleppo camp among the existing Armenian population on the coastal region of Northern Syria.

The political situation in Syria being much improved, the French authority was turning its attention to the conditions of the Armenians and in making its own contribution welcomed help from outside.

After some early vicissitudes this settlement scheme has proved an almost unqualified success. Its greatest recommendation is that it is a self-respecting one, in no way tending to pauperize the refugees. Money contributed to it is advanced to settlers, who repay gradually over a period of years. The money thus circulated through this revolving fund automatically becomes available for re-issue to fresh settlers until the completion of the scheme.

As it soon became evident that only a limited amount of agricultural land was available, and that at comparatively high prices, the Syrian Settlement Scheme naturally as time went on fell into two parts, the urban and the rural. Initiated towards the end of 1926, it will be found from League of Nations' reports that by the spring of 1929 the scheme had produced the following results:

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(Established	l by	Friend	 s of A	rmenia		10410	efugees
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Kiri-Khan						152	? >
Ardal-Heune	L.	•••	•••	***	•••	154 126	"
Hayshen	Α.	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•••	•••	• • • •	208	"
Tiaysiicii	•••		***		-	398	"
		Total 1,014					
		Urban	settle	ment			
Aleppo			•••	•••	•••	526 re	fugees
Kiri-Khan						56	,,
Alexandretta	•••	•••		•••	•••	138	,,
In the course of e	xecu	tion fo	r Settle	ement	at an	early	date:
Aleppo		41.			•••	200 f	
Beirut		71.1				710	,,
Alexandretta		•••		•••		62	35
Damascus	• • •	•••		•••		_0_))
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The following is a list of funds received by the High Commission at that time:

Lebanon Governme	nt	•••	•••	£,24,000	0	o
British sources	•	•••	•••	17,800	0	0
Other sources	•••	•••	•	10,173	5	5
League sources	•••	•••	٠	4,094	0	0
				£56,067	5	5

It will be seen at this stage that the British people through their own private societies and the Lord Mayor's Fund had subscribed nearly one-third of the total funds received. During the same period Armenians living outside Armenia had made the following contributions towards the solution of the refugee problem. They have given to—

Erivan Settlement	₹100,000
Syrian Settlement	1,200
Promised loan Syrian Settlement	10,000
	£111,200

As I have already indicated that the Armenians' leaders do not favour permanent settlement in Syria, I should explain that this promise of £10,000 to the Syrian Settlement Scheme was made subsequent to a declaration at Geneva on behalf of the British United Committee, to the effect that "The said Committee is prepared to agree that the unallocated balance remaining at the disposal of the High Commission from British Funds on the completion of the Syrian Settlement Scheme should be used outside as well as inside Syria."

The British United Committee is comprised of the following societies: "The Lord Mayor's Fund," "The Save the Children Fund," "The Friends of Armenia," and "The Society of Friends."

It must be remembered that through the medium of the funds of these societies, as well as others such as "Bible Lands Missions Aid Society" and the "Bishop of London's Fund," thousands of pounds of British money are being expended annually for the benefit of the refugees, quite apart from the sums I have already tabulated. The bulk of this money directly or indirectly serves the purpose in one way or another of simplifying the housing and maintenance problems of the most helpless amongst these unfortunate communities. The point I wish to emphasize, however, is that a mere handful of the British people have assumed, and continue to shoulder, a responsibility which

belongs to the whole nation, through its accredited representatives. Successive British Governments have withheld the truth from the people, and our statesmen, well knowing the moral obligations which they have incurred or inherited, have lacked either the will or the courage to discharge them.

In November, 1929, as reported in The Times and Manchester Guardian, there was an exodus of Armenian refugees from Turkey. In the course of a few months about 6,000 crossed the Syrian border. I will quote from the report of a British lady living in Aleppo: "I expect you will have heard from other sources of the influx of refugees which began a short time ago, and is growing from day to day. It seems that the Turks have been rounding up all the Armenians remaining in outlying mountain districts, and after robbing them of all their property and money (by such means as, e.g., demanding all arrears of taxation) they let them go. They are arriving here literally destitute, and are being housed in the most wretched and insanitary unfinished building which was occupied for four or five years by refugees who came in in 1922. The Armenian Benevolent Union is starting a soup kitchen, but it will cost nearly £5 a day, and more people are coming every day." These particular people had come from the region of Kharput and Diarbekir. The majority of the refugees, however, crossed the border further north in the neighbourhood of Kameschli, the frontier town near Nisibin. The Central Relief Committee, we were told, had made arrangements for provisional aid for these latter with the limited funds at its disposal. They were trying to shelter some 200 or 220 families in tents, and give them a start in farming and cattle raising. Up to the time of writing the Committee had received Tf21,800, contributed solely by Armenian individuals and Armenian Institutions, with Tf1,200 from foreign benefactors. The French Mandatory Government offered to settle these fresh refugees on free land in the valley of the Euphrates and Kabour. They were confident their safety in that district would be assured, and that their presence, as agriculturists, would be welcomed by the indigenous population, who would be glad of the opportunity of purchasing their produce.

In 1930 the League of Nations reported that by the summer of that year there had been re-housed under the League Settlement in Syria a total of 12,000 people. It is encouraging, therefore, to turn to the report submitted by the Sixth Committee to the League Assembly at Geneva, September 24, 1931, which reads as follows:

"The Committee learned with satisfaction (from the President of the Governing Body of the Nansen International Office for Refugees) of the progress made towards the solution of the problem of the Armenian refugees in Syria, and noted that, of the 40,000 refugees who were in the refugee camps at Aleppo, Alexandretta, and Beirut, when the co-operation of the High Commission for Refugees was invited, at the end of 1926, 25,000 had been settled. There now remains only 15,000, and steps are contemplated by the Office to ensure their transfer from the refugee camps and their settlement, under satisfactory conditions, before the end of 1933."

This remarkable speeding up of the process of settlement is in the main due to two causes. In my talks with Mr. Burnier, the League representative in charge in Syria, I was struck by his tribute to the character of the refugees themselves. The two points he stressed were:

(1) The fact that, almost without exception, where advances of money had been made for the purchase of land or houses, payments were always forthcoming when due. This in a country where employment is none too easy to find, and there is no poor law or its equivalent to fall back upon. (2) The formation of groups or associations amongst the refugees of people who were fellow-citizens of particular towns or districts in Turkey had enabled him greatly to expedite the work of settlement.

One example amongst many is that of what is officially known in League records as Quarter No. 4 Beirut. This quarter is situated on the right bank of the River Nahr-Beirut. It is occupied by the Union of Armenians from Marash (a considerable city in Anatolia). The Union has purchased 150,000 "pics" of land, and now possesses 450 lots, of which 442 are occupied.

The contributions of members of this association amounted in November, 1930, to 800,000 francs, and the League of Nations Committee advanced 400,000 francs in order to make up the sum needed for the purchase of the land, this advance being repayable in three years.

There are quite a number of these Unions, which are helped in some cases by generous gifts from their more fortunate fellow-townsmen who have prospered in America and elsewhere.

Whilst realizing that the problem of the camps is nearing solution, one has to remember that the unfortunate people who inhabit them have for the most part been compelled by circumstances to dwell there since the signing of the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty in October, 1921.

When my wife and I visited, for the first time, the camp at Beirut, these are briefly the impressions we carried away:

"I cannot adequately describe all we saw as we wended our way in single file up one narrow alley after another amid indescribable filth and flies. Just try to imagine 13,000 people, representative of all classes of civilized communities, dumped into a camp of huddled huts of rusty flattened petrol tins, packing-case wood, string, and old sacking. Then realize that they have been there for many years. In winter the ground is deep in mud, which mingles with the open sewerage. In summer the resulting substance is turned into many inches of pestilential dust, spreading disease and death. One cannot walk through the camp at any time without taking and keeping a grip upon oneself, to combat the sickening nausea as one strives to keep the flies at least from one's mouth. As we went into a hut here and there and looked into all we passed, amongst these rickety, rusty dwellings we found an amazing amount of cleanliness, courage, and selfrespect. We saw poor cooking utensils scrupulously polished. One was welcomed with brave smiles and simple dignity. We seldom left without gifts of a flower or two. These are grown in old tins on balconies contrived out of string and kindling wood, and testify to the Armenian love of beauty."

In the course of our travels through the refugee camps in Syria, in a country where begging is a tradition, we did not come across one single Armenian beggar. When I commented upon this fact to the Principal of the American College at Aleppo, he told me that this was characteristic of the Armenians, amongst whom he has spent a lifetime. He told me that when the Armenian refugees first came to Aleppo, a Moslem notable, thinking that the begging in the city was due to the influx of refugees, asked the Syrian Governor to arrange a surprise round-up of beggars. This was carried out, and there was not one Armenian amongst them. So impressed was the Moslem that, in spite of his prejudice against Christians in general and Armenians in particular, he wrote to the Armenian Bishop and congratulated him on his flock. To quote an experience of my own, some friends in Aleppo placed their car at our disposal on several occasions. When I tried to tip the chauffeur, a young Armenian survivor of the deportations of 1915, he refused to accept a tip, on the grounds that we were trying to help his people. The attitude of the Syrians towards the Armenians is one of thinly veiled hostility. This is not altogether unnatural, seeing that they constitute an economic problem at a particularly difficult time. Commercially, Syria has lost by the break-up of the Turkish Empire, due mainly to the fact that the area of free trade has been immensely curtailed by the erection of tariff barriers at the frontiers of Palestine, Trans-Jordania, and Iraq. The Armenian has few equals as a trader, and those who are unable to set up in a small way as traders, motor owner-drivers, etc., are willing to sell their labour for a lower wage than the Syrian is anxious to accept for himself.

Unfortunately the struggle for existence encouraged numbers of Armenians to serve in the French forces employed in putting down the Druse rebellion, and there are at present many Armenians serving in the mounted Gendarmerie, who most effectively patrol the roads in the vicinity of the Turkish frontier. Happily there have been no recent raids on the part of the Turks, who seem to have been discouraged by the fact that the last marauding party of twenty-five who came over were wiped out to a man.

In the event of the withdrawal of the French mandate, Armenians in Beirut should not be in any danger, as in the Lebanon Republic they form part of a Christian majority. In Northern Syria their position is less secure, though I think the fact that the Armenian leaders, as I have stated elsewhere, favour a gradual return of the Armenian community to Erivan would tend to prove a safeguard.

I cannot dismiss this subject without paying a tribute to the determination these refugees have shown in establishing churches and schools with the slender resources at their command. Up to the time of their dispersion, at any rate, ninety per cent. of these people were members of their National Gregorian Church, the remainder being either members of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Communions.

No small responsibility devolves upon their British and other foreign friends in seeking to help them to keep the lamp of faith burning in what must, in view of the fact that their Homeland is now a part of Soviet Russia, be the key to the survival of Christianity amongst the rising generation of those whose forbears have so nobly suffered in this cause.

The future of secular education can safely be left in their own hands with what aid is already available from British and American colleges and high schools. Amongst the keenest and most intelligent of the students in the American University at Beirut are to be found a sprinkling of Armenians. When I commented upon their zeal for learning to the Dean, he replied, "The Armenian will have education before he will have food."

If I were to be asked the question, "What is the attitude of the Armenians towards the British?" my reply would be that they draw

in their minds a very distinct dividing line between their opinion of the British politician and the British people. What they think of the former is best left to the imagination; what they think of the latter is well illustrated by the closing words of the Armenian Bishop at Aleppo, when he came to return our official call, "Commander Corbyn, I have faith in the justice of the British people."

The Republic of Armenia

The territory of the Republic comprises an area about the same size as Belgium. It is a high hilly country with a climate of extreme seasonal change, but very healthy. The land is fairly evenly divided between rocky barren soil, pastoral meadowland, and cultivable ground. This cultivable ground is occupied to the limit of its capacity by the population now swollen to over a million by the vast number of refugees who came from the Turkish provinces during the War. There are, however, large tracts of swamps that could be drained and other areas of good alluvial soil which only requires irrigation to become exceedingly productive. It was with these areas the Nansen Scheme was intended to deal.

This Armenian Republic of Erivan contains the traditional ecclesiastical centre of Etchmiadzin, which has been maintained throughout the dark centuries of Armenia's serfdom, carrying forward the memory of the days when she was free.

The population at the present time consists of (in round figures) 900,000 Armenians, 90,000 Azerbaijanis, 20,000 Kurds, Yezidis, etc., 20,000 Russians, Persians and Greeks, etc. There are in the two adjacent Republics a further 720,000 Armenians, 400,000 of whom are in Georgia and 320,000 in Azerbaijan. It must be remembered that many of these people are dwelling on their native soil, which was incorporated in the territories of their neighbours in the autumn of 1920, when Armenia was invaded simultaneously by the Turkish Nationalists and Russian Bolsheviks from Baku. There are also in the Northern Caucasian Republics a further 270,000 Armenians, and in the rest of the U.S.S.R. about 150,000. Whilst on this subject of vital statistics, it would be well to recall the fact that, according to the League of Nations' High Commission for Refugees, there were in 1931, 174,931 Armenian refugees scattered about Europe and Asia Minor, as follows: Syria 85,842, Greece 38,834, Bulgaria 22,000, other countries 7,555. There is a discrepancy between these details and the total. This would be accounted for by the fact that there is no mention

of some 25,000 Armenians who are known to be in Roumania, most of whom would come under the category of refugees. Included in the League estimate under "other countries" is probably the 4,000 refugees in Iraq. There are at least 35,000 Armenians remaining in Turkey. The details of further Armenian colonies are roughly as follows: Palestine 4,000, Egypt 25,000, France 60,000, England, Belgium, and Germany 5,000; North America 150,000, South America 25,000, of whom there are quite 15,000 in the Argentine Republic. In Persia, India, and the Far East, diocesan records show a rough total of 140,000, of whom there are about 70,000 in Persia.

When the Republic came under the protection of Russia in 1921, poverty and famine reigned supreme. In the following five years the reputation of the Armenian people for industry and enterprise had more than justified itself, and though they were still feeling acutely the want of capital, the most astonishing progress had been made. Armenia is an agricultural country and nine-tenths of the people are villagers. There were in 1926, 160,000 rural holdings averaging less than 15 acres apiece. It is realized that the way to prosperity lies in intensive cultivation of valuable crops. The most prominent of these is cotton, of which the best quality can be grown locally and for which there is an inexhaustible market in Russia. Wine, preserved fruit, and silk are other increasing exports.

Total exports were doubled between 1924 and 1925 and imports increased by 30 per cent. The Armenian Budget does not even now balance, however, and the deficit is made up by Russia, whose policy it is to foster the development of the Federated States of Transcaucasia. Each year the Armenian Government increases the cultivable area by drainage and irrigation works, and no better contribution could be made to the welfare of the country than the means to accelerate this process. It is the policy of the Armenian Government to admit as many more refugees as can be assimilated. The number so admitted is therefore governed by the funds available for drainage and irrigation schemes.

The paper Massis, an organ of Armenian interests, published in London, contains interesting information regarding present-day conditions in Erivan. The following notes are extracts from 1931 issues of this publication.

"ARMENIA

The seventh session of the Central Executive Committee (Parliament) of Armenia was opened in Erivan on February 14th, 1931. A

number of telegrams of congratulations were received from and sent to the Parliaments and Governments of all Constituent Republics. Delegates of District Councils from every corner of the Homeland had come to present their needs and take part in the deliberations. Peasants and shepherds in their sheepskin caps and old Khaldia-Urartian attire, and Armenian Tatar and Yezidi women delegates in their ancestral costumes gave a picturesque appearance to the Parliament Hall.

Pr. Simonik Piroumian, the delegate from the Transcaucasian Federal Government, gave a complete account of the economic progress of Transcaucasia as a political unit, and of the prospects of the next two years. Unfortunately we are obliged to present here only a short extract from his highly instructive account owing to lack of space.

In his open letter addressed in 1921 to all Transcaucasian Communists, Lenin said that the most fundamental problem was to establish national peace in the region. The Transcaucasian Republics fully honoured the message of their leader. The economic progress and the solid construction of Transcaucasia as embodied in the Five-Year Plan has been possible on that condition. The interests of the Republics and of the Federation are identical, because the latter is merely the concentration of the efforts of all on a uniform programme. 'Allow me to recapitulate our basic ideas,' continued Pr. Piroumian, 'that is, the industrialization of regions in harmony with that of All-Union; the advancement of agricultural productivity on lines of common interests, the specialization of Transcaucasia, as a separate region, on the principle of division of labour throughout the Union; finally the improvement of the standard of life and the cultural progress of the people.'

Then the speaker mentioned the large sums spent in the last two years on agriculture, tractors, electrification, and the rise in the Budgets. He reviewed the main problems of the foreign policy of the Union, which vitally concerned also the Republics of Transcaucasia. It is interesting to note Pr. Piroumian quoted a paragraph from a recent speech made by Mr. Lloyd George in regard to the significance of the

Five-Year Plan."

"On February 15, Pr. Sahak Ter Gabrielian, the Premier, rendered an account of the Government's activity in the last two years. We have often given facts in these pages in that regard. Even the résumé of the Premier's speech occupies thirteen columns of the official newspaper (Kh. Hayastan) of February 17. Unfortunately we can present here only the salient points of his account:

The sixth session of Armenian Councils in 1929, said Ter Gabrielian, had estimated that for the carrying out of the Five-Year Plan (1928-33) in Armenia, a sum of 268 million roubles (£26,800,000) had to be invested in the country. They were now in the third year of the plan, but they had already spent 254 and a half million roubles. After giving figures of the gradual increase of the productivity of the

country, he said that in the current year the rate of increase was assured, 47 per cent. in the U.S.S.R., 66 per cent. within the Transcaucasian Federation, and 107 per cent. in Armenia. 'You will ask why,' went on the Premier, 'there is such a disproportion between the various ratios of productivity?' and he replied that the reason was to be sought in the national policy of the Communist Party. In the days of the Tsars the national regions on the borderlands were considered as colonies. The national policy laid down by Lenin demands that the industrial progress of the backward regions should be pushed along with the greatest possible energy. The practical results of that national policy prove that we in Soviet Armenia follow the recommendations of Lenin with a determined continuity.

The Premier spoke very gravely of the housing shortage in the country, and their failure in carrying out the prearranged plan in that respect. He referred to the 'shameful conditions of housing in Erivan and Leninakan, where the construction of houses did not come up to

the increase of population.'

The representatives of the Sevan region had complained that the Lake of Sevan was being dried up for the purpose of irrigation without a proper survey having been made as to the rational use of the lake. The Premier assured the critics that the best scientists of the Union Academy of Sciences had been studying the possibilities of Sevan for the last three years and that, according to those scientists' preliminary report, the great plain of Sardarapat could be irrigated by the waters of Lake Sevan and an additional area of 140,000 hectares of land brought under cultivation. The economic and industrial potentialities of the country were being studied and a sum of over three million roubles had been assigned for the purpose in the current year.

Turning to the industry of copper, the Premier complained that the mines of Ghapan and Alah-Verdy had not produced the minimum of 60,000 poods, as laid down in the scheme. 'We are all guilty,' he said, 'from the Government downwards to the workers on the spot; that should be a lesson for our current year's activity.' He expressed his satisfaction that the production of the tufa stone of Artik

had come up to the programme.

As to the scheme of electrification, Ter Gabrielian said that when the station of Tsorages (north-east of Karaklissa) is completed in the course of the current year, they will possess 45,000 h.p. of electric energy. 'These 45,000 "horses," exclaimed the Premier, 'will work a hours in every day and without any stoppage to supply motive

power to our productivity.'

He referred to the schemes of cereals, cotton, finally transport, and primary education, and so on. Before concluding his speech Pr. Ter Gabrielian spoke on the ideological front, the necessity of constant self-criticism as the best means of improving the machinery of the State. He spoke a word of warning against the nationalist tendencies prevailing among the intellectuals, and certain 'great-Russian' ten-

dencies among others. Amid prolonged and enthusiastic cheering, the Premier finished his speech by assuring the Councils of Armenia that the Five-Year Plan will be carried out in full."

News from the Homeland and Elsewhere

The Five-Year Plan of industrialization was inaugurated throughout the Soviet Russian Union towards the end of 1928. When the programme of Armenian quotas was published in Erivan in that autumn, a very witty chairman of one of the provincial councils in the Homeland said that "it was easy to plan the erection of a Socialist State in Armenia, but you cannot erect any kind of State by donkey transport." This saying of the official caused great laughter and much amusement throughout the Homeland and elsewhere. Since then the "donkey transport" has become a password and a joyful incentive to substitute modern methods for the good old donkey.

The third year of the Five-Year Plan is nearing its end, and according to *Khorurdian Hayastan*, the only official daily newspaper in Erivan, most of the quotas of construction and production for the third year have been fulfilled and in some cases surpassed.

In fact, it matters little whether this minimum programme of the economic modernization of our Homeland and All-Soviet Union is carried out in five years or seven years. Of course, people on the spot are undergoing a measure of deprivation and inconvenience, in order to fulfil the plan. What matters most from the standpoint of national policy is the firm determination of the Government and the organized nation to carry it out within the prescribed time-limit; and, indeed, evidence is not wanting for it.

To begin with, the peoples of all the Republics are being trained into an industrial and productive discipline, which was almost unknown before the plan. The mystifying Russian or Ukrainian, the romantic Georgian, Armenian, Tatar, the slow and ponderous peasants throughout, are being initiated into the workings of modern technique, which is justly baffling the understanding of the outside world. They blunder, they grope forwards and backwards, they waste and sometimes even swear at each other. The blunderers are severely criticized by themselves in the public Press. The defaulters are dismissed and the dutiful workers of shock brigades are praised. Whereever there is a failure in a particular department of the plan, squads of shock volunteers are despatched to the scene to bring the quotas up to date.

Speaking about our own Homeland, a glance at the pages of Kh. Hayastan will give an idea of the methods. I am quoting from the October and November numbers of the newspaper.

"The shock workers of the cattle-farming centre at Alaghiaz (October 11th) report that during the preceding three weeks the farms of Alaghiaz had delivered 160 tons of fodder, instead of 100 tons allocated to them; the farms of Aghpapa had delivered 900 tons instead of 600. They had already cleared 2,000 hectares of land of pebbles and other obstacles, which prevented the growth of grass. The local cotton committee at Vagharshapat (October 20) reports that 443 tons of raw cotton had been collected and delivered to the authorities of the mill. But the deliveries by Kulaki are shamefully below the quota. They required 3,000 sacks for baling the cotton, but there being insufficient thread for sewing the sacks, only 1,200 bales have been delivered up to now. . . . In the region of Haitagh and Arbad (Vagharshapat) the quotas, thanks to the arrival of volunteers, have now been reached and exceeded.

'Shame to us,' write the campaigners of autumn-sowing from Leninakan, 'we have not been able to distribute the seeds before the appointed time, because the ox-carts were much delayed in the previous journey.' They request a fresh supply of carts or other means of trans-

port for fulfilling the programme of sowing."

"These are some of the methods by which our countrymen in the Homeland are being trained in the technique of state-building. Grigor Artsruni, one of our far-seeing and public-spirited leaders of last generation, said in 1872, that yesterday we were an ecclesiastical community and that to-morrow we shall be a nation of workers and thinkers. Had he been alive just now, he would have added that our people in the Homeland were also soldiers and statesmen."

It is evident, from these items of news, that the Armenians in Erivan, having resolved to make the best of the situation in which they are placed, are throwing themselves with characteristic energy and purpose into an endeavour to make the Five-Year Plan a success. Doubtless, there must be many amongst them who hope for a gradual change in the character of the Government, particularly those to whom the privilege of unmolested public worship is a matter of moment. Some of us may find it difficult to understand how it is that the refugees are voluntarily returning to a country where conditions are by no means ideal. We must remember that their plight in the camps in Greece is, if anything, worse than what I have tried to describe to you from my personal observation elsewhere, whilst unemployment there is a far more serious problem.

At the conclusion of the lecture the Chairman (Sir Arnold Wilson)

observed that he was unable to see in the photographs which the lecturer had thrown upon the screen anything to justify the lecturer's references to the notable economic progress made in Soviet Armenia. The factories and the public works which they depicted were on the scale of similar institutions to be found in any country town. The photographs entitled "A Tractor Station" might more suitably be entitled "A Stationary Tractor." A power station capable of producing 50,000 kilowatts was scarcely of sufficient interest to-day in any country to justify a photograph and a special encomium. The barrage for irrigation purposes and the proposed draining of a small lake was on the scale of a minor work which any Colonial Government or a Provincial Government in India was in the habit of undertaking, without floral decorations or trumpets, with the assistance of their own Public Works Engine Department and from their own revenue every year. To dignify such developments with the title of "The Fruits of a Five-Year Plan" was scarcely fair to Soviet Russia.

He emphasized the complete failure of the League of Nations to tackle constructively the problem of Armenian refugees. A man of international reputation with an honoured name, Dr. Nansen, did indeed put forward a carefully devised scheme which, if executed might have redounded to the credit of the League of Nations. The scheme was rejected and it had been left for individual nations such as the French, and organizations supported by individuals such as the Friends of Armenia, to undertake the task. The League of Nations had done nothing whatever to assist the Armenians out of the plight in which they found themselves consequent upon the failure of the United States of America to ratify the promises made, and to fulfil the hopes held out by President Wilson. Commander Corbyn had shown that the Armenians, in spite of the deliberate attempt to extirpate them, remained a nation with a national spirit so strong that the President of Soviet Armenia had found it necessary to issue a grave warning against the increase of nationalism in Soviet territory. He had mentioned that Armenians who had been successfully settled in Syria and elsewhere hoped eventually to return to their homelands in Soviet Russia on the very borders of Turkey. The existence of a strong, intelligent, and patriotically inclined race in such a geographical situation was a fact which was bound to influence the course of history in the future.

The Chairman expressed, on behalf of the audience, their cordial thanks to the lecturer for a most interesting address. (Applause.)

THE INDIAN VILLAGE

By F. L. BRAYNE, I.C.S.

[Short Notes of an informal address given to the Royal Central Asian Society on July 22, Sir John Thompson, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., in the Chair.*]

PROPOSE to run through some of the characteristics of the Indian village as a field not of economic or sociological study but of practical work.

I spent seven and a half years in a district just south of Delhi, Hindustan Proper, more than a year in Jhelum, North Punjab, and then studied intensively the six central districts of the Lahore Division. My books are widely read, particularly in South India, so my remarks are applicable probably to a wider area than North India.

The first thing which strikes me very forcibly in the Indian village is Waste-all poor waste, but the keynote of the Indian village is waste. There is waste of health and wealth by absence of any system of sanitation, by which of course manure would be collected and conserved (as explained in my books), waste of manure by burning cow-dung as fuel, also waste of women's time. This is a thorny problem, as people insist on studying the village in offices instead of in the village itself. An eminent health authority is anxious to incinerate all refuse, and an agricultural expert is ready to abandon the cow-dung to the housewife as fuel! Where will the villager get any manure? A little experience and reflection will show what one is up against. Take one instance: Ghi is made by simmering milk all day over a cow-dung fire, but it can be done equally well, and the same but far cleaner ghi obtained, by putting it for only half an hour over the fire, thereby saving threequarters of the cow-dung. The possibility of coal bought co-operatively has not yet been touched; it would probably pay the farmer and benefit both the coal merchant and the railway.

* The Chairman in introducing the lecturer regretted that Lord Lloyd was unavoidably prevented from taking the chair. He said that he had himself known Mr. Brayne since the beginning of his service in India and had served with him in the Punjab, where his work was well known. Some might differ from Mr. Brayne in regard to details, but he had got into the mind of the Indian peasant as few of his contemporaries had done. The audience might expect from him a vivid and human picture of the Indian peasant.

Then there is the triple waste of (1) cost of vaccinators, (2) backshish to vaccinator not to do his work, (3) small-pox.

Waste of health by want of light and air in houses, and by malaria from puddles of water and neglect of quinine and mosquito nets. Waste of money on ceremonies, litigation (a good murder case costs more than a High School for 500 boys), and ornaments. These things, however, only represent a desire for amusement and self-expression and must be replaced with something cheaper and better—e.g., organized games.

There is time wasted by bad implements, bad seed, etc. Menials do so much of the work that there is lack of occupation. Fragmentation of holdings spells more waste; there is also no means of fencing fields, and therefore children are kept from school and cattle-stealing

is easy.

After waste, there is the congestion of village dwellings. This means that sanitation is difficult, health bad, and all change difficult, as each man's business is every man's business and any attempt at change sets a hundred tongues wagging. But it will make it easy to place wireless loudspeakers where they can be heard by the whole village.

Third on the list is the neglect of girls' education, the biggest thing of all, as the woman is responsible for nine-tenths of village life, particularly for the life of small holders and small farmers. A villager always blames his wife for the waste on ornaments or litigation.

Fourthly, we have the increase of population; this is extremely important. There is a very high birth-rate, caused largely by the insecurity of life and livelihood. In order to make both secure, we must send the girls to school, so that they will have other interests and will postpone the marriage age; the birth-rate will soon drop very greatly. It is the women who are responsible for the standard of living. Enable them by sound education to raise it, and down will go the birth-rate. At present wealth often only brings an increased use of luxuries.

Fifthly, there is no central authority to act, to pay, to give an opinion on behalf of the village. A start was made with Panchayats, but has been stopped by the removal of supervising officers, owing to financial stringency. The result is insanitation, tyranny of the careless or the selfish. It is no one's business to see that a nuisance is removed—a blind well, a fallen tree, an oozy drain, a noisy engine may cause annoyance and obstruction for any length of time; no one

deals with them, for there is no one in authority to do so. No games have been organized, nor is there usually any organized effort to deal with epidemics, with plague, or with locusts; these all yield at once to organization.

Sixthly, there is the isolation, the insulation of the Indian village. There are few metalled roads; the distance between one village and another is great; there is no weekly market, no lights, no books or newspapers, and if there were there is still a high percentage of illiteracy. There are few post offices, no habit of letter writing, no wireless, no parson, squire, or doctor; it is the thing nowadays to run down the parson as a force in village life, but it will be a bad day when organized religion ceases to play a part in rural uplift. There is a huge population and great scarcity of trained workers.

All this leads to mental paralysis; there is no stimulus, but on the contrary a general apathy and absence of desire to improve village life, nor is there any knowledge of how to start. This is why these villagers fail to take steps which to us appear absolutely obvious. Hence, too, comes much of the crime, of the waste of money on litigation, on show, much of the constant quarrelling. Village life is utterly boring, and the school combs out the brighter wits, who leave the village when they are old enough, never to return to put it right.

So much for its defects. There are some advantages also. The North Indian peasant, whom I know in war and peace, is a first-class fellow and, in spite of all his heartbreaking resistance to one's efforts to improve him, a very charming fellow. He is persistent; he can hold a trench in France and can make a living out of the Rajputana sands. He is loyal to his village, to Government, and to his neighbour. He is clannish and capable of combined effort, very orderly and responsive to good leadership.

There are several handicaps to rural work in India. Firstly, Government officials cannot use the spur of religion. That is inevitable in a country of mixed religions where Government has to be neutral. We have also burdened ourselves with two self-imposed handicaps. We refuse to use the aid of the law for even such very obvious improvements as rural sanitation, the consolidation of holdings, etc. The argument is that the people are not yet ready to have these enforced and that there would be abuses. The people could, however, be made ready very easily and quickly by proper teaching. The other handicap is the failure, except in the very successful case of Co-operation, to teach the people to pay for their own improve-

ment and make rural uplift self-supporting. It is quite wrong to think that the villager cannot or, with teaching, would not pay. We thereby lose money and, moreover, all work comes to a standstill when, as now, Government finances are low, and we have the invaluable stimulus and discipline of payment. The Peckham Pioneer Centre lays down that the beginning of health is responsibility. We are pauperizing the people; no one is going to pay while there is free stuff about. Free quinine is like bad money, it drives out bought quinine as bad money drives out good.

The final result of all these things is that the villager is far poorer and far more unhealthy than he need be, and I would urge that a vast increase in both health and wealth is possible at extremely little cost.

There is no question of whether we shall or shall not do something to put the villages right. The Royal Commission reported, "If the inertia of centuries is to be overcome it is essential that all the resources at the disposal of the state should be brought to bear on the problem of rural uplift. What is required is an organized and sustained effort by all those departments whose activities touch the lives and the surrounding of the rural population."

The Viceroy in accepting this said: "Government would do everything to bring to fruition the labours of the Agricultural Commission." It is the declared policy of Government and we have to do something, and the only question is how to set about it.

What are the remedies for the present state of things in the villages? Wherever I go in England to study rural reconstruction I find the secret is to get the people together. The more we get together the merrier we shall be! The parson, if he is a live-wire, organizes the people round his church; we find Parents' Associations round the school, village halls, a village college, Women's Institutes, Miss James and her Pipes and Viols, Rural Community Councils; everything aims at getting people together for their own improvement.

The same holds good in India. The village must be organized. Best of all is the co-operative society of all kinds; then we must have the Panchayat and the Boy Scouts. These three are the best and the essential means. There are also the Rural Community Councils, of which a beginning has been made in the Punjab.

However, no amount of machinery is any good unless there is some motive power to work it; we must get the motive power from increased knowledge; knowledge will be the stimulus to action. In order to get this knowledge the village school must be adapted to rural life. But again I would impress on you that the most important thing of all is to educate the girls, get them to school; it is quite possible to do this, to get them to come with their little brothers if they understand. The standard of honour in villages is very high, and both in Gurgaon and the Moslem districts of Jhelum the little girls came gladly in large numbers to the village schools. I found this going on when I reached the Jhelum District, it was no innovation.

Besides schools, village newspapers are wanted; they will be a great help to the schools.

But the greatest of all instruments for rural uplift is the wireless; in districts where the population is dense and the distances great, where communications are bad, workers few and the percentage of illiteracy high, and where, as in all villages, whether in India or Norfolk, an infinite repetition of simple things is needed, wireless completely fills the bill. I have been shouting for wireless for six or seven years now and hope to get it sometime. In a small experiment made from Lahore last summer we found that we must talk on the wireless in the local dialect. This necessarily limits the range of each centre. About five centres will be needed for the Punjab. Programmes must be varied and lectures very simple and very short. Market prices will be given, news and warnings of all sorts—warning of floods, of plague, of locusts, etc. Tours of all officials will be made known, from the vaccinator to the Governor. There will be lectures on health, on farming, on sanitation, etc., and with all this there will be songs, dialogues, stories, music, and gradually the villages will become aware and interested in the world around them. It will be valuable to the village schoolmaster and will strengthen his general knowledge. Indian village life is still in the highly impressionable ballad-minstrel age to which England is trying to get back.

Payment will probably be made by co-operative societies, by Panchayats raising the money or by an enabling Act to enable villagers to agree to a cess, as they now agree to compulsory education and to the establishment of Panchayats. The cost at first will be about Rs. 150 a year until villages come in in large numbers, then it should drop to Rs. 100. I do not propose that villages should buy their sets outright, but the receivers should belong to whatever department or association runs the wireless, otherwise villages will be full of dud receivers. For an annual fee the organizers will provide and maintain receivers in the village and put on the programmes. A fairly extensive experiment is needed to answer the various questions about finance, programmes,

technique, etc., before broadcasting is started on a large scale. We want a five years' programme vigorously carried out. A simple programme would aim at the following: In agriculture: consolidation of holdings, better seed for, say, three crops—viz., wheat, cotton, and cane. In the health department: getting pits for refuse, complete vaccination, inoculation when and if plague comes, light and air in the houses. Generally: we should get the girls to school and get some kind of organization in each village, organized games, Scouts, village newspapers, wireless, and co-operative societies.

If we carry out such a programme vigorously it will give us a new India at less than the cost of the old, for the cost of rural reconstruction varies in inverse ratio to the amount of enthusiasm and co-ordination among the workers. It is essential that all workers and departments should say and do the same thing. Village life is not departmentalized, it is one whole; the doctor must be ready to tell the people about 8A wheat and the agriculturist to preach vaccination. One department must not preach vaccination and other departments allow their employees or pupils to be unvaccinated. Simple things like plague, cholera, locusts will fade away when tackled in this spirit. I have done it myself again and again, so I know what I am talking about.

There are two ways of reacting to a call for help, "Why should I?" and "Why shouldn't I?" We want more of the "Why shouldn't I?"s in India. There are unlimited possibilities of improvement, which will double and more than double the resources and quarter the diseases of the villager if we can all work together with that spirit of service, now so well inculcated by the Prince of Wales in England, and if we will make use of all the aids which modern science and experience have made available.

After the lecture, Mr. Jain told the audience that he and his brother had worked under Mr. Brayne, and bore testimony to the value of what had been done under his inspiration. Some questions were asked as to the feasibility of broadcasting, and Mr. Brayne stated that he had been assured by the B.B.C. that there were no technical difficulties that could not be easily surmounted; the B.B.C. was so impressed with the value and importance of broadcasting for rural reconstruction that it had offered to lend a complete transmitting set to the Indian Village Welfare Association to conduct an experiment with the help of Mr. Brayne in the Punjab.

The Chairman, in proposing a vote of thanks, agreed with the lecturer about the waste in Indian villages—waste of material, life, and

opportunity. In support of what he had said on the subject of broadcasting to villages, he referred to the recently published recommendations of the Indian Franchise Committee (the "Lothian Committee"). If wireless could be used for the political education of the villagers, it might equally well be used for their agricultural and social education.

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HE reliance placed on the opinion of the individual who is vaguely termed "the man on the spot" is responsible for the spread of many false ideas. Particularly is this the case when "the spot" in question covers an area of some two million square The cross-examination of the unfortunate individual who returns on leave to England in these days, whether it be from Calcutta, Tuticorin, or Mangalore, on "the state of affairs in India," is reminiscent of the days when the opinion of the 2nd Lieutenant fresh from his fire bay in France was eagerly sought as to the progress of the World War on four fronts. The writer is conscious that he owes the suggestion that he should write this article solely to this dubious qualification of having been a "man on the spot." In defence of his having fallen in with the suggestion, it can only be urged that the spot with which he proposes to deal is of comparatively modest dimensions. The events related will be confined almost entirely to those that have occurred in the Peshawar District. Moreover, in so far as generalizations concerning the Pathans are indulged in, it may be pointed out that Peshawar City is the nerve centre of the North-West Frontier Province, with reactions to Kabul, which has been described as "the spiritual home of all Pathans."*

It will be impossible however, altogether to avoid reference to influences and movements whose centres were far distant from Peshawar, or even to refrain from criticism which might well be modified had the writer fuller inside information than is available to him. Before accepting his views, it should be understood that, though intimately concerned with events that arose from the political situation that developed in the Peshawar District during the years 1930-32, politically the writer was to a large extent a mere outside observer.

Still, there can be few with his experience who have not been impressed by the many misconceptions that exist with regard to the unrest which afflicted the N.W.F.P. during this period, and as to the

^{*} Journal of R.C.A.S., January, 1932, p. 9 (Sir W. Barton).

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measures taken by Government for the suppression of disorder. It is in the hope that it may be possible to correct these false ideas that the article is written.

The most general misconception is that the unrest that arose in the N.W.F.P. was merely part and parcel of the unrest that has beset the whole of India, the revolt against the present order of things that is represented by the vapourings of the leaders of Congress. Without an appreciation of the true nature of the alliance ostensibly formed between Congress and the anti-Government organizations centring in Peshawar, such a misunderstanding becomes natural.

It is true that, in common with Congress agitation, and it may be said with most other revolutionary movements which claim a popular and national inspiration, the unrest that originated in the Peshawar District has been largely due to the spread of education. The doctrine of self-determination preached so assiduously after the Great War could not fail to affect every people that felt itself to be in political subjection to a foreign race. Moreover, it came to India at a time when a generation had grown up whose higher education made it unwilling to pursue the humbler vocations of its fathers and eager for the more responsible and lucrative employment for which it believed itself well qualified. In the agricultural country of India as a whole, and in the N.W.F.P. in particular, such posts are scarce outside Government employment. In such circumstances there will always be some whose ambitions have been disappointed or whose self-esteem has been wounded. Among these will be found those ready to sow the seeds of discontent among the contented. But when these points have been disposed of, nothing will be found which Congress can truly claim in common with the revolutionary movements in the N.W.F.P. For, as will be shown, although both parties looked to securing temporary advantage from a show of unity, the movements were, in fact, directly antipathetic.

Another common error, even among many who have been closely concerned with recent events in the Peshawar District, is to attribute the unrest that arose there to the adherents of a single organization. The generic term "Red Shirt" has come to be applied to all who engaged in activities against Government, and one hears little of anything but the "Red Shirt Movement" in this connection. Actually, in 1930, there existed two organizations subversive of Government, the one concerned with the "City Movement," the other with the "Rural (or so-called Red Shirt) Movement." Though working on parallel

lines, and to a certain extent in touch, these organizations at the outbreak of disturbance were distinct, and under separate leaders. Later the two movements gradually converged, till, ultimately, towards the end of 1931, in circumstances which will be explained in due course, the younger Rural Movement to a large extent absorbed the other. A realization of the existence of these two movements is necessary to a full understanding of the early events of 1930 and also of the different influences which persuaded the Mohmands and Afridis, respectively, to support the disorders in the Peshawar District.

The older City Movement represented a survival of the Khilafat Movement, from whose headquarters in Peshawar City it was directed. The ideals professed by the Khilafatists, and inherited by the City Movement, were Islamic and universal rather than national; while those of the Rural Movement were more national and particular to the Pathan. On the grounds of being the victims of a common "oppressor," the British Government, the Khilafatists had joined hands with the Hindu Congress. It was they too who organized the Hijrat in 1920, the emigration of Mohammedan pilgrims to Afghanistan to seek the protection of Amanullah, champion of Islam and invader of India, against the British "oppressor." Though the Hijrat in itself proved a terrible fiasco, there sprang from it the Rural Movement in the Peshawar District, from which the disillusioned pilgrims had been largely recruited. It is from their return to India that date the activities of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, to whom the Rural Movement, with its stronger appeal to the national sentiment of the Pathan, owed its origin.

The Rural Movement originated, professedly, as an organization for the moral uplift of the villagers of the Peshawar District. A legitimate and natural line on which to preach reform of this kind would be an appeal to the national sentiment of those addressed; to urge that they should show by their conduct that they were worthy of the name of Pathan. For, in certain directions, national sentiment has a very real meaning for all Pathans. But, even where the true object is moral uplift, people urged continually to take a proper pride in themselves are apt to develop an overweening arrogance, in which shame for unseemly conduct is replaced by shame for what becomes regarded as an unworthy position. It may, therefore, be of advantage to consider the history of the leader in this movement, and the influences to which he was subject, in order to judge the extent to which he would be likely to restrain or exploit this tendency to arrogance; to confine his

efforts to the moral uplift of the villagers or, by spreading among them a sense of injury, to provoke them to sedition.

In the Hashtnagar subdivision are situated two neighbouring villages, Utmanzai and Turanzai. Abdul Ghaffar hails from the former, while the name of Turanzai has become notorious from being borne by one of the most irreconcilable enemies of Government on the North-West Frontier. The Hajji of Turanzai, seditionist and outlaw, has for years been seeking revenge on Government by stirring up trouble among the Upper Mohmands with whom he has sought sanctuary. This individual is closely related to Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Whatever may have been his earlier aspirations, it would be astonishing if, with the double curse of this relationship and the realization of his outstanding powers as a demagogue, a man like Abdul Ghaffar, unintellectual and completely ignorant of the needs and difficulties of Government, had remained content with the rôle of a mere moral reformer. And so we find him stating his later ambitions to be the sweeping away of all existing Government officials in the N.W.F.P. and their replacement by sundry of his followers who are as inexperienced in the art of government as himself.

Extravagant as the notions of the Red Shirt leader may seem as to the needs of efficient administration, the powers of organization in the movement must be admitted. The name of Red Shirt or Khudai Khidmatgar (Servant of God), as applied indiscriminately to the leader of the Rural Movement or his followers, is, strictly speaking, incorrect.* With its head and centre in the village of Utmanzai, the movement, by progressively creating cells in village after village, gradually established a sort of "civil administration" throughout the Province. These administrative cells were collectively known as the Afghan Jirgah, a term which may have a certain significance, as will later be pointed out. Neither Abdul Ghaffar nor the members of the Jirgah aspired to the glory of a red uniform; they adopted the more unassuming khaddar (native cloth). In short, they corresponded to our blackcoated administrators in Whitehall. Nor did they claim for themselves the high title of "Servants of God." The red uniform and title of "Khudai Khidmatgaran" were reserved for those who had to do the dirty work—the Army. In each village, side by side with the Afghan Jirgah, was a local detachment of Khudai Khidmatgaran with

^{*} The name has since been so generally given this application, even by the Pathans themselves, that it will be used to indicate a follower of Abdul Ghaffar in this article.

appropriate ranks. Villages were grouped to form larger units, and at the head of the Khudai Khidmatgaran was a "Commander-in-Chief," whose duty it was to enforce by "non-violent" means the directions of the head of the Movement transmitted through the Afghan Jirgah.

Though Abdul Ghaffar, like others of his type, may have talked himself into a sincere belief in the satanic character of British rule, it is believed that the true grievance against Government of the bulk of the educated Rural or City leaders was not that it was satanic, but that it was alien. From a moral point of view, this was wounding to their self-esteem; from the material point of view, the occupation of the higher Government posts by British officials stood in the way of the educated Pathan securing the spoils of office. Autonomy is what they sought. The immediate, it may be said the only, obstacle to the attainment of this was British rule in India. They, accordingly, would support any movement in India which had as its object release from British domination. But note that, in giving such support, their aim would be, not the establishment of and adherence to the Gandhi ideal of a self-governing Indian nation, but the consolidation of a Pathan nation free from India, to which they felt they were linked by British rule. It may be objected that, if such were their objective, it would have been patent to one as astute as Gandhi is held to be; that he would never have accepted the allegiance of Abdul Ghaffar and others with aims so destructive to his vision of a self-governing Indian nation. The clue to the paradox of the Gandhi-Ghaffar alliance is to be found in the fact that the Hindu leader knows well in his heart that the Pathan province stands as the greatest obstacle to the realization of his dreams. In return for his recognition of the Red Shirt leader, Abdul Ghaffar would rid India of a province that no "Nationalist" Government could control.

But there are those who believe that behind this definite ideal of an autonomous N.W.F.P. lies a much wider, though as yet vague, conception; an ideal so destructive of Gandhi's visions that no politician has ventured to compromise himself by giving utterance to it. Curiosity is provoked by the vague connection of the name of Amanullah with anti-British movements on the Frontier. One is asked whether the recent risings of the Moslems in Kashmir are to be regarded as a purely local incident, unconnected with aspirations of their co-religionists in British India. Explanation seems required for the application of the name Afghan Jirgah to the administration of a revolutionary organiza-

tion originating in the Peshawar District. Interpreting these phenomena, there are those who claim to discern among advanced Mohammedan thinkers the vision of an independent Afghan or Mohammedan Central Asian State, to include those territories which, at one period or another, have been ruled from Kabul. A State, so defined, would include Afghanistan, the N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Sind, and would extend even to Delhi. A licence, denied to politicians, is permitted to a poet. It is then, perhaps, deserving of note that Sir Mohammed Iqbal, the eminent Urdu poet, is said to have openly foreshadowed in his writings and speeches the possibility of such a dream proving true and the means by which it might be realized.

This reference to the dreams and ideals of the intelligentsia is perhaps out of place. For prior to the attainment of ideals the means adopted to gain them are of more immediate importance. To become a leader one must procure followers, and the preaching of lofty ideals will not always serve the purpose. The Pathan peasant has a wholesome regard for the interests of No. 1. He dislikes any form of government, but if he has to submit to one he would not care so much about its being "alien" as for its having his true interests at heart. It was necessary therefore for the leaders of the Red Shirt Movement to exploit every opportunity for persuading the villager that the British Government is unjust and oppressive. The most unscrupulous agitation was carried on to this end. Every sort of wild and unjustifiable charge was brought against Government until, as stated to the writer by a Pathan friend, it had become customary to attribute every evil or mischance, be it the death of a cow or the bite of a snake, to the "Shaitan Sirkar."

There were, however, surer means of seducing the villagers than cow and snake stories, and on these the propagandists concentrated. As far back as 1895 Sir Louis Dane stated what is as true today as then, that "the fiscal history of Peshawar is one long struggle between the cultivator to pay as little and the tehsildar to collect as much of the revenue as possible." Deeply engrained in every Pathan is the desire to escape from paying revenue. No less deeply engrained in certain of our own countrymen, it would seem, is the idea that the revenue as assessed in the N.W.F.P. represents a harsh demand from a poverty-stricken population.

Now as a fact the Peshawar District is the richest and most naturally endowed district in the whole of Northern India. The soil is unparalleled and the irrigation never failing. Some of the wealthiest

landlords in the whole of India are to be found in this area. The dense standing crops covering the whole area, and the gardens and orchards surrounding the villages, into which the tribesmen infiltrated during the summer of 1930, presented the chief difficulty to the troops in dealing with the Afridi incursions of that year. From an agricultural point of view the District is superior to any in the Punjab, with the possible exception of Lyallpur. Yet it is assessed for revenue on a scale that represents only about one-third of those on which the Punjab is assessed. That agricultural discontent has prevailed during 1930-32 is true. But this has not been provoked by scarcity or famine; there have been copious harvests. Discontent arose from the fact that no market could be found for the surplus produce of the cultivators.

Such are the true facts with regard to the agricultural conditions and revenue assessment in the Peshawar District. Yet it is on the revenue question that the Red Shirt leaders have chiefly relied in stirring the Pathan Zemindars to revolt against Government. For, to the Pathan, Government and the payment of revenue are synonymous terms. He is led to believe that if rid of the one he will be released from the other. This concrete proposition is better calculated to appeal to the Pathan masses than any vision of a Pathan State, except in so far as they have the vague perception that such a State would bring that complete form of liberty, known as anarchy, which appeals to the nature of all Pathans. And this was the main theme of the propaganda that was spread, in season and out of season, in the most insidious form by Abdul Ghaffar and his lieutenants.

It will be appreciated that the causes of the agricultural discontent, which has been referred to as prevailing during 1930-32, have been attributable solely to the depression which afflicted the whole world, and not to any shortcomings of the Administration. It is not so easy to acquit the Local Government of responsibility for other factors which cannot have failed to lead to the serious disorders that came to a head in the spring of 1930. A failure to enforce its laws will inevitably bring a Government into contempt, and lead to lawlessness. Comparisons with the Punjab have been made to enable the reader to judge for himself whether the revenue assessment in the Peshawar District was harsh or lenient. Whatever view is formed as to this, it will be accepted that Government, in adopting the assessment, must have held it to be fair and equitable. Yet, even prior to 1930, there were villages in the District from which for years the full demand had not been recovered. In addition, there were some which had completely dis-

regarded the payment of fines awarded for criminal outrages. Failure to make any serious effort to recover their dues cannot have failed to damage the prestige of Government.*

On the other hand, the Local Government was severely hampered in dealing with the open defiance of authority of those who preached sedition far and wide. For, throughout India, sedition at this time was being openly preached with impunity. The peculiar nature of the N.W.F.P., derived from its situation and the dangerous character of its people, might be held to have justified special measures to deal with such movements in the Province. But the introduction of such measures made applicable to a Mohammedan Province, while Hindu agitators were left free to pursue their evil ways, would at once have brought the communal question into prominence. One can believe that even loyal supporters of Government among the Mohammedans would have cried out against such partial action, when the freedom allowed to Gandhi was already to them an irritant past comprehension. At the same time, though the ultimate outcome of the licence given to the traducers of Government would seem to be certain, the Local Government appears in 1930 to have viewed matters with a strange equanimity. If it is to escape the charge of negligence, it can only be on the plea of ignorance of the real nature of the Red Shirt Movement and the extent to which it had spread. True, it was not till March 1930 that Abdul Ghaffar publicly inaugurated the Red Shirt Movement, and that, prior to the disturbances in the following month, no British official, outside the Civil Government or Police, had heard of a Khudai Khidmatgar or Red Shirt. But the existence of the organization, equally with the activities of the leaders of the City Movement, had been known to the Local Government for a considerable period.

In April 1930, however, it was decided that the leaders of neither the City nor Rural Movements could longer be left at large. A visit by H.E. the Viceroy to Peshawar necessitated the postponement of their arrest till 23rd April. Troops were warned to stand in readiness that day to support the civil power if required, but the appreciation of the civil authorities was that the arrests would be unlikely to provoke serious disturbance, and that any event necessitating military aid was remote. Some account of the events of 23rd April and of those that

^{*} As to the ability of the villages to pay their due, it is relevant to point out that subsequent to January 1, 1932, both present and past dues have been paid in full without difficulty.

followed during the summer months may serve to indicate the extent to which revolutionary propaganda had already affected the people, and the manner in which certain incidents were calculated to influence the development of the seditious movements directed, respectively, from Peshawar City and Utmanzai. The arrest of the City leaders will be dealt with first.

Early on the morning of 23rd April the civil authorities still held the opinion that no trouble would occur over the arrests in the City. Yet, when a few hours later, in response to a sudden urgent call to the Cantonment, troops arrived at Edwardes' Gate of Peshawar City, they found themselves faced by a dense, murderous mob, over which the civil police had completely lost control. The amazing rapidity with which a frenzied and fanatical mob will collect in Peshawar is notorious. That in itself would have been expected, and could have been forestalled, had the civil authorities rightly foreseen that the arrests would provoke serious disturbance. The splendid devotion to duty of their British officers makes it hard to criticize the civil police, but it must be stated that there had been a failure also to realize the extent to which the morale of the Pathan civil police had inevitably suffered from the licence granted for weeks past to the enemies of the Government they served; without proper power of retaliation, they had been subjected, during this period, to taunts and ridicule by the people among whom they and their families were living, under threat of boycott, in a city where they had to purchase their daily bread. During the afternoon of 23rd April complete order was restored in the City, and was maintained throughout the following day. But on the evening of the 24th, a fatal decision was made which had evil and far-reaching results. All troops were withdrawn from the City. The considerations on which this decision was based need not be specified; suffice it that they in no way justified so dangerous a step. During the days that followed the leaders of the City Movement, acting in the name of Congress, to all intents and purposes usurped the functions of Government. Under the pretence of maintaining order, their piquets and patrols duplicated the civil police. A "Martyrs Memorial" to those who had been killed in the disturbances on 23rd April was erected. Edwardes' Gate was renamed the Khuni Darawaza (Bloody Gate). The impression gained by villagers and Afridi tribesmen visiting the City in those days can be readily imagined. A Cantonment filled with troops, for the greater part Indian, was within a mile; what would be the construction placed by

an Afridi on hesitation to employ them in re-establishing some semblance of Government authority?

The evils resulting from this unfortunate interlude were to some extent remedied by the reoccupation of the City by troops on 4th May; but the effect of this fresh assertion of its authority by Government was marred by the almost simultaneous announcement that a Judicial Committee was to be appointed to inquire into the events of 23rd April. The announcement was accompanied by an almost pressing invitation to all and sundry who had evidence to give, to come forward. Such inquiries may serve a useful purpose; but before becoming committed to them, it is necessary to recognize that the impression gained by ignorant minds from their institution will be that the forces of law and order are under reproof, and will not venture again to take stringent action to quell disorder. The justice of this contention was proved, in the course of further disturbances that broke out on 31st May. On this occasion a small party of British troops came unexpectedly face to face with a large and angry mob; the rioters, without hesitation, attacked the troops, who were compelled to open fire; the mob immediately dispersed. It is significant that from that day the mere presence of troops has proved sufficient to secure order in Peshawar City. The people had realized that a military commander, called on to restore order, will not be deterred from taking the measures necessary to this purpose, however harsh they may be, and however repugnant to himself.

The gravest result of the incidents that occurred in connection with the disorders in Peshawar City was undoubtedly the manner in which they influenced the Afridi tribesmen. But before dealing with this, sequence demands that we should turn to the action which had been taken against the leaders of the Rural (Red Shirt) Movement, and its reaction among the Mohmands and Utman Khel.

The arrest of Abdul Ghaffar and certain other Red Shirt leaders was effected at Charsadda, simultaneously with that of the City leaders in Peshawar. The occasion was marked by a very serious disturbance, which necessitated the calling in of troops from Mardan in support of the civil police. It was, moreover, the signal for the immediate descent of the Hajji of Turanzai and his son Badshah Gul, who arrived on the frontier with a considerable lashkar of Mohmands at the end of April. If proof were needed of a long-standing agreement between Abdul Ghaffar Khan and this sworn enemy of the Government to whom the former owed allegiance, it is to be found in this swift action of the

Hajji; if distinction is allowed between reformers and rebels, the Hajji supplied the clue to the category in which his son-in-law should be placed. Air action immobilized the Mohmands, of whom only elements infiltrated across the border.* But fed by the villagers, who had in former days looked to Government for protection against transborder incursions, the lashkar remained on the border for forty days as a constant menace to the District.

Towards the end of May, information was received of the assembly of an Utman Khel lashkar further to the north, which necessitated action both by the R.A.F. and ground troops in the neighbourhood of the Jindai Khwar. Trouble with the Utman Khel continued till late in July. But by the end of that month the activities of this tribe and of the Mohmands had been definitely suppressed.

To revert now to the Afridis, who were at this time being subjected to the propaganda of the Congress agents of the City Movement. A strange theory has been put forward that the harsh conditions under which their brethren are living across the border rouse the Pathans of the fertile Peshawar District to passionate resentment against the existing order of things. Now, though it has been long since accepted that the tribesmen, in the present conditions of their country, cannot eke out an existence without resorting to the time-honoured custom of looting caravans, and raiding the villages of the plains; and though Government, in consideration of this, has, for years past, agreed to pay them allowances to deter them from these practices; the conditions revealed by a flight over the area of the Bara and Bazar Valleys are anything but those of an arid waste of mountains. Before the harvest, all along the banks of the rivers, and surrounding the terraced villages, extensive areas of standing corn will be observed. But be the poverty or prosperity of the tribesmen what it may, there has been little sympathy in past history between the Pathans of the plains and the hills. Racial affinity has not deterred the tribesmen, or the outlaws they harboured, from raiding the villages of their brethren in administered territory; and these, on their part, were not of a character to turn the left cheek and take their offending brothers to their hearts in a spirit of forgiveness. The agents of disorder were drawn to the Afridis by no consideration of the conditions under which the tribesmen had chosen to live for centuries, but by the knowledge of the embarrassment

^{*} For details of air action against the Mohmands and Utman Khel, see "Air Operations on the N.W.F., 1930" (Air-Commodore Brock), Journal of R.C.A.S. (January, 1932).

which could be caused to Government, if disaffection could be spread among the tribes. But the action of the City leaders is distinguished from the conspiracy between the Hajji and Abdul Ghaffar by its having come to some extent as an after-thought; and at first it seemed that their overtures might be rejected. It is seldom difficult, however, to find discontented elements among the tribes ready to make trouble. The Peshawar agitators were fortunate in finding, at the psychological moment, a large element among the Afridis that harboured a grievance. But the grievance was not against the British Government itself; it was against the supporters and beneficiaries of that Government. These, among the Afridis, were the pensioners and allowance holders, who had everything to lose, and nothing to gain, from a quarrel with Government. Among the young men, hot-headed and irresponsible, there was soreness over the matter of the recent Sunni-Shiah settlement. The maliks were held to have pocketed considerably more than their fair share of this. Anxious to spite the greybeards, the younger Afridis saw their opportunity in involving their tribes with the Government, and in so ensuring that all pensions and allowances would be forfeited. They would recoup themselves, they thought, by the loot they would secure in Peshawar Cantonment, which they proclaimed as their objective, and which they were persuaded that the troops of the Indian Army would make no serious effort to defend. They had seen Severnment abandon, at the end of April, effective control of the forces of disorder in Peshawar City, and they believed that it would offer equally feeble resistance to armed tribesmen that crossed the border. These were the main incentives to the Afridi incursions which took place in June and August 1930. It is true that, to rally adherents among the half-hearted, and to put spirit into their enterprise, alleged blood-stained clothing of victims of the Peshawar riots was produced, and the Government was denounced as the oppressors of Moslems and Pathans. But, in so far as the Afridi incursions were repercussions of the disturbances in the City, the reaction was to the weakness of Government in withdrawing the troops on 24th April, and not to the measures taken to suppress disorder on the 23rd. It was the supposed weakness, not the tyranny of the "tyrant," which made the strongest appeal to the Afridi lashkars.

Proof of this is to be found in the astonishing feebleness shown by the Afridis who entered the Peshawar District. Every element favourable to guerrilla action was presented to them. Propaganda in the villages had assured them of a friendly country in which to operate, where at will they could pose as peaceful inhabitants, and where they could obtain accurate information and spread false reports; in the intense heat of the day, they could lie up, concealed and secure, in the villages or in the dense crops and gardens which surround them, while being assured of immediate warning on the approach of the regular troops, who would be labouring, under a fierce sun, over heavily irrigated ground in this close country; their opportunities for effecting a surprise were unlimited. Yet the damage they did was negligible, and, without waiting to be driven out, they scuttled back across the border on both occasions after sustaining comparatively few casualties. For the Afridis the tribal incursions ended in fiasco. They suffered retribution in being deprived for twelve months of their valued grazing grounds on the Kajuri and Akha Khel plains, until they consented to terms which restored their grazing rights, but insisted on the military occupation of this territory.

Yet, though the Afridi ventures ended unhappily for the tribesmen, they gave fresh impetus to the Red Shirt Movement. Villagers had actively co-operated with the armed enemies of Government, felling trees to hamper movement by road, and interrupting communication by cutting telephone and telegraph wires. Such a situation could only be dealt with satisfactorily under martial law. But, at this time, it was considered that the general conditions prevailing in India made the introduction of martial law inadvisable. This mischievous obstruction to the forces of law and order was, accordingly, carried on with impunity. Nevertheless, by the end of August, the general situation. had so far improved as to permit of the withdrawal of the small military detachment that still remained in the City. A few weeks later the concentration at Peshawar of the force formed for the clearing and occupation of the Kajuri and Akha Khel plains made it clear to the people that Government was still capable of vigorous action when a disturbance of the peace had passed the wide limit of its endurance.

During the winter of 1930-31 a steady and marked improvement was apparent throughout the Peshawar District. Abdul Ghaffar and many of the most dangerous leaders were in prison, steady progress was made by Kajuri Force against feeble and half-hearted resistance by the Afridis, and small columns of troops marching through, or training in, the District were in most cases cordially welcomed by the villagers. Tentatively, the loyal elements once more began to raise their heads. That this apparent improvement in the situation was largely superficial was shown by subsequent events. But there is every reason to believe

that had the situation, as it then was, not been violently and unexpectedly disturbed, the better feeling on the surface would have percolated deeper and that unrest would have died down as completely as is possible among a restless and violent natured people.

Now, it must be clear that political considerations, if not common fairness, demanded that if Gandhi, the Hindu agitator, and his disciples were to be released from gaol, Abdul Ghaffar, the Mohammedan leader, and his followers should also be set at liberty. But while it might have been sincerely believed by some that the release of Gandhi might work for peace in India as a whole, there can have been no doubt that the release of Abdul Ghaffar and the Red Shirt leaders would result in spreading renewed and increased disorder in the N.W.F.P. It may, then, be questioned whether the hypothetical benefits to be derived from the release of Gandhi should have been allowed to outweigh the certain evils that would result from the release of Abdul Ghaffar. Subsequent events seem to point that they should not. However this may be, the peace of the N.W.F.P. was sacrificed to wider political considerations. In March 1931, under the Delhi Pact, Gandhi and the Congress agitators were released and, simultaneously, Abdul Ghaffar and the Red Shirt leaders were set at large. Gandhi at this time nominated Abdul Ghaffar as the representative of Congress in Peshawar and the N.W.F.P.; an appointment not altogether pleasing to the leaders of the City Movement.

The events following immediately on these releases procured a different degree of publicity. Headlines announced to the public the Mahatma's visit to the Viceroy; few heard of an attempt to assassinate the Assistant Commissioner in charge of the district in which the Red Shirt leader's village is situated, or of several bomb outrages against loyal inhabitants in the Peshawar District. Later, while Gandhi was receiving ovations in England, British officers were being openly insulted by bands of Red Shirts in the immediate neighbourhood of Peshawar Cantonment. While the Round Table Conference sat in serious deliberation, Red Shirt headquarters were being established in every village in the Peshawar District.

During the summer and autumn of 1931 the Movement continued to spread throughout the N.W.F.P., and there was less attempt to disguise that its true object was revolution and not reform. In complete disregard of the Delhi Pact, Abdul Ghaffar toured the villages, making the most inflammatory speeches. His libellous charges against Government were broadcast by the Red Shirt press through its organ

The Pakhtun. The immediate result of these activities forecast the chaos that the substitution of Pathan for British Government would bring to the Province. Violent crime assumed unprecedented dimensions;* the collection of revenue almost entirely ceased. The Pathan Utopia seemed at hand.

Early in December, at a Durbar, which Abdul Ghaffar declined to attend, the Chief Commissioner announced the concession of reforms which had been demanded in a constitutional manner by many progressive Pathans for a considerable period. This announcement secured the adherence of the more far-seeing of the politically minded to the side of law and order. Conversely, the rejection of the concessions by Abdul Ghaffar Khan served to show him up in his true colours. The Government of India, at long last, became convinced that its representatives in the N.W.F.P. were faced with a widespread conspiracy, threatening a complete breakdown of the Administration, which could ultimately lead only to armed rebellion. On 24th December the Frontier Emergency Powers Ordinance was promulgated. At midnight Abdul Ghaffar, his brother-in-law Dr. Khan Sahib, and two other prominent leaders were arrested and carried to Attock, whence they were despatched to an unknown destination. At dawn on Christmas Day, in accordance with secretly prepared plans, the civil police supported by troops arrested the revolutionary leaders in Peshawar City and took possession of the headquarters of prohibited organizations, while similar action was taken in villages throughout the N.W.F.P.

This sudden, vigorous action by the Government, following a prolonged attitude of what had been interpreted by the people as weakness and apathy, had a marked and immediate effect. But more than one morning's work was needed to stamp out the effects of propaganda that had been assiduously spread for years. There were villages where the strength of the loyal element had kept down open sedition, but these were few. Practically every village in the Peshawar District had by now its Red Shirt leaders and revolutionary organization. They were visited in turn by the police, supported in most cases by troops; leaders were arrested; revolutionary headquarters searched and sometimes destroyed; and revenue, which was due and overdue, was

^{*} As evidence of the amazing prevalence of crime in the Peshawar District, with its population of one million, Sir William Barton quotes the 307 murders that were committed in the District during 1928 (Journal of R.C.A.S., January, 1932). During 1931 the total reached the appalling figure of 450.

collected. Within a week the whole atmosphere of the Peshawar District, than which no district in the Province had been more deeply tainted by sedition, had changed: within a fortnight conditions generally had reverted, at least superficially, to those that had prevailed before the first organization of the Rural Movement.

Now, it may be thought that nothing short of the most ruthless repression, including terrorist methods, could have stamped out this seditious movement in so short a time. A recent publication, by an author with no personal experience of the events he relates, would give colour to such a view. His readers might well gain the impression of police and troops carrying fire and sword through the land, of terrorized peasants, cowed by maltreatment, being driven from their burning homes. Such an impression is so utterly false that any suggestion calculated to create it can only be characterized as unjustifiable and mischievous.

On Christmas Day in the Kohat District an unfortunate collision occurred between Red Shirts and troops. A mob attacked the troops, who were forced to fire, with fatal results to the rioters. On the same day, at a village near Peshawar, the civil police were forced to disperse a mob by fire, one boy being slightly wounded in a part of the body designed by Nature for the application of the cane rather than the bullet. At a later date, near Mardan, on the withdrawal of troops supporting the police in making arrests, a mob attacked the police with the intention of rescuing the prisoners; the sub-inspector in command was compelled to order fire and one man was killed. Though hundreds of other villages were visited, in no other case had police or troops to resort to fire.* It may be that there were isolated cases where insolent and recalcitrant men were handled roughly, but no sincere recorder of events will employ individual incidents to describe the general measures taken to deal with hundreds of villages scattered over a vast area. From his personal experience of visiting villages when arrests were made, which was considerable, the present writer can say with the strictest truth that he never saw a hand laid roughly on a villager by police or troops. He recollects seeing a young Pathan of the special police showering blows of a lathi on a villager, whom he was driving down a street to appear before the magistrate; but

^{*} Compare this one death which occurred, during a period of several weeks, in connection with the restoration of order in the Peshawar District, with the average of over eight murders a week in the same District during the reign of disorder in 1931.

when he observed that the blows were landing on the loose folds of a thick blanket, and that both hunter and hunted were laughing at the pantomime, he did not deem it necessary to intervene. He recollects, too, witnessing the distress of a Pathan who had been ordered back to his house by a British sentry. On investigation he found that this worthy's hands were filled with rupees, rightful dues to Government, and that his distress arose from being prevented from handing them over to the magistrate. The village in which that occurred had a population of 10,000 people, a criminal record unsurpassed on the Frontier, was known to be stocked with illicit rifles, and had paid no revenue for five years. The chappar roof of the mud Red Shirt office was burnt (this was done in a few other villages and represents the total extent of "the burnings"), otherwise there was no vestige of violence in dealing with the village. The people had realized that the tide had turned; that Government intended once again to see that the Law was enforced; and the writer received, that morning, at least three cordial invitations from inhabitants to drink tea with them. Nothing in the nature of sullen resentment was shown, except by certain of the Red Shirt leaders, as a rule noticeable as ill-favoured, crafty-looking fellows. On Christmas morning in Peshawar City, the writer saw fantastically dressed mountebanks courting martyrdom in front of British soldiers, and in the presence of thousands of townsmen. Beyond being placed under arrest and bidden to hold their tongues, they were not molested. The crowd was apathetic and showed them no sympathy. It is true that the City leaders had not relished the absorption of their Movement brought about by Gandhi's recognition of Abdul Ghaffar as his chief lieutenant, and that the announcement by the Chief Commissioner of the reforms to be introduced had had good effect, but the passive attitude of Peshawar City was in the main due to a realization that, suddenly and unexpectedly, but no less certainly, the tide had turned. The above, among a host of incidents that could be quoted, should be sufficient to rebut charges of "terrorism," and to prove that the change in atmosphere was attributable to a perception by the people that Government once again intended to govern.

To appreciate the sudden change that came over the District, it is necessary too to realize the extent to which politics are influenced by faction feeling in the villages. The most bitter jealousies are found among all Pathans. Every community, every village, is tainted with faction feeling, whether it be due to family quarrels or to personal

grudges. No true political considerations, or concrete complaint against Government, are necessary to provoke enmity against its rule. It is sufficient if the leader of one faction is a loyal supporter of Government for those of an opposing faction to be against it. Between the extremists of two such factions is probably found the bulk of the villagers, watching always to see which way the cat will jump. In the villages this ever-wavering centre had now abandoned the seditious left and were inclining to the loyal right. The very rapidity of the change of front shows the ease with which an ignorant people can be influenced, and the urgent necessity for Government officials maintaining a constant personal touch with the peasants if they are to be protected from the poison of evil propaganda.

Finally, although this article has already extended to a length far beyond that which was intended when embarking on it, it is felt that it would be incomplete if no reply were given to a question constantly asked—viz., "To what extent has Moscow been concerned with the unrest in the N.W.F.P.?" From such information as can be gathered, the answer is that there is no direct evidence of any material assistance having been given by the Bolsheviks to these movements. Yet two pronouncements of Lenin, who was nothing if not frank, cannot be overlooked: "The road to London lies through Kabul," and, in urging the rooting out of British Imperialism from the world, "In India we must strike them hardest." It can only be said that neglect to attempt to exploit the situation created by Abdul Ghaffar and others in the Peshawar District in 1930-31 would have represented an utter disregard by the Bolsheviks of the injunctions of one whom they still hold in reverence.

Be that as it may, there is little doubt that had Government at the close of 1931 forborn from stamping out sedition for a day longer, the wavering and already weakened centre in the villages would have thrown in its lot with Abdul Ghaffar. His plans then would have been crowned with success and the New Year would have opened in bloodshed and chaos. The timely action of its Government on Christmas Eve saved the North-West Frontier Province from a tragedy, which half-measures might have served to postpone, but could not have averted.

Yet it is on the purpose to which it puts the success it has achieved that that Government will be judged. What, then, of the future? The Oriental holds no monopoly of dreams, and one may be permitted to present a vision as an alternative to those which have

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been quoted. In our refusal to treat the Pathan as an equal we cannot be absolved from having been in part responsible for the fading of a unity derived from those sentiments which in the past formed a close bond between the two races—respect for manliness, a common sense of humour, and mutual self-respect. With the grant of representative institutions on the Frontier, can one not foresee the re-establishment of this natural sympathy? The vision, then, is that of an iron chain along India's frontier, forged by Pathan and Englishman in concert and tempered by mutual esteem.

H. R. S.

ANNUAL DINNER

HE Annual Dinner was held on July 7, the President, Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby, in the Chair.

The health of the guests was proposed by Sir A. T. Wilson, who said: My Lord Chairman, Your Excellencies, My Lords and Ladies, Ladies and Gentlemen,—It is my privilege in the absence through indisposition of the Chairman of our Council, Lord Lloyd, to propose the toast of the guests. May I preface my observations by expressing to you all on his behalf his keen regret at his enforced absence, and in your name convey to Lady Lloyd, whom we are privileged to greet this evening, the disappointment we all feel at not being able to hear him address us this evening.

Like his distinguished predecessor in the Chairmanship, Lord Allenby, he has been assiduous in promoting our interests, in presiding over our deliberations, and in bringing to our counsels the harvest of his own wide experience.

I do not propose to bring a crimson blush to the cheeks, or a sinking feeling to the hearts, of our distinguished guests by reciting their names to you in order, refreshing my memory by occasional reference to a list, punctuated by inaccurate biographical references of their many merits, culled from the unimpeachable but uninspired pages of "Who's Who." We are proud that they should have accepted our invitation to be present, and we hope that they will come again—perhaps as members.

We are honoured this evening, as you will see from the list before you, by the presence of the Netherlands Minister, the representative at the Court of St. James of a great country, closely connected with the regions with which this Society deals—and may I explain here that the adjective "Central" refers rather to this Society than to any particular geographical region. The responsibilities of the Netherlands Government in Asia are second only to those of Great Britain, and though the Dutch East Indies bulk more largely on our markets than on our maps, I often wish that we knew more of the administration of those great countries, second only in population to those of Great Britain in the East, and distinguished by a policy of efficiency and a liberality to which every student of Asiatic affairs must pay a respectful tribute.

We welcome Sir Aurel Stein fresh from further extensive travels, this time in Eastern Persia. He never returns empty-handed, and the present occasion is no exception to the rule. Last year we sent him, after our Anniversary Dinner, a telegram of condolence, consequent on the news that a certain foreign government had refused to accord to him in the course of his scientific labours the assistance which he had every right to expect. I am glad to have the opportunity on this occasion of telling you that his experience in Persia has been very different. He has been accorded every assistance and has received nothing but kindness and co-operation from the officials of the Persian Government in the territories in which he has been working.

Mr. Philby needs no introduction to this gathering. He has recently returned, bronzed and footsore, having, in the words of *The Times*, "crowned fourteen years of travel and study with one of the boldest feats in the enthralling history of Arabian exploration." We are proud that in two successive years an Englishman, a member of this Society, should, at great risk, have sought to probe geographical secrets which have been hidden from human knowledge since the earliest times.

If I may interject here a personal note, it is no small satisfaction to me that both Mr. Thomas and Mr. Philby should have served their apprenticeship in Asia as colleagues of mine in Mesopotamia, and this prompts me to remind you that by the end of the present year the government of all the British territories on the coast of East Africa will be in the hands of men who won their spurs either in Mesopotamia or under Lord Allenby in Palestine, Sir Bernard Bourdillon in Uganda, Sir George Symes in Kenya, Sir Hubert Young in Nyassaland, and Sir Ronald Storrs in Rhodesia. We wish them all, and especially Sir Ronald Storrs and Sir Hubert Young, who are with us this evening, good luck and fresh successes in their new spheres.

I have deferred to the last a reference to our principal guest—Sir Samuel Hoare, the Secretary of State for India. His shoulders have had to carry for nearly a year the heavy burden of responsibility for the government of one-sixth of the human race, assisted, for a time, by so many Commissions and Committees that he must have found it hard to find time to read their Reports. Their tabulated recommendations remind me of the formidable printed menu that is placed before a hungry guest in a large restaurant: the dishes are individually attractive, but collectively indigestible and ruinously expensive. It is for Sir Samuel Hoare to choose from the long list a menu which will be

both digestible and not too expensive. We have it on the authority of Solomon that in the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom, but Solomon makes no reference to the need for leadership. With Sir Samuel Hoare at the India Office that will not be lacking. "Real subtlety," said Choiseul, "consists in telling the truth, sometimes forcefully, but always gracefully." That is a form of subtlety in which Sir Samuel Hoare excels, and it is a quality which we all admire. Within the limitations imposed on his office by past history and present policy, Sir Samuel Hoare has done great things, and has made for himself a reputation which will serve him and this country in good stead in yet greater fields in the future. The strain on him has been great, and I will not increase it by discussing current political questions.

May I conclude on a note of optimism and of hope by quoting to you words spoken by Emerson at Manchester in the hungry Forties:

"I see England pressed upon by the transition of trade and competing populations. I see her not dispirited, not weak, but well remembering that she has seen dark days before, indeed with a kind of instinct that she sees a little better on a cloudy day, and that, in storm of battle and calamity, she has a secret vigour and a pulse like a cannon."

I am no pessimist; I firmly believe that we have the power as never before to control our environment. We have a national unity denied to others; we have leaders, and we have faith in them. My innermost feelings are those of Milton, three hundred years ago:

"I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks; I see her as an eagle . . . kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam . . . while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms."

In the words, once more, of Milton, whether at Ottawa or in Whitehall, Geneva or Lausanne:

"Let not England forget her precedence of teaching" (by her example) "nations how to live."

Sir Samuel Hoare, replying to the toast, said: I am sure that Bateman could make a good caricature of a comparatively newly appointed Secretary of State for India in the presence of these distinguished and learned experts. I feel to-night as if you were all pointing enormous fingers at me and shouting in my ear, "This is the politician who, having been in India for a month and the India

Office for less than a year, thinks he knows all about the 350 million inhabitants of the Indian continent and the intricate machine of government by which it is administered." Let me assure you that I do not make any such pretence and that from the very first I have realized only too clearly that I am dealing with many questions to which there is no answer, and that with some of them there is an equally strong case to be made against doing anything or against doing nothing.

Moreover, I have soon realized the fact that someone or other is always certain to suspect your motives and to believe that your action is prompted by some ulterior motive. I will give you an example of what I mean, and I take it from the events of the last two or three days. Almost every Indian with whom I have had communications during the last two years has constantly impressed upon me the need for swift action and definite decisions in the field of constitutional reform. I agree with my Indian friends. A long period of uncertainty is bad for everyone. It creates suspicion. It undermines authority. It saps the foundations of friendship. We, here, were no less anxious to bring this period of uncertainty to an end as soon as possible, and we accordingly came to the conclusion that it was necessary to speed up the procedure under which the constitutional changes were being discussed. Our change of procedure meant no change of policy. We are just as anxious to-day as we were when the Round-Table Conference first met in London for all the help that we can get from representative Indians. We felt, however, that if decisions were to be made in any reasonable time, it was quite essential to get away from the big and almost endless formal discussions that we have had during the last two years and to substitute for them much freer and much more intimate and much more definite consultations. Yet within a few hours of the declaration of this programme a section of Indian opinion jumps at the altogether erroneous conclusion that we no longer wish for Indian co-operation and that a change of method means a change of objective. If, however, our Indian friends will scrutinize with care and impartiality the programme we have drawn up, they will see that their criticisms are based upon a misapprehension of its meaning. Particularly do they seem to have misunderstood the procedure of the Joint Select Committee of both Houses to which the Government proposals will be referred. For the first time in our constitutional history a Joint Select Committee of this kind will meet before a Constitutional Bill has been read a first or second time in Parliament.

This unprecedented proposal is definitely intended to meet the Indian desire to be consulted before any irrevocable decision has been reached. Moreover, it is the intention of the Government to ask both Houses to agree to a procedure under which Indians will be enabled not only to appear as witnesses, but also to take part in the discussions of the Committee.

I hope that I have said enough to clear up once and for all the misunderstandings that seem to have arisen. Naturally these misunderstandings make the task of the Secretary of State more difficult and tiresome than it would otherwise be. I should not, however, be candid with you if I did not say that I was intensely interested by my work, and that I regard the India Office as much the most interesting Department in London at the present time.

I will give you, if I may, in a sentence or two some of the impressions that I have gathered during my short connection with Indian affairs.

My time has been chiefly occupied with political questions, whether it be the constitutional questions of the future or the administrative questions of the present moment. The impression that these political experiences have left most clearly upon my mind is that almost every phase of the political developments in India is originally due to the direct encouragement we have now for generations past given to Indians to govern themselves. Almost every speech at the Round-Table Conference was founded upon British constitutional procedure and phrased in British constitutional terminology, whilst the demand for self-government has quite obviously been stimulated for many years past by the unselfish efforts of British officials to help Indians to take a greater share in their own government. Is there any other example in the history of the world of a Government so consciously and consistently preparing the way for a possible successor?

But my impressions are not restricted to the political field. I think, also, of the help that we have been able to give to India in a whole series of intellectual activities. Can we not claim to have laid the foundation of Indian archæology, epigraphy, numismatics, Indian history, Indian philology, and critical scholarship? It was an Englishman, Prinsep, who by deciphering the inscriptions of Asoka, laid the real foundations of Indian chronology and history. It was a number of Englishmen who first studied the evidence of Indian coins. One of them, who worked under the name of Masson and whose real name was James Lewis, had a unique career. From 1822-27

he served as a private in the East India Company's army and then deserted. Eventually he received a free pardon in 1835 and became the British agent in Kabul, where he made full use of the opportunity for study and exploration. I imagine that he must be the only deserter who subsequently became a distinguished scientist.

Has it struck you that the history of Indian numismatics shows that certainly from the time of Pliny until the last nine months there was a constant stream of precious metals from West to East, and that now at last this stream has been reversed? Now more than 50 million sterling has flowed back to the West.

It was a long line of great officials, fitly leading up to Sir John Marshal and Sir Aurel Stein, who have made the Indian archæological survey one of the great works of our generation. I had the pleasure of flying over Taxila, just as I have more than once flown over Ur, and of seeing an example of this great work. I was glad to think that the aeroplane, which as an instrument of destruction might well prove disastrous to civilization, might be used so effectively and beneficently for discovering and surveying the historic remains of the It was an Irishman, Sir George Grierson, who carried through the vast linguistic survey of the Indian continent. a great Englishman, perhaps the greatest Englishman who ever went to the East, Warren Hastings, who first sent a mission to Tibet and started a long line of great explorers in the rediscovery of Central Asia. And let me say in passing that there is scarcely a corner of the big developments that have taken place in the last 150 years in India into which Warren Hastings' prophetic eye did not penetrate. Is it not, therefore, fitting that this year when we are celebrating the bi-centenary of his birth there will in the autumn be a Warren Hastings exhibition in the British Museum to which I shall gladly send the treasures of the India Office?

I have said these things not in any way to imply that the British have a monopoly of knowledge and virtue, but rather to give an answer to those who for political purposes declare that Great Britain has exploited India for its own selfish ends. The records of the present and the past are the answer to such groundless charges. If the world does not yet realize these things, it is mainly because we have gone about our business so quietly and unostentatiously that many people do not realize what we have been doing. Perhaps, also, being often unimaginative people, we have thought too much of the efficiency of the work and too little of the appeal to the imagination to which

these achievements are entitled. Now, however, when we are considering a new chapter in Indian history, we must clearly state our case and we must take these things into account. Indians must realize what we have done, no less than we must realize the great things that Indians themselves are capable of doing. Have we not, perhaps, in the past made too little of the need for intellectual co-operation between British and Indian? Might not Indian intellectual life be better understood in British society and British centres of learning? Whilst we know much of modernist movements in almost every European country, how much do we know of the very interesting modernist movement that is passing over Indian literature? I would ask you, as the representatives of a body that can have much influence upon British public opinion, to think over these things and to consider if it would not be possible, whether by having Indian Chairs at British Universities, whether by having a closer association between British and Indian students and writers, whether, to give an even more concrete example of what I mean, by encouraging the holding of an Indian Art Exhibition on the lines of the Persian, French, Dutch, and Italian exhibitions at Burlington House, we could not ensure for the future a greater intellectual co-operation between the East and the West, and so by this means bring about a more understanding association between the East and the West. (Applause.)

The health of the Royal Central Asian Society was proposed by His Excellency the Minister for the Netherlands: -When perusing lately the literature connected with the Royal Central Asian Society, my attention was drawn to its Annual Dinner held in 1924, where I read that Lord Winterton proposed the toast which I have the great honour to give you to-night. But I noticed there, that no less a personage than that eminent statesman hesitated, because, though he had been in a mild sense a traveller in Asia, he saw before him many distinguished travellers whose experience had been far wider than his own. If you bear that in mind you will have the right to accuse me of extreme presumption, when I face this distinguished audience as an ignoramus, who has never been east of Suez and who knows nothing more of Asia than what some learned lecturers of the Royal Geographical Society have told him about it. But at the same time I feel highly honoured to sit amongst you to-night as a representative of a country which, I dare to say, ranks high amongst the Colonial Empires. And I feel tempted, if it was only to justify my presence here at the Central Asian Society, to commit the geographical heresy

that our East Asiatic Empire also may with some elasticity of conception be considered as being included in what one calls Central Asia, in so far as the field of your interests extends over the entire Moslem world. Owing to the area, to the size of their population, and to the number of centuries during which experience has been gathered there, and owing to their economic possibilities, the Netherland East Indies are bound to draw upon themselves a considerable amount of international interest.

The genesis and history of our beautiful Insulinde is, I venture to suggest, well known to most of you; it dates back to June 24, 1596, when the inhabitants of Bantam in West Java saw the arrival of four vessels of European structure flying a flag unknown to them. It was the Dutch squadron associated with the name of Houtman, the supercargo, which had left Texel fifteen months earlier fitted out by a number of Amsterdam merchants for the purpose of finding the way to the Spice Islands, and obtaining a share of the trade which up to that time had been monopolized by the Portuguese traders. From that moment dated the connection of Holland with the East Indies, which, with a short interval in the Napoleonic period, has lasted until the present time. In that interval, when the British statesman Raffles was at the head of the Administration, we find the turning-point in Dutch Colonial policy, which, beginning with the monopoly of the East India Company, was followed by that of the Government with forced cultivation and differential duties, ending then some sixty years ago in free labour and the completely open door. Holland may fairly claim that for the last half century she has sought no advantages in trade and industry in her colonies which she has not been prepared to share on equal terms with other countries. These colonies are, in fact, now ruled in a manner hardly distinguishable from the administration of mandated territories. There are, apart from the Netherland East Indies, very few tropical colonies of European powers—and certainly none of equal economical importance—where the open door policy is voluntarily maintained to-day.

Great Britain has not been slow in taking advantage of the opportunities which the Netherland East Indies industries have offered to her trade. A substantial share of the import and export trade of the islands passes through British hands; and of recent years the British Chamber of Commerce for the Netherland Indies, thanks to its admirable organization, has been able to render good service to promote the object for which it was formed, and I have no doubt that it will

continue to do so, especially when world conditions become more favourable. These conditions are undoubtedly appallingly bad to-day. No country in the world is being more severely hit by them than the Netherlands, and the new fiscal policy adopted by Great Britain, especially the differential duty against non-British tea, is aggravating the depression. One hesitates to make any prediction as to when the improvement will make itself felt, but that the day will come when the tide will turn is certain, and then Netherland Indies will, owing to the efficient manner in which her agricultural industry is equipped, be able to recover from the very lean years through which it will have passed. The co-operation of Great Britain and the Netherlands upon economical and political demands of the commonwealth administration is the more assured, as amongst both nations the same principles in the treatment of the native populations have always prevailed. If we question the past we shall discover how sympathy towards weaker races has been the fundamental course of the progress made in both countries. Dalhousie declared it to be the mission of his country to found British greatness on Indian happiness, and our great liberal statesman Thorbecke, who in so many respects recalls the great figure of Gladstone, pronounced the memorable words: "The interest of the overseas population is the interest of the mother country." But like everywhere else, here also the golden mean must be sought. Excess of coercion and excess of abstention are both evil. They who ignore the rights of others will find out that their own interests will suffer in the end, while those who profess the doctrine of Robespierre, "perissent les colonies, vivent les principes," thinking that the maintaining of their principles would not be paid too high by the loss of a colony, will soon have to acknowledge how wrong they were. Mistakes are almost bound to occur, but they will be limited in their extent if the men who commit them understand Eastern society, and are animated by genuine interest; and as knowledge of the East and interest in its native inhabitants are among the chief objects which the Central Asian Society serves, the warmest sympathy goes out to that Society, and its growth and prosperity is watched with the keenest interest.

It therefore is a very great pleasure to me to give you the toast of the Royal Central Asian Society and to couple it with the name of its President, that distinguished soldier-statesman, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby. May I add, as a personal wish, that Lord Allenby, who intended last year to visit our colonies and was, alas, prevented from doing so for reasons independent of his will, may find an opportunity

to make that visit before long. He then can count upon my full assistance to make his journey as successful and pleasant as possible.

Air-Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham and Mr. Philby replied for the Society, Mr. Philby laying down with all his customary vigour his impressions and solutions of some of the problems facing the country. In contrast to the scene which he faced, he gave a picture of the evening discussions in Arabia when, seated on the palace roof waiting for the evening breeze, the talk ranged over all subjects in Heaven and on earth, and the Arabian King, telling each his part, would say: "And for the Opposition we can always count on Philby." And the Chairman, whose health was proposed by Sir Samuel Hoare, praised the moderation with which each guest had stated his view and thanked them for a most interesting evening.

THE MOSLEMS IN TUNISIA*

By LIEUT.-COMMANDER E. S. WILLIAMS, R.N. (Ret.)

THE present paper is subsidiary to a private study of Franco-Italian relations in Savoy, Italy, Malta, Sicily, and Tunis, that I and my wife undertook in September 1931, and completed in May of this year, with the goodwill and full assistance of both the French and Italian ambassadors in London. It would be difficult to thank adequately either the French or Italian Governments for the pains to which they went both in showing friendship to us personally and in putting before us any information of which we had need. In Tunisia itself we were given the full assistance of Monsieur Manceron, the French Resident-General; M. Bonzon, Ministre Délégué; of M. De Verneuil, the Secretary-General, and his successor M. Knobel; of M. Hartmann, of the Press section of the Résidence; and many others; and if M. Thierry, the Ministre de l'Intérieur, and his staff in Tunis itself did not give us quite all the assistance we had hoped, it was amply compensated for by the ready assistance of those Contrôleurs Civils in the provinces, to whom the Ministre Délégué gave us the strongest of introductions; of the several Kaids, Khalifas, Sheikhs that we met; by the very full assistance of the Italian Consul-General, Signor Bombieri, a native of Rovereto, and his staff of Vice-Consuls throughout the country, especially Signor Tolci, an expert on Arab matters; Signor Ferigo, the Vice-Consul of Sousse, and Signor Stefanelli, the Vice-Consul of Sfax, also from Trent; by the friendliness of General Chambrun, the Commandant of the troops of Tunis; by several members of his staff; by Colonel Caillon, commanding the troops in Sfax, and Colonel Laumonier, Commandant of the Military Territories of the South; by the friendly help of Mr. Lomas, the British Consul-General, and the English and the Maltese colony in general; and by a number of other persons-archæologist, missionary, journalist, Jew, Arab, French, English, Maltese, and Italian-with whom we had contact.

^{*} Paper read at a members' meeting on June 27, Brig.-General Sir Percy Sykes in the Chair. The Chairman said all sections of the Moslem world were of interest to members, even those outside the Society's province.

And if the Ministry of the Interior in Tunis did not assist much in our study, the fault can in no way be placed to them, but solely to the unfortunate incidence of the worst storm in living memory that two days after our arrival devastated the country, breaking down the railway bridges, cutting all telephone and telegraph communications, swamping the country, and rendering distressed and homeless a large section of the community. The one big river in the country, the Medjerdah, swelled to unprecedented proportions, flooding its valleys and bringing down in its stream to fling across the Gulf of Tunis to the sands of Cap Bon, some thirty miles distant, numbers of vipers and other serpents, whose killing occupied bands of natives during many days. The woods of the Belvedere Park, the Tunisian Bois de Boulogne, were felled, and the seventy-year-old cypress avenue at the British Consulate, an Arab palace en route to Carthage, the gift of the former Bey, had but half a dozen of its eighty trees left standing. After five weeks in Tunis itself, since the Ministry of the Interior had not recovered, we proceeded to Hammamet and then southward to Sousse, Kairouan and Sfax, Medenine and Djerba, to Gafsa, Metlaoui, and Tozeur, to find the line Sfax-Gabes still interrupted, and on our return to Tunis two months later we found the Résidence occupied with a Grand Council and budgetary difficulties greatly increased by the devastations of the storm.

Further, the storm had coincided with the arrival in Tunis of all the Moslem lettered and religious pundits from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia to take part in a first and very successful Conference on Arab Art, Literature, and Language, convened at the invitation of the Resident-General in honour of the fiftieth year of the occupation of the Regency by the French. We were present at the soirée given at the Résidence in their honour, at which the Arab musicians of Baron Rudolph D'Erlanger played selections from his great collection of Arab music, the research into which had made him, together with the skill with which he had built his Arab palace at Sidi Bou Said, and cared and tended the interests of that village of rich Moslem proprietors, an unrivalled authority on the social connections of the aristocratic Moslem world of North Africa, and perhaps even of the Middle East. It was remarkable at this reception to see the Sheikh-ul-Islam of Tunis speaking to a circle of learned divines from Fez and from Algiers. We were present at the opening of the Conference, thanks to the Resident-General, M. Manceron, a diplomat of ability and poise, and an administrator of very great energy; an honour we much appreciated.

At the opening ceremony, a matter of perhaps primary political significance, the Resident-General and a very small handful of high French functionaries arrived on the platform, surrounded by the Ministers of the Bey and the more notable religious chiefs of North Africa, before an audience of some half-dozen Europeans and of some four hundred Moslem delegates. There was a hitch in the band playing the Marseillaise, and a tense pause followed before the bournous-clad audience rose.

At a subsequent address of the Sheikh-ul-Islam himself, the Moslem speaker and audience were entirely left to their own devices, a point that indelibly left the impression with me that the French were taking the utmost pains that tact could conceive to convey the impression that fifty years of French rule in Tunisia had had no other effect than that of protecting the culture and religion of the Moslem subjects of the Republic—a bold and fearless course that prescribed *Liberté*, Fraternité, Égalité to Moslems within a French social milieu, yet within the ambit of firm French Government control and French military and commercial necessity.

The Conference very happily ended, Christmas became the preoccupation, and I drank my Christmas cocktail in the Kashah with
General Chambrun and two of his staff, the former so charming, a
descendant of Lafayette and married to an American wife, a player
of golf and perfect in his English. He insisted that as England always
continued her traditional foreign policy, she was mistaken if she
thought that at this date it was Germany that was the weaker element.
France was still, in his view, the weaker element in European matters.
His État-Major, Captain Regnault, possessing fourteen medals, many
of Syrian origin, and married to an attractive Italian lady from Alexandretta, is son of a General and nephew of the French Ambassador to
Tokio during the war period.

In the New Year the Résidence and the Ministry of the Interior were desperately busy with the visit of the Italian Air Minister, his accompanying Generals, Admirals, and Air Force staff, to whom I had the honour of introductions and conversations. Tunis was filled with mixed and native troops, and what with that and unsparing pains on the part of the police the visit went off without incident and with a very good feeling that increased Franco-Italian amity and decreased tension quite visibly.

Signor Balbo expressed to me his admiration of, and friendliness with, Sir Samuel Hoare; and it is perhaps here that should be men-

tioned that whenever I went into French circles in Tunisia, or into French, British, or Italian diplomatic circles in Rome, I found on the part of all concerned an insistence on the necessity of friendly and close co-operation in our care and advancement of those Moslem subjects that fall within our ambits. This was a common care and responsibility to all three Powers. Each Power naturally had had varying lengths of experience in such matters. I submit that in this matter lies one of the greater keys, in the realm of politics rather than economics, to common friendship, thought, and action between Great Britain, France, and Italy. I consider I owe the success of my journey as much to the goodwill of Sir Howard D'Egville, of the Anglo-French Colonial Committee, and of Signor Guariglia, Italian Minister for North Africa, as to any other authority.

In passing, I found in Rome that the Italian post-war propaganda against England among the Moslems of Egypt (a matter that Signor Bombieri, formerly in Egypt, must be as much conversant with as any) has at this date entirely ceased. That is possibly due, it has been suggested, to the temperate regard with which Great Britain has viewed Italian strong punitive methods in Cyrenaica. I do not include Kufra, as the Palazzo Chigi assured me once that the Arabs of that oasis had, in unnecessary terror, commenced their disastrous flight into Egypt even before the Italians had arrived. That point of view regarding Kufra or Somaliland does not pertain, even if not encouraged thereto by the French, among the Berbers of Tunisia, whose vernacular press, fortified with harrowing photos, from time to time is insistent upon the extreme length of Italian severity. As a result there is no doubt that, even if there is a nationalist movement of some strength in that, even if there is a nationalist movement of some strength in Tunisia—the Jeune Tunisien, whose members sport the Egyptian type of fez rather than the traditional Tunisian chechia, whose press is inspired not by an Arab, but by a Tunisian Jewish solicitor intent upon increasing his clientèle—even if there is a party that would like to see the backs of all Europeans in North Africa, including the French, yet equally there is no doubt, as far as the Berbers of Tunisia are concerned, that the French "devil" is to be preferred to the Italian "devil." And finally, having said all that, I believe I have arrived at the truth when I say that among the more experienced and soberminded of the Berber aristocracy who remember the troublous times of former pre-French days, and among the vast majority of the poorer of former pre-French days, and among the vast majority of the poorer population, there is nothing but praise for the greater advantages, greater peace and prosperity, that have accrued to the Regency under

the fifty years of French protection. This was the general theme, perhaps naturally, of the Kaids and Sheikhs that I met.

When we were in Southern Tunisia we were surprised at the downfall of the Sheikh-el-Medina, the appointment of his successor, and by the news also that the Bey was involved in a ministerial crisis of the first order, the full details of which we never gathered, that led, even before our return, to the appointment of a new Prime Minister.

My own experience does not equip me in any way to make any generalizations about comparative colonial or protectorate government, but I did note, in meeting in Tunisia an Egyptian Government servant, an Englishman of experience who had retired there, that he did greatly admire the French, to the detriment of our Egyptian administration. The French make the Berber feel that he is of equal social status to themselves-for instance, the Contrôleur Civil of Gabes had the Kaid Djellouli to dine and play cards with us; and Admiral Barth, Mr. Thierry's father-in-law, the Khalifa of Sfax, always danced with all the military ladies at the fortnightly hop at the Hôtel des Oliviers; again, all the upper-class Berbers enjoy their holidays in French social circles in France-while the French grant equal social status and turn a blind eye to North African idiosyncrasies in the matter of backsheesh, yet they see to it that the native authority hops to the precise French tune required under pain of instant dismissal, and although the French do not make any ostentatious show of the armed forces at their disposal, those forces are quite adequate and ready for nse.

Social equality is a matter which pleases the Berber, and perhaps shocks British tradition. I spoke on the point to a Frenchwoman, a vendor of chocolate in the Tunis suks. She said that we English hold ourselves too much aloof and are too superior. She never for a moment thought that her action would do other than improve the native, and she had no fear of the deterioration of her own civilization. It has to be said that the café life, not to mention the sweet tooth of the French, approximates more easily to the Arab café life and their love of the kitchen than the English order of living; and incidentally the French export their Lalique glass and the creations of their Maison Lafayette to Tunis, unlike the British in Malta.

In returning to bigger questions, I was informed by instructed persons in London before I left that Tunisia was not caught up in any Pan-Moslem movement. Official circles in Tunisia said that was quite wrong, that a powerful and dangerous movement was on foot,

that it affected specially Sfax and Southern Tunisia, and that Egypt was the centre whence flowed the propaganda. Certainly, too, I found that both the Berbers, especially the Kaid of Sfax, and the Jews of Tunisia were very well informed, or rather perhaps propaganded about the Palestine movement, and tremendously interested in the turn of events there, naturally from opposite view-points. The matter quite recently has become fairly tense. Some three weeks ago the *Résidence* found itself under the necessity of forbidding Zionist meetings, for fear of quick repercussions on the part of the Arabs.

Here, without going into any details of the texture and organization of the strong Jewish community in Tunisia, numbering some 54,000, it is, however, pertinent to remark that the position of the Tunisian Jews, half of whom reside in Tunis itself, has been throughout their history one of great isolation from the remainder of the Jewish world, a factor that has only been slightly remedied in the latter centuries owing to some slight contact with Jews of Leghorn, from which contact in turn has sprung the Italian immigration to the area, a movement that had assumed importance prior to the French occupation of 1881. Under the circumstances, it cannot in fairness be taken that any criticism of the Jews in Tunisia reflects in any way upon Jews in other parts of Europe. The position of the Jew vis-à-vis the Berber is very much the same as the relationship between Armenian and Turk in Anatolia. The vast majority of Berber property is Habous-that is, property left under the guardianship of the Moslem ecclesiastical authorities for the use of descendants, until such time as they cease, when the land reverts to the Moslem ecclesiastics. The Berber landowners are not given to modern agricultural methods, and are inclined to overspend their incomes. When years of drought arrive in an area not overburdened with rainfall, where water is a precious commodity, they are very apt to borrow money from the Jew at about 100 per cent. interest, which naturally places them entirely in the Jewish power.

The French have taken the courageous course of combating this evil. I have seen safes under the charge of the Contrôleurs Civils both of Kairouan and of Gabes full to overflowing with Berber land-titles and jewellery, on which money has been lent at a reasonable 6 per cent. Of course it has to be said that the French themselves, for quite another reason, are particularly interested in the matter of Habous property, and on this account have been warmly criticized for stealing the Berber land. The point is that the Berber, with his antiquated methods, gets but little out of even a rich property, and complicated

laws have been devised by which, in many cases, undeveloped Habous property has reverted to the State to be worked by French and Italian colonists, particularly the former.

When travelling, the difference between Habous property and that of a European colon is very marked. I particularly remember a large Habous property belonging to the ancient family of Jadidi, to the west of the route between Hammamet and Bu-Fisha, towards Zaghouan. Rich was the land; primitive were the methods; picturesque was the village; patriarchal were the inhabitants; overflowing was their hospitality; how good was their kuss-kuss; with what trust they welcomed Englishmen, pressing my wife into their houses to see their brides, and both of us into their Marabout to show us their Holy Shrine, and to be honoured by the handling by us of the relics of their Saint, for it was a Moslem pilgrimage centre of importance, with a guest-room supported by ancient Roman columns, and with an ancient Roman inscription embedded in the centre of the sanctified courtyard. But the Jadidi, a last remnant of ancient things, were uncommonly poor, and, owing to rainless years, and general world-crises, entirely in the hand of the Jews. And what a difference in their cultivation compared to the Government-controlled Arab community of Enfidaville to the south, or to the Italian-run area of Grombalia to the north.

Indeed, the Jadidi were an example of a process that, everywhere apparent, was put to me in a nutshell by Kaid Baccouche, the Kaid of the banlieue of Tunis, a well-travelled man with polished French, whom I interviewed in his office. I asked whether the world-crisis was affecting Tunis. He replied that Tunis had been affected as everywhere else, and, as for the cause of the trouble, he would relate a story of Harun-al-Raschid, Sultan of Baghdad, to whose presence came a poor devil with a glass vase that he claimed to be a great invention. "And what may be the property of the vase?" exclaimed the Sultan. "O mighty one, it breaketh not!" replied the beggar. So to the roof they all went; they threw the glass into the street and it broke not. Then, much to the surprise of the courtiers, Harun-al-Raschid imprisoned the poor devil and shortly after executed him. "Where lies thy justice, O mighty one?" cried the courtiers; "it was a great invention, the glass verily broke not!" "Yes," explained the Sultan, "but how would my subjects who daily work in the suks to replace the breakages of my people-how would they fare if no glass ever broke?" And Kaid Baccouche went on to explain that the hand industries of the suks were being swamped by the machine-made

manufactures of France, and the farm-hands were being thrown out of work by machinery that replaced the toil of six or seven men.

Indeed, times are lean in Tunis. There is unemployment and maladjustment due to the introduction of modern methods, and as far as Sfax, the capital of the south, is concerned, by the fact that the great olive industry, on which its growth in great part depended, is now in violent competition with a South American area that has started growing olives with equal intensity, this even though Berber labour in the olive plantations ranges from six to ten French francs daily, and even though Sfax is equipped with the most up-to-date olive presses. Sfax equally depends on what was an expanding export of phosphates, for the exploitation of which the phosphate company built the line Sfax-Gafsa-Metlaoui-Tozeur. The phosphate mines, which exported an annual mean of about 27,800,000 quintals during the period 1925-1929, had been a sure source of revenue, with reserves which at the present rate of consumption would hold for another thousand years. But already another big deposit, with even greater strength in phosphates, is working in Morocco, more accessible to French and British markets, and already the new wharves and loading machinery in Sfax are not working at anything like full capacity.

But the mines, mainly worked by Italian and French, do not hit the native population in the same way as the olive industry, the amazing revival of which is entirely due to the archæological researches of one Paul Bourde, who discovered the nature and extent of the ancient Roman cultivation. As a result, with clever manipulation of the land property question, and satisfactory co-partnership organized between European proprietor and capitalist and Berber tenant, Sfax today, over a radius of some fifty miles, is surrounded on all sides as far as the eye can see, even from the special view-points provided on high overlooking hills, with square mile upon square mile of olive trees, line upon line, twelve metres apart—a breath-taking spectacle.

Archæology in Tunisia provides several such amazements. Take, for instance, the water-reservoirs of Carthage: some twenty-four enormous tanks of Punic construction still store the water, which, flowing by the ancient aqueduct from the ancient source of Zaghouan, some seventy miles away, serves the town of Tunis with excellent water. Take again the ancient site of Carthage running from the Marsa to Modern Carthage. The few thousands of today compare not with the two millions of ancient times—in one city a population almost equivalent to the present-day, roughly, 2,159,151 Moslems that

form the bulk of the present-day, roughly, 2,410,692 inhabitants of all Tunisia, of whom some 91,427 French and 91,178 Italians* form the majority of the European population. A lesser archæological wonder, not to mention Dougga, Thala, Tebesa, Sbeitla, and Djiptis, is the colosseum at El Djem, which is still very complete. Local archæologists maintain that, though second in size only to the Roman Colosseum, it did not indicate a large city, but only the meeting-point of important roads to populous areas north, south, and west. I thought of other archæological discoveries that had inspired men like the late Sir William Wilcox in Mesopotamia, and I set to wondering when the political situation would be sufficiently clear for modern men to take to heart the discoveries of Sir William Ramsay and Professor Calder, and the words of Strabo, and resuscitate Anatolia to the populous richness of ancient days. Therein would lie a cure for British unemployment in my view.

But to return to the present-day economic conditions of Tunisia, a land that in the eyes of the great M. Bertolle, the Contrôleur Civil of Sfax, should consist in wheat and barley cultivation, rather than wine in the north; in olive cultivation in the centre; and in the raising of herds of sheep and cattle in the south. In the north-western area, the cereal area, the landscape assumes a likeness to the open areas of the Piave round about Cortina d'Ampezzo. Here the French colon, his Christian churches and his motor-tractors, takes the place of Berber labour; here the formerly flourishing zinc and lead mines have diminished in value; and here, on the northern hills round about Tabarca, nearer in scene to Corsica, even the cork industry shows stack upon stack of unexported cork. Eastward from Tunis, especially, there are the commercial wine vineyards of the Sicilian, who employs quantities of Arab labour. Fruitful years produce large profits, but the wines of France itself are superabundant, and there is always an anxious struggle on the part of Tunisia, increasing in anxiety as the wine cultivation increases, to obtain permission for a reasonable quota of its wine to be exported. M. Bertolle maintains that it is a mistake to increase, in this area, wine production at the expense of wheat and barley.

The olive cultivation of the Sfax area and of the Sahel has been touched upon. As for livestock, the French indulge in every type of experimental farm, and import the best French stocks. A contingency

^{*} Dénombrement de la population civile Européene et indigène en Tunisie au 22 mars 1931. (The Italians criticize the figures for Italians.)

of this industry is the necessity due to years of drought, and to general scarcity of water, to keep the tribes, who gain their living by grazing, in a state of nomadism. They must go where pasture is, and it is recognized as a wrong policy to try too drastically to settle the nomad population at the expense of the livestock industry, which, of course, includes the raising of camels. Tunisian camels, as well as cereals, were inspected by a British Commission during the war period, and exported to the troops in Egypt. In normal times cereals, livestock, and horses are exported to Malta.

Finally, there is an industry of the south centre which, almost entirely supported by British capital, is the mainstay of the wilderness or "bled"; I mean the alpha grass industry, a descendant of the papyrus industry, the process of making which into paper is a peculiar British, or rather Scottish, affair. The Sfax-Tozeur Metlaoui-Sousse railways are busily employed carting the bales, which pile high on the quays of Sousse and Sfax, and lead to much British shipping entering these ports. Some ten British firms are engaged in an industry which would have been irretrievably hit had the 10 per cent. duty not recently been removed. This, together with the less important date industry of Gabes, Tozeur, Gafsa, and Shott Djerid, raises the prestige of Great Britain, perhaps a little too much for French liking, in the south and south centre.

We were unable, due to heavy rains and the early season, to proceed from Metlaoui to Tozeur by the Shott, an easy journey by car in summer, nor were we able, owing to mischance, to visit the interesting Matmata area. We were also invited to proceed to Foum-Tatouine and Fort Sainte, but there was not time at our disposal, and the exchange-rate had diminished our funds too severely.

Leaving out of account the Franco-Italian side of the matter, and even including it, for Franco-Italian relations in Tunisia are a mere mosquito whose continuous biting indeed may cause fever in a perfectly healthy body politic, there was a feeling of law, order, and contentment throughout the Regency, even if from time to time the more educated and ambitious Berber elements have agitated for more democratic forms of Government. M. Manceron had informed us that we could go unguarded from one end of the Regency to the other in perfect safety, and that we proved to be the case. Indeed, we only heard of one incident, and that near Medenine, where some time ago an Autobus du Sahel with the mails had been attacked and some eleven occupants killed; and if the general opinion that the Moslems of Tunisia, of the

Malakite rather than the Hanafite persuasion, are particularly fanatical is the truth, and that entry into the Mosques, except those of Kairuan that have been defiled, will be met by instant death, yet I have to state that besides witnessing a burial service in the Grand Mosque of Kairuan and inspecting its Library, entry to which is generally jealously guarded, and besides visiting very thoroughly the Mosque du Barbier and the shrine of the Companion of the Prophet, we also were invited to inspect a Mosque at Houmt-Souk on the Island of Djerba, au claire de la lune; we were invited into the Jadidi Marabout afterwards; and we were invited by the Sheikh of Hammamet to an I-Isawa in a Marabout in honour of the feast of Ramadan. My wife entered harems innumerable, and I was also invited into the harem (not quite, but nearly so, in the presence of his wife-i.e., she saw me) of the Kaid of Nabeul, while the Sheikh of Hammamet and a Moslem colour sergeant at the Kasbah there took both of us into their harems, introduced both of us to, and entertained us before, their wives and daughters. Of one head of a family my wife visited, she tells the following story: He had married young, and is now some sixty years of age. His first wife was getting long in the tooth. He took unto him a girl of twenty, who twitted him shortly after on his advancing age, and on the way he puffed as he ascended the stairs. The next day he took him a third wife aged sixteen. But this is a rare example.

The Sheikh of Hammamet whiles away his days at the local Hammam, whose waters are replenished due to the continuous itinerary, round and round, of a blindfold camel on the roof of the Hammam. The Sheikh maintains that he is one of a party of Moslems, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Egyptians, that were sent in 1916 or 1917 to operate against the Sherif of Mecca in the country between Medina and the Holy City.

I shall never forget my visits to the Kaid of Nabeul, an elegant of the first order, whose cakes were excellent and oranges beautiful to look upon, but "douce" to an extreme unknown in England. It was dark when we left after our first visit; the moon and the stars were out as we entered his Daimler. As he held the door open he looked up at the heavens in the direction we were to take. There was the crescent moon and a great star exactly between the horns. The car began to move, and he waved his hand at the moon, exclaiming, "Au revoir—and the luck of the East go with you."

On another occasion we were parading the lesser-known parts of Tozeur unaccompanied. Four elders squatting in a row asked, "And

why do you wander unaccompanied?" "I need no guide, God is my guide," said I. "Well said! Well said!" said they.

That takes me back to the guiding hand of Providence down the ages; the history of the country. And in that context I might mention that the indigenous Berber white race of Tunisia is still the main body of the population. In Tunisia the Italians speak of the French, the French of the Berber. The French are right. It has only to be added that it is held that the invading Arabs only consisted of some two or three hundred families, and that the amount of Arab-blooded persons is now very small, although certain ancient families pride themselves on their Arab ancestry. Members of the Djellouli family, which had lived in the same house in the Tunis suks for six hundred years, contradicted one another regarding their Arab ancestry.

Second, it has to be remembered that the Mosque du Barbier at Kairouan, in that it contains the remains of a companion of the Prophet and a hair of his beard, is a shrine of very great veneration, and that, in Tunisia, they maintain it to be second only to Mecca as a Holy of Holies of Islam.

Third, that in 1270 Louis IX., King of France, died and was interred at Carthage to become both a Christian and a Moslem Saint, his death being followed by the signing of a Treaty between Abd Allah, King of Tunis, and Philippe III., which consecrated in the eyes of the French their moral right to Tunis.

Fourth, that the former mighty Augustinian Church of some 800 churches is the only example of the utter disappearance of a thriving Christian community for a period of centuries, a phenomenon entirely due to the fact that the inrush of Moslem thought could not be stemmed once the Byzantine administration had been broken in an area where the ancient Church only preached and taught in Latin. Christianity only began to reappear with the entry of Capucins under Ousta Mourad, Bey of Tunis (1637-1640). In 1830 a chapel was erected in memory of St. Louis. In 1843 Pope Gregory XVI. confided the vicarate of Tunis to the Capucins of Italy, which, after the French occupation of 1881, was handed to Mgr. Lavigerie, the former Archbishop of Algiers, under whom in 1884 the vicarate became an Archbishopric again, as of old. He it was who founded the Pères Blancs, a very worthy body, who, training at Carthage, push the Catholic Mission into all parts of Northern and Central Africa.

Fifth, that whereas Tunis is a training-ground for Catholic Missionaries, it is equally a training-ground for Moslem Missionaries,

who cover with their labours the same area as the White Fathers, even to British Central Africa and the Sudan. These are trained in the Grand Mosque, Djamaa-ez-Zitouna, which, constructed between the years 114 and 141 of the Hegira, contains a University that is held to be equal to, if not more important than, the other two great centres of the intellectual life of African Islam—the University of Al-Azhar at Cairo and that of El Qarouyine at Fez.

With the details of administrative organization of Tunisia I will not here delay you. Suffice it to say that the French, in maintaining the whole façade of the original Beylical administration, support it by the provision of French functionaries, in whose hands all the power in fact lies, and whose government under the direction of the French Foreign Office, which has a special department for Tunisian affairs, is under the control of the French Resident-General-who is also Minister of Foreign Affairs-and a ministry of eleven heads of departments, eight French and three Tunisian. The country is divided into nineteen districts (Contrôles Civils) and the military district of the south, where one Contrôleur informed me I should "fall among the military." In each Contrôle Civil is a Kaid, with Sheikhs under him, nominally only servants of the Bey through the Prime Minister, but in fact dealing with that official, through and under the check of the French Contrôleur Civil and the Ministre de l'Intérieur. Laws are promulgated by Beylical decree, but the Resident-General, President of the Grand Council and of the Council of Ministers, has the prerogative to propose to the Bey "administrative, judicial, or financial reforms that the French Government consider useful," and the visa of the Resident-General is necessary before any Beylical decree becomes operative.

The Contrôleurs Civils control, but do not administer. Lieutenants of the Resident, nominated by the President of the Republic and therefore French functionaries, who, having passed through Colonial Office examinations in France, select to work in Tunisia, where they are re-examined after a period of two years in local language and customs, are taken on as Contrôleurs Civils Suppléants if successful. A very live body of men they are, and the following two stories amply show how akin they are in spirit to the best traditions of English administrators. The first relates to M. Clement of Sfax, who was ordered by M. Bertolle, slightly against the letter of the law, to influence a local election where the wrong persons were about to be elected. After remonstrations M. Clement went. "Where will you

hold the election?" said he. "In the hotel," said they. "No, in the Marabout," said he; and there, after going through the prescribed prayers and reading extracts of the Koran, he induced them then and there not only not to elect the two untrustworthy ones, but to nominate two honourable persons of his own choosing. The second I was witness of in Kairouan. We were awaiting M. Beaufils outside the Contrôle. He came to us and was stopped by an orderly, who showed him an emaciated and paralyzed ex-service Berber on a straw mattress. He had stayed for years with the tents of his family. He did not know that a disability pension to the tune of some 8,000 francs was due him. M. Beaufils ordered that he should be immediately motored to Tunis, eighty miles away, and that his pension should be paid him.

Of the friendliness of the army officers to us, especially at Sfax and in the military territories of the south, I cannot say too much, but time does not permit me to detail the many army matters I would care to mention. I must content myself by saying that there are wireless stations at Tunis and Medenine, that the coast from Hammamet to Mahdia is under control of headquarters at Sousse, where, among others, the Foreign Legion is quartered and the 4th Chasseurs have their headquarters; that there are flying-grounds at Gabes, Djerba, and Tunis; that the negligible coastal defences are being strengthened very slightly; that there is a permanent manœuvre ground between Hammamet and Bu-Fisha; that the Tunisian mounted regiments believe in horses entirely and wear dust-proof white overalls, the invention of Colonel Caillon. Manœuvres have taken place recently both at Bu-Fisha and between Gabes and Medenine. The horses are small, cannot jump great obstacles, but charge with speed. Much of the personnel, officers and men, have seen service both in Syria and Morocco, not to mention France. The Inspector-General of North Africa, whose office is in Paris, inspected the troops of Sfax, preparatory to manœuvres, while we were there. At Metlaoui the mines are protected by a subaltern and forty spahis.

Finally, in referring to such little matters as the swimming of the tortoises in the magnesia waters of the Gabes oasis, to the croaking of the frogs under the almond blossoms of Gafsa, and to the pad-pad of feet of men and camel as they wend their way wearily back to shelter in the wave-lapped town of Hammamet; in the sandy road, hedged by cactus, past the old Roman villas, the olive groves, and orange trees; while the sun sets in splendour behind Zaghouan—with such little happy whiffs of things we all love, I will end this paper.

COMMERCIAL POSSIBILITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HE early economic future of Middle Eastern countries, and the prospects of trade with them, depend upon political developments even more than on the promised lifting of the general commercial depression. And it happens that in all those countries political developments are at the mercy of a few leading and ambitious personalities. In such circumstances stability, which is essential to trade, can only be hoped for, but not confidently anticipated.

It will be convenient to deal first with the Arabic-speaking block of Syria, Palestine, Transjordania, Iraq, and Arabia proper. Syria, under the strong control of France, holds by itself the promise of peace, in spite of the turbulence of its varied people, the difficulties inherent in a Mandate, the doubts as to the future character of the Constitutions of its States and the permanence of the Mandate itself. But the incorrigible nationalist agitators of Iraq refuse to leave Syria alone. At the very moment when it is essential for Iraq to secure the suffrages of France and her satellites in the League of Nations, for the purpose of the admission of Iraq to the League, the Pan-Arab party under the leadership of Yasin Pasha is planning a Pan-Arab assemblage at Baghdad, to be attended by representatives of Syria, Palestine, Transjordania, the Hejaz, and Iraq, for the purpose of demanding the union of all Arabicspeaking people, especially of Syria, under the headship of King Feisal. No step can be better calculated to alienate France and King Ibn Saud; and the serious aspect of the affair is that the step is taken in spite of the British political control over Iraq, which still exists, and when every motive of prudence counsels an absence of agitation. It is to be feared that, as soon as Iraq is in the League and free of the British Mandate, the Pan-Arabs will throw all remaining shreds of sobriety to the winds and that Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and the Hejaz will be distracted by intrigues, political suspicion, and hostility. The better feelings recently established between the Governments of Iraq and King Ibn Saud could hardly survive such developments, and the consequent state of tension on the western and southern frontiers of Iraq would hamper trade. There is a chance, however, that the strong position which the international Iraq Petroleum Company is securing in Iraq

may enable it to exercise a moderating influence. The fixed annual sum now paid by that company has become a predominating feature in the Iraq budget, and the royalties that will be payable, when oil is delivered through the pipe-line on the Mediterranean seaboard, will be still more important. If Pan-Arab agitation threatens to wreck this great source of revenue, a stiff attitude on the part of the Company may force a return to reason.

Another danger threatening the stability of Iraq, and through her that of the whole of the Middle East, is the incapacity of the townbred Iraqis, from whose ranks all officials are drawn, to manage the Kurdish and Arab tribes, and the inability of the Iraq army, unaided by the British Air Force, to conduct tribal warfare. In no country in the world is the gulf between townsmen and tribesmen greater, and at any moment some administrative blunder (similar to the many by which Amanullah lost Afghanistan) may throw the Kurdish border or the Euphrates districts into rebellion. If this once happened, it is doubtful whether Baghdad could ever restore its authority without foreign aid, and there must always be a danger that the effective administration of Iraq will be reduced to the basin of the Tigris between Basra and Baghdad, while the rest of the country lapses into chaos, inviting the intervention of Turkey, Persia, Syria, or Ibn Saud.

Thus the investment of capital in Iraq, and to a lesser extent in the neighbouring territories, must for long be a risky business. But one item in the Pan-Arab programme deserves encouragement and might be encouraged without immediate risk of tranquillity. That is the demand for the abolition of customs barriers between Arabic-speaking countries. It cannot be denied that the erection of these barriers between territories and peoples, which under Turkish rule had formed an economic unit, has greatly injured the commerce of the Middle East, and prevented it from reaping the fruits of improved administration and communications. If the interests concerned would now devote themselves to helping Syria, Palestine, Iraq, and Arabia proper in the direction of some kind of customs union, while preserving their political and administrative separation, they might win a notable victory for commerce.

For the rest, as soon as the world depression lifts, Syria will export to advantage her cotton and dried fruits; Palestine her oranges; Iraq her oil, dates, wheat, barley, and hides; and all of these lands together with Arabia proper their wool. If the hopes of cotton-growing once held out for Iraq had been realized, her prospects would be much

brighter. But it seems now to be established that insect pests are too formidable for this crop. In return for these exports the Arabic-speaking countries will greatly increase their imports of sugar, cotton goods and cloth, coffee, motor-cars, and manufactured iron and steel. The sugar will come from the Continent of Europe, and the cotton goods mostly from Italy and Japan. Great Britain used to have almost a monopoly in the supply of cotton goods to these countries, but is now hopelessly outdistanced. In woollen goods she should have a better chance. Coffee comes to this quarter of the world mainly from Brazil, and diminished consumption here has played some part in producing the Brazilian coffee debacle. Its increase should help to restore Brazilian finances. As to motor-cars, the Arabic-speaking countries in prosperous times could absorb three or four thousand a year; for the distances are vast, railways scarce, and the people have become possessed with a passion for movement. But at present America is supreme in this trade, partly because her cars are best suited to the roughness of the roads, but mainly because only her manufacturers arrange for the adequate supply of spare parts. If British car manufacturers would bend their minds to this problem, they could probably oust America from this market, which will for many years be an expanding one. As to other manufactured iron and steel goods, there will be a large revived demand for oil-driven pumps for lifting the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates for irrigation purposes, as soon as agricultural prosperity returns. British firms ought to retain this market, which has always been in their hands. They should also secure a share in the large trade in enamelled iron goods. But perhaps the greatest advantage which British trade should derive from the returning prosperity of these countries lies in the increased use of British shipping, especially of British oil-tankers.

The trade of Persia next calls for consideration. About this there is unfortunately little to be said. As Persia depends upon Russia for the consumption of most of her exports, except oil and carpets, she is becoming more and more commercially enslaved to that country, and however much she may flourish in the near future, the sphere of British trade with her will be limited by bartering quotas and embargos. She will take more tea from India, and will require more motor-cars. As to these, the remarks made with regard to the Arabic-speaking bloc apply equally in the case of Persia. If British firms would only concentrate on the supply of spare parts in the capital and provincial centres, they should drive a good trade. For Persia lacks

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railways and the demand for cars is ever expanding. The British cotton trade with Persia, once very considerable, is dead and without

hope of revival.

Of Afghanistan also, although she is recovering stability, there is little to be said from the point of view of British trade. She takes her imports mainly through India, and they consist chiefly of cotton goods, tea, sugar, and enamelled iron-ware. British tea companies should benefit from a revival of Afghan trade; but Italy and Japan will

dominate the market for cotton goods.

The upshot of this survey of commercial prospects in the Middle East is that there ought soon to be a striking increase of prosperity and trade activity in the Arabic-speaking countries if Pan-Arabian ambitions can only be restrained and confined to the establishment of some kind of customs union for Syria, Palestine, Transjordania, Iraq, and Arabia proper. But there is great danger that the Pan-Arabs will, as soon as Iraq becomes completely independent, upset the applecart. There is an equally grave danger that the Iraq Government will fail to control the Kurdish and Arab tribes, and that chaos will result. If both these dangers can be avoided, British trade should expand through the increased demand for shipping (especially oil-tankers), for motor-cars, oil-driven irrigation pumps, other articles of manufactured iron and steel, and woollen goods. The prospects are too uncertain to warrant the investment of much British money in these countries, which may well become the Balkans of the East, although they may be saved by the pressure of the great international oil interests. As to Persia and Afghanistan, British trade may enjoy a good share in the expanding trade in motor-cars, and British tea companies in India will largely increase their exports to those countries.

H. DOBBS.

SOME NOTES ON THE SOUTHERN ROAD OF CHINESE TURKESTAN

N olden days the route from China to Kashgaria traversed the south of the present province of Sin-kiang, along the northern slopes of the Kuen Lun, but for many years it has fallen into disuse. Partly internal disturbances, partly a change of markets, partly the development of the north, have caused the abandonment of this historic highway, and now save for some reluctant official compelled to enter Kansu by the south, the road is unused. That part of it, however, which is within provincial limits is regularly traversed by local traffic; but it is the northern route by Urumchi and Hami that is now exclusively used by travellers to China. Yet the old road has still some advantages, and wood, grazing, and, as a rule, water are all more abundant in the south.

Early in the spring of 1931 we left Keriya for Charkhlik in the Lop Nor district, and reached Niya on the third day. This place used to be a Wakf or charitable foundation for the use of the famous shrine of Imam Jafar Sadik, two long marches away to the north. The settlement is flourishing with an adequate bazaar where prices are low, as there is no export of foodstuffs. Were this route more used, supplies would cost more, but as it is, the chief traffic is to the shrine, which is much visited in the autumn when crops have been gathered and the market rates are low. The Niya-liks undoubtedly exploit the pilgrims as much as possible, but it is doubtful if the latter are numerous or rich enough to yield a good return. From Niya we took supplies to carry us to Cherchen.

We reached the Yartungaz River the second day after leaving Niya and found it, even at that time of the year, a stream of considerable size. The country showed signs of moisture, with great stretches of waving reed, many swamps, and some blue lagoons, in one of which, called Biliklek (Fishy), there were said to be many fish, but we could see none. A dust-storm or buran came up, and in the twinkling of an eye the face of the country was changed and all was hidden in a yellow fog. These storms are very prevalent in South-East Sin-kiang, but especially so in the spring and early summer.

The Langars or Serais on this road are very indifferent halting places. They are often not even wattle shacks, but merely a miserable

grass lean-to, with no supplies, and little shelter for man or beast. Although it was mid-April the cold was considerable, especially after a storm. Earlier in the year the absence of shelter would be a serious privation, though compensated somewhat by the ample toghrak (wild poplar) fuel.

After the Yartungaz the next river was the Endere, a really impressive stream, flowing between high cliffs with abundant springs at their foot. The river wound through a countryside covered with groves of toghraks, reed, and scrub, on which many animals were feeding; and with its broad well-filled channel and high cliffs was a noble sight; indeed, when swollen by the snow water from the Kuen Lun it must be a formidable obstacle.

It is remarkable that, except for two rather insignificant settlements just where the Yartungaz and Endere end in the desert, these two rivers support no population. The immediate cause is that neither is easy to tap, as their deep beds-especially in the case of the Enderemake irrigation difficult. There are, however, broader issues that explain the lack of inhabitants and why east of Niya a not unattractive region should be left empty. Both these rivers could be canalized, but the truth is the whole of this country has certain drawbacks. Burans, flies, and ticks are great disadvantages; the winters, too, are cold and the summers hot; but the decisive factor is that all this region is isolated. Traffic sweeps west and north, by Khotan, Kashgar, Aqsu, and Kucha, and it is only a few merchants and pedlars, supplying the scanty population, that visit these parts. Sometimes, indeed, a caravan passes along on the way to Turfan or even Urumchi, but, generally speaking, there is no movement here since the old through route has been abandoned. Why, then, should people leave the comfortable populous countryside of the west and north, where there is still ample water, to settle in an uninhabited region? Until the pressure of population is felt, all South-East Sin-kiang will remain remote and undeveloped. There is nothing to prevent settlement, but up till now there is no inducement. Thus it is that the three riversthe Yartungaz, Endere, and Cherchen-have so far found so few cultivators to use their abundant water.

Beyond the Endere River the track is easily missed, and after a dust-storm it is impossible to find the path. We often went astray, but generally not badly, though it is definitely unwise to travel during a buran, guided or guideless. The only thing to do if overtaken by a storm is to sit down till it is blown over.

The scenery is somewhat monotonous, but was not unpleasant. Fine groves of toghrak, abundant reed, scrub, and brushwood lined the route, varied by occasional high dunes. There were many evidences of water. The lagoons were often salt and smelt abominably, but drinkable water was found after digging three or four feet in the sand. Indeed, except for one or two isolated places, the whole area from Niya to Charkhlik showed evidence of an ample water supply. The growth of reed was particularly luxuriant and abundant, extending for many miles to the north. On our right, to the south, was a barren plain sloping gently up to the foothills of the Kuen Lun, but so hazy was the atmosphere that those mountains were seldom seen, and then in outline only, so it was easy to understand how Chinese travellers had followed this road without knowing there were mountains at hand.

At Shudun Langar we were agreeably surprised to find a really good serai with ample accommodation, and we rejoiced on getting some shelter from the tearing blasts of the eternal burans. Beyond this stage the track became even harder to follow, and from the next stage, Chingelik, a miserable grass hovel, we took a guide, a poor creature and an unworthy member of the great race of chaperones, for he had to halt every few miles to smoke charas (hemp) or else he collapsed forthwith; thus we had to wait, cursing, whilst my Hunza men reviled him with vitriolic remarks, to which he paid no heed at all.

On April 20 we were struck by a terrific dust-storm, and I must say that our guide was useful. We could make no progress against the blasts of the wind, freezing as though it blew direct from the Pole; all we could do was to struggle to the nearest water-hole and fling ourselves on the ground, thus to pass a melancholy night. The cold was intense. After blowing for fifteen hours the storm subsided. In the morning we went on to Aq Bai, where we should have arrived the day before, but we were thankful we did not try, for the hut resembled a broken-down hen-coop by a puddle of brine; and had we made an effort to reach this horror someone would have suffered from our disgust and ill-temper.

It was still cold at night, 24° F., but we were approaching Cherchen and felt happier. Besides these ceaseless burans, the ticks were a nuisance, for they were ubiquitous, persistent, and voracious. They had spent the winter in seclusion, chiefly amongst the bark of the toghraks, but, encouraged by the coming of spring, they emerged to

enjoy the sun. The horses suffered, and it was distressing to see the poor beasts covered with these repulsive vermin, hanging on like some loathsome kind of damson. We used to cast the horses and spend hours pulling off the ticks, but it was little good.

Cherchen was a very flourishing place with a good bazaar and a steadily growing population. The land is excellent and the water ample, and the river even in spring was a stately stream. The two drawbacks are the remoteness and to some extent the climate, which is rather cold compared with the rest of Southern Turkestan. We found several British subjects here, and they were rather unhappy, as they seldom or never were visited by the Consul at Kashgar, and wanted a little encouragement.

There were two ambans, the new and the old, and both were most courteous. When I saw their lovely new bowler hats I blushed at the thought of my battered topi, but they kindly excused me.

I had some difficulty in escaping from Cherchen, as its bazaar, full of good bread, pilau, dumplings, and mutton broth, fascinated my men, after a long spell without any of these luxuries behind them, and another famine area in front of them. Not that they were starved, but no Turki can resist the sight of abundant, cheap, good food, and I don't blame him.

It was a week to Vash Shahri, the next source of supply, and we left Cherchen in a dust-storm. For some days the road was near the river, and the amount of water in it was impressive. The whole country now became a series of lagoons, backwaters, swamps, and marshes, with much high reed, dry, but golden, swaying rhythmically in the breeze, and very lovely against the blue sky.

The first long stage from Cherchen passes the growing settlement of Tatran, but beyond there is nothing but reed, toghrak, and scrub. In summer from here onwards—though the whole of the road is afflicted by those scourges, the green-eyed horse-fly (kokyin) and the mosquito, which make travel very unpleasant—there fortunately is an alternative track in the hills which is generally used.

The langars between Cherchen and Vash Shahri were even more miserable than those we had already passed, but they are only maintained by the Chinese to ensure official letters reaching the mandarin at Cherchen.

After the third day we left the river, and were now dependent on wells, which were frequent enough, and well supplied with water, but always more or less brackish. On May 1 we reached Vash Shahri, a

curiously isolated but fertile settlement, and stayed comfortably in the headman's house to keep the Id-i-Qurban. We gave a gramophone performance in celebration of the feast, but it was rather an ordeal as the whole population came and listened. Let us hope they liked it, but as they made a great deal of noise they could have heard but little.

Here another terrific buran swept down on us, and it was impossible to see across the courtyard, thanks to the thick orange fog. We were getting tired of these storms, and wondered how anyone lived in so disagreeable a climate.

Two days from Cherchen brought us to Charkhlik in the Lop Nor district. The soil here is remarkably good, and though the water supply is rather poor, the place is ready to expand. Unfortunately, it is considered by the Chinese a point of strategic importance—which it is not—and troops are often sent here. A mythical threat from the east had brought down reinforcements to this remote place, and the inhabitants were fleeing as fast as they could. One night was enough for us to determine that the example given by the cognoscenti was too good to ignore, and we, too, fled away the day following.

It was a sad business altogether, as Charkhlik, left to itself, would really develop, and development is wanted here. It was a tragedy, too, that the cause of its woes was the imbecility of dumping men in a place where they could be neither fed nor relieved, and where, if attacked, could never escape alive. So it was a piece of bad luck for all concerned.

REVIEWS

A HISTORY OF BABISM

The Dawn-breakers: Nabil's Narrative of the Early Days of the Baha'i Revelation. Translated from the original Persian and edited by Shoghi Effendi. New York: Baha'i Publishing Committee. 1932.

This beautifully printed, richly illustrated, and admirably indexed volume is a chronicle of the Babi movement from its beginnings to a little after the execution of the Bab in 1853. The head* of the Baha'i community has displayed great skill as a translator, since the result of his work is a thrilling narrative, felicitously expressed. He has also shown himself a capable commentator, as his notes explain difficulties, and furnish from European sources confirmations of the statements in the text.

Although the volume is a biography of the Bab, the underlying purpose is to show that the Bab was the forerunner of a yet greater personage, Baha'ullah, after whom the Baha'i community is called. This purpose appears in the first anecdote introduced. A man to whom the secret had been communicated that a new Deliverer was to come into the world, announced with ecstatic joy on November 12, 1817, that this person had just been born. The witness of this scene, when he afterwards became a follower of the Bab, learned with disappointment that the Bab had been born some two years before that date. Presently he joined the community of Baha'ullah, and on enquiring his birth-date, found that it was the day whereon the announcement had been made!

"The light shineth in the darkness," and the blacker the darkness the more conspicuous the light. The darkness of Persia at the time when the Bab arose is described as hopelessly black. The statements of Nabil on this subject are confirmed by Shoghi Effendi, who quotes the authority of Lord Curzon (who indeed visited Persia a generation later than the time of the Bab). Nabil attributes any sort of opposition

* The headship in the case of all Islamic turuq (orders or sects) is normally hereditary. Baha'ullah was succeeded by his son Abd al-Baha, called in this work "the Most Great Branch"; the present head is the son of Abd al-Baha's daughter. The Bab himself lost his son by death. After the execution of the Bab and during the troubles that befell the community it would appear that Baha'ullah became its head as both its most important and ablest member, though his succession was not undisputed. The relations between him and the Bab prior to those events are not quite clear; Nabit says they never met.

which the Bab encountered to baseness of character; even when the opponents do what is right, their motives are shown to have been evil. Such partisanship helps to make the book interesting, but scarcely convincing, since the kind of light shed by the Bab in this work is not to the European mind luminous. Where Baha'ullah figures, he wins respect. He is a man of resource, able to rescue the heroine Ourrat al-'Ain from a difficult situation; he is a real reformer, or, at least, innovator, since he proclaims the abrogation of the Islamic rites and ordinances. We await with interest the subsequent volume which is to treat of his further career. In the Bab's record it is not easy to find much that evokes admiration. Few over here have the mentality which will be impressed by his chief miracle, ability to produce in a couple of days revelations as bulky as those produced by Muhammad the Prophet in twenty years. The portrait which Nabil has drawn of his hero bears considerable resemblance to that which M. Photiades has recently furnished so brilliantly of Cagliostro. Both seem to have possessed an extraordinary power of winning affection. Both appear to have effected the cure of disease by some personal influence. Each of them was for a time the idol of a fickle crowd.

One result of Nabil's narrative, which does not appear to have been intended, is, if not the justification, at any rate the explanation of the persecutions organized by the Persian Government. For of "the promised One," who the Bab claimed to be, it is said (p. 15): "His is the right to command whatsoever He willeth, and to decree that which He pleaseth. Whoever hesitates, whoever, though it be for the twinkling of an eye or less, questions His authority, is deprived of His grace, and is accounted of the fallen." One of the Bab's agents was asked by a provincial governor (p. 146) whether he approved of the Bab's telling the rulers and kings of the earth, "Divest yourselves of the robe of sovereignty, for He who is the King in truth hath been made manifest." It appears clearly that by this "King in truth" the Bab meant himself; on p. 316 he says plainly: "It is incumbent on the peoples of both the East and the West to obey My word and to pledge allegiance to My person." The provincial governor ordered the Bab's agents to be scourged, have their noses pierced, and be led through the streets of Shiraz with halters passed through their noses. We agree that this punishment was barbarous, but cannot agree that it was wholly undeserved (p. 148). One who preaches rebellion against an autocrat cannot well expect to go unpunished.

The Bab at first showed greater discretion than his agents. "The

masterly manner in which that Youth succeeded in silencing his formidable opponents" (p. 145) was the simple expedient of publicly abdicating his claims. "The Bab, as he faced the congregation, declared: The condemnation of God be upon him who regards me either as a representative of the Imam (the promised One) or the gate (bab) thereof." Later on, when force had come to be employed, he adopted a bolder attitude. On the other hand his able general, Mulla Husain, seems to have reverted to discretion. He asserted that the Babis had no intention of subverting the foundations of the monarchy or usurping the authority of the Shah (p. 365).

The appeal to force was started by a dastardly murder perpetrated by a man who apparently was not a Babi, but a follower of some teachers regarded as forerunners of the Bab. The motive for the murder was the employment by the victim of some disrespectful language about those teachers. The victim's heirs took savage reprisals on the Babis. connection of this affair with the conference of Badasht at which Baha'ullah abrogated the ordinances of Islam is not very clear; but one of the Bab's agents proceeded to organize a force, and build a fort at Shaikh Tabarsi, where he prepared for a siege. This event coincided with the commencement of a new reign, and the young Shah's advisers very naturally regarded the building of a fort as an overt act of rebellion, which it was their duty to suppress. Though Baha'ullah advised and attempted to aid the besieged, it is clear that the latter still adhered strictly to the Islamic rites. Led by a man of great courage and ability, a handful of devotees (or perhaps fanatics) were able to defeat repeatedly numerous forces sent against them, though ultimately they succumbed. Meanwhile the Bab had been arrested, and conveyed from one prison to another, having succeeded by the magic of his personality in winning jailer after jailer to his cause.

The fierce resistance which had been offered by the heroes of Shaikh Tabarsi, and the losses which they had inflicted on the Government troops naturally led to a general persecution of the sect; just as the initial successes of the Young Pretender account for the ruthlessness of "the Butcher" when the Pretender had been compelled to flee. Little more than a century separated the events in Persia from those in Great Britain, and we might expect Great Britain in the eighteenth century to be more humane than Persia in the nineteenth; but a Government that has been defied and humiliated is apt to be merciless when it recovers the upperhand.

The weakness which the Persian Government had exhibited in the

affair of Shaikh Tabarsi caused vast accessions to the Babi community, and similar episodes were enacted elsewhere in Persia. Forts were seized and victualled, the Babis defended themselves for a time with extraordinary courage, but were ultimately overcome by numbers; according to Nabil the Government forces had no monopoly of savagery or even of treachery. If it is true that the Babi leaders charged their followers to defend themselves valiantly, but never to attack, they must be held responsible for the disasters which befell them; war cannot be waged in that way: unless people intend to win they had better not fight at all.

When these troubles were at their height the Persian Government resolved on the execution of the Bab at Tabriz. The account of this affair is similar to records found in the Vitæ Sanctorum. The first attempt on the life of the saint is miraculously frustrated; but a second succeeds. The atrocity is not prevented but is miraculously punished. If these records are historical, the ways of Providence are certainly past finding out.

The overthrow of the Babi forces and the execution of their chief were followed by a futile attempt on the life of the young Shah, which led to further persecutions. It is not necessary to enquire into the workings of Providence, which in this case interfered effectively, if at all; but the comments of both Nabil and Lord Curzon (whom Shoghi Effendi quotes) are deserving of consideration. "The folly (says Nabil, p. 600) that characterized their (the assassins') act was betrayed by the fact that in making such an attempt on the life of their sovereign, instead of employing effective weapons which would ensure the success of their venture, these youths charged their pistols with shot which no reasonable person would ever think of using for such a purpose. Had their action been instigated by a man of judgment and common sense, he would certainly never have allowed them to carry out their intention with such ridiculously ineffective instruments." Their folly, it thus appears, lay not in their attempting regicide, but in their taking no steps to ensure success.

Lord Curzon wrote: "From the facts that Babism in its earliest years found itself in conflict with the civil powers, and that an attempt was made by Babis on the life of the Shah, it has been wrongly inferred that the movement was political in origin and Nihilist in character." For the charge that it was Nihilist in character Nabil's narrative does not furnish much evidence. Still we are told in the record of the conference at Badasht (p. 293) that "each day of that memorable gathering

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witnessed the abrogation of a new law and the repudiation of a long-established tradition. The veils that guarded the sanctity of the ordinances of Islam were sternly rent asunder." In consequence (p. 298) "a few of the followers of the Bab sought to abuse the liberty which the repudiation of the laws and sanctions of an outgrown Faith had conferred upon them."

The assertion, however, that the movement was non-political is not to be reconciled with Nabil's account. As has been seen, the Bab claimed to be supreme dictator of the world. If he was, as he asserted and convinced many others, the Qa'im, the one who should arise from the family of Muhammad to fill the world with justice, he could not claim to be anything less. Lengthy as is Nabil's biography of the Bab, the only doctrine which he emphasizes, or perhaps mentions, is that of the Bab's Qa'imship. This is what the Bab and his agents demonstrate from the Qur'an and the Tradition, confounding their opponents, whose reports of the debates would perhaps be different. The miracles which the Bab works are consistent with this claim; he cures cholera by giving the sufferer a draught of the water in which he had performed his ceremonial ablution. He can mount and ride with ease an exceptionally restive steed. He can foretell the future with exactitude.

If therefore Nabil is right, Lord Curzon was mistaken. The Bab resembled the long line of Alid Pretenders, with whose failures and successes Islamic history is crowded. If the armies of the Shah were really as debauched, ill-disciplined, and cowardly as Nabil asserts, the Bab ought to have been able to oust him with ease.

As an Alid pretender the Bab's claims were based on the Qur'an and Islamic Tradition. Shoghi Effendi furnishes an example of the mode in which Tradition is employed, this time in favour of the claims of Baha'ullah. "Mirza Abu'l-Fadl quotes, in his Fara'id (pp. 50-51), the following remarkable tradition from Muhammad, which is recognized as an authentic utterance of the Prophet, and to which Siyyid 'Abdu'l-Vahhab-i-Sha'rani refers in his work entitled Kitabu'l-Yavaqit va'l-Javahir: All of them (the companions of the Qa'im) shall be slain except one who shall reach the plain of Akka, the Banquet-Hall of God." Since Baha'ullah alone remained of all who had shown themselves capable of carrying on the Bab's work, and died in confinement at Acre (Akka), such a prophecy would seem very remarkable. Only it has no existence. What Sha'rani quotes is a Tradition that the Mahdi shall be present at the greatest battle, the feast of Allah in the mead of Akka. The Feast of Allah means a massacre of Byzantines. One

wonders whether the other Traditions whereby the Bab confounded his adversaries had more to do with the subject.

It is not permissible to palliate the atrocities committed by the Persian Government either in their suppression of the Babi fighters or in their reprisals for the attempt on the Shah's life. When, however, we remember that the murder of a European royalty in 1914 turned land and sea for more than four years over a large part of the globe into one vast slaughterhouse, we are enabled to understand where we cannot excuse.

The enthusiastic language in which Shoghi Effendi in his Epilogue depicts the success which Baha'ism has attained, and prophesies that the ascendancy it will eventually obtain will be such as no other Faith has ever in its history achieved, seems somewhat out of proportion to the evidence. The future cannot indeed be foretold, and though the phenomenal spread of certain religions is historical fact, the causes of such growth are obscure; crevit obscuro velut arbor ævo is certainly true of Christianity, and the writings of the early Christians doubtless seemed as bewildering to educated Græco-Romans in the early centuries of our era as do the Baha'i scriptures to Western readers of our time. If the movement is growing, in this country at any rate crescit obscuro ævo. And though Shoghi Effendi's translation of Nabil's work has qualities which should attract readers, it is unlikely to win much sympathy for the Bab.

D. S. Margoliouth.

Caste and Race in India. By G. S. Ghurye. 9\frac{3}{4}" \times 6\frac{1}{4}". Pp. vii + 209 + 19. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. 10s. 6d.

This book is a volume of the ambitious "History of Civilization," of which Mr. C. K. Ogden is the general editor. It falls roughly into three parts, the first an account of what is known of the history and development of caste, and the second an attempt to correlate caste and race, while in the third the author

propounds views of the future.

Mr. Ghurye's energy and industry deserve every praise. His historical pages are a mosaic of quotations from classical texts and modern studies, interspersed with appropriate and often sound comment. To a reader new to things Indian this part of the book should be of very considerable value. One, however, who has handled similar books before must feel that he has seen most of it already. The very multiplicity of the quotations makes it difficult to assess their value, or to distinguish those which are authoritative and of wide application from others which have at most a local or temporary validity. None the less, the Hindu system is so comprehensive and so tolerant of opposite and contradictory tendencies that it is not a little to the author's credit that he should have given the general student a reasonably clear idea of what caste has meant for India on the whole.

The section on race is suggestive rather than conclusive. The science of anthropometry has not yet altogether passed the contentious stage, and when the populations are numbered by hundreds of millions, a few thousand measurements of cephalic and nasal indices—great as is the devoted labour which they represent—do not go far towards proof of a theory. Yet they point to some striking results. It is no surprise to find that the higher castes of the United Provinces have preserved the purest Indo-Aryan stock, but the anthropometric classification of other castes in each province is very different from their present social status. Without going into detail, it is enough to say that the author's list of six main physical types among the Hindu population of India may be as

near the truth as any other yet drawn up.

It is a pity that so many Indian writers of the present day regard it as legitimate to ascribe to the machinations of the British Government any development of which they do not approve. Our author admits that from the first it was the British policy "to leave the peculiar institutions of the country severely alone" as far as possible, but he censures the administration alike because it did not leave the Brahman supremacy untouched and because it has stood in the way of those reformers who would gladly see caste abolished altogether. It is usual to praise the rule of law and to demand for the courts the most complete immunity from executive interference, but it is not just to charge the administration with double-dealing because the sacrosanctity given to judicial decisions has frequently resulted in the ossification of the law, and in hampering efforts, with which the executive authorities themselves may have had the fullest sympathy, to reform practices which are no longer in accord with the best sentiment of the day. The suggestion that the entry of the caste of the sender in a railway risk note "has been inserted to enable the officers concerned to form a rough estimate of the moral character of the person" is merely ridiculous. The railway officials do not trouble themselves about the moral character of their clients, but they are very much interested in securing their proper identification. For other but equally obvious reasons it is, in the present stage of development in India, absolutely indispensable for magistrates and revenue officers and others who have to do justice between man and man to have knowledge of the castes of those appearing before them. Mr. Ghurye is probably nearer the truth when he regards the immense pains taken at every census to record and tabulate castes as to a great extent a waste of energy. But the collection of these details is prompted by a genuine, even if misguided, scientific interest rather than by a malign desire to divide and rule.

If with Mr. Ghurye the wish is sometimes father to the thought, he is not alone in that failing. He may, however, be assured that when the Indo-Aryans, "called upon to throw off caste, would rise to the occasion and achieve a still greater triumph" (for this is the note on which he closes his book), they will not find their task made more difficult by the British Prime Minister or by those British officials who may still remain in India when that day of awakening arrives.

E. H.

The Jesuits and the Great Mogu!. By Sir Edward Maclagan. Pp. xxi+434. 9" × 5\frac{3}{4}". Burns Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., London. 1932. 17s. 6d.

This book, by the President of the Royal Asiatic Society, will rank very high among studies in Indian history. It bears the *imprimatur* of the Vicar-General of Westminster and it is published by the publishers to the Holy See, but these are not perhaps to be taken as indications of its value as a record, the first com-

plete and fully documented record of what was one of the most romantic of all Christian missionary adventures, the quest after the soul of the Great Mogul. The quest failed, as we know, but the records which those who took part in it have left us, now woven together for the first time into a single whole, not only keep us in constant touch with the fluctuations of their hopes and disappointments, but present us with very intimate and human portraits of certain of the Emperors such as no other writers have painted.

The first mission reached Fatehpur Sikri at the end of February, 1580, in response to an invitation from Akbar. At that time, he had been on the throne for twenty-four years, and was no longer an orthodox Muslim. The personnel of the mission was carefully chosen. The Spaniard Monserrate, who has left us an invaluable account of their missionary efforts and of the Mogul Court, was a "wise and observant man of studious habits," while Aquaviva, who was destined a few years later to earn a martyr's crown, was "an Italian of high social status and outstanding sanctity." They had with them a Persian convert from Islam as an interpreter. Sir Edward Maclagan inclines to the view that Akbar's enquiries were prompted by the desire to ascertain whether Christianity was a faith which could suitably be imposed on all his subjects. His abandonment of orthodoxy had seriously alarmed the Muslims and rebellions broke out in Bengal and in Kabul. We can hardly be surprised. The missionaries were honoured by the Emperor with a degree of intimacy that was accorded to few. He listened with respect to their reproaches regarding the number of his wives. He had put his son Murad under their tuition. He and his sons attended the Christian services, removing their turbans as a mark of respect, while he himself kissed the sacred books and pictures. After his victorious return from Kabul, however, his attitude towards the mission was no longer quite the same. He was further than ever from Islam, but he had formed his own conclusions on matters of religious belief, and shortly afterwards he promulgated the Din Ilahi. The Fathers felt the change. Monserrate left in April, 1582. Aquaviva followed a year later, and in July, 1583, was murdered by an angry mob near Goa, to the great grief of the Emperor.

The second mission in 1591 was well received and some of the princes attended the mission school in the palace at Lahore, but the Fathers soon realized that it was too late to hope for the Emperor's conversion, and returned to Portuguese India.

Akbar was disappointed at their departure. He communicated with the authorities at Goa, who despatched three missionaries "of outstanding competence," among them Father Jerome Xavier, great-nephew of St. Francis, who had died in China in 1552. The mission reached Akbar's Court at Lahore in May, 1595, and Father Xavier was with him almost without a break till the death of the Emperor more than ten years later. During this period, though Akbar showed the missionaries great favour, he as a rule avoided religious discussions with them. So far as the problems of faith were concerned, he had already announced his conclusions, and whether he died a Muslim or not, he never was more than an enquirer as regards Christianity. But though the mission failed to convert the Emperor, they succeeded in obtaining from him a written order permitting his subjects to embrace Christianity without let or hindrance. As regards his own views, he seems to have been quite frank with the Fathers. He told them clearly that he found it impossible to accept the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. His attitude of cautious and reverent scepticism may have deprived the Jesuits of a royal convert, but it kept the long reign of the most illustrious of the Mogul Kings free from the stain of religious persecution.

Jahangir was even more demonstrative towards the Fathers than Akbar had been, though there were intervals of disfavour, chiefly for political reasons. He spoke of "his affection for the Lord Jesus." He wore a golden cross beneath his robe. He laughed aloud at the discomfiture of Muslim disputants. He subscribed to the cost of churches, and, more surprising still, he had three of his nephews baptized with imposing public ceremonial. But, like his father, Jahangir found the doctrine of the Trinity an insurmountable obstacle. His attitude is well described by Sir Edward Maclagan: "While he sat loosely to all forms of religion and yet showed an interest in all, his interest was not of the same refined and earnest type as that of his father."

The motto at the head of the chapter which deals with Shah Jahan is "Foris pugnæ intus timores." The golden age for the Jesuits was past. Within a short time of his accession, the events at Hugli led to the most serious persecution that Christians in India have ever had to suffer. Sir Edward Maclagan gives a very full account of the episode, based on materials which have recently been made available. It is an enthralling story, but neither the splendid gallantry of the defence nor the terrible sufferings of the Portuguese in their subsequent captivity should be permitted to blind us to the fact that they had put themselves

grievously in the wrong at the outset.

Space prevents us from following the fortunes of the Jesuits during the period of the decline of the Empire. The text "Quasi absconditus vultus ejus et despectus" gives the note of the chapter which deals with the later Moguls and closes with the suppression of the Society of Jesus by the Pope in 1773, and the capture of Delhi by the British in 1803. But there are many names and many memories over which the reader will linger, and those for whom the minor romances of history have a special charm will find much of absorbing interest in the chapters on Abkar's Christian wife, the Indian Bourbons, Mirza Zu'lqarnain and Donna Juliana Diaz da Costa.

There is a separate chapter devoted to the works of Father Monserrate. The publication of his *Commentarius* in 1912 we owe to Father Hosten, to whose monumental labours in connection with the history of the Jesuit missions Sir Edward Maclagan pays a well-deserved tribute. Akin to this chapter are others on the Culture and Language of the Jesuit Fathers, and the Persian works of

Father Jerome Xavier.

The chapter on the Missions and Mogul Painting will make a wider appeal. The attitude of orthodox Muslims towards pictures and statuary is well known, but "the Mogul rulers looked with a good deal of tolerance on the Christian use of images and paintings, and in the case of the earlier sovereigns, Akbar and Jahangir, the feeling was one not merely of toleration, but also of sympathy and admiration." "Few presents were more acceptable to Jahangir than a good picture." A large number of European pictures thus found their way to India, and influenced profoundly the style of Indian artists. It is difficult for us to realize that in some of the rooms of the royal palaces the walls and ceilings were covered with paintings of Christian subjects by Indian artists. Sir Edward devotes nearly fifty pages to the influence of European art, and there are many who will find this the most interesting chapter in the book. The excellent illustrations which adorn the volume are in reality all of them illustrations to this chapter. The author has brought together a vast mass of material and has most lucidly analyzed and arranged it all.

Special chapters deal with the Congregations and the Churches and Residences, while the last chapter gives the strange story of the Tibetan missions.

The sources are described and discussed in the important opening chapter,

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while Appendix I. gives a list of Jesuit letters and reports from Mogor, Bengal, and Tsaparang. The author tells us that it was some notes made by his father, the late General Maclagan, on the leanings of Akbar towards Christianity, which first led him to explore the wider field of the history of the Jesuit missions during Akbar's reign. The results of his investigations were published in 1896 in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. The work which is now presented to the public completes the story. It is a magnificent achievement, distinguished not only by scholarship and research of a high order, but by the balanced judgment of the man of affairs, and the sober and lucid eloquence which is now more rare than it was a generation ago. The members of the service to which Sir Edward Maclagan belonged have made many eminent contributions to the history of the country which they served. The present work will be placed with the greatest of them.

REVIEWS

J. P. T.

In the Footsteps of the Buddha. By Réné Grousset, translated from the French by Mariette Leon. Pp. xi+352. Illustrations, 2 Indices, and Map. Routledge. 15s.

"Periodically," notes M. Grousset, "humanity, after an infinite number of gropings, creates itself, realizes the purposes of its existence in one brief and rare moment of success, then destroys itself, loses itself once more, in an all-too-slow

process of dissolution.

"The Buddhist world appears to have experienced one of these favoured periods. It was in the early Middle Ages, about the seventh century of our era. Darkness brooded over our Western civilization which as yet guessed nothing of the approaching Romance dawn, and even extended to Byzantium, where the great basileis had not yet arisen. But away in the Far East, India and China were living with an intense political, intellectual, religious, and artistic life. Buddhism, in bringing them into contact with one another, had created a vast current of humanism, from Ceylon to the farthest isles of the

Japanese archipelago."

It is the story of this contact between the peoples of India and the Far East that M. Grousset seeks to tell in this book. For the most part he is content to describe the life of Hsüan Tsang, the eminent Buddhist divine who trawelled overland from China to India, probably in the early years of the seventh century. The first few chapters are exceedingly hard to follow, even to one who is familiar with the history of the period: the reader must plod diligently through a desert of Chinese and other place names, Sanskrit philosophical terms, and historical dates, to be rewarded occasionally by refreshing oases in the form of extracts from Hsüan Tsang's own biography. One wishes at times that the author had confined himself to editing the latter work and publishing it anew, a task for which he is eminently qualified, and one which badly needs carrying out, as the existing accounts of the pilgrim's travels and biography are difficult to obtain.

M. Grousset, as we should expect of the Keeper of the Musée Guimet, is at his best in describing the art of the period. Unlike many writers on art, he never loses sight of the cultural background, so that we get a really excellent picture of the civilization that gave birth to the great Buddhist works of art, from the statues of the Wei dynasty at Yun-kang to the marvels of Ajanta, Horyuji, and Borobudur.

"If the religious and political conditions that gave it (Buddhist art) birth—Buddhism and a comparative autonomy, or at least the presence of liberal and tolerant masters—had been maintained, if these ancient Græco-Buddhist provinces of Kapisa, Lampaka, and Gandhāra had not become Islamic territory, we can suppose that the curve of artistic evolution would have continued. It might perchance have been there that the human spirit, after adumbrating the transition from Græco-Roman to Gothic, would have realized this latter and brought it to maturity nine centuries before us."

In describing Hsüan Tsang's visits to the various Indian Courts M. Grousset really does succeed in bringing the times to life; and we can almost feel the Brahman influence becoming stronger and stronger until finally it crushes the very spirit of Buddhism. The account of the closing days of Harsha's Court is

particularly convincing.

"We are now in April, 643. Four years later Harsha disappears, replaced by a usurper who commits such deeds of robbery that the Sino-Nepalese Army of Wang Hsüan-ts'ê comes to take him captive. Henceforth there is chaos in Northern India. The Rājput feudatories seize the thrones of Mālva and the Ganges without being able to reconstitute the united empire of which Harsha has been the last defender. With these rulers comes the triumph of all the reactions of the non-Aryan element, the revenge of Sivaism and Tantrism. Then falls the Moslem avalanche, rushing down from the Khyber Pass, with its squadrons of Mameluk iconoclasts. With Harsha's death ends what is certainly the finest and most glorious period of Indian history. This last prince of the house of Thānēsvar, to whom no successor is known, is really the last of the Āryas, of the men of our own race, in what has once more become a stranger world."

M. Grousset also deals briefly with the travels of I-Ching (643-713) and certain other of Hsüan Tsang's contemporaries, all of whom travelled to India by the sea route, which was even then fully developed. His closing chapters are devoted to a brief excursus of Buddhist philosophy, which are, however, somewhat too condensed to make for clear understanding.

The translation of this book is strangely uneven: in some parts the English reaches quite high levels, whilst in others it is almost unreadable, so laboured

and in places ungrammatical does it become.

The spelling of the place names will be somewhat unfamiliar to English readers: Saluen for Salween; Samarqand for Samarkand, and so on: and it is also doubtful if diacritical marks serve any useful purpose in a book of this sort. If it is considered necessary to use them a key to their meaning should invariably be provided. This has not been done in the present work, where, in any case, it would have been preferable to confine their use to the two Indexes (one of persons, the other of places). In the book under review diacritical marks have most certainly been used to excess; for we find such familiar names as Kabul, Srinagar, and even Kashmir heavily disfigured by them, thus spoiling the even appearance of the text.

The book is illustrated with photographs of contemporary works of art: that of a Greek head of a Bodhisattva in Stucco (facing page 97) discovered at Hadda, in Afghanistan, and now in the Musée Guimet, is particularly beautiful and calls

for special mention. The map is adequate.

Altogether this is a most interesting book. Of the scholarship and expert knowledge of its author there is no doubt whatsoever, and it is ungrateful to find fault where there is so much excellence. If there is a fault it is that the author gives us too much detail, and one cannot but wish that he had treated the life

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of Hsüan Tsang in the manner in which Mr. Laurence Binyon has dealt with Akbar in the brilliant little study which he has recently published.

C. J. MORRIS.

The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908. With a Survey of Policy since 1849. By C. Collin Davies. 82" × 52". Pp. xii+220. 3 maps. Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.

Dr. Davies' book is a useful survey of the Military Problem of the North-West Frontier, which it puts forward clearly and succinctly. Where, however, the author fails, as, having had no personal experience of the question, he was almost bound to fail, is where "the military problem merges into the political."

Moreover, as the author's survey only takes us up to 1908 it is by now already much out of date. Especially is this the case in Waziristan, the country on which the author has based most of his more important arguments, where an entirely new policy, on the lines of the Sandeman policy, was inaugurated in 1922.

On the highly complicated and controversial subject of the political aspect of the case the author's summing up must, I think, be considered as unsatisfactory, as, beyond placing the problem before his readers, he has done little or nothing to solve it.

On the other hand, though he has stated that the Sandeman policy is entirely unsuited to most Pathan tribes, he has then gone on, though probably quite unwittingly, to put forward many proofs that such a policy is the only one which can be successful.

For instance, in his conclusions, he has definitely stated that the only hope of peace on the frontier is by the spread of civilization amongst the tribes. Elsewhere in his book he has also pointed out that "we can never hope to solve the frontier problem until the tribesmen are able to gain a livelihood without being forced to raid the settled districts."

Now, these are two of the main principles on which the Sandeman policy was built. Indeed, it is the only policy which has ever aimed at carrying out these principles. That the "Close Border" system makes no attempt to do so, and can therefore never be successful, the author himself admits when he writes, "The student of frontier history is soon convinced that the policy of butcher and bolt (another name for the 'Close Border' policy) will never produce any lasting results."

Although the author has pointed out that "the most pressing problem on the whole frontier since 1919 has been the settlement of the Wazir problem," unfortunately he has not even touched on the new policy in Waziristan, which was aimed at settling that problem. Indeed, it is practically on Waziristan that he has based his whole argument that the Sandeman policy is not generally applicable to Pathan tribes.

As he has taken his stand on Waziristan, let me do the same and see how far he is correct in saying that the most unanswerable argument against the success of the Maliki (Sandeman) system is the fact that it completely failed when my father (Mr. R. I. Bruce) introduced it into that country.

"But, was Mr. Bruce ever allowed by the authorities to introduce the Sandeman system into Waziristan?" The author himself, again quite unintentionally, I think, proves that he was not, for he says that the greatest mistake Mr. Bruce made was that he introduced the system "without first occupying some commanding central position." The author is perfectly correct in saying that a commanding central position was one of the foundations of the Sandeman policy, but incorrect

in saying that this was not recognized by Mr. Bruce. Far from this being the case, Mr. Bruce never ceased stressing the importance of this. In fact, the policy he advocated might be summed up in a nutshell as follows: "Let Government place a brigade at Razmak with strong outposts at Wana and Sherinna; open up the country by roads; develop its resources; give employment to the tribesmen as levies; control the country from within and give it a loose administration as was done by Sandeman in Baluchistan, and I guarantee you will hear little more of the Wazir problem." As the very essence of the Sandeman system, control from within, was not sanctioned, the fault was not Mr. Bruce's, but the Government's. The Sandeman system did not fail in Waziristan, it was not tried. That being the case, the author's main argument seems to fall to the ground.

He cites the occupation of the Bori and Zhob valleys as examples of how Sandeman recognized the importance of control from within. Though perfectly good examples of how Sandeman recognized the importance of such control, they are hardly good examples that Mr. Bruce did not do so. Possibly, however, the author did not know that Mr. Bruce himself had a good deal to do with the taking over of these valleys, and, as regards the Bori Valley in particular, it was he who first visited it and recommended its being taken over to Sir Robert

Sandeman!

The author then cites, as an additional proof of the failure of the Maliki (Sandeman) system in Waziristan, the fact that in 1893 the headmen, who had been instrumental in handing over to justice the murderers of Mr. Kelly, had themselves been murdered by their own tribesmen. The absolute necessity of supporting the Maliks was another of the foundations of the Sandeman policy. As the Durand boundary mission was on at the time these murders took place, the necessary support from Government, which was strongly advocated by my father, was not forthcoming. As an example that the Sandeman system was not carried out in Waziristan it is therefore a good one, as an example that it failed it carries no weight.

Another injustice done to Mr. Bruce by the author is the accusation that the Waziristan Maliks were chosen by him and not by the tribe. This, I think, needs no further proof than the fact that when the present policy was inaugurated, in 1922-23, Government had to return to Mr. Bruce's list. Indeed, they had had to return to it before this. Had the author gone through the present lists of Maliks in Waziristan and their family histories he would have found that all the leading Maliks, and, in fact, practically all the Maliks, were sons or near relations of

those appointed by Mr. Bruce.

The last and greatest proof of all that Mr. Bruce was right is in the fact that the present policy in Waziristan is almost exactly the policy advocated by him nearly forty years ago. Razmak has been occupied by a garrison of all arms. Wana has also been occupied. A network of roads has been made. The tribesmen have been given employment as "Khassadars" (levies) and control from within has been established. At last, therefore, after a period of nearly forty years, the Sandeman policy, though not yet absolutely in full, has been adopted.

But has the present policy proved a success? Having, either as Resident in Waziristan, or as Deputy Commissioner Dera Ismail Khan, had a great deal to do with the carrying out, if not the inauguration, of this policy, I will confine myself to quoting a short extract from the *Times of India* of January last. This article is of special significance and importance, as, of all the English papers of repute published in India, this paper was one of those which had taken the longest to convert, and the one that had argued most strongly against this

policy being tried in Waziristan. "Waziristan is contentedly quiet. . . . The chief thought of the tribes of Southern Waziristan is for the extension of British control and of civilizing activities among them . . . now the acquiescence of the trans-frontier tribes . . . springs absolutely from their appreciation of the blessings of law and order. . . . We strongly protested on the grounds of expense against the adoption of the new frontier policy when it was introduced in 1922, but that should not make us undervalue the great results which it has achieved. . ."

I agree, therefore, with the author's conclusion that the hope of permanent peace lies in the spread of civilization both in Afghanistan and on the Indian borderland, but hold that the only policy which will bring this about is one based on the tribal organization and tribal customs and built up therefrom—in other words, such a policy as Sandeman's.

C. E. BRUCE.

The Frontier Peoples of India. By Alexander McLeish. 10" x 6\frac{1}{2}". Pp. 202. Illustrations, Maps. World Dominion Press. 5s.

The title of this book is somewhat more important than the contents, in that it contains no very serious contribution to frontier lore and problems, while as a missionary book it does not yield some of those intimate human glimpses and traits which missionaries alone get in touch with. Otherwise the book is a pleasantly written gazetteer with cheap maps and lists of tribes. The grouping of the folk in this long frontier without connection and without much reference to the India they adjoin, save to give an idea of the vast unconnected areas in which missionary enterprise is active, has no particular purpose, and no particular significance. The work in Tehri Garwal, for instance, has no connection with the N.W. Frontier as such. On the other hand, each section of the frontier dealt with is a useful little gazetteer for the particular part of the border concerned, and given a less pretentious title there would be nothing but praise for well-produced book for a special missionary purpose. It is also of value as a useful aide-mémoire for a more important study of the border and border folk Maps, index, and arrangement as well as literary style are all to be commended The illustrations are also typical and pleasing. No one should read this book with the idea of finding a serious study of the frontier problem, but many may read it with pleasure and profit who need the briefest bowing acquaintance with the subject. The categories stop at Assam, and the kindred folks on the Burma border are not treated of.

Purdah: The Status of Indian Women. By Frieda Hanswirth (Mrs. Sarangadar Das). 8½" ×5¾". Pp. ix+289. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner. 10s. 6d.

Mrs. Das, in the foreword of this sincere and able book, states that it is an endeavour to side not with partisans but with truth. The result of her efforts is, though deeply interesting, at times slightly confusing to the reader. A child of Switzerland, student of California, wife of a Hindu, Mrs. Das has unique opportunities for observation, yet in her former book, Marriage to India, it was clear that she irked at the No Man's Land in which she found herself. In this later book Purdah one fancies that she is still without a definite standpoint, and the reader may be inclined to accuse her of inconsistency, for sometimes one paragraph appears to be written from the Eastern point of view, whilst the very next is from the Western.

The theme of *Purdah* is the astonishing change which has taken place in the behaviour of Indian women in recent years. This change and development Mrs. Das does not attribute to any particular incident such as the Nationalist Movement, though she avers that it has undoubtedly hastened it. In her opinion it was inevitable. For over half a century there has been an increasing straining and breaking of those terrible chains which were first fastened on to women in the Brahminical Period, and a looking back to the freedom of the Vedic days when women lived as equal partners with man free to share his life physical and spiritual.

In a book which covers so much ground, from "The Freedom of the Vedic Period" to "Women and the Nationalist Movement," it is difficult to select any particular chapter for comment, especially when all are so full of interest and information. Writing of the Zenana, Mrs. Das points out its far-reaching effects beyond the obvious ones. She quotes, for instance, the inevitable death of all interest in the care of the home, when women are never in that part of the house where visitors are received, and the impossibility of retaining their native sense of beauty when they are all huddled together in ill-lit quarters swarming with children of all ages. In that life of most monotonous routine, of implicit obedience to husband and mother-in-law, of innumerable bickerings and jealousies, the brilliance of jewelry and saris can be their only taste of beauty. It is not surprising that these high caste women often vent their pent-up emotions on equals and inferiors in obscene language and abuse. These scenes must inevitably take place in front of the children who naturally are only too ready to repeat them with gusto. In this same chapter there is a truly heartbreaking picture of the little Hindu bride entering into the strange household, prostrated with homesickness and self-consciousness, spied upon, criticized, only speaking when she is spoken to, the first to rise in the morning, the last to go to rest. Implicit obedience is exacted from her; her meals can only be taken when all other members of the household are served. She is not allowed to see her husband during the day, and the jealousy of the mother-in-law may prevent her from the privilege of cooking her husband's food or coming to him when he is ill. It is a haunting story, and one which is perhaps lost sight of in the more ghastly physical side of child marriage. Mrs. Das is of opinion that it is these conditions which tend to make the little Hindu wife find in her husband a "father" rather than a "mate," and that this has far-reaching effects. She seeks her emotional fulfilment in her son rather than in her husband. She binds her son with unbreakable cords, she possesses him, and he in his turn, however he may rebel in childhood, will long before he is adolescent yield to the universal mother worship. In Mrs. Das' own words, "Never has man dug a deeper pit for himself than did the Hindu when he worshipped goddesses, and degraded woman, when he adored the mother, and slighted the wife."

In the light of modern psychology one cannot but agree.

Though obviously striving to be fair, it is clear that the author is no fonder of the British than she is of the Brahmin. She alludes to the former, by the way, as the "White blue-eyed Brahmin." The two are the villains of the piece. Scattered throughout the book are many rather acid comments on British policy, comments which suggest the difficulty which some authors experience in gaining access to historical records. For example, take her comparison of the success of Albuquerque in suppressing widow burning in Goa, with the reluctance of the British to interfere in a custom claimed to be based on Hindu religion. The main purpose of Albuquerque was to convert the heathen by fire and sword, and his policy has held good during the succeeding generations in a few hundred

square miles of desolate jungle. The British decided to abjure proselytism, and to civilize the country step by step, and their influence has spread triumphantly, changing the lives of hundreds of millions in all India. It is difficult to conceive a comparison which gives less support to the theory of callous negligence which appears to be the conclusion Mrs. Das has reached.

Then she disputes the idea that such education as there is for Indian women has been brought about by the British. On the contrary, she declares that when they took over there were large numbers of Brahminic Sanskrit schools where reading, writing, sewing, and cooking were taught, that in Delhi alone there were six public schools taught by Punjabi Brahmin women. (It is odd, by the way, since Delhi is a Moslem city, that she makes no mention of Moslems and their Mullah schools.) But here there are many who will agree that it would have been in the best interests of India if these schools could have been saved and adapted to present needs, and who wholeheartedly echo her opinion that it is useless for an Indian girl to read of "hares and bluebells and Santa Claus."

To those who have not visited India recently it is an amazing revelation to read of the suffrage and social work Indian women are now undertaking.

The slow breaking down of the Joint Family System has been an undoubted factor, and in this connection it is interesting to learn that Mrs. Das declares, judging from those who have broken caste under her roof, that not more than one out of ten Orthodox Hindus observe caste rules from principles.

In her account of the curious custom at Puri, where all caste and purdah rules may be tossed aside, she shows how light a straw may turn the tide, as indeed one realizes from the way in which all and sundry are willing to travel by train and bus. She is of opinion that a great movement like the Nationalist movement might sweep away purdah and caste in an incredibly short time, whereas a foreign Government could not take the risk.

Enough has been written to show that purdah is provocative of thought. One hopes that readers may not be deterred by the inconsistencies referred to. They

are far too many to enumerate, but a few examples may be given.

On page 195 Mrs. Das writes, the Christian missionary is seldom free from the "white ruler's loathed attitude of race superiority." On pages 198 and 199 she says, "It is best to let a Hindu woman express how she and her sisters appreciate the work of missionaries," and she quotes at length Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddi's address to the All-India Women's Conference in which the Missionary organization is referred to in the most glowing terms.

Then, "It is the writer's considered opinion that England as a Government through its official policy has done more harm than good to the cause of Women"; but elsewhere, "The white Brahmin in actuality though not always in intention has been the Indian Woman's friend," and "The majority of English people wholeheartedly back up the aims and aspirations of Indian Women."

As would be supposed, Mrs. Das has much to say on Mother India, the racial hatred it has engendered, the exaggerations, inaccuracies, and so forth. Yet on page 219 she admits the book certainly gave a tremendous impetus to reform, and resulted in the Age of Consent Report. "Even the best informed Indians themselves . . . had had but a partial idea of the extent and hold of this evil practice."

She is sarcastic on the supposedly "helpless" women of India and describes how five hundred of these "much abused defenceless weak creatures gathered together... to give the world a drastic little demonstration of just how cowed

they were, and how abused they felt."

One rubs one's eyes. Five hundred is not a large proportion of one hundred

and seventy million, and surely the greater part of Mrs. Das' book is the description of the Indian woman's sufferings and helplessness? Does she not write herself, "Kept down to some degree by a foreign government but far more by the weight of Indian custom"?

She cannot have it both ways.

But Mrs. Das has a lively pen, and where Manu himself and the Brahmin are sharply criticized, and Sister Nivedita gets a dig ("even child marriage, forced widowhood, and purdah received from her an appreciative pat on the back"), it is not likely that the British will escape.

R. L.

A Descriptive Catalogue of the Oriental Manuscripts belonging to the late E. G. Browne. By Edward G. Browne, M.A., M.B., F.B.A., F.R.C.P., edited, with a memoir of the author and a bibliography of his writings, by R. A. Nicholson, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press, 1932. 42s. net.

This work is a noble memorial to Professor E. G. Browne, who was a worthy successor of men such as Morrison of China, Max-Müller, and W. W. Hunter in the task of explaining to the Western world the inwardness of the Oriental outlook on life, and especially the value of Persia's contributions in the realm of literature and philosophy, and constitutional progress. On the subject of Persian sectaries, Ismailis, Hurufis and Babis, Professor Browne was the leading authority in Europe, and his magnificent Literary History of Persia, together with the equally comprehensive and learned work of Professor Nicholson on The Literary History of Arabia, placed Oriental studies in this country on a higher plane than ever before.

The Bibliography, including some 55 items, is a valuable aid to students of Persian literature, history, politics, medicine, and journalism, for Browne was

keenly interested in all these subjects.

Nearly 500 manuscripts are described in this work—all of value and importance, for Browne's flair for good books was only equalled by his energy in seeking them out, and he had good friends and generous. The Shaykhi and Babi MSS. are the richest extant assembly of documents relating to these sects, and those relating to the Hurufi and Sufi schisms are of outstanding value. Other important groups deal with History and Biography—Medicine and Science.

An important part of the total collection is the Albert Houtum-Schindler Library, which Professor E. G. Browne acquired on the death of its learned owner. It was, like Browne's own collection, "a working library, containing many very rare books carefully collected during a long period of time," and as such is peculiar. Browne's thirst for knowledge, and the depth and breadth of his interest in the Eastern world, have given the collection the character and individuality which marked his writings. This book will be indispensable to students so long as Eastern history is studied in the West.

A. T. W.

Ta'rikh-i-Jahān Gushay of Juwaynī. Vol. III. With an introduction by Sir E. Denison Ross. James G. Forlong Fund, Vol. X. Royal Asiatic Society, 1931. Pp. ii+108.

Sir E. Denison Ross deserves the thanks of all Orientalists for publishing this beautiful facsimile in 108 pages of a MS. dated 690 A.H., belonging to Wahīdu'l-

Mulk of Tihrān. The first two volumes of Juwaynī's history were edited by that eminent Persian scholar, Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Abdu'l-Wahhāb of Qazwīn, who is now preparing a critical edition of the third volume and will no doubt find this copy, written nine years after the author's death, extremely serviceable for purposes of collation. But apart from this ultimate value, the publication of the text is an immediate service to Persian letters, for it supplements and corrects the information hitherto available and presents a coherent narrative.

'Alā'u'd-Dın 'Atā Malik Juwaynī's history of the Assassins comprises two portions: the first, pp. 1-70, deals with Mängü Qā'ān and the campaign of Hülägü in Persia against the Assassins, and is based on personal observation, for 'Atā Malik was in the service of Hülägü and witnessed the extinction of the Assassins in 654 A.H.; the second, pp. 70-108, deals with the history of the Assassins, and is based on original sources like the Sarguzasht-i-Sayyidnā, which the author utilized when he inspected the Alamūt library before its destruction. The work, however, is not purely historical: information on Ismā'īlī doctrines

is found scattered in both these portions.

The founder of the sect was Hasan b. 'Alī b. Muhammad b. Ja'far b. Husayn b. Sabbāh al-Himyarī. His father came from Yemen to Kūfa and proceeded from Kūfa to Qum and thence to Ray, where he settled and where Hasan was born. In 464 A.H. Ibn 'Attash, whose "see" was 'Iraq, came to Ray, converted Hasan to the Isma'ili creed and bade him proceed to Cairo, the capital of al-Mustansir. Accordingly in 469 A.H. Hasan left for Egypt, where he arrived in 471 A.H. He returned to Isfahān in 473 A.H. and for ten years carried on a vigorous propaganda in Persia (visiting Kirman, Yezd, Khūzistan, Shahrvar-Kūh, Dāmghān, Jurjān, etc.), and finally captured Alūh-āmūt (Alamūt) in 483 A.H. Alūh-āmūt means the Eagle's Nest* (p. 71, l. 16). In 485 A.H., by order of Malikshāh, Hasan with sixty or seventy followers was besieged in Alamüt, but Dihdar Abu 'Alī sent 300 men, arms, and provisions from Qazwīn and Tāliqīn and the siege was raised. Thereupon Qizil Sārīgh was commissioned to destroy Alamut, but as Malikshah died about this time nothing was effected. The fratricidal wars between Barkiyārūq and Muḥammad enabled the Assassins to consolidate their power, but with the accession of Sultan Muhammad to the Seljuq throne the campaign against Hasan was resumed. The amir Anushtigin Shirgir besieged Lumm-sar (1 Safar, 511 A.H.) and Alamut (11 Rabī'I., 511 A.H.), but the campaign proved abortive because of the death of Sultan Muhammad. Afterwards Sultan Sanjar conducted a campaign against the Assassins in Quhistan, but a dagger in his tent, driven into the earth with the message, "If we were not well-disposed towards thee we could have stuck this dagger in thy soft breast rather than in the hard earth," compelled Sanjar to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Assassins. Hasan-ī-Şabbāh introduced the "New Propaganda" and established the institution of the Fida'is (p. 75, l. 12); he also introduced the principle of "Necessity,"—i.e., an imām was necessary to interpret religion. Hasan died in 518 A.H., and as he had put his sons, Husayn and Muhammad, to death, he nominated Muhammad Buzurg Ummīd to succeed him.

Space does not permit further details: the reign of Muḥammad Buzurg Ummīd (518-532 A.H.) is described on pp. 77-81; of Muḥammad b. Muḥammad Buzurg Ummīd (532-557 A.H.) on pp. 81-82; of Ḥasan 'alā dhikri's salām b.

^{*} Cf. Farhang-i-Jahangīrī under Āmūt where a verse from Manjīk is cited: "On the peak of the Caucasus of good fortune is the nest (āmūt) of the eagle of thy government."

Muḥammad (557-561 A.H.) on pp. 82-89; of Muḥammad b. Ḥasan (561-607 A.H.) on pp. 89-90; of Jalālu'd-Dīn Ḥasan b. Muḥammad (607-618 A.H.), the "New Musalmān," on pp. 89-93; of 'Alā'u'd-Dīn Muḥammad b. Julālu'd-Dīn Ḥasan (618-653 A.H.) on pp. 93-97; and of Ruknu'd-Dīn b. 'Ala'u'd-Dīn (653-654 A.H.) on pp. 97-104. According to a historical work dedicated to Fakhru'd-Dawlah the Buwayhid and found by 'Aṭā Malik in the Alamūt library, the castle of Alamūt was originally built by a Daylamite prince in 264 A.H. The stone walls of the castle were impregnable against steel, and in the castle were reservoirs containing honey, sugar, vinegar, and cereals, stored so carefully that they had not deteriorated since the days of Ḥasan-i-Ṣabbāḥ. Ruknu-d-Dīn was the last of the Grand Masters of Alamūt: he surrendered to Hülägü in 654 A.H., and in 655 A.H. was sent to the Mongol capital at Qarāqorum, where, observing that it was unnecessary to have brought him so far, Mängü Qā'ān ordered him to be put to death.

To proceed now to Ismā'īlī doctrines. When Hasan-i-Şabbāh established himself permanently at Alamut he sent his propagandists everywhere and fixed a day for himself for propagating his doctrines and carrying on the "New Propaganda." He argued as follows: God cannot be known by reason and insight, for as the majority of people are wise and possess insight, if wisdom and insight had alone sufficed for a knowledge of God, there would have been no religious differences among people. Therefore as religious differences do exist, it follows that wisdom and insight are not enough for a knowledge of God and that an imām is necessary to instruct people in religious matters. Further he asked: "Is intelligence alone sufficient for a knowledge of God?" Now if the disputant said "Yes," he could not object to any intelligent man possessing the Ismā'ilī faith, and if he said "No," then ipso facto it became necessary to have an imam to instruct people in matters of faith. Therefore, whether the disputant said "Yes" or "No" he admitted the proof of the soundness of the New Religion (pp. 72-73). Hasan b. Muhammad (557-561 A.H.) pushed these doctrines still farther: his ambitions had been checked by his father, who had put 250 of his followers to death and had the bodies carried out of Alamut on the shoulders of a like number of followers. But on his accession, Hasan held an 'Idi-Qiamat on the 17th of Ramadan, asking the people to eat in disregard of the Fast, and asserting that he is really the descendant of Nizār b. al-Mustansir (p. 85). "I, who am Hasan, declare that to-day I am God's vicegerent on earth and that Muhammad Muzaffar (Hasan's agent in Quhistan) is my vicegerent." A reaction in favour of Islam set in during the reign of Jalalu'd-Din Hasan (607-618 A.H.), who cursed his forefathers for their heresy, sent his mother to perform the pilgrimage at Mecca, and invited the divines of Qazwin to purge his library of heretical books. 'Ala'u'd-Din (618-653 A.H.), however, reversed his father's policy, but this may partly have been the result of melancholia, though the doctors dare not reveal the true nature of the disease, for it was a crime to assert that an imam could ever lose his mental power. It is not surprising to find this 'Ala'u'd-Din's son, Ruknu'd-Din, weak and infirm of purpose: when a prisoner in Hülägü's camp, he pined for a Mongol woman of the lower class and obtained her in marriage. How different was this last "Grand Master" from the first, who had confided to Abū'l-Fadl of Isfahān that if he could have only two genuine friends he could overthrow Malikshāh! (p. 75).

Juwayni's history is interesting and instructive, full of facts and dates, and

replete with information both historical and religious.

The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades. 8" × 5\fmathbb{1"}. Pp. 368. Translated by H. A. R. Gibb. Luzac. 15s.

To the library of the student of the Crusades, that most facinating and romantic of all periods of history, Professor Gibb's translation of The Damascus Chronicle will form a most valuable and much-desired addition. For there has been far too great a tendency to overlook the value and importance of the Oriental sources for the Crusades. The writer of the Chronicle, Hamza ibn-Asad, known as Abu Yala, belonged to one of the most respected families in Damascus, bearing the surname of al-Qalanisi, or the Hatter. Born in 1070, he died on March 18, 1160, at the great age of ninety years, and thus was an eye-witness of the First and Second Crusades, and lived to see the beginning of the great Moslem reaction, which was to culminate a generation later in the sweeping victories of Saladin. A man of education and culture, he spent his life in the civil service of his native city, of which he rose to be the head, and was twice Rais or Mayor of Damascus. He was thus in a position to obtain exact information concerning the events of his day, of which his Chronicle constitutes the official record. The full title of his work, Continuation of the Chronicle of Damascus, indicates his intention to continue the earlier Chronicle of the historian Hilal ibn al-Muhassin, which terminated in 1056, but this was a universal history, whereas the work of Ibn al-Qalanisi is centred upon the city of Damascus, and is therefore far more limited in its outlook.

Professor Gibb's translation is divided into two parts. Part I. opens with the arrival in Asia Minor of the armies of the First Crusade, the Battle of Dorylæum and the Siege of Antioch, and closes with the death of the Emir Taj al-Muluk Buri of Damascus in 1132, one of the many victims of the pestilent sect of the Assassins. Part II. opens with the accession to power at Damascus of the worthless Shams al-Muluk Ismail, the son of Buri, and closes with the death of the Kurdish Emir Mujahid al-Din Buzan, leader of the army of Damascus, in February, 1160, the writer of the Chronicle dying the following month.

Whilst the work as a whole is somewhat dry and heavy reading, as is inevitable in a chronicle of this nature, despite the excellent translation of Professor Gibb, it is none the less of the deepest interest, and contains many vivid passages, as in the description of King Baldwin's narrow escape at the Battle of Ascalon

on pages 55 and 56:

"In this year also (i.e., 1102) the Egyptian armies came up from Egypt to assist the governors of the Sahil (i.e., the coastal plain) in those fortified ports which still remained in their hands against the besieging parties of the Franks. They reached Ascalon in Rajab (April-May), and when Baldwin, Count of Jerusalem, learned of their arrival, he marched against them with his force of Franks, consisting of about 700 knights and footmen, picked men. With these he charged on the Egyptian army, but God gave the victory to the Egyptians against his broken faction, and they killed most of his knights and foot-soldiers. He himself fled to Ramla with three followers. The Egyptians pursued and surrounded him, but he disguised himself and succeeded in eluding their vigilance, made for Yafa (Jaffa) and got away from them. During the pursuit, he had hidden in a brake of canes, which was set on fire, and the fire singed part of his body, but he escaped from it and reached Yafa. His companions were put to the sword, and all his men and champions who were captured in Ramla were killed or made prisoners, and carried off to Egypt at the end of Rajab."

It is evident throughout his work that Ibn al-Qalanisi, though not a soldier, took the greatest interest in military operations. His descriptions are clear and

concise, as well as frequently vivid and picturesque. A good example of his style is to be found in his description of the disastrous Battle of Danith in 1119, where the forces of Tancred's nephew Roger Fitz Richard were surprised and overwhelmed in a few minutes (pages 159, 160).

"When Zahir al-Din Atabek arrived at Aleppo to join forces with Najm al-Din . . . news reached them that Roger, lord of Antioch, had marched out of his city with an army . . . of Franks and Armenian foot-soldiers . . . and had encamped at the place known as Sharmada, or some say Danith al-Baqal, between Antioch and Aleppo. When the Muslims learned this, they flew towards them with the wings of hawks flying to the protection of their nests, and no sooner was eye matched with eye and each side approaching the other than the Muslims charged down upon them and encompassed them on all sides with blows of swords and hails of arrows. God Most High, to whom be the praise, granted victory to the party of Islam against the impious mob, and not one hour of the day . . . had passed ere the Franks were on the ground, one prostrate mass, horsemen and footmen alike, with their horses and their weapons, so that not one man of them escaped to tell the tale, and their leader Roger was found stretched out among the dead. A number of the eyewitnesses of this battle have related that they made a circuit of the scene of this combat in order to see the glorious sign wrought by God Most High, and that they saw some of the horses stretched out on the ground like hedgehogs because of the quantity of arrows sticking into them.'

Perhaps the most interesting part of the Chronicle is the description of the rise of the Assassins, and the beginnings of that reign of terror, which they established in the Levant, until Beybars el-Bundukdari finally tamed them. The Batiniya, as lon al-Qalanisi calls them, the Ismailian branch of the Shiite sect, established themselves at Alamut in Persia in 1000 under their founder Hassan ibn Sabbah. They appeared at Aleppo under a certain al-Hakim al-Muuajjim at the beginning of the twelfth century, and in 1103 they began their reign of terror with the murder of the Atabek Janah al-Dawla in the Mosque of Homs. In 1106 they murdered the Emir of Afamiya on the instructions of a new leader, Abu Tahir, a Persian goldsmith at Aleppo. But they soon made themselves so hated and feared in Aleppo, that in 1114 their leaders were arrested and slain, and they were expelled from the city. They were credited with the murder of the great Egyptian minister Al-Afdal in 1121, but wrongly so, and then in 1126 the Atabek Tughtagin of Damascus granted their leader Bahram the frontier town of Banyas, the Bélinas of the Crusaders, where, in the words of the chronicler (page 180):

"He was joined there by his rabble of varlets, half-wits, peasants, low fellows, and vile scum. . . . This public establishment of their cause created a grievous calamity and a public terror. . . . For they set about killing all those who opposed them, and supporting all who gave them assistance in their impious ways, so that neither Sultan nor Wazir would condemn them, nor could any general or Amir break the edge of their malice."

Two years later, in 1128, Bahram was slain by the avengers of one of his victims, and was succeeded by Ismail the Persian, but before the year was out Taj al-Muluk Buri of Damascus slew their leaders and drove them out of that city. The next year Ismail surrendered Banyas to the Crusaders, but died a year later. But Taj al-Muluk Buri paid for his intrepidity with his life, and in 1131 was attacked in the midst of his guards and mortally wounded, dying the following summer. For the next ten years the Assassins appear to have been

driven underground in Syria, but in 1141 they seized the castle of Masyath, on the frontiers of Tripolis and Antioch, and there the Old Man of the Mountain, as the Crusaders called their leader, established his iniquitous rule, which was to last for nearly a century and a half, the terror of the East.

No account of Professor Gibb's excellent work would be complete without a reference to the learned and enlightening introduction. He there summarizes for his readers the tangled and complicated political and religious situation in Syria, which alone rendered possible the success of the First Crusade. His description of the Muslim military system of the time is particularly valuable. Each chieftain maintained a permanent force of mounted troops, called his "askar," corresponding in many ways to the Teutonic comitatus of which Tacitus tells us. These troopers were as a rule the slaves of their lord, specially purchased and trained for the purpose. The askar formed the nucleus, and far the most important part of every Muslim army. It was expensive to maintain and therefore limited in numbers; thus at the Battle of Inab in 1150, where Raymond of Antioch met his doom, the askar of Nur al-Din, reinforced by that of Damascus and by the Turkmens that he had summoned to his aid, amounted to only 6,000 men. In other words, the armies of the period were small, and the fantastic numbers attributed to their enemies by the Crusaders must be ignored.

In conclusion, it is impossible to speak too highly of Professor Gibb's valuable work; it was really needed, and those interested in the history of the Crusades must remain much indebted to him. Only one fault can be found with the book, it should have included a map, without which it cannot be easily understood.

E. I. KING.

Palestine: Department of Education Annual Report, 1930-1931.

Jerusalem, 1932. Government Printing and Stationery Office. Price 2s.

This Report, by Mr. H. E. Bowman, C.B.E., Director of Education, follows closely the lines of previous Reports; it is accompanied by no less than thirty statistical tables, most of them of purely departmental interest. The Education Budget for 1931 for a population of about one million souls, of whom 90,000 are Christians and 175,000 Jews, is nearly £155,000, or over 6 per cent. of the total budget estimates for the year. The total estimates, it may be mentioned, for 1931 are about 8 per cent. in excess of those for 1931, notwithstanding economic depression, and involve taxation at the rate of £2 10s. per head of the population, a large figure for a poor country and one that can scarcely be maintained.

There is much valuable information to be gleaned from the Report, but it is severely objective and official in tone. If the Director, in his next Report, could see his way to give us a general summary of the results of the work of his Department for the last ten years, the student of Near Eastern affairs would be grateful. No one is so well qualified to do this as Mr. Bowman. In the Report under examination we miss his compelling enthusiasm, his cheerful personality, or his critical mind; yet we know that, beneath the "damnosa papyro" of Juvenal, he and a highly competent staff are at work, imbued with the trained and dispassionate steadfastness of scientific workers, yet with something of the zealous enthusiasm of the true missionary.

"Quis tamen inde seges, terræ quis fructus apertæ" (What is, in their view, the harvest of ground so laboriously tilled?). To that question, as in Juvenal's Satire, this Report offers no reply.

England im Nahen Osten: Das Königreich Irak und die Mossulfrage.

By Henry U. Hoepli. Pp. xi + 168. Maps. Erlangen. 1931.

Dr. Hoepli has written a noteworthy book and one of particular interest for those who have followed the steady development of 'Iraq from the end of the war to the present day. The country, partly owing to British guidance under a mandate conferred only twelve years ago, but also to a high degree to the far-sighted and energetic policy of its own Government, is now sufficiently advanced to have permitted the Council of the League of Nations to declare last January that in principle it was prepared to pronounce the termination of the mandatory régime in 'Iraq, to become effective when that country is admitted to the League, sometime before the end of the previous year.

The Swiss author collected his extensive and well-documented material during a stay in England, and was also most generously assisted by the League's Secretariat. The book bears ample evidence of the thoroughness with which he

approached his task.

A very instructive introduction deals with the history and importance throughout the ages of the overland trade route across 'Iraq. It is shown how the discovery of the passage around the Cape of Good Hope (1498) and the construction of the Suez Canal (1869) led to the partial abandonment of the ancient highways of commerce between the Mediterranean and India, without, however, lessening the significance of 'Iraq's strategical position in so far as England was concerned. 'Iraq's situation is particularly important with respect to the safeguarding of Britain's interests in the East, thus explaining for instance the apprehension with

which the Bagdad railway scheme was regarded before the war.

The book exposes the many-sided problems, political and economical, which have combined to form the actual structure of the 'Iraq kingdom. The struggle for the exploitation of the very rich oil fields to both sides of the Tigris and in the Mosul district is explained with intimate knowledge of the circumstances. As the book, however, went to press in September, 1930, no mention is made of the powerful British Oil Development Company, which together with the 'Iraq Petroleum Company plays such an important rôle in the economic life of 'Iraq under the recently concluded treaties. While the I.P.C. has agreed to limit its activity to the east of the Tigris, it is the B.O.D.C. which procured the rights of exploitation on the west of the river, the oil-war thus giving way to the oil-peace in the interest of all concerned. The economic future of the country may be said to depend on the financial success of these two companies, in which English, French, American, Dutch, Italian, German, and Swiss capital is interested. If they are able to fulfil their obligations, which are considerable, in face of present market conditions in the industry, 'Iraq will receive very substantial revenues towards the balancing of her budget.

The conflicting interests of England and France in the Arabian world, although restrained during the war, have been manifested more than once since its conclusion. It can be said that Dr. Hoepli has treated this problem with impartial fairness to both sides, and the same is true of his handling of England's arrangements with the Arab nationalists, the United States and Turkey. The unreserved recognition of the efforts made by Great Britain for the consolidation of the 'Iraq kingdom, the inauguration of the "era of goodwill," deserves to be emphasized. The last chapter gives a comprehensive judgement of the British policy in the Near East. The author's conclusion that in 'Iraq the imperialism of annexation, prevailing during the last centuries, has been replaced by the im-

perialism of the dollar will be difficult to contradict.

An extensive bibliography, an index of personalities-in which after that of

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King Faisal the record of Sir Percy Cox deservedly occupies the most space—and several useful maps contribute to the value of the publication, an English translation of which would certainly meet the requirements of a wider circle of people interested in the 'Iraq question.

R. S.-R.

Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East. By Hans Kohn. Pp. 340. London: George Routledge and Sons. 1932. 15s.

The Spirit of World Politics. By W. E. Hocking, Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. Pp. 570. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1932. 218.

These two books are partly historical, partly philosophical studies from different angles of the development of political thought, with special relation to the conditions in the Near and Middle East. Dr. Kohn speaks of those countries as the Hither East, Professor Hocking as the Near East, but they are both concerned

with Egypt, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.

Dr. Kohn, who has already written a remarkable study of Nationalism in the East, is here concerned with a detailed survey of the progress of the movement for national independence in the countries of the Mandate and their neighbours. His work is mainly a narrative of events; but he makes the events illustrate the principle that "the idea of a civilizing mission, an exalted calling to protect, police, and rule the other nations, is no longer conceded to European States; and with the loss of this prestige the ethical claim of the European Powers to incorporate those peoples by force in their alien States is lost." He sees the events also as part of the transformation of the East and of the remoulding of its relation to the West. He is too near to the events themselves to write with a full perspective, but he has a remarkably well-informed mind and a sympathetic grasp.

Naturally, he has much to say of the problems in Palestine, the country where he has his home. But he does not give a pledge to fortune in proposing a solution. He states the two contending ideals of Jews and Arabs, and ends on a characteristic and brooding reflection. "Unique as the country, as the nation that was moulded in it and is now returning to it, deeply moving and instinct with promise and doom, is the destiny that is being determined in it, with a symbolic significance, at the crossroads where two worlds meet, that radiates

far beyond this narrow strip of Canaanite soil."

Professor Hocking looks at the East with a more definite and certain mind. He set out originally to write a book on political theory about the rights and duties of nations. His travels in the Near East and the impressions made by the Arab lands deflected him from that purpose; but his ethical convictions remained the same, "with an added confidence that we are bound, even in the interplay of world forces, to get and apply standards of right and wrong." His conviction induced hostility to certain current tendencies: "to any kind of determinism which resigns the affairs of the world to the contest of interests and Powers," and "to the pernicious theory that government has nothing to do with ethics or with general culture." He regards the Mandate system as a welcome evolution in that the Mandatory Powers invite the public opinion of enlightened men to be brought to bear on their international conduct. The Mandates Commission of the League of Nations is armed only with paper and publicity, but that is a vast advance on the old irresponsibility of the governors.

It is interesting to compare his estimate of the position in Palestine with that of Dr. Kohn. In a chapter headed "Palestine an Impasse?" he, too, sets out the moral and spiritual aims of the two sides, and recognizes that the aim of Zionism is first of all "a religious goal and a profound psychological promise." But he is worried by the idea that Zionism has an unholy alliance with a Western military Power, and thinks it must break free from that alliance.

In the latter part of his book he examines larger subjects: the problem of international control; the fate of Islamic culture; and "the ethical queerness of States." He thinks the present age is "a bad half-hour for the society of States dominated by suspicion of each that the other is merely playing for its own

advantage."

He has written a stimulating and occasionally provocative book. He puts his challenge to Imperialism trenchantly; but his conclusion is hopeful, for he holds that, with all its appearance of a mountain travailing and bringing forth a blank report, the League of Nations is kept to its work by the unremitting spur of its original motive, and gives a real hope of a better order.

N. B.

Persien: Entwicklung und Gegenwart (Persia: Its Development and Present). By Fritz Hesse. Welt-Politische Bücherei, Band 26, herausgegeben von Dr. Adolf Grabowsky. Pp. 92. Zentral-Verlag, Berlin, W. 35.

This is one of a series of books dealing with world politics of various countries. It is stated in the preface that, as Germany now finds a south-east orientation essential, particular attention has been paid to the preparation of this book as well as to its companion volumes on Egypt and Arabia. The result is a very readable and informative little book.

The historical portion increases in detail as the present day is approached. Ancient history is dismissed in a paragraph the object of which is to emphasize how Persia's past forms an important traditional background to her present. The history of the pre-war years is well summarized, with particular mention of all aspects of the conflict of British and Russian aims, but the war period is scantily treated. No mention is made of any German participation in Persian affairs, nor of the part played by a very brave band of Germans who formed the Jehad ex-

pedition to Afghanistan.

The downfall of the Kajar dynasty (Ahmad Shah is described as Shah Sultan Mohammed) and the rise to power and to the throne of Reza Shah Pahlevi is well described. The influence of this remarkable man on the national and international status of Persia is phenomenal. As a result of a series of successful campaigns against the powerful nomad tribes, the central government has established its authority throughout the country to an extent and to a degree which has no parallel in the past. Under a powerful administration great progress has been made towards educating Persia to take its place among the nations of the world. Westernization has not been pursued as rapidly as in the case of Turkey, but the advance already made is even more significant since the initial obstacles are greater.

Herr Hesse points out that the Government control of all import and export trade has been very drastic, but it has been successful in shielding Persia from many of the consequences of the present world economic depression. The great fall in value of silver in 1929 and 1930 forced the country to adopt a new currency based on gold, and a further step in financial independence was taken when the control of the note issue was transferred from the Imperial Bank of Persia to the

Government National Bank. Persia is almost unique among the nations of the world in that it is practically free from both internal and external loans.

Although this handbook on modern Persia is, in general, very well compiled, it is not without many inaccuracies of detail. The six text maps are inaccurate in many respects; one example is that the extent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession is shown as limited to a small area around the present oil-fields. In the text the date of the commencement of this company's operations is given as 1889 instead of 1901 and later.

The information about roads and communications generally is poor, and reference should have been made to the very good guide-book on Persia, published last year in Tehran by G. H. Ebtehaj. In this book the length of all improved motor roads is given as 9,000 km. and of other passable motor roads as 7,000 km., whereas Herr Hesse's estimates are 4,000 km. and 2,500 km. respectively. To anyone with a knowledge of Persia the estimate of 9,000 km. for the length of all foot-tracks in the country must seem rather ridiculous. Again, the date of the British protectorate over Bahrein Island is wrongly given as 1689. It is a pity that a book so substantially valuable should be marred by minor faults.

G. M. L.

Golden Horn. By F. Yeats-Brown. $8\frac{3}{4}'' \times 5\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. 287. Illustrations. Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1932. 8s. 6d.

If nothing proved more surprising to a war-weary Europe than that Turkey, worn out by ten years of incessant strife, and apparently the most completely defeated of all the Central Powers, should have dictated practically its own terms of peace at Lausanne, so nothing is more remarkable than that her former enemies should have since sunk back into their traditional apathy regarding her affairs, so it is perhaps no bad thing that the author of a best seller should have chosen Turkey as the theatre for his latest book, particularly when he is one who believes that "the spirit of man is more than his poor flesh," and that the war, by killing off those who put that doctrine into practice, has left an undue proportion of sentimentalists in the England of to-day.

Golden Horn opens with an absorbing and admirable account of affairs from the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress in Salonika down to the entry of Turkey into the Great War on the side of Germany in November, 1914, and, although, it suffers somewhat as a historical document, from the introduction of imaginary scenes and conversations, the reader will nevertheless be struck by the vivid and faithful picture of momentous events which is presented to him in the first half of the book. Students of international affairs may not perhaps entirely agree with all the author's deductions, and may attribute the inevitability of Turkish action to sources more deep-seated than some of the incidents to which prominence is given, but they will welcome the acknowledgment of Abdul Hamid's services to the House of Othman and the country over which he ruled for thirty-three years, and will not quarrel with the statement that with his passing "many voices were to mourn the good old days of autocracy."

The effort to weld Cretans, Greeks, Albanians, Armenians, Arabs, Druses, Kurds, Turks, Moslems, Christian Jews and Pagans into one nation upon the lines of the homogeneous and homophone communities of the West, was an ideal which Abdul Hamid recognized as impossible, and if his autocratic system of rule did not permit of rapid advancement, it did, at least, succeed in arresting part of the decay that had set in under his predecessors. But his ever-tightening despotism had become an anachronism to a younger generation, the product of

his own schools, and Turkey, which had forgotten the disasters of 1875-8, was to learn under the direction of a military clique drawn from this intelligentsia that Unity could only be brought about by years of war and untold suffering, whilst Nationality could only be accomplished by massacres and deportations which Selim the Grim had contemplated but rejected, and before which even Abdul Hamid had recoiled.

The second half of the book, for, as in *Bengal Lancer*, the theme changes half-way through, deals with the author's personal experiences as a prisoner of war, first in Anatolia and subsequently in Constantinople, and readers, who, with the dreadful story in their minds of what happened to our "guests of the Turkish Government," are curious as to the psychic and physical reactions to intense suffering of one who has "trodden the High way of Yoga" will be disappointed. Major Yeats-Brown explains "the small initial mistake," but for which Yoga which should have been his strength was denied to him, but we are more than rewarded by an account of simple fortitude cheerfully borne and humorously told, his courage and modesty being heightened by vivid thumbnail sketches of the experiences of his fellow-captives, the story of the spy who was bastinadoed in the military prison of the Seraskerat being particularly poignant.

It would be unfair to do more than refer to the author's two attempts at escape except to admire the resourcefulness he displayed, but the Epilogue should not be passed over without reference. "Mustapha Kemal," he writes, "has conquered more than cities: his greatest victories have been over the minds of a people almost as stubborn as the English. Something dynamic will be let loose upon the world from Asia, as has happened in times past, for the Great War was but the prelude for the gathering of invisible forces from Angora to Pekin."

The book is illustrated by photographs of the author and of his disguises.

H. E. GARLE.

Whither Islam? A Survey of Modern Movements in the Moslem World.

Edited by H. A. R. Gibb. 8vo. Pp. 384. Gollancz, Ltd.

This book consists of a series of essays on the above subject. There is an Introduction of 63 pages by Professor H. A. R. Gibb, who explains that such a survey, extending from Morocco to Java, being beyond the competence of any one man, has necessitated a division of the subject amongst several authors. Professor Massignon deals with Africa (excluding Egypt), Professor Kampffmeyer with Egypt and Western Asia, Lieut.-Colonel Ferrar with India, and Professor Berg with Indonesia. This is followed by a final essay: "Whither Islam?" by Professor Gibb.

One of the most interesting features of the Introduction is Professor Gibb's explanation of the way in which "Modernism" has appeared in Islam, by the extension of the principle of ijtihād. Primitive Islam issued from Arabia in a relatively plastic condition, and for two centuries or so was engaged in adapting itself to its new environment (very different from that of Arabia) and working out the details of its theology, for many problems of theology, administration, and law arose, to which answers were not to be found in the Qurān. This process was carried to its completion by theologists and legists who were generally recognized as possessing the capacity ijihād—"the power to give a decisive interpretation on points of theology and law." Once these decisions were made, they were regarded as unalterable, and "the gate of ijtihād" was gradually narrowed down to minor points. Liberal theologians in Egypt, led

by Shaikh Muhammad 'Abduh (d. 1905), asserted that the opening of the gate of *ijtihād* was imperative, and that many matters, considered as closed, required discussion and re-interpretation. His disciples have carried the principles of his teaching with great effect into all parts of the Moslem world, principally by their monthly journal *al-Manār*, "The Lighthouse."

It would appear from Professor Massignon's article, that the effect of this movement has been less in North Africa than elsewhere, for owing to its strong Mālikite traditions, North Africa is extremely conservative. But the influence of Europe must be enormous here, not only on account of the 800,000 European settlers, who form 18 per cent. of the population, but also on account of the amazing fact that in 1927 there were no less than 150,000 North African workmen in France!

Professor Kampffmeyer deals with various Moslem movements in Egypt. He apparently regards the Young Men's Moslem Association as the only really important one, for over 50 out of his 70 pages are devoted to it. One cannot help feeling that his account is altogether too couleur de rose. For example, he enumerates its four principal officials, elected in 1927, and apparently does not consider that the election, as Vice-President, of the notorious Shaikh Shawish, the most violent fanatic in Egypt (d. 1927), calls for any special comment. Scarcely a guarantee for sane and level-headed direction.

Nor is he more fortunate in his remarks regarding Syria: "The political division of pre-war Syria into three different Mandate administrations... and the further dismemberment of post-war Syria into different States—which the Syrians understood to be due to the maxim Divide et impera—increased rather the desire for unity," is neither fair to the Mandatory Powers, nor true of the Syrians. The reviewer prefers to regard the division of Syria into the "État de la Syrie, Grand Liban, Pays des Alanites, et Djebel Druse," as an heroic attempt to make parliamentary government workable amongst a population so varied.

Colonel Ferrar's chapter is admirably written and full of interest. He draws an interesting parallel between India and the rest of Islam, pointing out that whereas Islam elsewhere tends to be threatened by rising Nationalism, for the Turks are beginning to glory in their Khaqāns, and the Egyptians in their Pharaohs, in India the Moslems "are now of all Islamic peoples the most interested in the creation of a kind of Moslem internationalism."

Dr. Berg's chapter takes us to a very different and less known region, but there are passages, such as the following, which cannot be over-emphasized: "European education is absolutely revolutionary, and the force of the blow which the native cultures are daily receiving is only realized fully, though not always critically, by the older generation of the Indonesians. . . ." He points out that here (as in Turkey and Egypt) Nationalism tends to become stronger than Islam: "The Moslem supra-national community is about to split into consciously national groups, and its members will have to show which they will in future prefer: Islam or nationality."

In the Introduction there is an unfortunate reference to the Capitulations and "the misuse of these privileges by many unscrupulous persons." The Capitulations were not imposed on Turkey by a powerful and arrogant Europe; it was centuries ago, when Europe was weak and Turkey strong, that Turkey, not wishing to have the trouble of dispensing justice to the despised strangers within her gate, imposed the system. As for abusing it, one has only to recall the fate of the Armenians, who did not enjoy capitulatory rights, to realize that the chief culprit in the abuse of power was Turkey.

There is one curious omission in the book; no author discusses the extent to

which indifference to religion is prevalent in Islamic countries. The reviewer, some years ago, was in the mosque of Sīdī 'Uqba at Qairawān on a Friday. Although Qairawān is a holy city, with a population of 29,000, only two worshippers turned up at the hour of midday prayer. In Egypt, it is the rarest sight to see an Effendi in a mosque. In view of such facts, one cannot refrain from asking how much there will be left of Islam in North Africa and Egypt in fifty years' time.

K. A. C.

Turkey in the World War. By Dr. Ahmed Emin, formerly Professor of Statistics in the University of Constantinople. $9\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6\frac{3}{4}''$. Pp. xviii+310. Oxford University Press, Yale University Press. 15s. 6d.

The author and the subject of this remarkable book both combine to arrest attention. It is not too much to say that every student of modern history should study this authoritative statement from the pen of a man of letters, of Turkish nationality, whose fellow-countrymen it has hitherto been the custom to treat as Pariahs, whose expulsion from Europe constituted the first duty of civilization.

Dr. Ahmed Emin traces the history of the Turks from the time when, in the middle of the thirteenth century, they migrated westwards, traversed Asia Minor (successively misgoverned by Byzantine Emperors and Seljukian Turks) and ultimately established the Ottoman Empire at Constantinople.

Here these nomad tribes, who had shown themselves to be good soldiers as well as good shepherds, made an attempt to allow a very large measure of self-government to the subject races which had been brought under their sway by a series of successful wars.

When in the natural course of events they lost the qualities which had made them successful in war without acquiring any of those indispensable to prosperity in time of peace, the decay of the Empire began. At this stage the non-Turkish populations became centres of disloyalty and discontent, a process which was facilitated by the privileges of self-government which they never ceased to enjoy; and Constantinople became the happy hunting-ground of unscrupulous politicians, with Russia at their head, all anxious to have a share of the spoil when the inevitable demise of the "Sick Man" of Europe finally should place his estate at the disposal of his neighbours.

In one respect Dr. Ahmed Emin is unjust to Great Britain, and it is to be hoped that a perusal of these notes may induce him to study a little more closely the history of British relations with Turkey from the outbreak of the Crimean War up to 1914. Amongst the books included in his bibliography of his subject is The Western Question in Turkey and Greece, by Professor Arnold Toynbee. This book by no means exonerates Great Britain from blame, but it demonstrates the differences of opinion existing in England in regard to Turkey, as well as the importance (in such matters as these) of distinguishing between political sentiment, which has very largely, in England, been sympathetic to Turkey, and political profligacy which persists in making such questions as these mere shuttle-cocks in the game of politics.

Side by side with Professor Toynbee's illuminating essay, an American author, Mr. Edward Hale Bierstadt, has published a formidable indictment of America, under the title *The Great Betrayal.** This book is omitted from Dr. Ahmed

^{*} Hutchinson and Co., Paternoster Row, 1924.

Emin's list, but its perusal and careful study are indispensable to a right understanding of the recent history of events in the Near East.

Every country is at the mercy of politicians who, at moments of crisis, may suddenly be swept by a wave of national fanaticism into momentary control of the machinery of government. This happened in England in 1880 when, after the successful negotiation of the Treaty of Berlin, an instrument which practically gave peace to Europe from 1878 to 1914, Benjamin Disraeli was swept from office by the tempestuous oratory of Mr. Gladstone, aided by an unscrupulous Press, which magnified certain acts of cruelty, undoubtedly perpetrated by Turks in Bulgaria, into a Holy War of Moslem upon Christian. Influences such as these may explain the attitude of the United States in the Near East, and in European politics, during the last twenty years, but she can hardly escape the condemnation of history—even though a measure of blame should also be laid at the door of Great Britain.

For more than a century generations of devoted American citizens, aided by the subscriptions of their fellow-countrymen to the extent of millions of dollars, have built schools, churches, and institutions of all kinds, all over European and Asiatic Turkey. Surely here was an interest which no political casuistry of any kind, nor the narrowest possible application of the Monroe Doctrine, should have left to be overtaken by wanton destruction; yet, if Mr. Bierstadt is to be believed, this has actually happened.

So far as the actual devastation of Asia Minor is concerned, the blame lies at the door of the Western Powers who convoyed Greek troops to Smyrna in 1919, but even this fatal blunder might have been prevented if the President of the United States had chosen to assume the rôle of arbiter of the destinies of mankind, which is almost the part now claimed by America.

Professor Toynbee ably demonstrates that the original outbreak of the Great War was a consequence of the clash of incompatible civilizations, but the postwar attitude of the Western European Powers towards Turkey he humorously attributes to their inability to shake off the habit of putting their hands into each other's pockets.

Dr. Ahmed Emin claims that the creation of a wholly homogeneous Turkish independent State must be of benefit to the peace of Europe, by draining dry one of the worst breeding grounds of war.

At the time of the conquest of Constantinople by Mohammed II. there had existed for two centuries on the left bank of the estuary known as the Golden Horn an autonomous Genoese colony which looked on with complete indifference while Constantine, the last Emperor of the Greeks, was defeated and overwhelmed. Similarly an Allied Armada moored in the Gulf of Smyrna looked on with callous indifference while Greeks and Turks mutually gave vent to the racial hatred of each for the other—a result which the merest tyro in statesmanship should have foreseen as the natural and unavoidable consequence of placing them, alternately, at each other's mercy.

Turkey was entitled to consideration on the part of the Allies because, on October 30, 1918, months before the landing of Greek troops in Smyrna, she had asked for, and had been granted, an Armistice. It is more than doubtful if the terms of the Armistice gave any right to the Allies to take any such step, but, in any event, by so doing they became responsible for the safety of life and property, which the forces actually on the spot and at their command could very easily have protected. On March 16, 1920, the Allies proceeded to occupy Constantinople, and here, once again, was given to the world one of those lamentable exhibitions of divided counsels, corruption, and political profligacy

which have disgraced Christendom in the Near East ever since the days of the Crusades.

On the outbreak of the Great War there was no immediate reason why Turkey should become involved. Few Turks failed to realize that in a conflict of such magnitude any departure from absolute neutrality must in the long run prove fatal to Turkey whichever side might be victorious.

Professor Toynbee sums up the situation (which actuall; developed) in con-

vincing language:

"Turkey's intervention in the War removed all restraint on Western appetites. Germany dreamed of swallowing Turkey gradually, but whole; the Allied Powers of dividing her piece-meal. But how was she to be carved up?"

Whatever other crimes may be laid at the door of Great Britain she is certainly innocent of any desire or intention, at any time, of securing territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey. British policy had always included

the retention by Turkey of Constantinople and the Straits.

Moreover, immediately after the signature of the Treaty of Berlin (and as part and parcel of the scheme contemplated by that instrument), a brigade of Consuls was sent to Asia Minor to prepare the ground for the opening up of the country to trade. Amongst them were a number of military officers, in view of the designs of Russia, which were, at that time, a constant source of anxiety for the safety of the Indian frontier. It is of interest that amongst these efficers was Herbert Kitchener, afterwards Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener of Khartoum.

Dr. Ahmed Emin seems to have forgotten the part played by England in the Crimean War, and the forcing of the Dardanelles by the British Fleet when the

victorious Russian armies were encamped at San Stefano in 1878.

The British scheme for the regeneration of Turkey by means of trade was defeated by the "bag and baggage" policy of Mr. Gladstone, which recoiled with such devastating effects upon the heads of British politicians when Mustapha Kemal Pasha turned the tables upon them. There are three things which are fatal in all dealings with the average Turk: One must never deceive him; one must never threaten him; and one must never run away from him. If the recent floundering of the Allies can be dignified with the name of "policy" it embodies the negation of these three fundamental principles, and explains the otherwise astonishing success with which the present ruler of Turkey has raised his country from the position of abject suppliant at the feet of Europe to that of triumphant and defiant Dictator.

Dr. Ahmed Emin rightly attributes the salvation of Turkey to the blunders of her enemies and, although his words are somewhat humiliating for an Englishman, his condemnation of the Allies is irresistible and should be read in

his own words:

"They (the Allies) not only inspired the Turks with the desperate feeling that they had nothing to lose, but they also brought about a process of national unification which the best of Turkish efforts would have failed to do. In addition the corrupt and chaotic rule established by the Allied Authorities brushed away all fanciful ideas as to Government by the Western Powers. It was a discovery that led both to a sense of self-confidence, and to a feeling of contempt for foreign strength and prestige. People who considered it folly to provoke the British after the experiences of the War came, more and more, to the conclusion that the traditional respect for everything British was uncalled for and that they had merely been 'bluffed.'...

"The occupation of Constantinople on March 16th, 1920, was the best pos-

sible help to Mustapha Kemal Pasha. . . .

"Turkish intellectuals with national feelings rushed to take refuge in the interior. Thus the elements necessary for establishing a new government were assembled, as a direct result of Allied pressure. . . .

"As soon as the task of forming a regular army had been completed the new government felt itself solidly constituted in the interior, and went patiently to work to defeat the forces of the enemy. This was accomplished. The physical defeat of the Greeks with the consequent moral defeat of the British Near Eastern policy resulted in the almost complete realization of the National Pact. . . .

"For the first time in two centuries the Turks were a really independent nation."

Under the system of ex-territoriality existing under the Capitulations, foreign communities resident in Turkey enjoyed innumerable advantages, and a system grew up under which all commercial and financial activity remained practically exclusively in foreign hands. This led to innumerable abuses, and it also entirely divorced the Turks from trade—except through more or less unscrupulous middle-men, who took advantage of Turkish ignorance to line their own pockets. Of all the non-Turkish communities resident in Turkey there is no doubt that the British enjoy the best reputation for honesty and commercial morality.

In spite of the disastrous consequences of the war (of which some idea may be formed from a perusal of Dr. Ahmed Emin's book) there is still a residue left of the reputation built up from generation to generation by Englishmen ever since the Middle Ages. If advantage be taken at once of the present necessities of Turkey, and of the desire of the Turk to engage in direct trading on his own account, without the intervention of the middle-man, there can be no doubt that there is scope in Turkey for profitable trading which cannot fail to benefit both Turkey and Great Britain, and, by teaching the Turk trade as an alternative to fighting or corrupt official employment (with "backsheesh" taking the place of salary), help to people the Near East with an honest trading community who must, in time, help to promote the peace of Europe.

Dr. Ahmed Emin's book forms part of a series published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This is to constitute an economic and social history of the World War. Dr. James T. Shotwell, the general editor, in his Editor's Preface describes the scheme and outlines its general purpose.

It is clear, however, that any further academic discussions about war in the abstract or the Great War in particular must be not only futile, but directly mischievous and calculated to defeat their own object. It is first of all necessary to establish the facts. All those who participated in the Great War and in the events which, after the war, drenched Eastern Europe in blood must make a clean breast of their proceedings, and America cannot escape the accusation of blood-guiltiness, now resting upon all the Western Powers, by shutting the doors of the State Department upon historians or essayists seeking to verify facts, and by refusing to disclose documents.

Mr. Edward Hale Bierstadt, Executive Secretary of the Emergency Committee for Near East Refugees, has formulated in *The Great Betrayal* a crushing indictment of a section of his fellow-countrymen which cannot be left unanswered. He says in his Preface: "During the serial publication of *The Great Betrayal* the Department of State wrote to the publisher referring to 'grave errors' in the work. Accordingly both editor and publisher journeyed to Washington for a conference with Mr. Hughes, the Secretary, Mr. Phillips, the Assistant Secretary, and Mr. Dulles Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. At the

end of a day's discussion, however, the Department was unable to point to any error in fact."

Mr. Edward Capps, former minister of U.S.A., in his Foreword says: "An attempt such as Mr. Bierstadt has made will further the cause of truth by eliciting facts and motives hitherto kept from public knowledge. It is a pity that access to the wealth of material available in the Department of State in Washington, which would have enabled him in many cases to clear up problems which must now be left in doubt, is still denied to the public."

All wars originate in avarice, cupidity, and greed, and if it be true (as suggested by Mr. Bierstadt) that the dollar magnates of Wall Street were allowed to influence American policy in the Near East to the extent of condoning Turkish cruelty, that fact is no justification for seeking to condemn the Turkish nation for the excesses of a minority who (in their turn) were enabled to dominate Turkish policy, to the consternation of a large section of their fellow-countrymen.

Dr. Ahmed Emin has shown clearly that Turkey was tricked into the war, and that a nation of soldiers was degraded into a mere tool in the hands of Germany, until Ghazi Mustapha Kemal Pasha was able to assert the independence of Turkey in the manner which Dr. Emin describes.

After having been the playground of politicians for generations, it is hardly astonishing that a revulsion of feeling should now have overtaken the Turks, which finds its expression in exaggerated nationalism. This phase, however, must inevitably give way to the economic and financial exigencies which make all states to a certain extent interdependent.

The Carnegie Institute can make no more useful contribution to the cause of World Peace than by inducing America to abandon her tendency to aloofness, and her claim to sit in judgment upon Europe, and frankly to co-operate with Great Britain in opening up direct trade with the Turk.

In this way it may be hoped that some of the ravages (to which American policy has largely contributed) may, in time, be repaired and the Turkish nation converted from a nation of soldiers into a nation of traders collaborating with their neighbours in peaceful and friendly rivalry.

PHILIP C. SARELL.

Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East. By Dr. K. Krüger. Pp. 223.

London: Allen and Unwin. 1932. 7s. 6d. net.

This is an extremely callow and slipshod book. In his Preface the author claims to have undertaken a thorough study of modern Turkey and to have special sources of information in Turkish circles: there is, however, nothing in his pages to substantiate these claims.

Four chapters (61 pages out of 223) are devoted to the internal affairs of present-day Turkey. The longest of these (27 pages) purports to deal with the economic position of the country. The author makes no attempt to analyze the causes of the economic crisis which afflicts Turkey or to suggest any remedies for it—indeed he does not mention the existence of this crisis; he merely gives a number of figures of production, foreign trade, budget, and so forth (mostly rather scanty and relating to single years only) and conveys the impression that the Government's economic measures have been uniformly wise and successful. A dozen pages are devoted to "Cultural and Social Conditions"; no attempt is made to explain the currents of politics or to appraise the methods of the present Government, but the absence of any real parliamentary system and the subservience of the Press to governmental influence are strongly commended. Four

pages deal with "The Emancipation of Women," but these have little precision or novelty; however, they give the author the opportunity to reveal his ignorance of Turkish ways of living and of the background of his subject, by stating (p. 88) that the efforts of intellectual Turks to emancipate their womenfolk led to these latter smoking cigarettes in the privacy of the Turkish home (a habit with which emancipation has nothing to do in Turkey), and by implying (p. 90) that, under what he is pleased to call "the barbaric marriage laws of Islam," a

woman had no right to her separate property.

About half the book is composed of chapters purporting to describe the foreign policy and international position of Turkey. These chapters are of a very elementary character; moreover, they contain few definite statements and by no means enough of the relevant facts. For instance, the chapter dealing with relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia does not mention any political or diplomatic event which has occurred since the year 1921; that dealing with relations with Iraq gives no details in regard to the settlement of the Mosul question. The section dealing with relations with Italy does not mention the pacts of non-aggression concluded under Italian influence or the effect of Italian influence on Greco-Turkish relations (five pages only are given to Turkish relations with Western Europe, in which this so-called account of Turco-Italian relations is comprised). Vague descriptions of internal conditions in Soviet Russia, Persia, Syria, and Afghanistan and a lengthy résumé of the history of Russian expansion in Asia from 1774 to 1914 fill out this part of the book, and presumably are felt to justify the second part of the title.

Statements such as that the exchange of populations was desired by the Turks in order to increase the population of Anatolia (p. 33), or that Russia's participation in the European War "on the side of England and France was dictated exclusively by her ambition to conquer Constantinople" (p. 101), or that it is incomprehensible why the Greeks delayed their advance against Mustafa Kemal until the moment when contact between Moscow and Angora was fully established—i.e., until after 1920 (p. 106), sufficiently reveal the extent of the author's political knowledge and judgment. His historical incompetence is revealed by the confused and quite inaccurate summary (pace the word) of Turkish military history on p. 91, and by the astonishing statement on p. 164 that the French have been instrumental in introducing Christianity into Syria and that the Christian Arab element in that country has detached itself from its original

Islamic faith.

A chapter is devoted to the Christian Minorities, and the author is right in saying that a writer on Turkey ought to deal with the problem of atrocities. There is more to be said in explanation, if not in extenuation, of that matter than is commonly supposed. Unfortunately, Dr. Krüger is not equipped to

throw any light on the question.

There is no consistent system of transliteration and there are numerous errors; the author says he has studied Turkish and Turkish literature, but one would not suspect it from his book. He has little to say about the cultural significance of the introduction of the Latin alphabet, but mentions (becomingly, as he is a Professor of Technology) that it has increased the use of typewriters in Turkey. On the other hand, if, as appears, he has written his book in English, his command of that language is remarkable; yet he says on p. 79 that the character "c" in the new Turkish alphabet has "the sound of the English 'dj.'"

In the light of his own book, his depreciation (in the Preface) of other writers on the subject is an impertinence. In particular, to say that the majority of English writers on Turkey "seem to be ex-officials, whose contact with

Turkey dates from the hostile period of the Allied occupation, when Greek ambitions ran riot in Anatolia" is wholly unjustifiable; very few of those who can properly be described as "ex-officials" have written on Turkey, and those who have are men whose contact with Turkey extended over a lifetime.

J. P.

Russia and the Pacific Problem. Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East. By Victor A. Yakhontoff. $8\frac{3}{4}$ " $\times 5\frac{3}{4}$ ". Pp. xxii+454. Maps. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 18s. net.

This is an ambitious but, on the whole, rather a disappointing book, though one would avoid saying so if one could because of the very modest note struck by the author in his preface. His book is, he says, a "humble endeavour to fill a somewhat noticeable gap in that body of literature in English which pertains to Russia's activity in the Extreme Orient." A carefully thought out and business-like list of contents, combined with the modesty of this claim, dispose one to begin reading in a hopeful frame of mind. But performance does not come up to promise, and while the book contains useful information, and is conveniently paragraphed and cross-headed, it fulfils the functions of a compilation rather than a study of great events and issues.

A Russian author, for instance—especially one who claims to have had considerable experience in the Far East, both under the Russian Imperial régime and later—might have been expected to give us something more penetrating and satisfying in regard to Borodin's career in China than the very bald statements contained in Chapter X. The ensuing chapter adds little, if anything, to our knowledge of Chinese domestic affairs, and nowhere is there any analysis of the interaction of Chinese and Russian communism, which is what most of us really want (and need) to know. Incidentally, it is irritating to read constantly of the Kao-min-tan, when the merest tyro knows that the word for "party" in northern Chinese is pronounced quite clearly tang, with the "t" sounding like "d."

The latter portions of the book deal with the problems of population, raw materials, markets, and cultural intercourse. On the last-named the author asks:

"Does the appearance of machinery and of new technique in the Orient necessitate its passage through the identical forms of economic structure of society which Europe underwent? The past history of Japan has not prevented her from taking the same path as her tutors had to follow. China, on the other hand, may prove able to work out her own new forms, influenced by her own specific past, and arrive at some sort of amalgamation of old and new." This is, indeed, a possibility, and one which many think may come to pass. But it is disappointing to have the possibility merely stated and not discussed.

E. M. GULL.

"At Home with the Savage." By J. H. Driberg. Pp. 267. Photographic illustrations. Routledge. 7s. 66. net.

It may seem strange at first sight to find reviewed in the pages of a journal devoted to the study of Asiatic affairs a book which, while not exclusively devoted to Africa, has its greater number of references to that country, and has—since the author, before he became a lecturer in Ethnology at the University of Cambridge, was a member of the Uganda Civil and Sudan Political Services—a general African background.

"When I first went to Africa," writes Mr. Driberg, "I had never heard of the word anthropology: I had read none of the standard works on anthropology and not a single monograph describing any primitive people. My duties were to bring me into the closest touch with the natives, and yet I was expected (as everyone else was expected at that time) to direct their energies wisely and to guide them along the road of progress, without having the faintest idea of the kind of people entrusted to me or of their cultures, a word itself which had then little meaning to most of us."

In an exceedingly clear and concise preliminary chapter the author outlines the scope and functions of anthropology. "In a sense we are all anthropologists," he writes, "or at least we should be. Every rational man, who keeps his eyes open, must constantly ask himself why the people he meets behave in the way they do. He may travel, even if it is only to Paris, and he will observe that human conduct and relationships there exhibit a different pattern of behaviour. But he need not go so far even as that. The cultural differences between our own counties are sufficiently marked to attract the attention of anyone who is not blind or deaf."

After describing the advances made in modern ethnological technique and of the interest of the subject from a purely scientific point of view he goes on to describe the practical value of this newest of all the sciences.

"To countries, however, with colonial possessions," he continues, "to countries which exercise rule over less advanced peoples in different parts of the world, anthropology assumes a different sort of importance. We are now learning that we have delayed dangerously late in recognizing its importance. In the past we have assumed that the cultures of savages were not worth consideration, that it was our duty to improve the material and moral conditions of their lives, and that the only way to do this was to destroy their cultures and to give them ours, or as much of it as we thought desirable. This still remains our duty, it is true, but we have recollected the parable of the new wine and the old bottle, and experience has shown us that old bottles have a distinct tendency to burst when filled with a heady new wine. At the same time anthropology has put her house in order and improved her technique to such an extent that reliable information concerning primitive cultures is much more readily available now than was once the case.* It is a happy coincidence that a recognition by governments that the old was not necessarily the best has found anthropology prepared to take a hand in the problem. The problem is part of a wider one known as the 'Contact of Cultures,' but its immediate bearing as a political issue is purely anthropological. If, as we maintain, culture is a biological growth, it is no use trying to substitute one culture for another by an arbitrary act of compulsion. The only sure method of serving the ends at which colonial administration aims is by recognizing the institutions of the subject races and building up on that basis,'

That seems to me about as good a definition of the practical aims of anthropology as it is possible to frame, and it is these aims which are constantly held in view in the subsequent chapters dealing, amongst other subjects, with Environment and Culture; the Individual, the Family, the Clan, Tribe and Tribal Government, and the Emergence of the Nation; while later chapters are devoted to a study of Warfare, Religion and Magic, Economic Life, Law, and Education.

^{*} This is unfortunately not true of India, which has been sadly neglected by the modern ethnologist.—C. J. M.

Of particular interest is the chapter devoted to the subject of manners.

"There is a curious but deep-rooted prejudice," notes Mr. Driberg, "which makes us associate manners with clothes, as if one superficiality cannot exist independently of another. . . . The older civilizations of the East have accustomed us to the idea that quite intelligent people eat with their fingers and, though we do not choose to imitate them, we do not find the custom repulsive to good taste. But somehow the normal person does not expect a dark-skinned savage to have those graces of intercourse which we call manners. He is traditionally crude in his appetites, blunt in sensitivity, careless of the finer shades of conduct. It is strange that this is just what the savage thinks of us with our domineering and hectoring ways, our appalling egotism and our certainty that we are the best in the best of all possible worlds. We usually offend against every canon of politeness to which he is accustomed, and he naturally views us with the mistrust and suspicion which he generally reserves for his enemies, as no one but potential enemies would be so graceless as to disregard the social conventions."

One could continue to quote almost indefinitely but for considerations of space.

Mr. Driberg modestly disclaims that his book makes any pretensions to being an academic treatise on anthropology. "It is intended neither for the expert nor for the student," he writes, "but for the general reader, who, it is hoped, will find in it a possible line of approach to the problems of contact which now loom so insistently on the cultural horizon." The fact remains, however, that this is quite the best introduction to social anthropology that has so far been written and it deserves to be widely read. The lessons which Mr. Driberg so clearly brings out are of universal application: they apply as clearly to Asia as they do to Africa, and I cannot conceive of a better book to put into the hands of young officers, either civil or military, going out to the East, or of those whose work will take them in an unofficial capacity amongst people of a culture different to their own.

C. J. Morris.

The Secret of the Golden Flower. Translated and explained by Richard Wilhelm. With a European Commentary by C. G. Jung. Translated from the German by Cary F. Baynes. $9\frac{3}{4}'' \times 6\frac{1}{4}''$. 11 plates and 4 illustrations. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd.

This remarkable book consists of four parts. Professor Wilhelm has written an historical introduction to his translation of an esoteric Chinese text, which is followed by the translation itself, and Dr. Jung has endeavoured to interpret the Chinese mentality to Western readers in terms of modern psychology. In an appendix an address by Dr. Jung in memory of Professor Wilhelm is reproduced.

According to Prof. Wilhelm, the printed form of the text can be traced to the seventeenth century in China, but the oral tradition goes back much further than that—to a religious sect in the Tang period. The founder is said to have been a Taoist adept, one of the eight immortals, but he himself attributed his information to an older tradition, the origin of which had its roots in the teaching of Laotse, the author of the Tao Te Ching. The text is important to the student of religion, because it illustrates the syncretist tendency of Taoism, and also because it is very similar to a collection of texts which were widely read in Europe between the thirteenth and the seventeenth centuries, and were generally

described as Alchemical. There are traces, in the text, of Mahayana Buddhism, of the old Persian religion, and probably also of Nestorian Christianity; but the phraseology is unmistakably Taoist, or, to use an attribute more familiar to the West, it is Alchemical. Thus the text might be considered as additional evidence for the theory of the Chinese origin of European Alchemy, but further proof can only be forthcoming if some of the numerous works included in the voluminous Taoist Canon could be translated.

The purpose of this text is to give a more or less clear exposition of the possibility of attaining a perfect state of consciousness, if one—and this is important—is willing to make the effort. It is here that this mysticism differs from the Christian, for there is no idea of Divine Grace, nor is there a conscious endeavout to imitate a deity and be one with Him. It is also different from Buddhism in that it does not seek to teach its devotees how to enter a Nirvana, where there is a discontinuance of activity and an absorption of the individual consciousness by the cosmic consciousness. What is taught in our text is a retention of the individual consciousness with all the impressions of experience. A higher consciousness is created, so to speak, free from the entanglements of the daily routine. It is then possible for this new consciousness, which has become "purified," to establish a contact with the cosmic consciousness, the Divine Light, which fact, according to this teaching, no longer necessitates a regression into the world of time and space. That means that a complete cessation of rebirths will have taken place and salvation will have been achieved.

There have been different methods used by individual mystics and their disciples in order to attain a union with the Divine Principle. The Christian mystics

and the Sufis centred their concentration round the image of their God so that an absorption might be experienced, but in our text, as mentioned before, a conscious effort is made to create within ourselves the Golden Flower, the entity of a higher consciousness. The body and the spirit are conceived of as crucibles in which this entity is to be born, and the phrases used to describe this process are curiously similar to those in the European Alchemical books. The basis of the process is a concentration on the space between the eyes, the abode of the "light," from which further concentration on other parts of the body follow. Descriptions of the correct manner of breathing are also given—no doubt, derived from Indian Yoga practice—and it is then, when breathing and concentration have effected a change in the physical body and its psychic correlatives, that the Circulation of the Light begins to take place. We might say, in our terminology, that the endocrine system of the body has been influenced to a degree where distinct bodily manifestations become apparent to the individual. The body assumes a healthier aspect, and the mind is in a less disturbed state than before. The Circulation of the Light is a phrase used to describe the initial stages of the birth of the new consciousness. By concentrating on the fundamental essence within ourselves, the Divine Element in us, so to speak, we can increase the awareness of this Element so that it assumes the form of an external radiance. This radiance, or light, is projected into space, and, as Dr. Jung rightly says, creates a kind of protective shell that prevents our consciousness from losing its identity when it comes into contact with the cosmic consciousness. In other

tion into a new being.

The Western mind, with its insistence on the externals, and its formalistic religions, will find it difficult to comprehend this text without a new orientation

words, a splitting of the ego is avoided, a danger in all mystical contemplation. After a period of time, the process of concentration is continued until the next stage is reached, the result of which is the birth of the new self, the transforma-

towards psychological fundamentals. As a contribution towards a deeper understanding of the complexities of the individual self this text is invaluable, as is the illuminating commentary by Dr. Jung.

The translation from the German is excellent.

G, H.

CORRECTION

Himalaya, Karakorum and Eastern Turkestan, by Filippo de Filippi.

The dimensions and publisher of this book, reviewed in the J.R.C.A.S., July 1932, p. 526, are: 10" × 7". Pp. xvi+538. Illustrations and maps. London: Arnold. 1932; not those given in the review.

